Original release date: December 1, 2022

Summary

Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:

• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
• Enable and enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication.

Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Cuba ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated with Cuba ransomware actors identified through FBI investigations, third-party reporting, and open-source reporting. This advisory updates the December 2021 FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.

Note: While this ransomware is known by industry as “Cuba ransomware,” there is no indication Cuba ransomware actors have any connection or affiliation with the Republic of Cuba. 

Since the release of the December 2021 FBI Flash, the number of U.S. entities compromised by Cuba ransomware has doubled, with ransoms demanded and paid on the increase.

This year, Cuba ransomware actors have added to their TTPs, and third-party and open-source reports have identified a possible link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom Remote Access Trojan (RAT) actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors.

FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Cuba ransomware and other ransomware operations.

Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 652 kb.

Technical Details

Overview

Since the December 2021 release of FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware, FBI has observed Cuba ransomware actors continuing to target U.S. entities in the following five critical infrastructure sectors: Financial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Critical Manufacturing, and Information Technology. As of August 2022, FBI has identified that Cuba ransomware actors have:

• Compromised over 100 entities worldwide.
• Demanded over 145 million U.S. Dollars (USD) and received over 60 million USD in ransom payments.

Cuba Ransomware Actors’ Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

As previously reported by FBI, Cuba ransomware actors have leveraged the following techniques to gain initial access into dozens of entities in multiple critical infrastructure sectors:

• Known vulnerabilities in commercial software [T1190]
• Phishing campaigns [T1566]
• Compromised credentials [T1078]
• Legitimate remote desktop protocol (RDP) tools [T1563.002] 

After gaining initial access, the actors distributed Cuba ransomware on compromised systems through Hancitor—a loader known for dropping or executing stealers, such as Remote Access Trojans (RATs) and other types of ransomware, onto victims’ networks.

Since spring 2022, Cuba ransomware actors have modified their TTPs and tools to interact with compromised networks and extort payments from victims.[1],[2]

Cuba ransomware actors have exploited known vulnerabilities and weaknesses and have used tools to elevate privileges on compromised systems. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42,[2] Cuba ransomware actors have:

• Exploited CVE-2022-24521 in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver to steal system tokens and elevate privileges.
• Used a PowerShell script to identify and target service accounts for their associated Active Directory Kerberos ticket. The actors then collected and cracked the Kerberos tickets offline via Kerberoasting [T1558.003].
• Used a tool, called KerberCache, to extract cached Kerberos tickets from a host’s Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) memory [T1003.001].
• Used a tool to exploit CVE-2020-1472 (also known as “ZeroLogon”) to gain Domain Administrative privileges [T1068]. This tool and its intrusion attempts have been reportedly related to Hancitor and Qbot. 

According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors use tools to evade detection while moving laterally through compromised environments before executing Cuba ransomware. Specifically, the actors, “leveraged a dropper that writes a kernel driver to the file system called ApcHelper.sys. This targets and terminates security products. The dropper was not signed, however, the kernel driver was signed using the certificate found in the LAPSUS NVIDIA leak. »  [T1562.001].[2]

In addition to deploying ransomware, the actors have used “double extortion” techniques, in which they exfiltrate victim data, and (1) demand a ransom payment to decrypt it and, (2) threaten to publicly release it if a ransom payment is not made.[2]

Cuba Ransomware Link to RomCom and Industrial Spy Marketplace

Since spring 2022, third-party and open-source reports have identified an apparent link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom RAT actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors: 

• According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors began using RomCom malware, a custom RAT, for command and control (C2).[2]
• Cuba ransomware actors may also be leveraging Industrial Spy ransomware. According to third-party reporting, suspected Cuba ransomware actors compromised a foreign healthcare company. The threat actors deployed Industrial Spy ransomware, which shares distinct similarities in configuration to Cuba ransomware. Before deploying the ransomware, the actors moved laterally using Impacket and deployed the RomCom RAT and Meterpreter Reverse Shell HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server [T1090].
• Cuba ransomware actors initially used their leak site to sell stolen data; however, around May 2022, the actors began selling their data on Industrial Spy’s online market for selling stolen data.[2]

RomCom actors have targeted foreign military organizations, IT companies, food brokers and manufacturers.[3][4] The actors copied legitimate HTML code from public-facing webpages, modified the code, and then incorporated it in spoofed domains [T1584.001], which allowed the RomCom actors to:

• Host counterfeit Trojanized applications for
  • SolarWinds Network Performance Monitor (NPM),
  • KeePass password manager,
  • o    PDF Reader Pro, (by PDF Technologies, Inc., not an Adobe Acrobat or Reader product), and
  • Advanced IP Scanner software;
• Deploy the RomCom RAT as the final stage.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

See tables 1 through 5 for Cuba ransomware IOCs that FBI obtained during threat response investigations as of late August 2022. In addition to these tables, see the publications in the References section below for aid in detecting possible exploitation or compromise.

Note: For IOCs as of early November 2021, see FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.

Table 1: Cuba Ransomware Associated Files and Hashes, as of Late August 2022

File Name		File Path	File Hash
netping.dll	c:windowstemp		SHA256: f1103e627311e73d5f29e877243e7ca203292f9419303c661aec57745eb4f26c
shar.bat			MD5: 4c32ef0836a0af7025e97c6253054bca SHA256: a7c207b9b83648f69d6387780b1168e2f1eabd23ae6e162dd700ae8112f8b96c
Psexesvc.exe			SHA256: 141b2190f51397dbd0dfde0e3904b264c91b6f81febc823ff0c33da980b69944
1.bat
216155s.dll
23246s.bat			SHA256: 02a733920c7e69469164316e3e96850d55fca9f5f9d19a241fad906466ec8ae8
23246s.dll			SHA256: 0cf6399db55d40bc790a399c6bbded375f5a278dc57a143e4b21ea3f402f551f
23246st.dll			SHA256: f5db51115fa0c910262828d0943171d640b4748e51c9a140d06ea81ae6ea1710
259238e.exe
31-100.bat
3184.bat
3184.dll
45.dll			SHA256: 857f28b8fe31cf5db6d45d909547b151a66532951f26cda5f3320d2d4461b583
4ca736d.exe
62e2e37.exe
64.235.39.82
64s.dll
7z.sfx
7zCon.sfx
7-zip.chm
82.ps1
9479.bat			SHA256: 08eb4366fc0722696edb03981f00778701266a2e57c40cd2e9d765bf8b0a34d0
9479p.bat			SHA256: f8144fa96c036a8204c7bc285e295f9cd2d1deb0379e39ee8a8414531104dc4a
9479p.ps1			SHA256: 88d13669a994d2e04ec0a9940f07ab8aab8563eb845a9c13f2b0fec497df5b17
a.exe			MD5: 03c835b684b21ded9a4ab285e4f686a3   SHA1: eaced2fcfdcbf3dca4dd77333aaab055345f3ab4   SHA256: 0f385cc69a93abeaf84994e7887cb173e889d309a515b55b2205805bdfe468a3   SHA256: 0d5e3483299242bf504bd3780487f66f2ec4f48a7b38baa6c6bc8ba16e4fb605   SHA256: 7e00bfb622072f53733074795ab581cf6d1a8b4fc269a50919dda6350209913c   SHA256: af4523186fe4a5e2833bbbe14939d8c3bd352a47a2f77592d8adcb569621ce02
a220.bat
a220.dll			SHA256: 8a3d71c668574ad6e7406d3227ba5adc5a230dd3057edddc4d0ec5f8134d76c3
a82.exe			SHA256: 4306c5d152cdd86f3506f91633ef3ae7d8cf0dd25f3e37bec43423c4742f4c42
a91.exe			SHA256: 3d4502066a338e19df58aa4936c37427feecce9ab8d43abff4a7367643ae39ce
a99.exe			SHA256: f538b035c3de87f9f8294bec272c1182f90832a4e86db1e47cbb1ab26c9f3a0b
aa.exe
aa2.exe
aaa.stage.16549040.dns.alleivice.com
add2.exe
advapi32.dll
agent.13.ps1
agent.bat			SHA256: fd87ca28899823b37b2c239fbbd236c555bcab7768d67203f86d37ede19dd975
agent.dll
agent13.bat
agent13.ps1			SHA256: 1817cc163482eb21308adbd43fb6be57fcb5ff11fd74b344469190bb48d8163b
agent64.bin			SHA256: bff4dd37febd5465e0091d9ea68006be475c0191bd8c7a79a44fbf4b99544ef1
agsyst121.bat
agsyst121.dll
all.bat			SHA256: ecefd9bb8b3783a81ab934b44eb3d84df5e58f0289f089ef6760264352cf878a
all.dll			SHA256: db3b1f224aec1a7c58946d819d729d0903751d1867113aae5cca87e38c653cf4
anet.exe			SHA1: 241ce8af441db2d61f3eb7852f434642739a6cc3   SHA256: 74fbf3cc44dd070bd5cb87ca2eed03e1bbeec4fec644a25621052f0a73abbe84   SHA256: b160bd46b6efc6d79bfb76cf3eeacca2300050248969decba139e9e1cbeebf53 SHA256: f869e8fbd8aa1f037ad862cf6e8bbbf797ff49556fb100f2197be4ee196a89ae
App.exe
appnetwork.exe
AppVClient.man
aswSP_arPot2
aus.exe			SHA256: 0c2ffed470e954d2bf22807ba52c1ffd1ecce15779c0afdf15c292e3444cf674 SHA256: 310afba59ab8e1bda3ef750a64bf39133e15c89e8c7cf4ac65ee463b26b136ba
av.bat			SHA256: b5d202456ac2ce7d1285b9c0e2e5b7ddc03da1cbca51b5da98d9ad72e7f773b8
c2.ps1
c2.ps1
cdzehhlzcwvzcmcr.aspx
check.exe
checkk.exe
checkk.txt			SHA256: 1f842f84750048bb44843c277edeaa8469697e97c4dbf8dc571ec552266bec9f
client32.exe
comctl32 .dll
comp2.ps1
comps2.ps1
cqyrrxzhumiklndm.aspx
defendercontrol.exe
ff.exe			SHA256: 1b943afac4f476d523310b8e3afe7bca761b8cbaa9ea2b9f01237ca4652fc834
File __agsyst121.dll
File __aswArPot.sys
File __s9239.dll
File_agsyst121.dll
File_aswArPot.sys
File_s9239.dll
ga.exe
gdi32 .dll
geumspbgvvytqrih.aspx
IObit UNLOCKER.exe
kavsa32.exe			MD5: 236f5de8620a6255f9003d054f08574b SHA1: 9b546bd99272cf4689194d698c830a2510194722
kavsyst32.exe
kernel32.dll
komar.bat			SHA256: B9AFE016DBDBA389000B01CE7645E7EEA1B0A50827CDED1CBAA48FBC715197BB
komar.dll
komar121.bat
komar121.dll
komar2.ps1			SHA256: 61971d3cbf88d6658e5209de443e212100afc8f033057d9a4e79000f6f0f7cc4
komar64.dll			SHA256: 8E64BACAF40110547B334EADCB0792BDC891D7AE298FBFFF1367125797B6036B
mfcappk32.exe
newpass.ps1			SHA256: c646199a9799b6158de419b1b7e36b46c7b7413d6c35bfffaeaa8700b2dcc427
npalll.exe			SHA256: bd270853db17f94c2b8e4bd9fa089756a147ed45cbc44d6c2b0c78f361978906
ole32.dll
oleaut32.dll
open.bat			SHA256: 2EB3EF8A7A2C498E87F3820510752043B20CBE35B0CBD9AF3F69E8B8FE482676
open.exe
pass.ps1			SHA256: 0afed8d1b7c36008de188c20d7f0e2283251a174261547aab7fb56e31d767666
pdfdecrypt.exe
powerview.ps1
prt3389.bat			SHA256: e0d89c88378dcb1b6c9ce2d2820f8d773613402998b8dcdb024858010dec72ed
ra.ps1			SHA256: 571f8db67d463ae80098edc7a1a0cad59153ce6592e42d370a45df46f18a4ad8
rg1.exe
Rg2.exe
rundll32
s64174.bat			SHA256: 10a5612044599128981cb41d71d7390c15e7a2a0c2848ad751c3da1cbec510a2 SHA256: 1807549af1c8fdc5b04c564f4026e41790c554f339514d326f8b55cb7b9b4f79
s64174.dll
s9239.bat
s9239.dll
shell32.dll
stel.exe
syskav64.exe
sysra64,exe
systav332.bat			SHA256: 01242b35b6def71e42cc985e97d618e2fabd616b16d23f7081d575364d09ca74
TC-9.22a.2019.3.exe
TeamViewer.exe
testDLL.dll
tug4rigd.dll			SHA256: 952b34f6370294c5a0bb122febfaa80612fef1f32eddd48a3d0556c4286b7474
UpdateNotificationPipeline.002.etl
user32.dll
v1.bat
v2.bat
v3.bat
veeamp.exe			SHA256: 9aa1f37517458d635eae4f9b43cb4770880ea0ee171e7e4ad155bbdee0cbe732
version.dll
vlhqbgvudfnirmzx.aspx
wininet.dll
wlog.exe
wpeqawzp.sys
y3lcx345.dll
zero.exe			SHA256: 3a8b7c1fe9bd9451c0a51e4122605efc98e7e4e13ed117139a13e4749e211ed0

 

Table 2: Cuba Ransomware Associated Email Addresses, as of Late August 2022

Email Provider		Email Addresses
Cuba-supp[.]com	admin@cuba-supp[.]com
Encryption-support[.]com	admin@encryption-support[.]com
Mail.supports24[.]net	inbox@mail.supports24[.]net

 

Table 3: Cuba Ransomware Associated Jabber Address, as of Late August 2022

cuba_support@exploit[.]im

 

Table 4: IP Addresses Associated with Cuba Ransomware, as of Late August 2022
Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action such as blocking.

193.23.244[.]244	144.172.83[.]13	216.45.55[.]30
94.103.9[.]79	149.255.35[.]131	217.79.43[.]148
192.137.101[.]46	154.35.175[.]225	222.252.53[.]33
92.222.172[.]39	159.203.70[.]39	23.227.198[.]246
92.222.172[.]172	171.25.193[.]9	31.184.192[.]44
10.13.102[.]1	185.153.199[.]169	37.120.247[.]39
10.13.102[.]58	192.137.100[.]96	37.44.253[.]21
10.133.78[.]41	192.137.100[.]98	38.108.119[.]121
10.14.100[.]20	192.137.101[.]205	45.164.21[.]13
103.114.163[.]197	193.34.167[.]17	45.32.229[.]66
103.27.203[.]197	194.109.206[.]212	45.86.162[.]34
104.217.8[.]100	195.54.160[.]149	45.91.83[.]176
107.189.10[.]143	199.58.81[.]140	64.52.169[.]174
108.170.31[.]115	204.13.164[.]118	64.235.39[.]82
128.31.0[.]34	209.76.253[.]84	79.141.169[.]220
128.31.0[.]39	212.192.241[.]230	84.17.52[.]135
131.188.40[.]189	213.32.39[.]43	86.59.21[.]38
141.98.87[.]124	216.45.55[.]3

 

Table 5: Cuba Bitcoin Wallets Receiving Payments, as of Late August 2022

bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc

bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x

bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z

bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t

bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83

bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl

bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza

bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus

bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh

bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah

bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx

bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr

bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h

bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv

bc1qvpk8ksl3my6kjezjss9p28cqj4dmpmmjx5yl3y

bc1qhtwfcysclc7pck2y3vmjtpzkaezhcm6perc99x

bc1qft3s53ur5uq5ru6sl3zyr247dpr55mnggwucd3

bc1qp7h9fszlqxjwyfhv0upparnsgx56x7v7wfx4x7

bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc

bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x

bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z

bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t

bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83

bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl

bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza

bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus

bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh

bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah

bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx

bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr

bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h

bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv

 

See figure 1 for an example of a Cuba ransomware note.

Figure 1: Sample Cuba Ransom Note 2, as of late August 2022

Greetings! Unfortunately we have to report that your company were compromised. All your files were encrypted and you can’t restore them without our private key. Trying to restore it without our help may cause complete loss of your data. Also we researched whole your corporate network and downloaded all your sensitive data to our servers. If we will not get any contact from you in the next 3 days we will public it in our news site. You can find it there ( https[:]// cuba4ikm4jakjgmkeztyawtdgr2xymvy6nvgw5cglswg3si76icnqd.onion/ ) Tor Browser is needed ( https[:]//www.torproject.org/download/ ) Also we respect your work and time and we are open for communication. In that case we are ready to discuss recovering your files and work. We can grant absolute privacy and compliance with agreements by our side. Also we can provide all necessary evidence to confirm performance of our products and statements. Feel free to contact us with quTox ( https[:]//tox.chat/download.html )   Our ToxID: 37790E2D198DFD20C9D2887D4EF7C3E295188842480192689864DCCA3C8BD808A18956768271   Alternative method is email: inbox@mail.supports24[.]net   Mark your messages with your personal ID:

 

Additional resources to detect possible exploitation or compromise:

• Palo Alto Networks Novel News on Cuba Ransomware: Greetings From Tropical Scorpius
• BlackBerry blog RomCom Threat Actor Abuses KeePass and SolarWinds to Target Ukraine and Potentially the United Kingdom
• BlackBerry blog Unattributed RomCom Threat Actor Spoofing Popular Apps Now Hits Ukrainian Militaries 

 

MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES

Cuba ransomware actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 6. Note: For details on TTPs listed in the table, see FBI Flash Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.

Table 6: Cuba Ransomware Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise

Resource Development
Technique Title	ID	Use
Compromise Infrastructure: Domains	T1584.001	Cuba ransomware actors use compromised networks to conduct their operations.
Initial Access
Technique Title	ID	Use
Valid Accounts	T1078	Cuba ransomware actors have been known to use compromised credentials to get into a victim’s network.
External Remote Services	T1133	Cuba ransomware actors may leverage external-facing remote services to gain initial access to a victim’s network.
Exploit Public-Facing Application	T1190	Cuba ransomware actors are known to exploit vulnerabilities in public-facing systems.
Phishing	T1566	Cuba ransomware actors have sent phishing emails to obtain initial access to systems.
Execution
Technique Title	ID	Use
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell	T1059.001	Cuba ransomware actors have used PowerShell to escalate privileges.
Software Deployment Tools	T1072	Cuba ransomware actors use Hancitor as a tool to spread malicious files throughout a victim’s network.
Privilege Escalation
Technique Title	ID	Use
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	T1068	Cuba ransomware actors have exploited ZeroLogon to gain administrator privileges.[2]
Defense Evasion
Technique Title	ID	Use
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools	T1562.001	Cuba ransomware actors leveraged a loader that disables security tools within the victim network.
Lateral Movement
Technique Title	ID	Use
Remote Services Session: RDP Hijacking	T1563.002	Cuba ransomware actors used RDP sessions to move laterally.
Credential Access
Technique Title	ID	Use
Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory	T1003.001	Cuba ransomware actors use LSASS memory to retrieve stored compromised credentials.
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting	T1558.003	Cuba ransomware actors used the Kerberoasting technique to identify service accounts linked to active directory.[2]
Command and Control
Technique Title	ID	Use
Proxy: Manipulate Command and Control Communications	T1090	Industrial Spy ransomware actors use HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server to direct traffic to avoid direct connection. [2]

Mitigations

FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Cuba ransomware:

• Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).
• Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies.
  • Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length.
  • Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.
  • Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials.
  • Avoid reusing passwords.
  • Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts.
  • Disable password “hints.”
  • Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year.
  • Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
  • Require administrator credentials to install software.
• Require multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
• Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Prioritize patching SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities and known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems. Note: SonicWall maintains a vulnerability list that includes Advisory ID, CVE, and mitigation. Their list can be found at psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list.
• Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.
• Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.
• Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
• Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.
• Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege.
• Disable unused ports.
• Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.
• Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
• Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). JIT sets a network-wide policy in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.
• Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.
• Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.
• Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure.

RESOURCES

• Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
• Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.
• No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment.

REPORTING

FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with ransomware actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.

FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents immediately. Report to a local FBI Field Office, or CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report.

DISCLAIMER

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI and CISA do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI or CISA.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

FBI and CISA would like to thank BlackBerry, ESET, The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA), and Palo Alto Networks for their contributions to this CSA.

References

• [1] Palo Alto Networks: Tropical Scorpius
• [2] Palo Alto Networks: Novel News on Cuba Ransomware – Greetings From Tropical Scorpius
• [3] BlackBerry: Unattributed RomCom Threat Actor Spoofing Popular Apps Now Hits Ukrainian Militaries
• [4] BlackBerry: RomCom Threat Actor Abuses KeePass and SolarWinds to Target Ukraine and Potentially the United Kingdom

Revisions

• Initial Version: December 1, 2022

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Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov

Original release date: November 16, 2022

Summary

From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. In the course of incident response activities, CISA determined that cyber threat actors exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in an unpatched VMware Horizon server, installed XMRig crypto mining software, moved laterally to the domain controller (DC), compromised credentials, and then implanted Ngrok reverse proxies on several hosts to maintain persistence. CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that the FCEB network was compromised by Iranian government-sponsored APT actors.

CISA and FBI are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) providing the suspected Iranian government-sponsored actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help network defenders detect and protect against related compromises.

CISA and FBI encourage all organizations with affected VMware systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities. If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs described in this CSA, CISA and FBI encourage organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors, investigate connected systems (including the DC), and audit privileged accounts. All organizations, regardless of identified evidence of compromise, should apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to protect against similar malicious cyber activity.

For more information on Iranian government-sponsored Iranian malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and FBI’s Iran Threats webpage.

Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 528 kb.

For a downloadable copy of the Malware Analysis Report (MAR) accompanying this report, see: MAR 10387061-1.v1.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: AA22-320A.stix, 1.55 mb.

Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations.

Overview

In April 2022, CISA conducted retrospective analysis using EINSTEIN—an FCEB-wide intrusion detection system (IDS) operated and monitored by CISA—and identified suspected APT activity on an FCEB organization’s network. CISA observed bi-directional traffic between the network and a known malicious IP address associated with exploitation of the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) in VMware Horizon servers. In coordination with the FCEB organization, CISA initiated threat hunting incident response activities; however, prior to deploying an incident response team, CISA observed additional suspected APT activity. Specifically, CISA observed HTTPS activity from IP address 51.89.181[.]64 to the organization’s VMware server. Based on trusted third-party reporting, 51.89.181[.]64 is a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server associated with threat actors exploiting Log4Shell. Following HTTPS activity, CISA observed a suspected LDAP callback on port 443 to this IP address. CISA also observed a DNS query for us‐nation‐ny[.]cf that resolved back to 51.89.181[.]64 when the victim server was returning this Log4Shell LDAP callback to the actors’ server.

CISA assessed that this traffic indicated a confirmed compromise based on the successful callback to the indicator and informed the organization of these findings; the organization investigated the activity and found signs of compromise. As trusted-third party reporting associated Log4Shell activity from 51.89.181[.]64 with lateral movement and targeting of DCs, CISA suspected the threat actors had moved laterally and compromised the organization’s DC.

From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an onsite incident response engagement and determined that the organization was compromised as early as February 2022, by likely Iranian government-sponsored APT actors who installed XMRig crypto mining software. The threat actors also moved laterally to the domain controller, compromised credentials, and implanted Ngrok reverse proxies.

Threat Actor Activity

In February 2022, the threat actors exploited Log4Shell [T1190] for initial access [TA0001] to the organization’s unpatched VMware Horizon server. As part of their initial exploitation, CISA observed a connection to known malicious IP address 182.54.217[.]2 lasting 17.6 seconds.

The actors’ exploit payload ran the following PowerShell command [T1059.001] that added an exclusion tool to Windows Defender [T1562.001]:

powershell try{Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath ‘C:’; Write-Host ‘added-exclusion’} catch {Write-Host ‘adding-exclusion-failed’ }; powershell -enc « $BASE64 encoded payload to download next stage and execute it »

The exclusion tool allowlisted the entire c:drive, enabling threat actors to download tools to the c:drive without virus scans. The exploit payload then downloaded mdeploy.text from 182.54.217[.]2/mdepoy.txt to C:userspublicmde.ps1 [T1105]. When executed, mde.ps1 downloaded file.zip from 182.54.217[.]2 and removed mde.ps1 from the disk [T1070.004].

file.zip contained XMRig cryptocurrency mining software and associated configuration files.

• WinRing0x64.sys – XMRig Miner driver
• wuacltservice.exe – XMRig Miner
• config.json – XMRig miner configuration
• RuntimeBroker.exe – Associated file. This file can create a local user account [T1136.001] and tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8 [T1016.001]. The exploit payload created a Scheduled Task [T1053.005] that executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM. Note: By exploiting Log4Shell, the actors gained access to a VMware service account with administrator and system level access. The Scheduled Task was named RuntimeBrokerService.exe to masquerade as a legitimate Windows task.

See MAR 10387061-1.v1 for additional information, including IOCs, on these four files.

After obtaining initial access and installing XMRig on the VMWare Horizon server, the actors used RDP [T1021.001] and the built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount [T1078.001] to move laterally [TA0008] to a VMware VDI-KMS host. Once the threat actor established themselves on the VDI-KMS host, CISA observed the actors download around 30 megabytes of files from transfer[.]sh server associated with 144.76.136[.]153. The actors downloaded the following tools:

• PsExec – a Microsoft signed tool for system administrators.
• Mimikatz – a credential theft tool.
• Ngrok – a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain, which the user can then access at a randomly generated subdomain at *.ngrok[.]io. CISA has observed this tool in use by some commercial products for benign purposes; however, this process bypasses typical firewall controls and may be a potentially unwanted application in production environments. Ngrok is known to be used for malicious purposes.[1]

The threat actors then executed Mimikatz on VDI-KMS to harvest credentials and created a rogue domain administrator account [T1136.002]. Using the newly created account, the actors leveraged RDP to propagate to several hosts within the network. Upon logging into each host, the actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and implanted Ngrok executables and configuration files. The threat actors were able to implant Ngrok on multiple hosts to ensure Ngrok’s persistence should they lose access to a machine during a routine reboot. The actors were able to proxy [T1090] RDP sessions, which were only observable on the local network as outgoing HTTPS port 443 connections to tunnel.us.ngrok[.]com and korgn.su.lennut[.]com (the prior domain in reverse). It is possible, but was not observed, that the threat actors configured a custom domain, or used other Ngrok tunnel domains, wildcarded here as *.ngrok[.]com, *.ngrok[.]io, ngrok.*.tunnel[.]com, or korgn.*.lennut[.]com.

Once the threat actors established a deep foothold in the network and moved laterally to the domain controller, they executed the following PowerShell command on the Active Directory to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain [T1018]:

Powershell.exe get-adcomputer -filter * -properties * | select name,operatingsystem,ipv4address >

The threat actors also changed the password for the local administrator account [T1098] on several hosts as a backup should the rogue domain administrator account get detected and terminated. Additionally, the threat actor was observed attempting to dump the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process [T1003.001] with task manager but this was stopped by additional anti-virus the FCEB organization had installed.

MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

See table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory, as well as corresponding detection and/or mitigation recommendations. For additional mitigations, see the Mitigations section.

Table 1: Cyber Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise

Initial Access
Technique Title	ID	Use	Recommendations
Exploit Public-Facing Application	T1190	The actors exploited Log4Shell for initial access to the organization’s VMware Horizon server.	Mitigation/Detection: Use a firewall or web-application firewall and enable logging to prevent and detect potential Log4Shell exploitation attempts [M1050]. Mitigation: Perform regular vulnerability scanning to detect Log4J vulnerabilities and update Log4J software using vendor provided patches [M1016],[M1051].
Execution
Technique Title	ID	Use	Recommendation
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell	T1059.001	The actors ran PowerShell commands that added an exclusion tool to Windows Defender. The actors executed PowerShell on the AD to obtain a list of machines on the domain.	Mitigation: Disable or remove PowerShell for non-administrative users [M1042],[M1026] or enable code-signing to execute only signed scripts [M1045]. Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049].
Persistence
Technique Title	ID	Use	Recommendations
Account Manipulation	T1098	The actors changed the password for the local administrator account on several hosts.	Mitigation: Use multifactor authentication for user and privileged accounts [M1032]. Detection: Monitor events for changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728, and 4670. Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity [DS0002].
Create Account: Local Account	T1136.001	The actors’ malware can create local user accounts.	Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts. Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that are associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd, and dscl -create [DS0017]. Detection: Enable logging for new user creation [DS0002].
Create Account: Domain Account	T1136.002	The actors used Mimikatz to create a rogue domain administrator account.	Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts. Detection: Enable logging for new user creation, especially domain administrator accounts [DS0002].
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task	T1053.005	The actors’ exploit payload created Scheduled Task RuntimeBrokerService.exe, which executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM.	Mitigation: Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM [M1028]. Detection: Monitor for newly constructed processes and/or command-lines that execute from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows [DS0009] Detection: Monitor for newly constructed scheduled jobs by enabling the Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational setting within the event logging service [DS0003].
Valid Accounts: Default Accounts	T1078.001	The actors used built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount.	Mitigation: Change default usernames and passwords immediately after the installation and before deployment to a production environment [M1027]. Detection: Develop rules to monitor logon behavior across default accounts that have been activated or logged into [DS0028].
Defense Evasion
Technique Title	ID	Use	Recommendations
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools	T1562.001	The actors added an exclusion tool to Windows Defender. The tool allowlisted the entire c:drive, enabling the actors to bypass virus scans for tools they downloaded to the c:drive. The actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the GUI.	Mitigation: Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services. [M1018]. Detection: Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values related to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools such as HKLM:SOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindows Defender [DS0024]. Detection: Monitor for telemetry that provides context for modification or deletion of information related to security software processes or services such as Windows Defender definition files in Windows and System log files in Linux [DS0013]. Detection: Monitor processes for unexpected termination related to security tools/services [DS0009].
Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion	T1070.004	The actors removed malicious file mde.ps1 from the dis.	Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be utilized to unlink, rename, or delete files [DS0017]. Detection: Monitor for unexpected deletion of files from the system [DS0022].
Credential Access
Technique Title	ID	Use	Recommendations
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory	T1003.001	The actors were observed trying to dump LSASS process.	Mitigation: With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping [M1043] Mitigation: On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing [M1040]. Mitigation: Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network [M1027]. Detection: Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe. Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. [DS0009]. Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the LSASS [DS0017].
Credentials from Password Stores	T1555	The actors used Mimikatz to harvest credentials.	Mitigation: Organizations may consider weighing the risk of storing credentials in password stores and web browsers. If system, software, or web browser credential disclosure is a significant concern, technical controls, policy, and user training may be used to prevent storage of credentials in improper locations [M1027]. Detection: Monitor for processes being accessed that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0009]. Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0017].
Discovery
Technique Title	ID	Use	Recommendations
Remote System Discovery	T1018	The actors executed a PowerShell command on the AD to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain.	Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0017]. Detection: Monitor for newly constructed network connections associated with pings/scans that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0029]. Detection: Monitor for newly executed processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession [DS0009].
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery	T1016.001	The actors’ malware tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8.	Mitigation: Monitor executed commands, arguments [DS0017] and executed processes (e.g., tracert or ping) [DS0009] that may check for internet connectivity on compromised systems.
Lateral Movement
Technique Title	ID	Use	Recommendations
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol	T1021.001	The actors used RDP to move laterally to multiple hosts on the network.	Mitigation: Use MFA for remote logins [M1032]. Mitigation: Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary [M1042]. Mitigation: Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network [M1030]. Mitigation: Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP [M1026]. Detection: Monitor for user accounts logged into systems associated with RDP (ex: Windows EID 4624 Logon Type 10). Other factors, such as access patterns (ex: multiple systems over a relatively short period of time) and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP [DS0028].
Command and Control
Technique Title	ID	Use	Recommendations
Proxy	T1090	The actors used Ngrok to proxy RDP connections and to perform command and control.	Mitigation: Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists [M1037]. Detection: Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure) [DS0029].
Ingress Tool Transfer	T1105	The actors downloaded malware and multiple tools to the network, including PsExec, Mimikatz, and Ngrok.	Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049].

 

INCIDENT RESPONSE

If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs in this CSA, CISA encourages organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors and investigate connected systems and the DC.

CISA recommends organizations apply the following steps before applying any mitigations, including patching.

1. Immediately isolate affected systems.
2. Collect and review relevant logs, data, and artifacts. Take a memory capture of the device(s) and a forensic image capture for detailed analysis.
3. Consider soliciting support from a third-party incident response organization that can provide subject matter expertise to ensure the actor is eradicated from the network and to avoid residual issues that could enable follow-on exploitation.
4. Report incidents to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870) or your local FBI field office, or FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov.
    

Mitigations

CISA and FBI recommend implementing the mitigations below and in Table 1 to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of threat actor behaviors.

• Install updated builds to ensure affected VMware Horizon and UAG systems are updated to the latest version.
  • If updates or workarounds were not promptly applied following VMware’s release of updates for Log4Shell in December 2021, treat those VMware Horizon systems as compromised. Follow the pro-active incident response procedures outlined above prior to applying updates. If no compromise is detected, apply these updates as soon as possible.
    • See VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2021-0028.13 and VMware Knowledge Base (KB) 87073 to determine which VMware Horizon components are vulnerable.
    • Note: Until the update is fully implemented, consider removing vulnerable components from the internet to limit the scope of traffic. While installing the updates, ensure network perimeter access controls are as restrictive as possible.
    • If upgrading is not immediately feasible, see KB87073 and KB87092 for vendor-provided temporary workarounds. Implement temporary solutions using an account with administrative privileges. Note that these temporary solutions should not be treated as permanent fixes; vulnerable components should be upgraded to the latest build as soon as possible.
    • Prior to implementing any temporary solution, ensure appropriate backups have been completed.
    • Verify successful implementation of mitigations by executing the vendor supplied script Horizon_Windows_Log4j_Mitigations.zip without parameters to ensure that no vulnerabilities remain. See KB87073 for details.
• Keep all software up to date and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs).
• Minimize the internet-facing attack surface by hosting essential services on a segregated DMZ, ensuring strict network perimeter access controls, and not hosting internet-facing services that are not essential to business operations. Where possible, implement regularly updated web application firewalls (WAF) in front of public-facing services. WAFs can protect against web-based exploitation using signatures and heuristics that are likely to block or alert on malicious traffic.
• Use best practices for identity and access management (IAM) by implementing phishing resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), enforcing use of strong passwords, regularly auditing administrator accounts and permissions, and limiting user access through the principle of least privilege. Disable inactive accounts uniformly across the AD, MFA systems, etc.
  • If using Windows 10 version 1607 or Windows Server 2016 or later, monitor or disable Windows DefaultAccount, also known as the Default System Managed Account (DSMA).
• Audit domain controllers to log successful Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests and ensure the events are monitored for anomalous activity.  
  • Secure accounts.
  • Enforce the principle of least privilege. Administrator accounts should have the minimum permission necessary to complete their tasks.
  • Ensure there are unique and distinct administrative accounts for each set of administrative tasks.
  • Create non-privileged accounts for privileged users and ensure they use the non-privileged accounts for all non-privileged access (e.g., web browsing, email access).
• Create a deny list of known compromised credentials and prevent users from using known-compromised passwords.
• Secure credentials by restricting where accounts and credentials can be used and by using local device credential protection features. 
  • Use virtualizing solutions on modern hardware and software to ensure credentials are securely stored.
  • Ensure storage of clear text passwords in LSASS memory is disabled. Note: For Windows 8, this is enabled by default. For more information see Microsoft Security Advisory Update to Improve Credentials Protection and Management.
  • Consider disabling or limiting NTLM and WDigest Authentication.
  • Implement Credential Guard for Windows 10 and Server 2016 (refer to Microsoft: Manage Windows Defender Credential Guard for more information). For Windows Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light for Local Security Authority (LSA).
  • Minimize the AD attack surface to reduce malicious ticket-granting activity. Malicious activity such as “Kerberoasting” takes advantage of Kerberos’ TGS and can be used to obtain hashed credentials that threat actors attempt to crack.
     

VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS

In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and FBI recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA and FBI recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see table 1).
2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
3. Test your technologies against the technique.
4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies performance.
5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

References

• [1] MITRE ATT&CK Version 11: Software – Ngrok

Revisions

• Initial Version: November 16, 2022

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Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov